

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — O R — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

**THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪKANTHA-  
BHĀSHYA.**

**FIRST ADHYA'YA—FIRST PA'DA.**

BHĀSHYAKA'RA'S INTRODUCTION.

1. Bow ! to S'iva, the Paramatman (Supreme Spirit) who is Sat (Existence), Chit (Intelligence) and A'nanda (Bliss) in essence denoted by the word *aham* (I, ego); the cause of the manifestation of the worlds.

Supreme S'iva, that Great A'tman (spirit the entire essence of all agamas scriptures), by whom the whole panorama of all the worlds has been painted on the wall of His Śakti (energy)

May He secure perfection to you,—He the Paramatman Supreme Spirit, endued with all excellences, to whom all this Universe of Chit and bit (spirit and matter) is subservient.

1. Bow ! to the Teacher (acharya), S'veta by name, the author of many an agama (scripture); bow ! to

the excellent Master (Guru), the generous giver of liberation (kaivalya)

Resplendent is S'rikantha's work on the blessed Sutras of Vyāsa,—his great commentary (Bhāshya), a sweet composition, mighty in meaning (but) not too extensive.

6. This Sūtra of Vyāsa, the eye for the wise to see the Brahman with, made turbid by the former teachers, will be made clear by S'rikantha.

7. This commentary (Bhāshya) is a great treasure for those A'ryas who are devoted to S'iva, and who take a delight in tasting the sweet essence of the whole Vedānta.

Here begins an enquiry into the Upanishad Now:—(1) For what end of man (*purushārtha*) is this enquiry intended The end of man consists verily in the attainment of happiness which is the object of unqualified love, or the complete cessation of pain which is the object of unqualified hatred. (2) Who here the *adhiikāra*, who the person qualified for the enquiry The *adhiikāra* the person who is endued with such attributes as a thirst for the subject. (3) What is its *subject* That forms the

subject of an enquiry which, though known, is yet not quite so well-known, and which, therefore, hangs on the swing of doubt. (4) *After* what does this enquiry arise? What is it which, as necessarily leading to the enquiry, should precede that enquiry? It is with a view to eradicate these sharp bristles of doubts from the minds of enquirers that the following Sūtra is introduced by Lord Vyāsa, the crest-jewel of the Omniscient.

### SŪTRA 1.

Now, then, arises a desire to know Brahman.

This Sūtra forms one section (*adhikāraṇa*). By an *adhikāraṇa* or section is meant here a topic which is made up of the following members: (1) *Viśaya* or the subject, (2) *Samsāya* or the doubt, (3) *Pūrvapakṣa* or the *prima facie* view or argument, (4) *Siddhānta-nirṇaya* or the demonstrated conclusion, and (5) *Saṅgaṭi* or the connection.

Here the word “now” (*atha*) denotes *ānantarya* or immediate succession, not *adhikāra* or commencement as in “*atha Yogānusāstam*,” “Now (let us begin) to treat of Yoga.” We cannot, indeed, speak of commencing a desire to know Brahman as though it were something that can be done as a duty. In fact, desire can arise from a mere sense of loveliness in the object.

Neither can we interpret the word ‘now’ (*atha*) as meaning *āntyagala* or auspiciousness as said in the *Smṛiti*,

The syllable \_\_\_\_\_ and the word *Arha*, these two emerged at first from Brahman, breaking forth from his throat; whence both

for, auspiciousness can have no logical connection with “desire to know.” As to the necessity of performing, in pursuance of the example of the wise, an auspicious act when commencing a science, that necessity can be met by the mere utterance of the syllables.

Nor does the word “now” (*atha*) indicate that now follows another side (of an argument); for there is no occasion to speak of another side, as no one side (of any subject) has been treated of before.

The use of “now” (*atha*) can have no reference to an antecedent circumstance such as, like the act of eating or of going, is merely accidental; for, here it is intended to speak of something which forms a necessary equipment: that is here held to be the antecedent condition which, when secured, forms a special

qualification of the student and constitutes a necessary equipment for an enquiry into Brahman.

Now one may say: it is but right that the necessary antecedent (here implied) of *Brahma-vichāra* is the *Vedādhyaṇa* or the learning of the Vedas, which, preceded by the sacramental rite of *Upanayana* performed in the case of *Brahmanas* and other castes at the age of eight and so on, consists in the getting up of the texts coming from the mouth of the teacher duly approached, and which leads (ultimately) to a knowledge of its contents,—this learning of the Vedas being obligatory inasmuch as it is enjoined in the special injunction “Veda should be learned;” for, Brahman, like Dharma, being known only through the Vedas, an enquiry into Brahman is not possible for him who has not learnt the Vedas. An enquiry into Brahman should therefore come immediately after the learning of the Vedas.

(We say) granted that such a study is necessary; but immediately after that study should come the *Dharma-vichāra* or enquiry into Dharma, since such an enquiry is not possible without that study. It has accordingly been expounded by the *A'chārya* (Teacher)—in the words “Now, then, (arises) a desire to know Dharma,”\*—that after learning the Vedas from the *Upādhyāya* (Teacher) is the time for an enquiry into Dharma. We do not hold that the *S'āstras* treating respectively of Dharma and Brahman are quite distinct. On the other hand we hold that they form one (*S'āstra*). From the Sūtra, “Now then arises a desire to know Dharma,” to the Sūtra, “No return, because of the text,”† it is but one *S'āstra*, treating of Dharma and Brahman, of worship and the object of worship: the Sūtra “Now then arises a desire to know Brahman,” marks only the beginning of a section which forms an integral part of that one *S'āstra*, like the Sūtra “Now then as to the definition of *śeṣha* or the subsidiary.”‡

Or, because Dharma is a means to the knowledge of Brahman, and that such topics as *śruti* (direct statement), and *linga* (indication), and the exposition of the authorities such as *Veda-chodanā* (scriptural injunction), *arthavāda* (explanatory passage), *Smṛiti* (mediate revelation),—which are treated of in the science of Dharma—are also useful in the science of Brahman, it is right that the science of Brahman should come

\* *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra*, I, i, 1.

† *Vedānta-Sūtras* IV, iv, 22.

‡ *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra*, III, i, 1.



after the science of Dharma; for, the end cannot be achieved without the means. The authority as to Dharma, being the means to the knowledge of Brahman is the divine s'ruti itself,

"This by Vedic study do the Brāhmanas seek to know, by Yajña (sacrificial rite)\* by Dāna (gift), by tapas (austerity), by fast."

It cannot be urged that, if Karma be the means to the knowledge of Brahman, Dharma alone should be investigated and practised, and that the enquiry into the import of the Vedāntic passages serves no purpose. For, when devoid of a longing for the fruits, Karma forms a means to the knowledge of Brahman by bringing about purity of mind, by way of removing sins. Accordingly the Smṛiti of the learned, beginning with the words "He who undergoes the forty saṃskāras (sacramental rites)" and ending with the words "He attains unity with the Brahman and goes to His loka,"† declares that all Karmas beginning with the Garbhādhāna (the ceremony connected with Impregnation) constitute a means of (spiritual) regeneration by way of removing the dirt of sin.

(Objection): If all Karma should thus form but a complement (of something else), like the sprinkling of water upon the grains (in a sacrificial rite), then it would detract from the independence of the (several) Āśramas or religious orders as to their fruits,—that independence which is declared by the S'ruti in the words "all these attain to the heavenly regions,"‡

(Answer): Not so. Though those Karmas are independent which are done with a longing for such fruits as heavenly regions, still it holds good that those which are performed by the man who is free from such a longing constitute mere complementary factors by way of conducing to the purity of mind. In the case of such a man the fruit of Jñāna (knowledge) is itself the fruit of Karma. Just as the sprinkling of water upon the grains helps to secure *Sarga*, as forming a factor in generating the *apūrva* (unseen effect) of the sacrifices of *Dars'a* and *Pūrnāmāsa*, so Karmas help to secure mokṣa through the attainment of Jñāna; and therefore as forming *guna-karmas* (secondary factors) they are mere *angas* (subsidiaries).

(Objection): Since the Jyotishtoma and other sacrificial rites which are enjoined by independent injunc-

tions as obligatory cannot constitute the mere *itikar-tatyatā* or the manner of bringing about another main act, it cannot be that they are complementary factors.

(Answer): This objection is untenable; for just as the Sautrāmani, the Brihaspati-sava and the like which are enjoined as primary means by independent injunctions form also secondary constituents of the Agnichayana and the like, so also an act may be of the two-fold nature in virtue of a two-fold injunction.\* Wherefore until knowledge springs up karma should be performed.

(Objection): Because of the text "(by yajña etc.) they seek to know," † karma should be performed till the dawn of a desire for knowledge.

(Answer): There is no force in the objection; for, mere desire cannot constitute an object of human pursuit.

Wherefore it is but right that the science treating of Brahman should follow the enquiry into karmas which are the means by which to attain the knowledge of Brahman.

(Objection): How can the order of sequence, here defined, as to the sciences of Karma and Brahman be explained? If it be so because the agent is the same in both, then it may be that the agent is the same in both either because the one is complementary to the other, as the *aghāra* (an oblation) is complementary to the (main sacrifice of) *Dars'a* and *Pūrnāmāsa*; or because, they both form, like the five *prayājas* (certain oblations), two secondary factors of a third which is primary; or because, as in the case of *godohana* ‡ and the like, the one is enjoined under a special circumstance as a substitute for the other; or because like the six constituent parts§ (of the *Dars'a*-*Pūrnāmāsa*) they conjointly produce one single effect. We find no s'ruti or any other authority showing that the sciences bear such a relation to each other. Wherefore this definite order of sequence as to the sciences of Karma and Brahman is unjustifiable.

\* One injunction enjoining it as a primary means and a second injunction enjoining it as a secondary factor.

† Bri. Up. IV, iv. 9.

‡ Referring to the injunction, "the priest should consecrate water in the vessel called *chamasa*, and in the case of one who desires to attain plenty of cattle, he should consecrate it in the vessel called *godohana* instead of *chamasa*."

§ These six parts are made up of the three main sacrifices in the *Pūrnāmāsa* known as the *āgneya*, the *agnishomīya*, and the *upāsāna-yāga*; and of the three main sacrifices in the *Dars'a* known as the *āgneya*, the *āindram-dadhī*, and the *āindram-yajnas*.

\* Brihadāranyaka-Upanishad IV, iv. 22.

† Gautama Dharmasūtra, viii, 24, 25.

‡ Chāndogya Upanishad, ii, 23, 2.

(Answer): Indeed it may be so, if there were no authority, s'ruti and the like. We do find passages like the following in s'ruti, declaring a conjunction of Karma and Jñāna:

"He who knows together both Vidyā and Avidyā" \*

"On he goes, whoever knows Brahman and who has done good." †

"By truth verily this A'tman can ever be attained, by tapas (austerity), by right knowledge, by Brahmacharya (devotion to Brahman)." ‡

Thus Karma and Jñāna conjointly producing one effect, namely Moksha, it is but right that the two sciences should come in a definite order of sequence.

Though indeed the injunction as to the learning of the Vedas inculcates the mere getting up of the text, still there does arise an occasion for the two enquiries. By the learning of the Veda together with the Angas or auxiliary sciences, § one comes to know the literal meaning of the passages in the s'ruti. Then finding apparent mutual contradictions in the passages, which treat of the Jyotishtoma and other rites constituting the Sthūla-Upāsana or coarser forms of worship, as well as in those passages which treat of Dahara-Vidyā (contemplation of the Divine Being in the heart) and the like constituting the Sūkshma-Upāsana or finer form of worship, the student aspiring towards higher aims of life engages of himself in an investigation of the subject. Hence no absence of an occasion for the enquiry.

(Objection): In the passage, "the A'tman should be learnt" the vedantic enquiry is directly enjoined.

(Answer): No, because of the absence of conditions which go to make it an injunction. To explain: vedantic enquiry cannot be the subject of an *apūrva-vidhi*, an injunction which enjoins an act not known of before from any other source, for, the vedantic enquiry is otherwise known as necessary. It is known as necessary by arguing thus: vedantic enquiry, like the enquiry into the science of medicine, is a means to the understanding of the thing the Vedānta treats of, since the former is a scientific enquiry like the latter. Neither does it form the subject of a *nigama-vidhi*,—an injunction intended to restrict the act to only one of the several alternative ways of doing it,—like the threshing of rice (in a sacrifice);

for, no other means (except the vedantic enquiry) has been known in our experience to produce the same result. Nor does it form the subject of a *parisankhyā-vidhi*,—an injunction which is intended to exclude all other alternatives,—for then it would be tantamount to this, that the vedānta should be only enquired into and not learned by rote. In that case since the enquiry into the vedānta is not possible for those who have not thus learnt vedantic texts they can never attain the (Supreme) end of man. If, on the other hand, vedantic enquiry should form the subject of a *parisankhyā-vidhi* as excluding an enquiry into the karma-kānda or the ritualistic portion of the Vedas, then, too, in the absence of this latter enquiry, performance of Karma is not possible. As, without performing Karma, mental purity cannot be attained, there can be no dawn of knowledge. Wherefore the aforesaid proposition holds good.

Thus the sastra known as the Upanishad which treats of the Para-Brahman—Who is unrivalled in His glory, as endued with the Supreme S'akti manifesting itself in the form of the Universe composed of *Chit* and *Achit*,—spirit and matter, the conscious and the inert; Who is the storehouse of all secrets contained in all the great scriptures; Whose supreme grandeur is declared by such choice synonymous designations applied to Him as Bhava, S'iva, S'arva, Paś'upati, Parames'vara, Mahādeva, Rudra, S'ambhu and the like; by Whose grace, extended to all sentient beings subservient to Him according to the manner in which they approach and worship Him, all human aspirations are fulfilled,—should be enquired into after completing the enquiry into the blessed Dharma, which is taught in the form of Vedic injunctions constituting Divine commands; which comprises, in one whole, various forms of Divine worship; whose excellence is made known in many a laudatory passage; which is embellished with the several subsidiary parts furnished by the s'ruti etc.; which is treated of even at a greater length in the Smṛiti, Itihāsa, Purāna and the wise sayings of the adepts, all these being in perfect accord with the original authority; which is composed of *vidhi* and *nishedha* (injunctions and prohibitions), *vikalpa* and *saṃvachchaya* (alternatives and conjunctions, *utsarga* and *aparīda* (general and special rules), *bīdha* and *abhyuchchaya* (weakening exceptions and strengthening illustrations); which is the repository of all human ends and the means of attaining the supreme knowledge. Thus has been determined the meaning of the word "now".

\* Is'opaniṣad II.

† Bri. Up. IV, iv, 9.

‡ Mundakopaniṣad III, i, 5.

§ These are s'ikshā (phonetics), grammar, metrics, nirukta (etymology), astronomy, and kalpa (liturgy).

The word 'then' (*atah*) indicates that what has preceded forms the reason of what follows: because Dharma has been investigated by the student after having learnt the Vedas, therefore, having attained to the purity of mind by the observance of Dharma, and being endued with supreme Bhakti (devotion) quickened by true discrimination and such other attributes which then unfold themselves, he should also investigate Brahman leading to the highest good.

In the compound "Brahma-jijñāsā," Brahman should be construed as the object of the verb "Jijñāsi" to know.

The subject (of discussion in this section) is the following passage:

"Having surveyed the worlds that deeds (done for reward) build up, He (the Brāhmaṇa) who loves God unto renunciation should betake himself. The uncreate is not by the create (to be obtained). To find out That, he verily should to a teacher go—versed in the law, who takes his final stand on God,—fuel samit in hand."\*

The doubt arises in the following form: Is Brahman fit for enquiry or not?

And the *prima facie* view may be stated as follows: Brahman is not a subject fit for enquiry, there being no room for doubt concerning it.—How can there be no doubt?—Thus: the S'ruti "This A'tman is Brahman" † teaches that the very A'tman that is immediately perceived as "I" is Brahman. How, then, can there be an occasion for slightest doubt? Furthermore, the aim of an enquiry is verily a knowledge of the subject of that enquiry. And to know is to define the object of knowledge. Now, does the knowledge, arising from Vedāntic enquiry, define Brahman or not? If it could define Brahman, then it would militate against the notion that Brahman transcends all definition. If it could not define Brahman, then He is not known in His true light. A jar or any other object is said to be known when it is defined "such is the jar". Wherefore knowledge, too, concerning Brahman is not possible. And, moreover, we see no good (resulting from the enquiry). Liberation (Mukti) is not the end, inasmuch as the beginningless samsāra is hard to set aside.

Such *prima facie* view presenting itself, we argue as follows: From all points of view the enquiry

should be undertaken, because Brahman, being within the realm of doubt, forms the subject of enquiry; and further because a determinate knowledge of the subject conduces to a great end. There does arise a doubt for the very reason that such passages of S'ruti as "This A'tman is Brahman" speak of this very samsārin, bound by egotism (ahankāra), as Brahman. It is indeed the possession in a great measure of the unsurpassed potencies of knowledge and bliss and the like, free from all taint of evil, that constitutes the nature of Brahman; and it is the being subject to the necessity of entering into and getting out of various bodies suited to the reaping of the fruits of actions ripening under the influence of the traces of beginningless ajñāna (nescience) and thus becoming subject to boundless pain, that constitutes the nature of Jīva. How can the s'rutis speak of a unity of two such quite distinct entities?—How can a doubt not arise in this way? A doubt, moreover, can also arise on the following ground: Food is Brahman; "Manas is Brahman; Vijñāna is Brahman;"\* "The sup is Brahman;" † Nārāyaṇa is the supreme Brahman;" ‡ these and other passages speak of widely different things as Brahman. Which of these is Brahman?

Being thus in many ways subject to doubt, Brahman is a subject fit for enquiry. And then by the Great Grace of Siva, the Para-Brahman, the Great Teacher, highly merciful and all-benign, Who, ascertained by studying the S'ruti and reflecting thereupon, is won over by proper Devotion and Knowledge (Bhakti and Jñāna),—there accrues to the aspirant the great Good, the wealth of Liberation (Kaivalya-lakṣmī), all bonds (Pāśa) being destroyed, his own nature as made up of unsurpassed intelligence and bliss directly perceived, while he is endued in his essence with the qualities similar to those of the Para-Brahman. Thus the Vedāntic enquiry has a subject to treat of and a purpose to serve.

As to the objection that, because knowledge consists in defining the object of that knowledge, no knowledge concerning the indefinable Brahman can arise,—it is only due to a want of proper investigation; for, though no positive definition of Brahman—"He is so and so"—can be given, still it is possible to define Him indirectly by means of implication, by distinguishing Him from all others. Indeed, everywhere, to know

\* Mundaka-Upanishad, I, ii, 12.

† Māndūkya-Upanishad, 2.

• Chandogya-Upanishad VII, ix, iii, vii, &c.

† Ibid III, xix, 1.

‡ Mahānārāyaṇa-Upanishad xi. 5.

a thing by definition is to know it as distinguished from all others. When Brahman is enunciated, defined and investigated by means of Vedāntic texts, He is known to be that thing which is distinguished from all others of the same class or from other classes not possessing the given characteristics of Brahman. Wherefore it is right to enter upon this enquiry into Brahman.

What is not subject to doubt or is not productive of any good cannot indeed form, for the wise men, a subject of enquiry. So, (the two points) that Brahman, Who forms a subject of doubt owing to the so-called authoritative texts and arguments on the subject, is the subject of this enquiry of Vedānta-Sāstra, and further that by worshipping Him the aspirant attains his end, the *Mukti*, which consists in the breaking of the bond (Pāś'a), as taught in the following passages:—

“The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme;”\*

“Knowing S'ri'a, he passes into peace for ever;”†

“Knowing that Is'a they become immortal;”‡

“A man who has left all grief behind, sees the majesty, the Lord, the passionless, by the grace of the creator;”§

“Making Atman the arani, and pranava the upper arani, only by the churning of dhyāna, the wise man bursts up the bond (pāś'a);”§

“Knowing God, he is released from all bonds”;—||

these two points have been propounded here in the first section.

A. MAHADEVYA SASTRI, B. A.

\* Taittirīya-Upaniṣad, II. ii. 1.

† S'vet. Up. 4—14.

‡ Ibid. 3—7, 20.

§ Kaivalya-Upaniṣad, II.

|| S'vet. Up. 1—8.

## SIVAGNANA SIDDHIAR

OF

ARUL NANDI SIVA CHARIYAR.

(Continued from page 180.)

JAINISM:—NIKANDAVADI Sect.

1. Let us state the views of the Jains of the Digambara sect, who worship the Asoka tree laden with sweet-scented flowers, covered with bees, who, in the performance of *Tapas*, inconsistent with the Vedic Dharma, go about without clothes, and with dust covered body, remain ascetics abjuring family life, and feeding sumptuously, carry about with them mats and peacock feathers.

2. Our Lord is the Immortal Aruga, full of glorious attributes, praised by the Gods, who, leaving all the eight evil qualities, is clothed with the eight immaculate virtues, as the full moon is clothed in coolness.

3. Our Lord filled with austerity, has rid himself of the evil senses and know in an instant what takes place in all places and in all time, and is gracious to those who worship him and worship not. His other good qualities will be further described.

4. Leaving the evils of hunger, thirst, fear, envy, liking, lust, thinking, abusing, disease and death, sweating, surprise, pride, wondering, eating, and birth, and sleep and being covered with the eight good attributes, and being seated in the Highest Heaven above this world, He imparted his 'One word' to the host of Siddhas who surround him.

5. Following that one word, the Siddha composed several treatises called Charana, Yoga &c. so that mankind may not be misled. The gist of these books is that Time, space, Dharma body and Adharma body, *Punyam* (virtue) and *Papam* (sin) Atomic bodies, *Atma Bandam* and *Moksha* are all eternal verities.

1. Nikanda means literally without clothes and these are otherwise called Digambaras, which means clothed with sky; and the secondary meaning Nirvana also means a naked person. Digambara and Nirvani are both names of Aruga and Siva.

2. The eight virtues (வெகுமை) are *Anantagnan*—endless Intelligence, *Ananta Darśanam*—Limitless vision, *Ananta Viryam*—endless power, *Anantasukam*—endless joy, namelessness, sectlessness, (Gotra), agelessness, and Immortality. The eight evil qualities (வெகுமை) are Ignorance, Defective Vision, Belief in the Vedas, Sensuality, Possessing name and Gotra and sorrows arising from age and bodily pains. The glorious attributes (சிறவு) are Perfection, Omniscience, Benevolence to all sentient beings, Joyfulness, Activity, Being possessed of the fourteen wonders, Being seated in the Highest Heaven, &c.



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## TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDA'NTA-SŪTRAS WITH S'RĪKANTHA-BHĀ'SHYA.

(Continued from page 198.)

**Adhikarana. -2.**

Now that the question arises as to what that distinguishing mark is which determines the nature of Brahman here enunciated, the blessed Sūtrakāra introduces the sūtra which forms the second adhikarana or section and states the definition of that (Brahman):

Whence the birth etc. of this (I. 1. 2.)

When the thing to be defined is known, definition serves no purpose; when the thing is not known, there is no seeking for its definition. So, what occasion is there for giving a definition of Brahman here?—No objection such as this need be raised; for there does arise an occasion for a definition of Brahman, of whom a vague idea is formed by the study of vedic texts.

The literal meaning of the Sūtra is: Brahman is He from whom proceeds the evolution—i.e., birth (janma), existence (sthiti), dissolution (laya), disappearance (tirobhāva), and grace (anugraha)\*—of this manifested universe made up of chetanā and achetanā, of spirit and matter, held together in indissoluble union.

\* Appaya-dīkshita in his S'ivārkmānidīpikā, a commentary on S'rikānta-Bhāṣya, explains *sthiti* as the state of continuance of the universe between its emanation and dissolution; *tirobhāva* as bandha or bondage, the root of the whole evil of Samsāra, the inherent powers of Jñāna and Kriyā (knowledge and action) being veiled or hidden; and *anugraha* as deliverance from bondage. He cites also, with a view to refute two other explanations of *tirobhāva*: (1) the ceaseless continuance of worldly enjoyment ascribed to each sentient being, (2) the return, at the time of pralaya, of chetanā and achetanā existence to their subtlest forms. This last explanation of the word seems to agree with the teachings of S'āiva Āgamas so far as Brahman's five-fold act (Pancha Kṛitya) is concerned.

In his Saundaryalahari, verse 24, S'rī S'ankarāchārya, following the teaching of the āgamas, describes this (*tirobhāva*) stage of the universe as Is'āna's act of concealing (by way of merging) it as well as His own form in Sadāś'iva, and he describes *anugraha* as Sadāś'iva's act of projecting into manifestation Brahmā the Creator, Hari the Preserver, Rudra the Destroyer, and Is'āna the Concealer, from out of Himself in whom they lay concealed after pralaya, and who once more emanates the souls into being with their respective pās'as (or karma-bandha) with a view to further on the evolutionary progress of such souls as lag behind in their march towards moksha. Appayadīkshita's interpretation of *tirobhāva* and *anugraha* emphasises only one aspect of the evolution, that which refers to Jīvas individually, not to the universe as a whole.



The texts which here form the subject of discussion are such as the following

“From what indeed these creatures have their birth; by what, when born, they live; to what they do depart, they pass away; that strive to know.”\*

“The master of nature and of man; the lord of qualities; the cause of the bondage, existence and liberation of the world.”†

“Truth, wisdom, and endless is Brahman.”‡

“Hail to the reality, the truth, the Supreme Brahman, dark and yellowish in person, having the semen above, diverse-eyed, hail to the Omnipresent.”§

Now the doubt arises as to whether or not the birth etc. of the universe form the definition or characteristic marks of Brahman.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—They cannot constitute (the characteristic marks of Brahman), inasmuch as they do not inhere in Him. Moreover, in the passage “He saw that Bliss was Brahman” || it is evident that the birth etc. of the universe are the characteristic marks of the Bliss. Elsewhere, in the passage “Existent (sat) alone, my dear, this at first was” ¶ the sat or the existent is taught as the cause of the universe. In one place—in the passage “Truth, wisdom, and endless is Brahman”—it is taught that the infinite Jñāna or wisdom is itself Brahman, the cause of the universe; and in another place, in the passage,

“When the light of knowledge has risen, there is no day, no night, neither existence nor non-existence, S'iva alone is there,”\*\*

we are given to understand that the Being denoted by the word ‘S'iva’ is the cause and therefore Brahman, existing before all.

Now, it may be asked: in case the Bliss etc. are Brahman, do they constitute Brahman each by itself, or all of them conjoined together? In the former case, we ignore what is directly revealed and commit other similar fallacies; and then, too, Brahman will be of an undefined nature. If it be held that each of them is the mark of a Brahman of a distinct kind,

then a plurality of Brahman has to be admitted. If it be supposed that they conjointly constitute Brahman, even then, since they are mere attributes, they cannot constitute Brahman who possesses attributes, such as a knowledge as to the means of building the whole universe. Furthermore, the S'ruti “One should know Māyā to be the cause”\* declares that the unintelligent Māyā is the cause of the universe; and it does so rightly; for, if Brahman who is made of intelligence (Jñāna) be the cause of the universe, He would be subject to vikāra or change,—which runs counter to the teaching of the S'ruti declaring that Brahman is “partless, actionless, tranquil”† and so on. Wherefore in no way is it possible to define Brahman,—to define Him as the cause of the universe and so on.

As against the foregoing *prima facie* view, we hold as follows:

Admitted that birth etc., as attributes inhering in the universe, do not pertain to Brahman; still, they rightly constitute the defining marks of Brahman as one closely connected with the universe. The Entity called S'iva, possessed of the attribute of omniscience and so on and denoted by the eight appellations,‡ is said to be Brahman, the cause of the universe; and to that Entity alone Bliss and all other like attributes point. The attributes referred to are Omniscience (Sarvajñatā), Ever-contentedness (nityatṛiptatā), Beginningless Wisdom (Anādibodhatā), Independence (Svatantratā), Never-failing Potency (Nityalūpta-saktitā), and Infinite Potency (Anantasaktitā).

Omniscience (Sarvajñatā) consists in all things becoming objects of direct perception—of stainless intuitive experience—independent of all external organs of sensation. It is known to inhere in Brahman, from such passages as: “Who perceives all and who knows all, whose penance consists of knowledge.”§ Thus the cause (of the universe) is Brahman who knows the appropriate ways and means of building up the several bodies suited to all sentient beings for the reaping of the fruits of their multifarious acts.

Ever-contentedness (nityatṛiptatā) consists in being replete with unsurpassed Bliss, wherein there is not the slightest trace of distress. Hence the revelation “Bliss is Brahman.” || That Bliss (ānanda) which—introduced

\* Taittirīya-Upanishad. iii. 1.

† S'vet-Up. vi. 16.

‡ Tait-Upanishad. ii. 1.

§ Mahānārāyaṇa-Upanishad. 23.

Tait. Upanishad. iii. 6.

¶ Chhāndogya-Upanishad

\*\* S'vet. Up. iv. 18.

\* S'vet. Up. iv. 10.

† Ibid vi. 19.

‡ Vide page 220.

§ Māndūkya-Upanishad. 1. i. 4.

|| Tait. Up. iii. 6.

in the words "There is yet another A'tman who is composed of Bliss,"\* and carried to the culminating point of unsurpassed Bliss by repeated multiplication in the passages beginning with "Here follows the measuring of Bliss" and ending with "that is the unit of Brahman's Bliss"†—is the attribute of Para-Brahman is figuratively spoken of as Brahman Himself in the passage "Bliss is Brahman," because of the abundance of Bliss in Him. Brahman who delights in enjoying such a Bliss is said to be ever-contented. The enjoyment of this mighty Bliss on the part of Brahman is effected through *manas* only, not through external organs of sensation. Hence the passage,

"There is Brahman who is *ākāśa-sarīra* (whose body is light), *satyātman* (Himself the existent), *prānārāma* (whose joy is life), *mana-ananda* (delighted in the mind), *sānti-samriddha* (perfect in peace), and *amrita* (immortal)."‡

Here by *ākāśa*—literally, that which shines all round, the Light—is meant the *chid-ambara*, the ether of spirit, the spirit-light; but not the material *ākāśa* or ether, because the latter can mark no distinction (i.e., the latter cannot serve to distinguish Brahman from other things in nature). The *chid-ambara* here referred to is that Supreme Power (Parama-S'akti), that highest cause, that ocean, as it were, from which spring up all the hosts of bubbles, the mundane eggs of all groups. Brahman, whose form is that supreme light, is spoken of in the S'ruti as "*ākāśa-sarīra*." That *chid-ākāśa* is the highest cause is known from such passages as the following:

"All these beings take their rise from A'kās'a and return into A'kās'a." §

"He who is called A'kā'sa is the revealer of all forms and names"||

*Satyātman*: He who is the Sattā or existence. *Prānārāma*: He who delights in Prāna, the *chid-ambara-s'akti*, the Power of Spiritual light, the Basis of all, constituting Brahman's own essential nature. *Mana-ananda*: He whose joy is in Manas (mind), not in the external organs of sensation. Here, too, "*a-nanda*" refers to the spirit-light the *chid-ambara*, the Prakṛiti or cause. Accordingly the S'ruti says:

\* Tait. Up. II. 5.

† Tait. Up. II. 5.

‡ Tait. Up. I. 6.

§ Chha. Up. III. ix. 1.

|| Chha. Up. VIII. xiv. 1.

"Who could breathe if that Bliss, that Light, existed not."\*

*Sānti-samriddha*: He who has attained to S'ivatā, to Siva's condition. *Amrita*: He who has been free from time without beginning.

Thus, it is seen that Brahman who is essentially Existence, Intelligence and Bliss, and whose essential nature is the Supreme Light, enjoys the Bliss of His essential nature by mind alone, independent of external organs of sensation, as implied by the epithet "*Mana-ananda*." This epithet also implies that the emancipated souls who have attained to the state of Brahman are possessed of the *antah-karana* or mind, the organ which acts independently of external organs, and by which they experience the unsurpassed bliss of their essential nature. Wherefore, *nityatṛipta* or ever-contented is Brahman, enjoying the infinite Bliss of His essential nature by *manas* which is pure *bodha-s'akti* itself, the faculty of knowledge which can act independently of external organs. That is to say, for Him there is no necessity for the slightest joy of the world (*samsāra*) external to Himself.

The possession of unsurpassed knowledge—which is *svatas-siddha*, self-existing or inherent,—constitutes what is called *anādivyākṛatva* or beginningless wisdom. Indeed, the *antah-karana*, *jñāna* or knowledge, which is the organ whereby He enjoys the Bliss of His own essential nature, exists through eternity, without beginning. Wherefore, Brahman is one of beginningless wisdom, inasmuch as knowledge which repels *samsāra* exists through eternity; He is ever free from the evil of *samsāra* and is spoken of in the S'ruti as "perfect in peace and immortal."

*Independence* (*svatantratā*) consists in freedom from servitude to others and from other marks of inferiority, and in all things other than Himself being brought under his own control. Independence of Brahman as the impelling agent of the universe of matter and spirit is taught in such passages as the following:

"There are two, one knowing (I's'vara), the other not knowing, both unborn, one strong, the other weak." ‡

"By knowing the enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the ruler &c." §

"But he who controls both knowledge and ignorance, is another" §

\* Tait. Up. III. vii. 1.

† S'vetā. Up. I. 9.

‡ S'vetā. Up. I. 12.

§ S'vetā. Up. v. 1.

It is evident that because of His independence in all matters, Brahman is the author of all.

The never-failing-potency (*Nityāluṭṭas'aktitva*) consists in all potencies being inherent in His own nature. Accordingly, the S'ruti says "His Higher Power (*Parā-sakti*) is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge. \* From this it follows that the potencies of the universe of spirit and matter are inherent in Brahman and that He is never without these specific attributes.

The possession of unlimited potentialities is what is called Endless Potency (*anantas'aktitū*). It is in virtue of these endless potencies that Brahman is the producer and the ruler of the world. Accordingly it is revealed to us that

"There is one Rudra only,—they do not allow a second—who rules all the worlds by His powers"; †

"Who rules all these worlds by His supreme powers of ruling and producing." ‡

As possessed of endless potencies, Brahman can be the material cause of the infinite universe.

As to Brahman being the subject of eightfold appellation: The Supreme Brahman is the Being denoted by the eight appellations of *Bhava*, *S'arva*, *Is'āna*, *Pas'upati*, *Rudra*, *Ūgra*, *Bhīma* and *Mahādeva*. Though He is denoted by all words, He is designated specially by *Bhava* and other like words, indicative as they are of His Highest being: it does not follow that He is not designated by other words than these eight.

Brahman is called *Bhava* because He exists everywhere at all times, the root "bhū" meaning sattā or existence. We are taught that Brahman is the Existent, running through all things. Accordingly, the S'ruti says:

"Existent alone, my dear, this at first was, one only without a second." §

"Truth (Existence), Wisdom, Endless is Brahman." ||

"He who is existent, who delights in Prāna, whose joy is in manas." ¶

"The ineffable glory" \*\*

and so on. As running through all things—as for instance "jar existing" cloth existing—it is evident that Brahman, the existent, constitutes the upādāna

or material cause of all. The jar, for instance, always associated as it is with clay, is said to be made out of clay, i. e., has clay for its upādāna. Thus Brahman, the existent, is designated by the word *Bhava*.

Brahman, the all-destroyer, is designated by the word *S'arva*, derived from the root "S'ri" to destroy. Brahman is spoken of as the destroyer in the following passages:

"Hail! hail! therefore, to the Destroyer, to the Great Devourer" \*

"To whom the Brāhmanas and Kshatriyas (are as it were) but food" †

Brahman is denoted by the word "*Is'āna*," the Ruler, as endued with the unconditioned supreme sovereignty, as revealed in the passage, "Who rules these worlds with His powers of ruling." ‡

As the I's'vara or Ruler must have some beings to rule over, Brahman is denoted by the word *Pas'upati*, Master of *Pas'ūs* or subject beings (souls). Thus, the S'ruti says:

"Whom—the four-footed as well as two-footed souls (*pas'us*)—*Pas'upati*, the Lord of souls, rules." §

As *Pas'us* (souls) are so-called because of *pās'a* (bond), *Pas'u* stands for both *Pas'u* and *Pās'a*. By this epithet, Brahman is shown to be the Ruler of *chit* and *achit*, of matter and spirit.

Brahman is called *Rudra* as expelling the malady of samsāra, as we are told in the passage:

"The knower of A'tman crosses beyond grief" ||

Brāhman is called *Ūgra* or Fierce, because He cannot be overpowered by other luminaries, as taught in the passage:

"Not there the sun shines, nor the moon and stars." ¶

As the regulator and the source of fear to all sentient beings, Brahman is known by the name of *Bhīma* or Terrible. The S'ruti says:

"By fear of Him does the wind blow." \*\*

As Great and Luminous, S'iva is called *Mahādeva*. So the Atharva-S'iras says:

"For what then, is He called *Mahādeva*?—As having abandoned all things, He is adored for His A'tma-Jñāna or spiritual wisdom and for His yogic glory; wherefore He is called *Mahādeva*." ††

\* S'vetā. Up. vi. 8.

† Atharvas'iras-Upanishad.

‡ Atharvas'iras-Up.

§ Chhā. Up. vi. ii.

¶ Tait. Up. ii. 1.

\*\* Tait. Up. i. 6.

\*\* Mahānārāyaṇa. Up. 24.

\* Atharva-S'iras. Up.

† Katha. Up. ii. 25.

‡ Atharvas'iras-Up.

§ Taittiriya-Samhitā. III. i. 4.

¶ Chhā. Up. VII. i.

¶ S'vetā. Up. vi. 14.

\*\* Tait-Up. ii. 8.

†† Atharvas'iras-Upanishad.

That Being called Śiva known as Free from all taint of Samsāra and as the repository of all that is good is, because He is of such a nature, the cause of the birth &c. of the whole world. Since a Being of such a greatness can be the twofold cause of the world, That (Being called Śiva), endued as He is with such a greatness, is called Brahman. He has also been proved to be the seat of Bliss and such other attributes; wherefore it is vain to raise the question whether Bliss etc., can constitute Brahman each by itself. From the passage "one should know Māyā as Prakṛti" it may be seen that Māyā is the Prakṛti or cause, that Māyā being Iśvara essentially, as taught in the concluding part of the sentence:

"And know Iśvara as the possessor or the seat of the Māyā." \*

Brahman, associated with the sūkshma or subtle chit and achit is the cause; and Brahman associated with the sthūla or gross chit and achit is the effect. Wherefore the Siddhānta or demonstrated conclusion is that birth etc. of the universe form the distinguishing marks of Brahman.

### Adhikarana 3--(A).

Knowledge of a thing is obtained by means of its definition and the organ of perception<sup>(1)</sup> Now what is the pramāṇa or organ of perception in the case of Brahman, the cause of the world? In answer to this question, the sūtrakāra says:

Because Śāstra is the source (of our knowledge of Brahman) (I. I. 3.)

Because Śāstra is the source, the pramāṇa, the authority, or the organ of perception, therefore, there is Brahman who has been defined by (i. e., as the cause of) the birth etc. of the universe.

Now, the doubt arises as to whether Brahman, the cause of the universe, can be reached through Śāstra alone or through other pramāṇas.

The *prima facie* view may be stated as follows: This world which is made up of parts is an effect, and that effect, involving variety, should have an appropriate agent. Thus may be inferred some agent endued with omniscience. Thus, not being reachable by Śāstra alone, Śāstra's aim is not Brahman. Śāstra treats of things not revealed by other pramāṇas.

The *demonstrated conclusion* may be stated as follows:—Brahman, the cause of the universe, can be reached through Vedānta-Śāstra alone; for such passages as

"None, who knows not the Vedas, can think of That, the Great"\*

—teach the impossibility of (attaining to) a knowledge of Brahman except through Vedānta-Śāstra.

As to the contention that the universe is an effect because it is made up of parts, and that it may therefore be inferred that the universe must have an appropriate agent, it is unreasonable to say so; for it is found that steeples and palaces and the like, which exhibit a complicated design, have more than one agent. Thus, it cannot be established that the universe has only one agent. By force of induction, we are further led to the conclusion that such an agent is subject to Karma, i. e. has to reap the fruits of his acts.

Even if it could be established by *anumāna* or *inference*—in virtue of the world being an effect—that the author of the world is one alone and distinct from itself, it cannot be proved that that one agent is endued with the potency of becoming both the efficient and the material cause of the universe. Thus it is proved that Brahman is reached by Vedānta-Śāstra alone, and is founded on that (Vedānta-Śāstra) alone as the authority.

### Adhikarana 3--(B).

Some hold that by this Sūtra we are further taught that the attribute of omniscience which is so essential in the cause of the world, propounded in the previous section (2nd adhikarana), can be predicated of Brahman as He is the source of all Śāstras or Vedas. Such a double signification is no more a fault in a sūtra whose aim is merely to indicate, than in a poem conveying (by *siesha* or *pun*) a double signification. Hence the introduction of a fresh adhikarana or section here.

Because He is the source of Śāstra (I. I. 3.)

In this case the texts which form the *subject* of discussion are the following

"What is (known as) Rig-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sama-Veda etc., is the breath of this Great Being" †

The *doubt* arises as to whether or not it is right to hold that Brahman is the author of the Vedas.

The *pūrvapaksha* or the *prima facie* view may be stated as follows. It is not right to hold that Brahman is the author of the Vedas; because it contradicts the s'ruti which declares the eternality of the Vach in the passage.

\* Taittiriya-Brahmaṇa III. xiii 9.

† Br. Up. II. iv. 10.

\* Ś'veta. Up. iv. 10.



"O Agni that assumest diverse forms, do thou impel (the sacrificer) to adore Indra by *eternal word*"\*. If they were the creation of Brahman, the Vedas would have a personal author and, as such, would form no authority. Wherefore, how can Brahman be the author of the Vedas ?

As against the foregoing, we hold as follows:—It is but right that Brahman is the author of the Vedas ; for, from the S'ruti,

"What is (known as Rig-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sama-Veda etc., is the breath of this Great Being,"

we understand that the mass of the Vedas has emerged as the breath from Brahman without any effort ; and further we are taught that Parames'vara is the author of all Vidyās, in the following verse:

"Of these eighteen sciences of different paths, the original author was, as the s'ruti says, the wise Sūlapāni Himself."

Of the Vedas dissolved in Himself before creation, the Omniscient Parames'vara again becomes the author by composing them in the same order of syllables as before. Wherefore it is that the Vedas have no personal author and are at the same time the work of Is'varā. The statements of persons who have likes and dislikes and so on may prove untrue. But ever true are the statements of Brahman, of S'iva, who is free from all taint of evil tendencies, by whose unobstructed and unsurpassed knowledge is directly perceived whatever may happen to things in all the three periods of time, who is an authority in Himself (Svatah-pramāna), who is the Supreme Lord and the Supreme Truth-speaker, who has attained all desires. For, in the passages "the Ruler of all Vidyās"† and "May that Divine Being endow us with the blessed wisdom (S'ubhā Smṛiti)"‡ it is taught that Parames'vara is the founder of all sciences and is the cause of the blessed wisdom (S'ubhā Smṛiti). Wherefore, Parames'vara being the author of the Vedas which illumine all things, His omniscience is proved, inasmuch as it is impossible to reveal what is unknown.

A. MAHADEVA SA'STRI, B. A.

To be continued.)

## TAYUMANAVAR'S POEMS.

(Continued from page 204).

சுதவாரி.

இன்னமுதகனிபாகு கற்கண்டுசீனிதே  
 நெனருசித்திடவலியவந்  
 தீபங்கொடுத்தினை பெங்கோகின்னன்ப  
 றிடையருதுகிராம  
 யுன்னியகருததவிழ வுரைகுளறியுடனெங்கு  
 மோயந்தயர்த்தவசமாகி  
 யுணர்வரியபேரின்ப வனுபூதியுணர்விலே  
 யுணர்வார்களுள்ளபடி காண்  
 கன்னிகையொருத்திசிறி நன்பவெஃபென்னி  
 னுந் தைக்கொள்வன்பக்குவத்திற்  
 சணவனருள்பெதிர்முனே சொன்னவாதென்  
 னெனக் கருநிகையாவளதுபேர்த்  
 சொன்னபடிக்கேட்குமிப் பேதைக்குநிள்கருணை  
 தோற்றிநிசுகாரம்பமாஞ்  
 சுத்தநிற்ருணமான பரதெய்வமேபாஞ்  
 சோதியேசுகவாரியே

(செ)

GOD-HEAD AS OCEAN OF JOY.

77. O Ocean of Joy, the characterless Supreme Being of Transcendent Brightness !

Knowing that Thou art the fountain of Supreme Bliss to them, and enjoying Thee, sweet as the delicious extract of the mixture of the three fruits\* with sugar, sugar-candy, ambrosia and honey, Thy beloved devotees would ever seek Thee, reflect on Thee and praise Thee in great emotion : They would blab and become overpowered with joy and would remain absorbed in Thy Heavenly Bliss. This is an undoubted fact with the advanced *sages*.

But to me, who am, as it were, in a state of maidenhood, it is not gratifying ; just as the sweets of 'nuptial embrace' will be quite unwelcome to a bride before puberty.

Do Thou, therefore, initiate me, my Lord, into the blessedness of Thy Grace.

அன்பினவழியறியாத வெண்ணைத்தொடர்ந்தென்  
 னையறியாதபக்குவத்தே  
 யானைப்பெருக்கைப் பெருக்கிக்கொடுத்தாரா  
 னற்றேனலந்தேனை  
 வென்புலமயங்கவே பித்தேற்றிவிட்டா  
 யிரங்கியொருவழியாயினு  
 மின்பவெளமாகவந் துள்ளங்கவிக்கவே  
 யெனைநீகலந்ததுண்டோ

\* Taitt-Samhitā II. vi. 11.

† Mahanarayana-Upanishad. 21.

‡ Mahana-Upanishad. 12.

\* Vide note to 17th verse.



# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — O R — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪ'KANTHA-  
BHA'SHYA.

(Continued from page 222).

### Adhikarana 3--(B).

Though in the case of the omnipresent Parames'vara, His omniscience has to be admitted in virtue of His contact with all things, still His being the author of the Vedas which illumine all things points to a peculiar feature—a lamp, for instance, illumines form alone, but not taste and so on, though these latter as well as form come in contact with its light; but not so does the Supreme Lord. He illumines all that is energised by His S'akti.

(Objection): Parames'vara's omniscience consists in His being aware of all things taught in the Vedas. Then we have to admit that even the Maharishis or the Great Sages who know the teaching of Vedas are omniscient. Then where is the distinction?

(Answer): Not so; I's'vara their author, has more knowledge. In fact we see that authors of works such as Vyākaraṇa are persons like Pāṇini who know more than what is contained in their works. And the Veda, though illumining all things, does not point to all as the main object of its teaching; it teaches certain things indirectly, certain other things in a general way and some only in their special character, whereas Parames'vara, the witness of all, perceives all directly. This, we hold, is the difference between the Veda and the I's'vara.

(Objection): It is not necessary that Parames'vara alone is the author of the Veda, as the passages of the S'ruti like

Having become Śat-hotri, Prajāpti created all this, the Rik, Yajus and Sāma,\*  
give us to understand that Hiranyagarbha and the like are also its authors.

(Answer): No, because of the existence of the Vedas even before the birth of Hiranyagarbha. The S'ruti says,

"He who first creates Brahman (Hiranyagarbha) and delivers the Vedas to him."†

\* Taitt. Brāhmaṇa II. iii. 2.

† S'vetā. Up. vi. 18.

He who is the author even of Hiranyagarbha and teaches Him all the Vedas, He alone is above all, the author of Vedas, the Supreme Teacher. Accordingly the S'ruti clearly teaches,

“Rudra who is above all, the great Seer, who first glanced at Hiranyagarbha, the foremost-born among the Devas, may He endow us with blessed wisdom.” \*

This passage has to be explained thus: That Maharishi, the Great Sage, the author of the Vedas, who, in virtue of His omniscience, is superior to the whole universe of *chit* and *achit*; that Rudra, that Para-Brahman, who at the time of creation cast upon Hiranyagarbha—the first among Gods including Indra, and just then emerging from A'tman who is His Prakriti or cause, by the force of Divine will—His gracious glance by way of teaching the whole Veda which is the source of all knowledge; may that Great Teacher endow us also with the Smṛiti, with that ray of wisdom (*bodha-kalā*) concerning Himself which brings about the cessation of the great evil, of the whole bondage of *samsāra*; which leads to the attainment of Supreme Bliss and conduces to the highest wealth of immortality; and which, therefore, is the supreme good, resulting from the harmonious essential teaching of the Vedānta. Thus it has been demonstrated that I's'vara is the author of all Vedas.

The teaching of the S'ruti as to the eternality of the word (*Vāch*) is not contradicted, inasmuch as the Vedas are said to have been composed by I's'vara just as they had been before; and thus I's'vara's authorship, too, of the Vedas is uncontradicted.

#### Adhikarana.—4.

For a knowledge of Śiva, the Para-Brahman, expounded in the first adhikarana as the subject of enquiry, a definition of Brahman was needed; and a definition thereof was stated in the second adhikarana as That whence proceeds the emanation etc. of the universe. Then the question arising as to what was the authority for such a definition, it has been propounded in the third adhikarana that the Vedānta S'āstra is the source of our knowledge of the subject, and that Brahman is the source of the Vedānta-S'āstra. That indeed is the *pramāṇa* or source of our knowledge of a thing, by which that thing is invariably known. Now, a question arises as to how the Vedantic texts can teach Brahman; and in answer thereto the fourth adhikarana is now introduced:

Him, verily, (the Vedānta teaches) with one accord (I. i. 4).

'Him' refers to Brahman, the subject of enquiry. The word 'verily' shows that all Vedantic texts taken collectively are here referred to. The word "Samanvaya (one accord)" shows that Brahman is the drift or the main subject of their teaching. The Sūtra means: The Vedantic texts treat of Brahman in the main, as shown by the several *lingas* or tests of their ultimate import.

All the Vedantic texts form the *subject* of discussion in this adhikarana.

The doubt arises as to whether or not it is right to hold that the Vedantic texts teach Brahman (a).

(a) To understand in its full bearing the discussion that follows in this adhikarana it is necessary to bear in mind that the first issue which the *mīmāṃsakas* or Indian theologians have taken up to settle in connexion with the problem as to what is the main drift of all the vedic teaching is the metaphysico-philological question, what does a word denote? A solution of this latter problem has been attempted by an investigation of the various sources from which a child,—or, for that matter, any one who does not know the meaning of a particular word—first learns the meaning of the word. The means of knowing what a word denotes are enumerated as follows:

(1) *Vṛiddha-vyavahāra* or the behaviour of one adult as induced by the speech of another; (2) *Vyākhyāna* or explanation; (3) *Vākyas'ekha* (the remaining portion of the passage where the word occurs); (4) connection with another word of known meaning referring to the same thing; (5) grammar; (6) lexicon; (7) instruction by a trustworthy person.

An investigation of one or another of these processes led some to the conclusion that all speech primarily points to acts; while others hold that it refers to things as they are in themselves as well as to acts.

The next question whose solution hinges on the settlement of the foregoing question is, what is the drift of all vedic teaching? On this question the Indian philosophers may be classed in two groups:

I. Those who, like the *āstika-mīmāṃsakas*, hold that the whole Veda inculcates action only.—By an investigation of the first process of *vṛiddha-vyavahāra*—in which the child, observing how one engages in an act when a word of command is uttered by another, is supposed to conclude that, from the words of the speaker, the hearer first understands that he has to do an act (in general), and then sets about doing the particular act commanded,—the *mīmāṃsakas* concluded that all speech, and therefore the whole Veda, inculcates action primarily; that all else taught therein is subservient to action; that the Vedas describe Brahman or other things in their already existing state, only so far as these subserv to an act enjoined; and that such descriptions of Brahman and other things connected with acts may or may not always correspond to truth.

II. Those who, like the Vedāntins,—seeing that other processes, mentioned above, of acquiring the first knowledge of the relation of a word to the thing denoted by it show that a word may denote a thing in itself unrelated to any act, and that even, in *vṛiddha-vyavahāra*, a knowledge of things as they are is imparted by the sentence uttered,—hold that the Vedas teach Brahman as He is in Himself, as well as *karma* or action. With reference to this question, the Vedāntins may be subdivided into two groups:—

(1) The older or pre-S'āṅkarī school of Vedāntins, who hold that the Veda teaches Brahman as He is in Himself, but only as a complement of an injunction of an act—i. e., by way of supplying the object of the act of knowing primarily enjoined in the form 'Brahman should be known.'

(2) The modern Vedāntins who, like Śrīkṛṣṇachārya, hold that, primarily, the Vedas both teach Brahman as He is in Himself and enjoin action. Most of these maintain that all acts of ritualistic

**Purvapakṣa:** (A) Everywhere the power which a word has to denote a thing depends upon the knowledge of their mutual relation. Without a knowledge of the special relation between a word and the thing denoted by it, no man can have an idea of the thing denoted by the word. And the knowledge of their relation is derived from *vṛddha-vyavahāra*, i. e., from an observation of the speech and the behaviour of the elders. This *vṛddha-vyavahāra* invariably points to something to be done as the ultimate import of words. To explain fully: seeing that immediately after hearing the words "bring the cow" "tie the cow" uttered by one elderly person, the other elderly person to whom the order is addressed engages in the act, the by-stander who seeks to ascertain the meaning of words concludes within himself thus: by all means, the person has engaged in the action knowing that he has something to do, and the knowledge that he has to do something is derived from the words just uttered; otherwise, how to account for his activity following immediately after hearing the word of command? Then, on seeing the cow brought and tied, the by-stander understands what is the special act meant. Thus the ultimate import of words pointing to *Kārya* or something to be done, the authority of *Śabda* or Revelation does not apply to Brahman who is *Siddha*, i. e., who already exists.

(B) Moreover, it being possible to know by inference that this world which is an effect of a particular kind must have its appropriate agent such as Brahman, how can the authority of the Vedantic texts which should treat of things not knowable by any other means apply to Brahman?

(C) Or thus: the Vedantic texts all point to *Vidhi* or injunctions of acts, not to Brahman, as the main subject of their teaching; if they should treat of both, then they would be teaching a double proposition. Wherefore it is not right to hold that Vedantic texts teach Brahman.

The *Siddhānta* maintains that it is right to hold that the Vedantic texts teach Brahman, inasmuch as by a proper collation of the several *tītparya-lingas*, or text-passages as to what the special aim of their

and meditative worship of Brahman, are subservient to, as a preparation for, the *Sākṣātkāra*, a direct and intuitive perception of Brahman.

A full presentation of the course of reasoning by which the several schools have established their respective conclusions, does not fall within the limited scope of this note. There exists a vast literature on the subject in Sanskrit.

teaching is, it is found that the Vedantic texts yield us a knowledge of Brahman.

(A) Now, as to the contention that, because the ultimate meaning of a word always refers to something that *has to be done*, *Śabda* or revelation does not point to Brahman,—i. e., to what already exists,—we hold it is wrong to say so; for it is found that, even from the sentences (b), such as "a son is born to you," which denote things as they are in themselves, a knowledge of the relation between words and their meanings is obtained. Even in *vṛddha-vyavahāra*—i. e., in cases where the import of words is learnt by watching the utterance of a word of command by one elderly person followed by action on the part of another,—the person who seeks to know the import of words concludes that the words of the speaker produces, in the mind of the person spoken to, a knowledge of the things themselves, inasmuch as the idea of something to be done which led to his own activity is found to have been preceded by a knowledge of the things themselves. Therefore, it may be concluded, that *Śabda* or revelation can signify things that are, as they already exist.

Or, why should we confine ourselves to *vṛddha-vyavahāra* alone? A knowledge of what a word means may be brought about in other ways. Children, for instance, often taught by their mothers etc., pointing out with their fingers or the like such objects as the moon and the cow, and using appropriate designations with reference to those several objects, come to know what objects the words severally designate (c). Persons, again, who are not conversant with poems and dramas approach one who is well

(b) This change of illustration is intended to show that in *vyavahāra* the first knowledge of *vātpatti* or the relation of a word to the thing denoted by it may be obtained even from a sentence which does not include within it any word or particle indicative of command.

(c) In *vṛddha-vyavahāra* the object of the speaker is not to instruct the child as to the meaning of words, the knowledge acquired by the child being merely accidental and not necessarily following from it and therefore liable to error; whereas the main object of the process described here is the instruction of the child. When the child thus learns the meanings of words, the things severally denoted by words in a sentence become known in their special relations to one another in virtue of *ākāṅkṣā* or the contiguity of words arranged in a particular order. The special relation in which things spoken of in a sentence stand to one another is knowable solely from the mere contiguity of words. In studying the meaning of a verse composed of unfamiliar words, the student who is taught only the meaning of words in it separately can, in virtue of their contiguity, understand the meaning of the whole verse without being specially taught the mutual relations of things spoken of in the verse. There is thus no use whatever of the general notion that all things spoken of in a sentence are mutually related to one another; a notion which alone can, if all, be said to be obtained from the *vṛddha-vyavahāra*. Page 15 of 241

versed in them, and by an analysis of words they understand the signification of all words, in their respective bearings. Wherefore, since words can signify things already existing, Śabda or revelation constitutes an authority concerning them. Hence the authority of Vedantic-passages concerning Brahman.

(B) As to the contention that since the universe is an effect, its appropriate agent, namely Brahman, can be arrived at by anumāna or inference,—we say it has no foundation to rest upon; for, it being found that cars, steeples, palaces and the like which exhibit complicated designs have each a plurality of agents, it is not possible to establish by inference that the universe has only one agent. And it has been already shown that, by force of induction, the conclusion becomes inevitable that the agent is subject to karma and so on. Wherefore Brahman cannot be reached by anumāna. And, moreover, it may also be conceded that even anumāna or inference is an authority concerning Brahman when it is accordant with the Sruti.

(c) Indeed, (d) whatever the words point to by *tītparya* as the special aim of their teaching, to that alone their authority extends, but not to all things, unlike the case of *pratyaksha* or sensuous perception. If it be asked, what are the lingas or marks which determine that Brahman is the drift of the teaching of Vedantic texts,—we say in reply that such marks comprise *upakrama* and so on. They are thus enumerated: *upakrama* (enunciation) and *upasamhāra* (conclusion), *abhyāsa* (repetition), *apūrvatā* (novelty), *phala* (the result), *arthavāda* (persuasion) and *upapatti* (the rationale). Accordingly, here, that Brahman is the drift of the Vedantic teaching is established by such lingas or marks as *upakrama*. The determining, by *upakrama* and other lingas, of the drift of the vedantic teaching forms what is called the *S'raṇa*, or "the process of hearing," of the vedantic texts. Accordingly they say:

"Born of ignorance is pain, and knowledge is the remover thereof: the *S'raṇa* of all the Vedantic texts brings about that knowledge. *S'raṇa* consists in determining, by *upakrama* and other marks, that Ś'iva, the Higher than the high, is the drift of the teaching of vedic texts."

(d) In this paragraph, the Bhāṣyakāra proceeds to show that Vedantic texts point to both Brahman and to an injunction of His worship as the main drift of their teaching, so that he may refute, in order, the views held respectively on the subject by other schools.

*Upakrama* (Enunciation) and *Upasamhāra* (conclusion) together constitute one *linga* or mark in determining that Brahman is the drift of the Vedantic texts. To say that Brahman is the drift of their teaching is to say that they treat of His essential nature and of His *upa'sana*. The following passages constitute the *upakrama* and *upasamhāra*, the enunciation and conclusion, in their respective contexts:

(a) <sup>1</sup> *Upakrama* :—"Existent alone, my dear, this at first was."

*Upasamhāra* :—"That thou art."

(b) <sup>2</sup> *Upakrama* :—"By the grace of the creator, he sees the Majesty, the Lord."

*Upasamhāra* :—"He who is Supreme, He is the Great Lord."

The *upakrama* and *upasamhāra* may similarly be discovered in other instances (e).

*Abhyāsa* (repetition) may be seen in the following passages (f):—

"That thou art."

"All verily is Rudra." <sup>3</sup>

"To the spouse of Ambikā, to the spouse of Umā." (3)

"He who verily is Rudra and who is, Brahman also, He is the Lord." <sup>4</sup>

*Apūrvatā* (novelty) consists in Brahman being not known from any other *pramāna* or authority than the Veda (g). *Brahma-Jñāna* (h) or knowledge of Brahman constitutes the *phala* or result. *Arthavāda* (persuasion) consists in the description of the creation of the universe, its continuance, dissolution etc. *Upapatti* (the rationale) may be said to consist in proving that the Vedantic theory does not contradict any authority, or in supplying such arguments as are derived from the Brahman's possession of omniscience and the like attributes.

The Vedāntas do not point to Brahman alone as the special aim of their teaching, but it is understood

<sup>1</sup> Chh. Up. 6,2—8.

Mahanarayana Up. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Mahanarayana Up. 22—24.

<sup>3</sup> Atharvasiras-Upanishad.

(e) In the passages quoted in the sixth and the subsequent *adhikaraṇās*.

(f) These passages respectively emphasise by repetition the following points in connection with Brahman:

1. that Brahman is intelligent;

2. that He is the All;


3. that He is associated with *chit-s'akti*.

4. that He is endued with all good qualities.

(g) We may add the *Smritis*, the *purāṇas* etc. which are based upon the *Vedas*.

(h) *Brahma-Jñāna* is the *sākshātkāra* of Brahman, who is the *Paramatma* of 241  
passed Bliss in essence.

# TABLE OF TATWAS AND THIRIPADARTHA.





that they point also to a *vidhi* (i) or an injunction as to knowing Him, as witness such passages as,

"Atman verily, my Dear, should be perceived." 1

As to the contention that, if the Vedāntas aim at both, then we would be led to the conclusion that the Vedāntas teach a double proposition,—we (j) say that the contention is groundless; for, just as by means of the eye which enables us to perceive rūpa (form or color), the underlying substance (dravya) also is perceived, so Brahman also is taught by the Vedāntas, though they aim at the injunction referred to and thus there is no self-contradiction involved in the Vedāntas aiming at both.

(Objection): The Brahmajñāna which is to be produced by the Śabda or revelation is obtained from the texts which treat of Brahman. Then, what is the use of an injunction concerning it?

(Answer): There is no inconsistency (k) in enjoining Brahmajñāna or the act of knowing Brahman, notwithstanding that we are led to the act otherwise. Take for example the case of *mantras* etc: although a knowledge as to the substances and Devatās concerned in a ritual has been obtained from a study of the *mantras* themselves treating of those substances and Devatās, still, the *prayoga-vidhi*—the tersely formulated statement of an injunction in all its details,—that those substances and Devatās should be thought of at the time of observance by means of *mantras*, impels us to a fresh act of knowledge. So also here. And this cannot be objected to on the ground that no such *prayoga-vidhi* is possible here, in the absence of *utpatti-vidhi* (l), *vinīyoga-vidhi*, and *adhikāra-vidhi*. For, *utpatti-vidhi* being understood through implication by force of context, there naturally comes the *Vinīyoga-vidhi*—prescribing the *modus operandi* in

1 Bri. Upanishad 4—5.

(i) Otherwise, owing to non-observance of upāsana, the result thereof, namely, the attainment of Brahman, is not possible.

(j) The objection is answered from the standpoint of the school holding that Brahman is taught in the Vedānta as a mere subsidiary factor concerned in the act of knowing, which is the main drift of the Vedāntic teaching.

(k) The jñāna derived by a study of the passages themselves which treat of Brahman is alleged to be quite different from that which is induced by injunction. Wherefore the injunction, they say, is not useless.

(l) *Utpatti-vidhi* is that in which the main sacrificial act as well as the substance by means of which the act can be effected is enjoined. *Adhikāra-vidhi* is that which teaches the fruit attainable by means of the act. *Vinīyoga-vidhi* is that which enjoins a minor or subsidiary act which subserves the major act of the sacrifice. *Prayoga-vidhi* is the formula of an injunction with all its subsidiary parts. The *Utpatti-vidhi* implied here in Vedānta is, "by means of Vedānta Brahmajñāna should be acquired."

the form of s'ama or self-control etc.—in connection with the injunction "Let him see the A'tman." And then, on the principle of *Rātri-sātra* (m) we may even supply the *adhikārin*,—the person for whom the Brahmajñāna is intended,—namely the seeker of moksha, as may be learnt from the arthavāda-passages—passages explaining things that are subservient to an injunction—such as the following: "Knowing God, one is released from all pās'as or bonds." Accordingly we come to the *prayoga-vidhi* in the following form: He who seeks moksha should equip himself with s'ama (tranquillity) and other attributes and acquire Brahmajñāna.

(Objection):—Brahmajñāna cannot be a subject of an injunction. In the passages such as "A'tman verily my dear, should be seen", it is not indeed right to construe Atman, i. e., Brahman who is eternal, immutable and quite pure—as karma-kāraka, i. e., as the direct object (of the act of seeing),—a construction which would be necessary if the passage should be interpreted as an injunction (of Brahmajñāna): for, such a Brahman cannot undergo birth; He cannot be an object of *prāpti* or attainment, nor can He be subjected to *vikāra* (change), or *Samskāra* (purification)(n). Neither is it possible on the principle of "*Saktu-nyāya*"(o) to resort to an injunction in the form "He should see by A'tman," thus construing A'tman as the instrument of action instead of as the direct object of the action. For, the two cases are different. To explain at length: a fresh change of state, by way of being reduced to ashes, being possible in the case of the flour in virtue of the act of throwing into fire, "flour" can be construed as an instrumental case in form, while in sense the

(m) In the passage in which the sacrifice called *Rātri-Sātra* is enjoined it is not mentioned for what result it is intended. Elsewhere, however, it is said in an arthavāda passage that he who performs *Rātri-Sātra* can secure *pratiṣṭhā*, glory or renown. Thus, *Rātri-Sātra-nyāya* consists in deriving the *adhikāra-vidhi* from a section different from that in which *utpatti-vidhi* is found.

(n) Brahman being eternal. He cannot be newly brought into existence; being Brahman,—literally, vast or omnipresent,—He cannot be attained to as one removed by space before; as immutable. He is not subject to change of form or attributes; as ever quite pure. He cannot be subject to purification, become purer.

(o) *Saktu-nyāya*: In the injunction "let him offer flour," 'flour' in the accusative case is converted into an instrumental case so as to render the injunction one of a main sacrificial act (artha-karma). If 'flour' be taken in the accusative case as it is, then the injunction is reduced to one of a subsidiary act (guna-karma); and it cannot be a mere subsidiary act here, inasmuch as the flour once reduced to ashes cannot be used again for any other purpose, nor is there another act mentioned to which it may be considered as subsidiary. In this case, though the 'flour' be thus taken logically as an instrument, it can continue to be the grammatical object of the verb.

flour' continues as an object of the act. This does not apply in the case of A'tman. Wherefore the Vedānta cannot be interpreted to enjoin Brahma-jñāna.

(Answer):—No; for though birth etc., which should necessarily pertain to the object of an action are absent in A'tman, an injunction is possible with a view to the result in the form of moksha accruing to the agent.

(Objection):—How is an injunction possible in the case of an act in which we will engage even without such an injunction?

(Answer):—The act to which we may thus be led even without such an injunction, is either intermittent or constant. In either case there is room for a *niyama-vidhi* and so on (p).

A. MAHADEVA SĀSTRĪ, B. A.

(To be continued).

### SIVAGNANA SIDDHIAR OF ARUL NANDI SIVA CHARIAR.

(Continued from page 201.)

RECITATION OF AJIVAKA JAINA.

1. From moksha, there is no return. As such there can be no return of your Lord to the earth to reveal his word; and hence there can be no authoritative book for you. As the five atoms cannot reach your heaven, your Lord can have no body. He cannot be omniscient for all time nor can he know all things at one time?

2. You say that Arhats are of two classes, called Mandalar (beings of earth) and Sembothakar (the perfect) and that the Mandalars return to the earth and reveal the teaching. Then these Mandalars become indistinguishable from the jivas of the earth. They

(p) The Vedantic study is either intermittent and occasional as following from one's own choice; or obligatory and constant, as due to the injunction that one should never leave vedic study. In the first case there is room for the *niyama-vidhi* enjoining that Vedantic study should always be pursued. In the latter it is a *parasankhyā-vidhi* intended to exclude altogether the study of things alien to the A'tman.

1. The commentator here asks—How do you know your Lord is omniscient? If you say, it is because he has attained to the condition of *moma*, then you can say that all dumb men and animals &c., are also perfect. Besides, if he ever remains in *moma*, of what use is he to mankind? He will be merely an useless sinner.

cannot partake both the earthly and divine element in themselves.

3. You state that the soul becomes intelligent by contact and full union with the body. The soul is not so, when a person is not intelligent or when he is an infant. As such your statement is false.

4. If as you say, of the four atoms, some two spread below, some two above, they cannot form any one body. If they can form one, then the atoms will undergo destruction. If they don't unite, there must be interspaces in the body between these atoms. As such they cannot unite into one body. They will be so various and there won't be any harmony and coordination.

5. If you say that these various bodies are made possible by there being innumerable atoms, yet as these cannot unite, they cannot form one united body. As these atoms spread in different directions and are contrary in nature, they cannot conduce to the soul being present in them: Your theory is ridiculous. Even a thousand sticks cannot form one pillar.

6. The atoms themselves cannot unite to form bodies as they have no intelligence of their own. If you say that air unites all the other atoms with the soul, the air cannot know the other atoms and the souls to be united, so as to enable it to unite them. If you say Karma effects this union, it cannot be, as it is also non-intelligent and cannot know the person to whom it has to be united. Therefore learn to know the One who brings about the union of these various atoms into bodies united to each soul according to its Karma.

#### GENERAL REMARKS.

Indian writers, both Sanscrit and Tamil, place Jainism usually after Buddhism, in their general retrospect or review of the various Schools of Indian Philosophy and we have once more to call attention to the fact that this is not altogether an historical or chronological order. The caution would be unnecessary but for the fact that eminent writers chiefly European, have been misled and have concluded that Jainism had no independent beginning and that it was a mere offshoot of Buddhism and as such have failed also to grasp its essential differences, and have therefore bestowed very little attention to this system and its Bibliography. And in consequence, this School of Philosophy has not attained to that amount of importance in the European and Indian minds of to-day, as Buddhism has. But for all that, so far as South

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH

— OR —

## SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA.

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### TRANSLATIONS.

#### THE VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS WITH SRIKANTHA-BHĀSHYA.

(Continued from page 246).

#### Adhikarana 4.

(*Objection* q);—In that case the drift of the Vedāntic teaching being an injunction, it cannot be held that Vedāntas teach Brahman. It has, however, been contended that just as by means of the eye, by which we perceive *rūpa* or colour, the underlying substance (*dravya*) is perceived, so also Brahman may be taught by Vedāntas which point to an injunction as their special But this contention is untenable; for the eye is a *pramāṇa*—an organ of perception as

(a) The Bhāṣyakāra has thus far expounded the view of the so-called Vedāntins. He now proceeds to remove, by means of objections and refutations thereof, such points as he does not approve. The first objection is that he does not approve the proposition that Vedāntas both teach Brahman and enjoin His Upāsana. The first objection has been raised and answered. Now he shows that the illustration of the eye is inapplicable owing to a difference between Veda and sensuous perception as their authority concerning their respective revelations; and that the same Proposition can only be established by an appeal to other instances in the Veda itself in which two different propositions are inculcated in the same sentence.

regards everything that comes in contact with it. Not so is the Sabda or revelation. This latter becomes a *pramāṇa* or authority only as regards that which constitutes the *drift* of all its teaching. Wherefore it is not possible for Vedāntas both to teach who Brahman is and to enjoin the act of knowing Brahman.

(*Answer*):—No: because we find that passages like "he should offer *samits* or fuel" \* have a double aim, namely, to enjoin the five *prayājas* themselves and to enjoin also the order of their observance, therefore it is but right that the vedantic texts also should both inform us as to what the nature of Brahman is and enjoin the act of knowing Brahman as leading to *moksha*.

(*Objection*):—(r) Brahman being known from the text itself, an injunction of *Brahmajñāna* is of no use, inasmuch as the aim of the injunction can be achieved without such an injunction, by the knowledge already obtained otherwise, (i. e. by an independent study of the texts themselves).

\* Taittirīyā Samhitā I. vi. 1.

Now the Bhāṣyakāra opposes the doctrine of the injunction that Brahman should be known by means of Vedānta with a view to establish his own doctrine that the aspirant should meditate upon Brahman after acquiring a knowledge of Him by means of the Vedānta.

(Answer):—Not so; for, though Brahman is known indirectly (parokhatvena) from the texts, it is right that there should be an injunction of the act of jñāna with a view to the sākshāt-kāra or an intuitive realisation of Brahman. It may be asked, what is the difference? We answer: the knowledge produced by the texts (śabda) cannot cause sākshāt-kāra on the other hand, it is jñāna, of the form of Upāsana or continuous meditation, which alone can produce sākshāt-kāra. Accordingly the Śruti says:

“ By meditating, the Muni goes to the source of all beings, the witness of all' beyond all darkness.”\*

“ By churning with Jnana alone does the wise man burn up the bond (paśa). ”\*

“ Knowing the Deva, the Shining one, he is released from all bonds (paśas). ”†

“ Knowing Him, the Lord, they become immortal”‡  
Accordingly in the passage.

Brahman should be learnt from the passages of

Śruti, reflected upon by reasoning, then after reflection meditated upon: these are the means to darsana or intuitive perception, ”

the smṛiti shows that it is nididhyāsana or intense meditation, inseparably associated with the knowledge produced by Śravaṇa and Manana, (s)—by the processes of learning and reflecting,—which produces sākshāt-kāra or direct perception of Brahman. Wherefore Jnana, of the form of Upāsana, calculated to produce the result of moksha, is enjoined in the following passages:—

“ In the self (t) should he see the Atman.”§

Sambhu should be contemplated in the middle of ākāśa ”||

Seeing that all this (Universe) has its birth, its dissolution, and its being in Him, every one, tranquil-minded, should worship Him.”¶

\* Kaivalya-Upanishad.

† Śvet Upanishad 1-5.

‡ Śvet Upanishad 3-7.

(t) Jnana is first produced by Śravaṇa or hearing, and then strengthened by Manana or reflection and reasoning. The Jnana being the cause of nididhyāsana or intense meditation of Brahman, the latter is said to be inseparable from it.

(u) In the self; In the body—the middle of the chest, of the heart.

§ Bri. Upanishad 4-5-23

Atharvaśikha—Upanishad

¶ Chh. Upanishad 3-14.

“ Do thou worship, O prāchīna-yogya.”\*\*

Similarly in such passages as “ the knower of Brahman attains to the Supreme”\* the nature of Brahman His Upāsana and the effect thereof are taught. Otherwise (u) how can either the attainment ‘of all desires’ as the result ‘equally with Brahman’ (v) who is described as the ‘True, or the sākshāt-kāra of such a Brahman, be achieved? Such passages as

Truth, wisdom, and endless is Brahman”†

Bliss is Brahman”‡

Brahman is He whose body is ākāśa, who is the existent, who delights in Prāṇa, whose joy is manas”§

Hail to the Reality, the Truth, the Supreme Brahman, dark and yellowish in person, having semen above, diverse-eyed, ”||

propound—as shown by upakrāma and other tatparyalingas or marks showing what the special aim of Vedantic teaching is—Brahman as one who is by nature Truth, Wisdom and Bliss, who delights in Himself, in whom all taint of pain is absent, who is all good itself who is dark and yellowish because associated with the inseparable Parama-Sakti or Supreme-Energy, who is diverse-eyed as possessed of three eyes. Such passages as

“ He who knows (Brahman) seated in the cave, etc.”¶

“ Thus do thou worship, O Prachīna-yogya”\*\*  
enjoin His Upāsana which is inseparable from Jnana. And passages like, “ he attains all desires” tell us of the attainment of all desires by the worshippers (Upasakas. Wherefore it is but just that there should be an injunction of Upasana inseparably asso-

\* Taitti. Upanishad 1-6.

(u) Otherwise It is but reasonable that the Vedanta should enjoin the Upāsana of Brahman. Without the Upāsana no sākshāt-kāra is possible, and the whole exposition of Brahman would be useless if no means of reaching Him be taught. If, therefore, the scriptures which expound Brahman should serve any human end, it can be only by enjoining the means of reaching him. This reasonableness is one of the lingas showing that Vedanta enjoins Upāsana.

(v) All desires: Equal to the aggregate of pleasures accessible to all beings from man up to Hiraṇyagarbha: Equally with Brahman i.e., the liberated soul enjoys all the bliss that Brahman enjoys.

† Taitti. Upanishad 2-1.

‡ Bri. Upanishad 3-9-28.

§ Taitti. Upanishad 1-6

Mahānarayana 12

¶ Taitti. Upanishad 2-1.

\*\* Taitti. Upanishad 1-6.



ciated with Jnana, in the following form:—A mumukshu or seeker of moksha, performing his own duties disinterestedly, eschewing all prohibited and interested acts, endued with the purity of mind resulting from the observance of acts enjoined in the Śruti and Smṛiti, saturated with Bhakti for Parama-Siva which is rendered possible by the subjugation of the body and the senses,—thus prepared, a mumukshu should know of Para-Brahman called Siva from the essential portion of the Śruti and meditate upon Him. The use of the epithet Siva here (in the Bhashya) is intended to show that the diverse-eyed Brahman is the repository of supreme purity and good and is therefore, for mumukshus, the sole object of Upasana. Accordingly in a passage in the Atharva-siṅha.—

“Siva alone, the source of good, should be meditated upon, abandoning all else.”—

it is taught that the Being denoted by the word Siva should alone be meditated upon. Otherwise, how can the cessation of Samsara be brought about? Siva is the seat of the unsurpassed good which is free from all taint of evil, and a knowledge of Him leads to moksha as its result, as said in the passage:

“When mṛta should roll up the ether like a hide, then only, without first knowing God, there could be an end of pain.”\*

The passage:

“Siva alone, the source of all good, should be meditated upon, abandoning all else,”

excludes all beings other than Siva as not worthy the aspirant's while to know or meditate upon. Wherefore those who are desirous of moksha has to know and meditate upon Siva alone, the Para-Brahman.

There can, therefore, be no opposition to the view that a harmonious concatenation of all texts which go to show what the drift of the Vedantic teaching is, proves that the Vedāntas point both to Brahman and to an injunction of His worship.

### Adhikarana--5.

With a view to prevent a possible objection that the aforesaid definition of Brahman is too wide as applying to Pradhana as well, the Sutrakara says

Because of thinking, (Sat is) not the unrevealed (I. i. 5.)

The subject of discussion in this section is the following passage of the Chhândogya Upanishad:

“Sat (existent) alone, my dear, this at first was one only, without second. It thought may I be many.”\*

Here the doubt arises as to whether the Being spoken of as Sat, the Existent, and said to have existed in the beginning and to be the cause of the whole of this universe, is Brahman or Pradhana.

(Purvapaksha:—It is but right that Pradhana is the cause of the world as described elsewhere in the Śruti:

“Unborn, one, red, white and black, giving birth to manifold progeny similarly formed.”†

Here it is taught that the Sāṅkhya's Prakṛti, composed of *rajas*, *sattva* and *taṃas*—as indicated by the red and other colours—is the producer of manifold progeny. In accordance with this passage we should understand that it is Pradhana which is the cause of the world, spoken of here (in the Chhândogya Upanishad) as the Sat. We may even explain that the Pradhana possesses, in virtue of *rajas* and *sattva* contained in it the powers of intelligence and action (Jnana-Sakti and Kriya Sakti) which are indispensable in the cause of the world. It stands to reason that the unintelligent Pradhana should become transformed (parinama) into the world, not the Supreme Lord, the Immutable Intelligence;—parinama (transformation) being only a vikara or modified form of the cause. Thus both reason and revelation lead us to the conclusion that it is the Pradhana which is spoken of as Sat and is the cause of the world.

As against the foregoing view, we hold as follows: the unrevealed i. e., the Pradhana established by pure anumana or inference, is not the thing spoken of as the Sat and described as the cause of the universe; but it is the intelligent Brahman (that is spoken of as Sat); for ‘thought’ is predicated of the Sat in the words “It thought, may I become many.”‡ In the unintelligent Pradhana, indeed, there cannot exist thought which is the property of a conscious entity.

It is not right to contend that, because of the passage “Giving birth to manifold progeny similarly formed,” it is the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya that is here spoken of as the cause of the universe. For, in Sutra I. iv. 8 we shall show that it is only that Pra-

\* Chh. 6—2.

† Mahanarayana Upanishad 12.

‡ Chh. Upanishad 6—2.

\* Bratasūtrata-Upanishad 6—20.

† The



kṛiti which has the Supreme Lord for its impelling cause that can produce manifold progeny. Neither is it possible to maintain that, as made up of *rajas* and *sattva*, Pradhana is endued with the potencies of action and intelligence; for, the Prakṛiti which is made up of the three *gunas* cannot possess *sattva* and *rajas* quite exclusive of *tamas*. It being admitted that Prakṛiti is the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in a state of equilibrium, it is idle to say that when *tamas* becomes quiescent and *rajas* and *sattva* not excited, Pradhana becomes endued with intelligence and activity. The objection that the transformation of the Supreme immutable Lord would subject Him to *vikāra* or change is a mere play of ignorance: there is no fear of our being led to such a conclusion, inasmuch as we hold that the Supreme Lord is the cause when invested with the potencies of subtle *chit* and *achit* in their undifferentiated state as to name and form, and He is the effect when invested with the potencies of grosser *chit* and *achit* which are differentiated in name and form.

(Objection): From the determinate exclusion implied in such passages as the "existent alone, my dear, this at first was, one alone, without a second" we learn that the thing spoken of as *Sat*, "the Existent" has no specific attributes. How can It be spoken of as the cause containing within it the universe in its subtle form?

(Answers) The determination conveyed by "Existent alone" is not meant to exclude specific attributes; but it is meant to remove the idea that the cause is not the non-existent; there being persons who by ignorance cherish that idea, as set forth in the *Sruti*:

"Non-existent verily this at first was; thence, indeed, the existent sprang up."\*

Moreover, how can Brahman—as described in the passage:

"The existent alone, my dear, this at first was, one alone, without a second,"—

be without specific attributes? In this passage the word 'was' shows a specific act, and the words "at first" show a specific time. The determination implied in "one alone" is intended to exclude an external ruler, and the words "without a second" indicate that it is the *Upadana* or material cause of the universe. Hence also the specific attributes of Omniscience and infinite power; for how, without the

specific attributes of Omniscience and all-powerfulness, can Brahman constitute the twofold cause of the universe? Or, (the same thing may be established in another way) it cannot be rightly held that the word '*Sat*' which is made up of a *base* and *termination* refers to only one thing; the word '*Sat*' being intended to denote two things by means of its base and termination. Accordingly, the learned have declared as follows:

"Sakti and Nivā are denoted by the base and the termination of the word '*Sat*'. These two constitute Brahman, as together forming, by their harmonious union, the essence of the whole universe."

The conclusion, therefore, is that the Supreme Lord Himself invested with the potencies (Sakti) of the Universe—*chit* and *achit* in their gross and subtle forms,—and thus forming the cause and the effect, is the thing denoted by the word '*Sat*'

Again an objection is raised and answered:

If (you regard it) figurative, (we say) no, because of the word '*Atman*' (I. 1. 6.)

(Objection):—It has been stated that, because no act of thinking is possible in Pradhana which is insentient, it is the sentient Supreme Brahman that is the cause, spoken of as the '*Sat*' or Existent. Now, this view is quite inconsistent. For, just as in the statements "that light thought" and "those waters thought," thought is figuratively predicated of insentient objects, so also it may be held that thought is figuratively predicated of Pradhana.

(Answer):—No, because of the word '*Atman*' denoting a sentient being. The *Sruti* starts with the words "the existent, my dear, this at first was," and concludes thus, "He is the *Atman*; That thou ~~too~~." Even as to the light etc., the predicate of thought is not figurative, since the sentient Supreme Lord runs through them as their *Atman* or essential Soul.

(Objection):—It has been shown that, even admitting that the predicate of thought is figurative, it is not possible to maintain that the insentient Pradhana is the existent and is the cause of the Universe, because of the word "*Atman*" implying that the cause is a sentient being. Granted that the word '*Atman*' cannot denote the insentient Pradhana; but the sentient Jiva or individual soul can be denoted primarily by the word '*Atman*.' Wherefore, it is the sentient Jiva that is spoken of as the existent and the cause of the universe.

\* Tait Upanishad 2. 7.

(Answer):—In reply the Sūtrakāra says:—

(The Sat is not Jiva.) It being taught that the devotee thereof attains Moksha (I. 1.7).

The passage,

“For him there is only delay so long he is not delivered (from the body)”\*

teaches that he who is devoted to the Being spoken of as the ‘Sat’ attains to Moksha. Wherefore neither Pradhāna nor Jiva is referred to by the word ‘Sat’. Not even they who hold Pradhāna to be the cause can admit that the devotee of Pradhāna attains to moksha holding as they do that Pradhāna is a thing to be avoided. Neither can a devotee of Jiva attain Moksha, Jiva being excluded from the passage,

“Siva alone, the source of all good, should be contemplated, abandoning all else.”†

Again, The Sūtrakāra states quite clearly the reason for discarding Pradhāna:

And (Sat is not Pradhāna), there being no declaration that (the Sat) is to be abandoned. (I. 1.8)

If the Pradhāna were intended to be taught here, then it (Sat) would have been spoken of as a thing to be avoided. Whereas in the sentence “That thou art” the ‘Sat’ is spoken of as an object of contemplation leading to Moksha. Wherefore it stands to reason that Pradhāna is not (the thing spoken of as ‘Sat’).

Moreover, in the case of Pradhāna there is some inconsistency, as the Sūtrakāra says:—

Because of inconsistency with the preposition.—(I. 1.9).

There is another reason why Pradhāna cannot be the thing denoted by the word ‘Sat’; the reason being that it would involve a contradiction of the original proposition asserting that, the One being known, all is known. The passage “whereby the unheard of becomes heard”‡ asserts that the knowledge of the thing denoted by the word ‘Sat’ leads to a knowledge of all things, sentient and insentient, these latter being the effect of that one thing. This would be impossible if Pradhāna were the cause, inasmuch as Pradhāna cannot be the cause of the sentient existence.

(Objection):—The cause, Pradhāna, being known, all this—the effect thereof—which is insentient and subject to change becomes known. When the clay, for instance, is known, its effect, the pot etc., is known

What inconsistency, then, is found here? In reply the Sūtrakāra says:—

Because of dissolution.—(I. 1.10.)

For the following reason, too, Pradhāna is not the thing denoted by the word ‘Sat’; for the passage

“Learn from me the true nature of sleep (svapna).

When a man sleeps here, then, my dear son, he becomes united with the Sat; he is gone to his own (self). Therefore they say ‘*svapiti*,’ he sleeps.”\*

speaks of the dissolution of the sentient Jiva when he becomes one with the Sat. Dissolution means absorption. The sentient cannot attain dissolution in the insentient Pradhāna. Wherefore ‘Sat’ does not refer to Pradhāna.

It is the Supreme Lord that is referred to by the word ‘Sat,’ not Pradhāna. So the Sūtrakāra says:—

The usage being the same.—(I. 1.11.)

Just as in this Upanishad the word ‘Sat’ is taken to mean the Supreme Lord, so in other Upanishads, too, ‘Sat’ refers to the same thing (i.e., the Supreme Lord), as for example in the passages like.

“Purnusha verily is Rudra, the sat, the adorable.

Hail! Hail !!”†

Wherefore it is verily the Supreme Lord who is denoted by the word ‘Sat.’

In this (i.e., the Chhandogya) Upanishad it is plainly said that everything takes its birth from the A’tman referred to by the word ‘Sat.’ So the Sūtrakāra says:—

And it being also revealed.—(I. 1.12).

Here, too, the S’ruti beginning with the words “From A’tman is Prāna, from A’tman is ākāśa” concludes with the words “from A’tman alone is all this.”‡

Therefore Brahman Himself is spoken of as the cause of the universe and is referred to by the word ‘Sat,’ not Pradhāna.

### Adhikarana—6

Here (in the adhikarana just closed) it has been objected that the definition of Brahman as the cause of the universe, which can be learned from scriptures alone, is too wide as applying to the Tāntic Pradhāna as well and arguments based on the sentience of the

\*Chh. Upanishad. 6—2...14.

†Atharvasikhā.

‡Chh. Upanishad 6—1.

\* Chh. Upanishad. 6—8

† Mahāna. Up.

‡ Chh. Upanishad 7—25

cause of the Universe) have been adduced with a view to show that the definition is not too wide as applying to Pradhāna. The next adhikarana proceeds to show that as in the case of insentient Pradhāna so also the definition is not too wide as applying to sentient Jiva either :

**A'nandamaya** (is Parames'vara) because of repetition—(I.1.13.)

In A'nanda-valli, in the passage beginning with "From this A'tman, verily ākāśa was born" and ending with "Beyond that A'tman made up of intellect, there is another inner A'tman which is blissful,"\* a certain A'tman, blissful and hidden within annamaya (physical) and other sheaths, is spoken of as the cause of the whole creation including ākāśa.

The doubt arises as to whether the 'blissful a'tman' is Jiva or Parames'vara.

The *primæ facie* view is that it is Jiva, because the attributes of Jiva are found described here. For example, in the passage beginning with "From earth plants, from plants food, from food the person,"† we find described the body made up of five members, and so on. Here *annamaya* refers to the physical body, *pranamaya* to prana within the physical body, *manomaya* to manas within prana, *vijnanamaya* to buddhi within manas; and *anandamaya* is the Jiva himself, the basis of all these,—of *annamaya* etc. The representation of *annamaya* and other A'tmans as made up of head and so on is intended for meditation. Abundance of food etc., is described as the fruit of the meditation of *annamaya* etc., as Brahman. It may be asked how can Jiva, immersed in pain—in the ocean of samsara—be spoken of as *anandamaya*? But there is no room for any such objection. The word 'ananda' denotes Supreme Brahman, as said by the S'ruti—"ananda is Brahman."‡ As the suffix *maya* implies modification (*vikāra*), *anandamaya* refers to Jiva, who is the *karya*,—the effect or emanation—of Brahman. If *anandamaya* were to refer to Brahman who is ever endued with goodness, the prayer for purity offered in the words "may my *annamaya*, *pranamaya*, *manomaya*, *vijnanamaya*, and *anandamaya* become pure" § would be useless. Wherefore this *anandamaya* A'tman is Jiva, not Parames'vara.

A. MAHADEVA SASTRI, B. A.

(To be continued.)

## SIVAGNANA SIDDHIAR OF ARUL NANDI SIVA CHARIAR.

(Continued from page 249)  
BHATTACHARYA'S STATEMENT.  
PURVA MIMANSA SYSTEM.

1. We here set forth the doctrines as now extant in this sea girt earth, of Jamini Bhagavan as expounded by his disciple Bhattacharya, to the effect that the Vedas alone are true and that there is no God and that by performing Karma heaven will be reached.

2. The souls have lust and other *Gunas* (attributes). If the Veda was given out by man, they cannot be accepted as true: as he is educated, he becomes intelligent and without education he will be something like a baby or a dumb man. (So it is impossible, man himself could have given out the Vedas).

3. If you say that he who made the Vedas is God and He is not a man, then, when He attains a body He must be a man only and his measure of knowledge is as he is educated. If He gets no visible body, then he can have no (mouth to utter) and mind to think.

4. All the Devas, Sages and Siddhas and elementals, and everybody else assert that they never heard that the Vedas were revealed by anybody. This is what was been imparted from generation to generation. It could have no human author either, as it treats of future births and states.

5. In the Vedas are comprised all the six *angas* and the three *Upa-Vedas*. All knowledge is centred in it. It is eternal, having neither beginning nor end. It is ever consistent and in constant usage.

6. It contains rules and prohibitions, and the description of the true paths, and the various mantras and their respective Devas, and the description of the various sacrifices are contained in the Vedas and as such they cannot be all similar. When people understand all the past, present and future, the Vedas appear in some form in all its truth.

3. This last stanza proves that no man could have been the author of the Vedas as man derives all his knowledge from the Vedas themselves. And no God could have revealed it either, which if true, he must have a mouth and mind and senses like man to utter the Veda—in which He is reduced to the condition of man and the former objection again applies. So it is not only among those who disbelieve in the Vedas there are atheists but those within the fold also.

5. The six *angas*, are Numbers, Nirukta, Grammar, Chandas, Astronomy, and Kalpa. The three *Upa-Vedas*, *Ayur-Veda* (medicine) and *Thanur-Veda* (science of warfare) and *Gandharva-Veda* (music).

\* Tait. Upanishad 2-1, 5.

† Tait. Upanishad 2-1.

‡ Tait. Upanishad 3-6.

§ Mahāva Upanishad 57.

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — O R — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDA'NTA-SUTRAS WITH S'RĪKANTHA  
BHĀ'SHYA.

*Continued from page 270, Vol. I*

### Adhikarana-6.

As against this view, we hold that the A'nandamaya Ātman is the Parames'vara, because this A'nanda or bliss is repeatedly spoken of as unsurpassed. Beginning with 'there arises this enquiry as to A'nanda,\* the s'ruti speaks of several grades of bliss, ranging from human bliss to that of Prajapati, each higher grade being a hundred times superior to the one below it, and then concludes with 'that is the limit of Brahman's bliss,' thus declaring by repetition that Brahman's bliss stands unsurpassed at the head. The samsārin cannot be spoken of as such a repository of unsurpassed bliss.

As to the question how, if A'nandamaya be the Īśvara, to account for His prayer for purity,—the

answer is as follows. Just as the highly lustrous moon attains clearness only on the disappearance of clouds which hide her, so, too, in the case of Him who is ever pure, purification consists in merely removing the *tirodhāna-mala*, the dirt which acts as the veil concealing Him from our view. Wherefore A'nandamaya is none other than Parames'vara.

(Objection) — A'nanda itself is declared to be Brahman; and A'nandamaya must be an effect — emanation thereon, since the suffix 'maya' implies production or change. If A'nandamaya be Īśvara, it would follow that Īśvara is different from Brahman. If, thus, Īśvara is a mere vikāra or effect, He could also be non-eternal.

The sūtrakāra states and meets the objection as follows:

If you hold it is not so because  
(we hold you are  
abundance.

Obj. to — J  
vikāras — J  
also limited — J  
form of — J

\* Tan. Upanishad 2



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Accordingly since *Parames'vara* cannot be *vikāra*, *A'nandamaya* is none other than *Jīva*.

(Answer):—No, because here the suffix 'maya' implies abundance. Only in the words 'annamaya,' 'prāṇamaya' and *manomaya*, 'maya' means *vikāra* or modified form. *Vijñānamaya* is the *Jīva* in whom *Vijñāna* or intellection is in abundance, *A'nandamaya* is *Parames'vara* in whom *A'nanda* or bliss abounds.

(Objection):—As occurring in a section dealing with *vikāras* or modified forms, it is altogether but proper that the suffix 'maya' should be taken to mean *vikāra*.

In answer, the *Sūtrakāra* says:

Also because of the mention of a reason therefor (I. i. 15.)

The passage "He alone verily causes bliss"\* declares *A'nandamaya* as the cause of bliss with reference to *Jīvas*. He alone who himself abounds in bliss can impart bliss to others. Wherefore *A'nandamaya* is none other than *Parames'vara*.

Objection:—Though it has been said that *A'nandamaya* is the *Parames'vara* in whom bliss is abundant, still, it will be found that He is quite distinct from *Brahman*; for, the words "Brahman is the tail, the basis"† show that He has *Brahman* for His basis. If it be admitted that *Brahman* is distinct from the *Parames'vara*, the former becomes a dependent being and cannot, therefore, be the cause of the universe, and so on. Wherefore it is better to hold that *Jīva* is meant here.

In reply the *Sūtrakāra* says

And the very subject of the hymn is sung here.—(I. i. 16.)

The very *Brahman* spoken in the words of the Mantra, "Truth, Wisdom, and Endless is Brahman"‡ is described as *A'nandamaya* in the passage "Another inner *ātman* is *A'nandamaya*, § as abounding in bliss. In the passage *Brahman* is the tail, the basis, the word "Brahman" designates *Pranava*, which as the designation of *Parames'vara*, forms His basis

On this subject some hold as follows:—

It is the *Paramākāś'a* or Supreme Light, the *Prakṛiti* *Ātman*, that is spoken of in the *S'ruti* as *A'nandamaya*; but not the *Para-Brahman*, that Cause which is beyond the Universe and described, as "Truth, Wisdom, and Endless is Brahman." *A'nandamaya* is the

*Paramākāś'a* described as the *Prakṛiti* or the material cause of the universe including *akāś'a* or ether, as stated in the passage "From this *Ātman*, verily, was *akāś'a* produced."\*\* That the *Ātman* here spoken of is of the form of *Paramākāś'a* is seen from the passage "If this *akāś'a*, the *A'nanda*, did not exist &c."† And the passage "Brahman is the tail, the basis"‡ shows that *Brahman* is the basis of *A'nanda-ākāś'a*. Accordingly in the passage "That is the unit of *Brahman's* bliss" we find that the *A'nanda* rests in *Brahman*. This very *A'nanda* is again described as the *prakṛiti* of all beings in passages like

"He knew that *A'nanda* is *Brahman*, it is from *A'nanda* verily are all these beings born." §

And *A'nanda* is here spoken of as *Brahman* in the words "A'nanda is *Brahman*," because as an attribute of *Brahman* is not quite distinct from *Brahman*. The passage "This wisdom of *Bṛhgu* and *Varuna* is based on the *Paramākāś'a* declares that *Varuna's* wisdom concludes with *Paramākāś'a*, which is an attribute of *Brahman*, and which is of the nature of Supreme Bliss, the *prakṛiti* or material cause of the universe, otherwise known as the Supreme energy, the self-conscious *Ātman*. Wherefore it is the Supreme energy (*Parama-sakti*)—which is an attribute of *Brahman*, the *Ātman* which is the *Prakṛiti* or the material cause, the Supreme Light (*Paramākāś'a*), that is spoken of as *A'nandamaya*. As the substance possessing *A'nandamaya* as an attribute, the Supreme *Brahman* is spoken of as its basis. And *Vijñānamaya* is the *Jīva*, the worshipper thereof. The *Sūtrakāra* has introduced the *Sūtra* 13, thinking that the *A'nandamaya-Ātman* is one with *Brahman*, because the former, the *A'nandamaya*, which is of the nature of an attribute (*dharma*) and energy (*Sakti*) cannot be thought of as distinct from the latter, the *Para-Brahman*, the basic substance wherein it inheres as an attribute and energy.

Others, again, hold as follows: these five *Ātman*, spoken of as *annamaya* and so on, are no doubt the five sentient *Parushas* or spiritual entities on the causal plane of being, designated as *Brahmā*, *Vishnu*, *Rudra*, *Īśāna* and *Sadāśiva* and who are the impelling controllers of the five *bhūtas* or cosmic elements hinted at by *anna* (food) etc., inasmuch as in such passa-

\* Tait. Upanishad 2.

† Tait. Upanishad 2.

‡ p. 1.

§ Tait. U p. 2-5.

\* Tait. Upanishad 2-1.

† Tait. Upanishad 2-7. Tait. Upanishad 2-5.

‡ Tait. Upanishad 3-6.

§ Tait. U p. 3-6.

ges as "from this world departing, he becomes united with the physical (*annamaya*) A'tman": the 'anna-maya' and others occur in connection with A'tman which denotes a sentient being, and are described as reachable one after another by the liberated soul departing from this world of *samsāra*. The Brahman who is known as *Paramas'iva* and who is the cause even of *Sadās'iva*, i. e., of the *A'nandamaya* who is the basis of the *Annamaya* and other A'tmans,—is spoken of as His (*Sadās'iva's*) basis. The *A'nandamaya* is not regarded as distinct from Brahman and is therefore spoken of as Brahman. Thus, all things considered, it may be concluded that *A'nandamaya* is *Parames'vara*.

#### Adhikarana-7.

It has been established that the definition—arrived at by an accordant construction of the scriptural texts—of Brahman, the Supreme *S'iva*, as the cause of the Universe, is not too wide as applying to *Pradhāna* and *Jiva* as well. Next the *Sūtrakāra* proceeds to discuss the passages which seem to declare that *Hiranyagarbha*, who is made up of the totality of *Jivas* is the cause of the Universe.

Not the other, because of incongruity. (I. i. 17).

The following passage of the *Mahopanishad* forms the subject of discussion here:

"Whence proceeded the birth of the Universe, That Being, by water sent forth the (bodies of) souls on earth, and (it was that Being) which by plants, entered into men and beasts, into all beings moving and unmoving."<sup>†</sup>

The doubt arises as to whether the *Parusha* spoken of as the cause of the birth etc. of the whole Universe is the *Parames'vara* or some one else.

*Pārīpakṣha*:—It is the *Hiranyagarbha*, because of His characteristic marks described here.

From the puranic passage:

"The three lokas having become ocean, the Brahman in the form of *Nārāyaṇa* reclines on the serpent-bed, expanded by the devouring of the three worlds."

we learn that Brahman lies in the ocean. This characteristic mark of His is found described in the passage:

Whom within the ocean the sages weave."<sup>‡</sup>

\*Tait. Upanishad 3-10.

†Mahān. Up. 1.

‡Mān. whom the sage forming himself the whole Universe reads form themselves a cloth.

In the opening passage of the whole section. "*Prajapati* moves in the womb within" \* He is described as having entered into all beings, and in the conclusion the passage "the creator made the sun and the moon as before, also heaven and the earth" † declares that He is the cause. Wherefore it is but right that to the *Hiranyagarbha* who is thus referred to in the opening and concluding passages apply all the attributes described in the intervening passages. Moreover, reference has been made to the following passages which treat of *Hiranyagarbha*:

"He was born of waters &c."

*Hiranyagarbha* at first was &c

In the section first referred to here, it is certainly *Prajapati* that is treated of; for, we find it said that "*Prajapati* moves in the womb within the unborn is born in many a form." In the section next referred to, it is said that "*Prajapati* is verily the *Hiranyagarbha*." Therefore it is verily the *Hiranyagarbha* who is described here as the cause of the birth of the world and so on.

As against the foregoing view we hold as follows: It is not the *Hiranyagarbha* as distinct from the *Parames'vara*, that is treated of here; for, the attributes of *Parames'vara*—such as being the cause of the origin of the Universe—cannot apply to the *Hiranyagarbha*. The Being spoken of at the beginning as the cause of the Universe, as the being "whence proceeded the birth of the Universe" is described to be higher than all and far transcending the darkness or the region of *Prakṛiti*, in the verses beginning with the following:—

"There is verily none else higher and subtler than This which is higher than the high and greater than the great; which is one, unmanifest, of endless forms, the whole universe, the ancient, beyond the darkness."<sup>‡</sup>

This cannot apply to the *Hiranyagarbha* who is within the *Mundane Egg*. Moreover, *moksha* or immortality is said to result from a knowledge of Him, in the words

"They who know Him become immortal."

This, too, cannot refer to *Hiranyagarbha*, for, as a special distinguishing mark of *Parames'vara*, it

\* Mān. Up. 1.

† Tait. Aranyako.

‡ Mān. Up. 1. Mahān.

declared that He is the source of immortality in the following passage.

When like leather men can fold, æther, men alone without knowing S'iva there can be an end of pain."\*

It is of no use to say that He (the Hiranyagarbha) is referred to in the opening and concluding passages. As inapplicable to Hiranyagarbha, the words "Prajāpati" and "Dhātā," denote the Parames'vara who is literally the Lord of creatures and the supporter of the Universe. In both the sections referred to—Taittiriya A'raṇyaka 3-13 and Taittiriya Saṁhita 4-1-8—it is the Parames'vara Himself that is spoken of, because of His characteristic attributes—that He is the Lord of the Universe and far beyond it—described thus.

"Who rules this, the two-footed and the four-footed"† "The sun-coloured, beyond the darkness."‡

Wherefore He who is spoken of as Prajāpati and the cause of the world is the Parames'vara, not the Hiranyagarbha.

As against the view that the Hiranyagarbha is the cause of the Universe since there is no distinction between Him and Parames'vara, the Sūtrakāra says:

And because of the mention of a distinction. (I. i. 18).

A distinction between Parames'vara and Hiranyagarbha as cause and effect, is made in this Mahopanishad in the following passage:—

"The Rudra, the Great Sage (Maharshi) transcending the Universe, first saw Hiranyagarbha, the first of the Devas then being born."§

Wherefore it may be concluded that the Iśvara is the cause of the whole Universe including Hiranyagarbha.

The Sūtrakāra refutes another possible objection thus

And in spite of his desire, no ground for inference. (I. i. 19).

Everywhere in the Sruti Hiranyagarbha's desire concerning the creation of the Universe is spoken of in the words "Prajāpati-desired, may I produce the creatures," still there is no ground for the inference that He is the cause of the universe, for his desire concerns itself with the minor creation. Even this

\* S'vetāśvatara Up. 6-2.

There can be no end of pain without a knowledge of S'iva.

† Tait. Saṁ. 4-1-8.

‡ Tait. A'raṇyaka. 3-13.

§ Mahānārāyaṇa Up. 12.

minor creation pertains to the Parames'vara Himself who takes the form of Hiranyagarbha as the Sūtrakāra will say in the Sūtra II. iv. 20.

The Sūtrakāra now proceeds to consider the view that the identity of Parames'vara and Hiranyagarbha should be admitted inasmuch as it is declared in the passage.

"Entering in the form of this Jīva, the Atman, the name and form will I differentiate,"\* that Parames'vara who has entered into the universe as its soul in the form of Hiranyagarbha is the creator of names and forms.

And herein (it) declares his relation to Him (I. i. 20).

Herein, in the science of this very Upanishad, the mantric texts declare the Hiranyagarbha's subordinate relation to Parames'vara, in the words "Brahman is the Lord, the Lord of Brahmā"†. Wherefore, it follows that none but Parames'vara is the cause of the universe and that the Hiranyagarbha is subordinate to Him.

### Adhikarana—8.

By means of arguments adduced in the foregoing adhikaranas it has been established that Para-Brahman is the Being called Siva who is distinct from *chit* and *achit*, spirit and matter; who is omniscient, ever-contented, of beginningless wisdom, independent of never-failing power, of infinite potentialities, the two-fold cause of the whole universe; who can be revealed only by the one accordant interpretation of the whole science of the Upanishad; who, by nature is without a second, self-luminous, and conjoined with the whole Universe; who is the existence, Intelligence and Bliss in essence; who constitutes the means by which to cut asunder the bond of saṁsāra. The next adhikarana proceeds to point out that form of His on which to concentrate the mind and which constitutes for the aspirant an antidote for saṁsāra

(He who is) within is Paramesvara because of the declaration of His attributes. (I. i. 21).

The following passage in the Chhândogya forms the subject of discussion here:

"Now that Golden Person, who is seen within the sun, with golden beard and golden hair, golden altogether to the very tips of his nails, whose two eyes are like white lotus."‡

\* Chhândogya—Up. 6—3.

† Mahāna. Up. 21.

‡ Chh. Upanishad 1-6.



The doubt arises as to whether this golden person within the sun is Parames'vara or any particular Devatā.

Now, Parames'vara who is the basis of all and who is everywhere, cannot be the person who is within the sun and of golden form. If it be held to be the form assumed by Him of His own accord, it must necessarily be the form containing three eyes. Such a form is not found here: we find described here only two eyes which are like blue lotus's.

Or, even if it were the body assumed of his own accord, it would certainly produce pain even in the case of Parames'vara as much as in the case of samśrins. Even in the case of a voluntary contact, it is in the very nature of fire to burn the thing in contact. Thus it is not proper to suppose that Parames'vara becomes united to body. Wherefore the person (spoken of in the passage under discussion) is some Devatā, not the Parames'vara. This is the argument that may be adduced on behalf of the *Pārvapaksha*.

The *Siddhānta* maintains that it is the Parames'vara Himself—Why so?—Because of the mention of his attributes. In the passages "He is the master of all worlds and of all desires" and "His name is the 'Above', He has risen above all sins" \* it is the attributes of Parames'vara, the attributes of fineness and of mastery over all worlds and desires, are spoken of; for, it is revealed that

One indeed is Rudra,—they are never for a second,—who rules these worlds by His ruling energies. †

The One who to many ordains the objects of desire. ‡ and so on.

As to the contention that He who is the basis of all and who pervades all cannot be a dweller within the sun, we reply that the Parames'vara who is the basis of all and who pervades all things assumes some golden form in consideration of the devotees and dwells in the solar orb. Unlike us, by such a connection with the body the Is'vara does not become subject to the evil of saṁsāra. The blessed s'ruti itself declares both his connection with the body and his freedom from all sin. In fact, dependant as we are on the authority of s'ruti, we do not hold analogical reasoning very high. Even fire cannot burn those

things in contact which are too powerful. The mention of two eyes of the three-eyed Parames'vara is meant merely to show its resemblance to white lotus: it does not mean the absence of a third eye. When we say, for instance, of a man having three sons, that two of his sons are like fire, the mention of the number 'two' does not imply the absence of the third, but it is meant to show the resemblance of the two sons to fire. So also here. Two of Parames'vara's eyes shine like the white lotus which has been blossomed by the sun, whereas the third eye, which is naturally closed, does not resemble the fully-blossomed lotus; it is like a closed lotus.

(Objection:) In the following passage,

"This Being who moves, the Dark-necked Nilagri-va) and Red, whom the cowherds and the water-carrying women have seen, and whom all beings see, He when seen, makes us happy." \*

we are given to understand that the dark-necked Parames'vara is visible to all beings. And from another passage "The three-eyed sun who by his splendour has pervaded the orb on all sides" we learn that he possesses three eyes. Therefore A'ditya Himself is the Parames'vara visible to all and residing in the middle of the shining orb. Otherwise, how can the S'ruti speak of the sun as dark-necked and three-eyed or designate Him a Brahman in the words "This sun is Brahman"? † Wherefore it is the very Sun-god residing in the orb, spoken of as he "who is within the sun," that is referred to as the golden puruṣa or spirit.

Against this view the Sūtrakāra says:—

And because of the mention of a distinction, He is another. (1.1.22.)

The Parames'vara of golden form is quite distinct from that sentient A'ditya, the personal soul of the solar orb, because of the distinction made in the s'ruti.

Who dwelling in the sun, inner than the sun, whom the sun knows not, whose body the sun is, who within controls the sun,—he is thy A'tman, the Inner Regulator (Antaryāmin), the Immortal. ‡

Here the word "immortal" denotes S'iva, because it is said in the Jābala Upanishad in praise of S'arāṇudriya that "these verily are the designations of the Immortal." § From the attribute—described of Para-

\* Chh. Upanishad 1-6.

† S'vetā Upanishad 3-2.

‡ S'vet. Upanishad 6-13.

• Tait. Samhitā 4-5-1

† Tait. Aranyaka 2-2.

‡ Br. Upanishad 1-7.

§ Jābala. Up. 3.

mes'vara—that He is unknown to the sun, we should understand that the Parames'vara is distinct from the Jīva. Wherefore it is the Parames'vara dwelling within the sun, the golden Is'vara,—it is the Parames'vara as distinguished from the sentient sun that is spoken of here as “dark-necked, blood-red.”\* As the indwelling soul of the sun, he is spoken of by the sun.

(*Objection*.) The “dark-necked” dwelling within the sun is not the Parames'vara; on the other hand He is Nārāyaṇa. Accordingly the lay poets, everywhere, declare:—

“To be always meditated upon is He, Nārāyaṇa, who, dwelling within the sun's orb, is seated on the lotus-seat.”

He alone can properly be said to have two eyes like the white lotus, because He is well-known as “the Pundarikāksha or the lotus-eyed.” Why all the trouble of explaining it otherwise?

(*Answer*):—No; because the special characteristic marks of the Parames'vara which are found described in connection with the Golden Spirit (Hiraṇyaya Puruṣa), cannot be explained when applied to Nārāyaṇa. Now it is proper to determine the drift of this passage of doubtful signification,—referred to in the Sūtra,—by collating it with other passages which admit of no doubt.

In the Mahopanishad there is the following passage:—

“It is verily the sun (āditya) that burns this orb, etc.”†

Here the sun, the personal soul dwelling in the orb, is spoken of in the words “the person who is in this shining orb”; then the Golden Spirit, the Regulator within the sun, is referred to in the words

“This Golden spirit who is within the sun.”\*; then again His vibhūti (glory) as the sun is spoken of in the words “The sun is the vigor, energy, strength and fame.”\*; then he is referred to as the Lord of all beings in the words “He is the Spirit, the Lord of all Beings.”\* then again in answer as it were to the question who He is, He is again described in the section which begins with “All is Rudra...”\* and concludes thus “to Him who is Golden-armed the Golden-Lord, the Lord of Ambikā (the mother), the Lord of Umā.”†. As the mention of ‘arm’ in this description stands for other features as well, we should understand that it means the golden-coloured. Therefore it follows that it is He whose colour is like gold, who is the Lord of Umā, that is spoken of as the one dwelling within the sun. Here His characteristic marks are: He is Nilagrīva or dark-necked, He is the Lord of Umā. These cannot be ascribed to any being other than the Parames'vara. The possession of eyes like lotus is a general mark, applicable to other beings besides Nārāyaṇa. We speak of a woman or a man having eyes like lotus. When the two marks are mentioned together, the special mark should prevail in our determining of the exact being spoken of here. The passage cited above to show that Nārāyaṇa should always be meditated upon as the deity dwelling within the sun should be understood in a figurative sense. Wherefore it follows that the Being who has to be meditated upon as dwelling in the sun by seekers of Moksha is none but the Blessed Parames'vara described in the Sāvitrī or Gāyatrī-Hymn—of golden form, having three eyes, dark-necked the Lord of Umā, the Lord of all regions and all desires, untouched by any evil whatsoever.

A. MAHA'DEVA ŚA'STRI, B. A.

(To be continued).

\* Tait. Sāhita 4-5-1.

† Mahā. Up. 13-14.

\* Mahā. Cp. 23.

† Mahā. Upanishad 18.

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — O R — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪKANTHA  
BHĀ'SHYA.

(Continued from page 6.)

Adhikaranas 9, 10.

Having mentioned that form of S'iva—the Para-Brahman possessed of omniscience and other attributes—which is to be worshipped as the source of supreme good, the sūtrakāra introduces the next section with a view to answer a possible objection that the given definition of Brahman is too wide inasmuch as the same names which are applied to Brahman are by usage applicable to other things as well.

**Ākāśa** (is Brahman), because of His characteristic marks. (I. i. 23).  
**For the same reason, Prāna** (is Brahman). (I. i. 24).

The subject of discussion in this section is a passage in the Chhândogya-Upanishad, which reads as follows :

"All these beings, verily, take their rise from ākās'a, and return into ākās'a."\*

"All these beings, verily, merge into Prāna alone, and from Prāna they arise."†

Here a doubt arises as to whether the terms "Prāna" and "ākās'a"—which denote the cause from which all beings take their rise and in which they attain dissolution—point to Parames'vara, or to bhūta-ākās'a (ākās'a as one of the rudimental elements) and to prāna (vital air).

The *prima facie* view may be stated as follows: it is prāna (vital air) and bhūta-ākās'a that are treated of here, since they are spoken of as the cause of all beings in the following passages :

From prāna alone, verily, are these beings, for, by prāna do these born creatures live; into prāna they go and enter."

"From ākās'a is the air born" etc.‡

Against the foregoing view we hold as follows. It is Parames'vara who is referred to by the terms "prāna" and "ākās'a, because of His characteristic

\* Chnā. Upanishad 1-9-11.

† Tait. Upanishad 3-3.

‡ Tait. Upanishad 2-1.

material, such as His, being the cause of all. Prāna (vital air) and the bhūta-ākāśa cannot indeed be the cause of all. Now such passages as "From prāna alone, verily, are these beings born," only inculcate the proposition that Brahman, who is bliss in essence, is the cause. They do not teach that prāna etc., are the cause. On the other hand, they form mere anuvāda, i. e., the s'ruti merely repeats what has been thought by another. A'kāśa being one of the bhūtas or rudimental elements, it is included in the term all 'bhūtas'; and the rise of "all bhūtas" can be from Parames'vara alone, as the s'ruti says "From A'tman is ākāśa born."\* Wherefore it should be concluded that the material ākāśa (bhūtākāśa) and prāna are not the causes of all beings.

(Question) What is the use of the qualification "bhūta" (material) in "bhūtākāśa"?

(Answer) The epithet has a purpose to serve, inasmuch as there exists another ākāśa viz., the Paramākāśa or transcendental Light, the Parā-Prakṛiti or the Great Cause, the cause of all bhūtas.

(Question) Then how to conclude that ākāśa is Parames'vara?

(Answer) Because there is no distinction between the two, between Parames'vara and Paramākāśa.

## Adhikaraṇa. II

In a former section it was shewn that the solar orb is the abode of Parabrahman, the Lord of Umā, the Lord of the whole universe, free from all taint and from all latent tendencies of evil, the repository of unsurpassed good. Here, then, the sūtrakāra refers to another abode of the Lord:

(Brahman is the) Light, because of the mention of the foot. (I. i. 25).

The subject of discussion here is a passage in the Chhāndogya-Upanishad which reads as follows

"Now that Light which shines above this heaven, higher than all, higher than everything, in the highest world, beyond which there are no other worlds, that is the same light which is within man."†

Here a doubt arises as to whether the Supreme Light which is said to be in heaven, pervading all worlds, is Parames'vara or some other being?

(Pūrvapaksha): The word 'dyu' stands for heaven, and the light which is said to be "above this heaven" may therefore here mean the sun himself. Or, as the words 'the light within man' point to the light being within man, it may be that the digestive fire in the stomach is here referred to.

(Siddhānta) The words "the light which shines above this heaven" refer to Parames'vara Himself who is the Supreme Light, higher than all; for, in a former passage, "All creatures form a foot of His"‡ all creatures are said to be a part of this light. This cannot apply to the sun and digestive fire in the stomach, whose range of action is limited.

(Objection) In a former passage, Gāyatrī is described to be all-pervading in the words "Gāyatrī, verily, is all this existence."† As occurring in the same context, the passage "All creatures form a foot of His" teaches only that the universe is a part of Gāyatrī.

This objection is thus answered:

(If you say it is) not so because of the mention of the metre, (we say) no, because (it is) the meditating (of Brahman) in that way (that is) taught; so, indeed, there is an instance. (I. i. 26).

(Objection): Because of the mention of the metre, in a former passage, "Gāyatrī, indeed, is all this existence," the same thing is spoken of here, not the Parames'vara.

(Answer): It cannot be that Gāyatrī, a mere metre, is all-pervading. On the other hand, we are taught to contemplate Parames'vara who resembles Gāyatrī: just as Gāyatrī is made up of four feet containing six syllables each and is four-footed, so Brahman too is four-footed. Accordingly, elsewhere, a word denoting metre is found applied to a different thing in virtue of some point of resemblance; as for instance, in the Samvarga-Vidyā where the s'ruti begins with the passage, "These five and the other five make ten, and that is the kṛitā"‡ says "these are again the Virāj." Wherefore in the determining of the subject propounded in the passage in question, the characteristic mark of Parames'vara, viz. all-pervadingness, should prevail as against the argument derived from the fact of the passage occurring in the section treating of Gāyatrī.

\* Tait. Upanishad 2-1.

† Chha. Upanishad 3-13.

\* Chha. Upanishad. 3-12.

† Chha. Up. 3-12.

‡ Chha. Up. 4-3.



And because of its congruity with the description of creatures etc. as feet, (it should be) so. (I. 1. 27).

The statement that it is four-footed by creatures, earth, body and the heart, cannot apply to the metre called Gāyatrī. It applies only to Parames'vara.

The sūtrakāra again rises and refutes an objection :

If (you hold it is) not (so) because of a diversity in the teaching, (we answer) no, because there is no inconsistency in either case. (I. 1. 28).

(Objection) : It is not right to hold that, because there is a reference made to a connection with heaven in the passage "All creatures form one foot of His ; His immortal three feet being in heaven,"\* Parames'vara is described in the passage which speaks of 'light' ; for, the two being quite distinct from each other as shewn by a diversity in their teaching, there can be no reference to the one by the other. In the passages "His immortal three feet are in the heaven," and "The Light which shines above the heaven," † the word denoting 'heaven' occurs in two different cases, (i. e. in the locative and the ablative cases), and therefore there is a diversity in the teaching. Hence the mutual opposition of the passages in question.

(Answer) : No, for there is no diversity between the two passages, just as there is no difference between the following two statements : "There is a hawk on the top of the tree ;" and "There is a hawk above the top of the tree." Wherefore in either case it is intended to declare that the light is above the heaven. By this characteristic mark, it may also be concluded that it is Parames'vara who is the Purusha spoken of in the Purusha-Sūkta, inasmuch as there, too, it is taught that "A foot of His are all the creatures."‡ Hence the conclusion that the Supreme Light which shines in heaven and of which the whole universe forms only a part is none other than Parames'vara.

### Adhikarana 12.

In the last adhikarana it has been shewn that the Parames'vara, referred to as the main object of worship in the orb of the Blessed Sun, Himself constitutes the whole universe. The present section proceeds to show that other beings form object of worship as ensouled by Him, and not otherwise.

So is prāna, because of the occurrence (of His attributes) (I. 1. 29)

The passage which has to be discussed here is the Indra's speech occurring in the Kaushītaka-Upanishad ;

"I am Prāna ; do thou meditate on me as the conscious A'tman, as life, as immortality."\*

The doubt arises here as to whether the being referred to as an object of worship and put in apposition with the word 'prāna' is Indra or Parames'vara.

(Pūrvapaksha) : Here in the passage "I am prāna, the conscious A'tman, and me etc." we see that the word 'prāna' is evidently put in apposition with 'Indra.' The passage, "worship me," clearly states that the injunction of worship refers to none but Indra. It is but proper to speak of him as prāna because he supports all beings by means of rain. As possessed of supreme power, he may also be spoken of as the object to be worshipped by all. Accordingly the s'ruti says "Indra is the king who rules the world"† and so on. Wherefore Indra himself is here spoken of as the object of worship.

The Siddhānta maintains that it is the Parames'vara—Why ?—Because His peculiar attributes—such as, He is the Bliss, He is without decay, immortal, He is the conscious Self—are found described when speaking of the being referred to by the word prāna :

"He is none other than prāna, conscious A'tman, the Bliss, without decay, immortal."‡

In the passage "Indra is the king" we should by the context understand the word "Indra" to mean I's'vara.

Again an objection is raised and refuted :

(If you say it is) not (so), because of the speaker's reference to himself, (we reply that) there is indeed in this (section) a preponderance of attributes of A'tman. (I. 1. 30.)

(Objection) : The being here referred to as the object of worship is not Parames'vara ; for, in the opening sentence such as "know me alone..... the three-headed son of Tvashtri did I slay." † Indra who is well-known to be a jīva is spoken of as the object of worship. And the concluding passage of the section should be interpreted in accordance with the opening passage.

(Answer) : It is not right to say so : in this section, from the very commencement, Parames'vara's charac-

\* Chha. Up. 3-12, 13.

† Chha. Upanishad 3-12, 13.

‡ Tait. Aranyaka 3-12.

\* Kaushītaka-Upanishad 8.

† Tait. Aranyaka 3-11.

‡ Kaushītaka Upanishad 3

teristic attributes are found in great preponderance. Thus, the opening passage proposes to treat of the most beneficial worship in the words "That which thou thinkest the best for man."\* This, indeed, is a characteristic property of Parames'vara, His worship alone being the most beneficial as a means of attaining moksha. In the middle of the section, too, He is spoken of as the impelling agent of others in all their actions, in the following passage :

"For he ~~leads~~ <sup>leads</sup> him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed ; and the same ~~leads~~ <sup>leads</sup> him, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad act."\*

So also he is spoken of in the following passage as the basis of the whole universe made up of both the sentient and insentient existence :

"As in a car the circumference of a wheel is placed on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these external objects placed on the subjective states of consciousness and these states of consciousness are placed on the prāna."†

And this, too, being a characteristic property of Parames'vara Indra cannot be the being here spoken of as the object of worship.

(Objection):—If, as a Jīva, Indra is not the object of worship, then how is it that he inculcates the worship of himself?

The sūtrakāra thus answers :

(It is) from the standpoint of the scriptures that he inculcates it, like Vāmadeva. (I. I. 31).

From the standpoint of such passages of the scripture as "In the form of this Jīva entering, I shall differentiate name and form," ‡ Indra saw that Parames'vara was the being denoted by all words and that therefore Indra himself was His body ; and he accordingly refers to Parames'vara by his own name 'Indra' and inculcates Him alone as the object of worship. Hence the reference to Parames'vara by the word 'Indra.'

The sūtrakāra quotes an example, "like Vāmadeva." Vāmadeva saw that Parames'vara was none but his own A'tma and exclaimed "I have become Manu and Sūrya." Just so is Indra's declaration.§

Or thus : When, by the contemplation of the harmonious nature of Brahman and A'tman brought about by Vedāntic knowledge, Vāmadeva attained to the state of Brahman and was freed from all the imaginary limitations due to the identifying of himself with the human body and so on, and his mighty ego expanded so as to embrace the whole universe, he saw that he was present everywhere and accordingly spoke of himself as one with the whole universe including Manu and Sūrya. So, it may be concluded, it was in the case of Indra. In the passage "I am prāna, the conscious Atman,"\* Prāna refers to Para-Brahman, inasmuch as He, blissful by nature, is the cause of all life, as said in the s'ruti "Prāna is the conscious self, the Bliss, undecaying and immortal." Accordingly it is from the standpoint of Brahman that Indra taught "I am Brahman," "me do thou worship" So, too, Krishna taught to Arjuna, and so several others.

Again an objection is raised and refuted :

(If you say it is) not (so) because of the characteristic marks of Jīva and prāna proper, (we reply) no, because, His worship being threefold and He being their basis, it is explicable. (I. I. 32.)

(Objection): It is but proper that Indra should speak of himself as the object of worship and as an all-pervading being, when, having attained by the contemplation of Brahmajñāna to the condition of Brahman, he was freed from the condition of jīva and spoke from the standpoint of Brahman. Here in the passages "I killed the three-headed son of Tvashtri"† and "till prāna dwells in the body, till then there is life,"‡ the characteristic marks of jīva and prāna proper are evident. So this teaching is not explicable.

(Answer): You should not say so. It is but proper that Parames'vara is spoken of as a jīva and prāna ; for there is a threefold worship. Here it is intended to teach a threefold worship of Parames'vara,—in His own form, in the form of Bhoktā or jīva, in the form of Bhogya or the object of sense. This may be explained by the fact that He is the basis of Bhoktā and Bhogya, the jīvas and objects of sense. The worship of Parames'vara in His own form leads to immediate salvation, whereas the other two do so in course of time. Wherefore we conclude that as a form of Parames'vara who dwells in him as his A'tma, Indra forms an object of worship.

Thus ends the commentary of Śrīkantha-Śivāchārya on Pāda i. e., of the Adhyāya I., of the Brahma-Mīmāṃsā.

\* Kaushītaka Upanishad 3.

† Kaushītaka Upanishad 3.

‡ Chha. Upanishad 6-3.

§ Brihadā. Upanishad 3—4.

\* Kaushītaka.—Upanishad 6.

† Kaushītaka-Upanishad 3.

## SECOND PA'DA.

## Adhikarana. I.

Owing to the endlessness of vedāntic passages treating of Brahman, it is not possible to discuss every one of those passages. By a discussion therefore, of some only of those passages, the meaning of others have to be determined on the same principles of interpretation. Thus, a few only of the passages are dealt with in the Sūtras by way of determining that those passages treat of Brahman as *śūnya* by a concurrence of the marks which serve to determine the main drift of the passages.

In the first pāda have been discussed a few of such passages as contain clear hints shewing what the main drift of the passage is. In the second pāda will be discussed a few of such passages as contain hints which are not quite so explicit.

(The passage refers to Parames'vara) as teaching of Him who is present everywhere. (I. ii. 1).

The passage which forms the subject of discussion here occurs in the Chhēndogya-Upanishad and reads thus :

"The *manomaya*, whose body is *prāna*, whose form is thought, whose will is unailing, whose nature is like *A'kasha*, from whom all desires proceed... He is myself within the heart."

Here a doubt arises as to whether the being spoken of as *manomaya* and so on is Parames'vara or Jīva.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*). It is Jīva.—Why so?—Because he is more proximate. In the passage which just precedes the one under discussion, viz.,

"Now man is a creature of will. According to what his will is in this world, will he be when he has departed this life. Let him therefore have this will and belief;" †

Jīva is spoken of as wandering in this and in the next world under the influence of karma. Then comes the passage commencing with "*manomaya*." Wherefore we conclude that it is Jīva who is referred to as "*manomaya*." These attributes—that he partakes of the nature of *manas* and that he has *prāna* for his body—belong to a *samsārin*; they are not attributes of Parames'vara. When this interpretation is accepted, the epithet "*satyasankalpa*" may be applied to a

*samsārin* or jīva by interpreting it to mean "*satī asankalpa*, he whose thought is not directed to the Real (Sat)." Wherefore it is Jīva that is spoken of as '*manomaya*' and so on, not Parames'vara.

As against the foregoing we hold as follows:—It is Parames'vara that is spoken of as '*manomaya*' and so on. Why?—Because it is the Para-brahman, the Parames'vara, that is spoken of as the cause of all and as the object of worship in the opening passage :

All this is Brahman, as beginning, ending, and breathing in Him; and therefore let a man meditate on Him."

This passage may be explained as follows: The origin, existence and end of all this depends on Brahman. All this, both the sentient and the insentient existence, is verily Brahman, and therefore let a man meditate on Brahman, tranquil in mind. Just as water-bubbles which have their origin, existence and end in the ocean, are found to be only forms of that ocean, so, too, that which depends for its origin etc. on Brahman associated with *s'akti* must be made up of Brahman and nothing else. Nothing distinct from Him is ever perceived. Accordingly in the Atharva s'iras it has been declared by I'sāna as follows :

"Alone I was at first, (alone) I am and shall be; there is none else distinct from Me." ‡

And then was declared by Him in the words "I am Brahman," § that the whole universe is His own form. And in the words "He entered the more hidden from (or than) the hidden one" etc., \* His entering into the universe is given as a reason for the whole universe being His own form. Thus, this universe having no origin, existence or end outside Brahman, it is not a quite distinct thing from Brahman. Accordingly the learned say :—

His *s'aktis* or energies (form) the whole world, and the Mahes'a or the Great Lord is the energetic (*S'aktimān*). Never can energy exist distinct from the energetic. Unity of these two is eternal, like that of fire and heat, inasmuch as inseparableness always exists between energy and the energetic. Wherefore the supreme energy belongs to the supreme *Ātman*, since the two are related to each other as substance and attribute. The energy of heat is not conceived to be distinct from fire and so on.

Vāyu-Saṁhitā, too, says

\* Chhā. Up. 3-14.

† Chhā. Up. 3-14.

"From S'akti up to earth, (the whole world) is born of the principle S'iva. By Him alone, it is pervaded, as the jar etc. by clay. His variegated supreme S'akti, whose form is knowledge and bliss, appears as one and many, like the light of the sun."

The following passages of the s'ruti speak of Para-brahman as possessed of infinite powers of creating, ruling and maintaining the world, all inherent in Him:

"His supreme S'akti is spoken of as manifold, inherent, endued with the activity of knowledge and life."\*

"One verily is Rudra,—they were not for a second—who rules these worlds with the powers of ruling."†

In short, on the authority of S'ruti, Smṛiti, Itihāsa, Purāṇa, and the sayings of the learned, the Supreme S'akti—whose manifold manifestation this whole universe of chit and achit is, whose being is composed of Supreme Existence, Intelligence and Bliss, and is unlimited by space and time—is inherent in the nature of S'iva, the Supreme Brahman, and constitutes His Jñān essential form and quality. Apart from S'akti He cannot be the Omniscient, the Omnipotent, the cause of all, the all-controlling, the all-adorable, the all-gracious, the means of attaining all aspirations, and the omnipresent; and, moreover, such grand designations as 'Mahes'vara' the Supreme Lord, 'Mahādeva' the supreme deity, and 'Rudra' the expeller of pain, cannot apply to Him. Thus it is Brahman whose body is the whole sentient and insentient universe, and who is denoted by all words. Just as the word 'blue' denotes not the blue colour only, but also the lotus which is of blue colour, so does the word 'universe' also denote Brahman. Therefore, such passages as "All is Rudra verily" teach that Brahman is denoted by all words. Accordingly the passage "All this, verily, is Brahman" refers to Brahman whose body the whole of the sentient and unsentient universe is. The universe being thus a form of Brahman and being therefore not an object of hatred etc., let everyone be peaceful at heart and worship Brahman. This doctrine is clearly expounded even in the purāṇic texts such as the following:—

"The body of the God of Gods is this universe, moving and immoving. This, the Jīva (Paśu) do not know, owing to the mighty bondage. They say sentience is Vidyā, and insentience Avidyā. The whole universe of Vidyā and Avidyā, is no doubt the body of the Lord, the Father of all; for the whole universe is subject to Him. The word 'sat' is used by the wise to denote the real and the good, and 'asat' is used by vedic teachers to denote the contrary. The whole universe of the sat and the asat is the body of Him who is on high. Just as, by the watering of the roots of a tree, its branches are nourished, so by the worship of S'iva, the universe which is His body is nourished. A'tman is the eighth body of S'iva the Parames'vara, pervading all other bodies. Wherefore the whole universe is ensouled by S'iva. If any embodied being whatsoever be subjected to constraint, it will be quite repugnant to the eight-bodied lord; as to this there is no doubt. Doing good to all, kindness to all, affording shelter to all,—this, they hold, is the worshipping of S'iva." And so on.

Brahman being all-formed, it is but right to say "all is Brahman" and "let every one be peaceful and worship Brahman." Wherefore it is Brahman who in the opening passage is stated to be the object of worship, that is also spoken of as manomaya, as partaking of the nature of manas, and so on. Neither should it be supposed that the partaking of the nature of manas is a characteristic mark of a samsārin; for Brahman may limit Himself by assuming a shape which can form an object of worship.

As to the contention that because Jīva is a creature of his own will it is Jīva who is spoken of as 'manomaya,'—we say that such a contention is untenable; for, since the upāsana has to be construed as having for its object Brahman who is mentioned as such in the sentence where the upāsana is enjoined, it is not possible for that upāsana to have again for its object Jīva who is but incidentally mentioned; as in the case of āmīkshū,\* which has been proved to appertain to Viś'vedevas who have already been mentioned in connection with it, not the vājina which belongs to vājins. Wherefore it is Brahman who is to be worshipped as possessed of attributes mentioned in the passage commencing with 'manomaya'.

A. MAHADEVYA S'A'STRI, B. A.  
(To be continued).

\* Sveta. Upanishad 6-8.

† Sveta. Upanishad 3-2.

\* See Jaimini. Mimamsa. 3-2-23.



# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — O R — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪKANTHA  
BHA'SHYA.

*(Continued from page 30.)*

*(Objection):*—If it be held that it is Brahman mentioned in the opening passage who is spoken of as *manomaya* etc., the reference to *jīva* who is mentioned incidentally would serve no purpose.

*(Answer)* The Sūtrakāra says:—

And because of the appropriateness of the qualities intended to be taught. (I. ii. 2.)

Since the qualities intended to be taught,—namely, that He is of unfailing will, that from Him all desires proceed,—can be applied only to Brahman, He alone is the object to be worshipped. And *jīva* who is incidentally mentioned is the worshipper, there being a necessity for the supply of that factor to complete the injunction.

## Adhikarāṇa. 2.

In the last *adhikarāṇa* it has been shewn that *jīva* in general cannot be an object of worship but that he can be only a worshipper. Now again, the next section proceeds to establish that even *Nārāyaṇa*, who is the *upādāna* or material cause of the *Hiranyagarbha*, the aggregate of all *jīvas*, is only a worshipper of Brahman who is above all universe, but not an object of worship.

Owing to incongruity, the embodied is not meant (I. ii. 3).

The passage which forms the subject of discussion here occurs in the Mahopanishad:

“The Lord of the universe, the Ātman, the I'svara, the Eternal, the Good, the Indestructible, *Nārāyaṇa*, the Great one who was to be known, and so on.”

Here a doubt arises as to whether it is the embodied entity, or the *Paramesvara*, or some one else, who is spoken of as *Nārāyaṇa* and described as the Lord of the universe and so on.

*(Purvapaksha):*—It is *Nārāyaṇa*, the embodied entity, who is spoken of as the Lord of the universe, firstly because *Nārāyaṇa*, the embodied entity, is repeated as the subject, of whom thousand-headedness etc. are

to be predicated, in the section beginning with. "The thousand-headed Deity," \* secondly because of his characteristic marks—such as lying in the ocean—spoken of in the section; thirdly because of the use of the synonymous terms, *Aclyuta*, *Hari* applicable to him alone.

*Siddhānta*, however, maintains that it is Mahes'vara, the Supreme Lord, the Ātman of Nārāyaṇa—How? Because such attributes of Parames'vara as the lordship of the whole universe cannot be applied to any other being such as Nārāyaṇa. Lordship of the whole universe is predicated of the Parames'vara alone by repetition in the words "to Him who is the Lord of cattle, the Lord of trees, the Lord of the worlds. I salute." † That no other being than Rudra is the Lord of the universe is declared by the following passage :

"One verily is Rudra,—they are not for a second,—who rules these worlds by the powers of ruling" ‡

And the s'ruti "Rudra is high above the universe" § teaches that it is Rudra who is high above the universe. Wherefore it is but right to say that the Being spoken of as the Lord of the universe is the Parames'vara, the Ātman of Nārāyaṇa.

(Objection):—To speak of Him as the Self of Nārāyaṇa is to imply that Parames'vara is the *Antaryāmin* or the Inner Regulator of Nārāyaṇa: which is not right. In the words "Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme Brahman," the s'ruti declares that Nārāyaṇa is the Supreme Brahman. Then the passage beginning with "like unto the lotus-bud" speaks of Paśuśaṅka located in the heart-lotus; then jīva is described in the passage beginning with "in its midst is the flame of fire", and then in the words "in the middle of that flame is the Paramātmā established," Nārāyaṇa is spoken of as the Paramātmā, as the *Antaryāmin* or Inner Regulator of the jīva. Thus, we see that He (Nārāyaṇa) is the object of worship. The passage "He is Brahmā, He is Ś'iva" and so on declares that Brahmā, Ś'iva and other beings are His vibhūtis or glorious emanations. Wherefore Nārāyaṇa Himself is the Lord of the universe, the very Supreme Brahman and is to be worshipped as the *Antaryāmin* or Inner Regulator of jīvas. It is therefore unjust to

hold that the Parames'vara is Nārāyaṇa's Ātman, and that as such He is above Nārāyaṇa and to be worshipped by Him.

In reply the Sūtrakāra says:—

Because of their mention as the object and the agent. (I. ii. 4.)

There, the Parames'vara and Nārāyaṇa are mentioned respectively as the worshipped and the worshipper, as the object and the agent.—How?—The passage "like unto the lotus-bud" describes the heart of Nārāyaṇa who has been just spoken of; and the passage "Paramātmā is established" declares that the Parames'vara who is himself the Paramātmā is the object of worship as dwelling within Nārāyaṇa. Thus, Nārāyaṇa is spoken of as the agent, as the worshipper; and Parames'vara as the object, as worthy of being worshipped. Wherefore the Paramātmā who is to be worshipped is some being other than Nārāyaṇa. The passage "He is Brahmā, He is Ś'iva" and so on teaches that Parames'vara manifests His own glory in the form of the universe comprising Brahmā, Vishnu, Rudra, Indra and the like. Though Vishnu is not mentioned here (as the Parames'vara's vibhūti), He is mentioned as such in the Kaivalya Upanishad. After speaking of the heart-lotus, the upanishad says:

"Him whose help-mate is Umā, who is the Supreme Lord, who is Mighty, Three-eyed, Dark-necked and serene; having meditated thus, the sage reaches Him who is the womb of all beings, the witness of all, transcending Tamas. He is Brahmā, He is Ś'iva, He is Indra, He the Indestructible, the Supreme, the self-luminous. He Himself is Vishnu, He is Prāṇa, He is Time, "He is Fire, He the Moon," and so on.

The same principle should be applied here. The following passage from the Atharva-upanishad should also be taken into consideration

"That Lord who is Known Rudra, He is Bhūh, Bhuvah, Svah as well as he who is known as Brahmā; to Him we bow. That Lord who is known as Rudra, He is Bhūh, Bhuvah, Svah as well as he who is known as Vishnu to Him we bow. That Lord..... as well as he who is known as Mahes'vara,....." and so on

The omission of Vishnu between Brahmā and Ś'iva in the passage quoted from Mahopanishad is to be accounted for by the fact that Vishnu has been spoken of as the worshipper. Hence no mutual contradiction among these passages.

\* Mahanarayana Upanishad.

† Taittiriya-Samhitā 4-5.

‡ Śvetāśvatara Upanishad 3-2.

§ Maha. Upa. 10.

(*Objection*):—The Being (Purusha) spoken of in the Purusha-sūkta which begins with "Thousand-headed is Purusha" is said to be endued with a world forming a part of Himself, as declared in the s'ruti "A foot of His do all these creatures form." The same Being is treated of here—in the passage under discussion—under the name "Nārāyana." The same Being is designated by the name Brahman in the passage "Nārāyana is the Supreme Brahman." Indeed it is Brahman who is to be worshipped by all. How can it be that such a Being is the worshipper of another?

The Sūtrakāra answers the objection as follows

Owing to the specific word (I. ii. 5).

The specific text "Brahman is above Nārāyana" declares that Brahman is higher than Nārāyana. Wherefore the Supreme Brahman who is distinct from Nārāyana is to be worshipped, inasmuch as the Parabrahman Himself puts on the form of the thousand-headed Purusha and forms the upādāna or material cause of the universe. In II. 23 we shall show that Nārāyana, having Parabrahman for his A'tman or the Impeller, assumes the form of the universe.

The sūtrakāra adduces another sort of evidence to prove that Nārāyana is an upāsaka or worshipper:

And because of smṛiti. (I. ii. 6).

From the following passage of the smṛiti,

"Having thus spoken, then, O King, Hari, the great Lord of Yoga, showed to the son of Pritthā the Supreme Form of Īśvara."\*

it is evident that Nārāyana, the great Master of Yoga is engaged in Yoga or samādhi, i. e., in the contemplation of Parames'vara, the Supreme Lord. Bearing on this subject there is the following speech of the Parames'vara addressed to As'vatthāman:

I am duly worshipped; by Krishna who is unwearied in action; therefore none else exists who is dearer to me than Krishna."

Wherefore the Supreme Brahman who is to be worshipped is different from Nārāyana.

The sūtrakāra again raises an objection and refutes it:

If (you hold it is) not (so) because of His having a small abode and being so designated, (we say) no: He is so (designated) because He is to be worshipped; and He is like a'ka's'a. (I. ii. 7).

(*Objection*): The Being here spoken of cannot be the Parames'vara who is all-pervading, since the former

is described in the following passage as dwelling within the small flame of fire and so having a small resting-ground and is denoted by terms implying smallness

"There is (a streak of light) which is as fine as the bristle of a Nivāra grain, which is yellow in colour, the standard of things that are fine: Within that flame does Paramātman abide."

(*Answer*):—Not so. He is so designated because He is here described as an object of worship. Not that He is small in himself; for it requires no proof that He is infinite in Himself, like the ākās'a which when conditioned by an upādhi such as a jar is said to be small, and which is said to be infinite when regarded in itself. Hence no inconsistency.

Again the sūtrakāra raises an objection and answers it:

If (you say that this) necessitates enjoyment, (we say) no, because there is a difference. (I. ii. 8).

(*Objection*): It is the same Being spoken of as higher than Nārāyana and therefore as the object of worship is the Being described as "Honest and True, the Supreme Brahman, the Purusha dark and brown, whose semen is held above, of divers eyes"\* and so on. Here the Parabrahman is described as dark and brown because of His being tinged with Māyā, the Supreme Ś'akti or Power; He is described as one 'whose semen is held above' because of His having Fire for His semen: He is 'of divers eyes' because of His having three eyes: He is Purusha because He lies in the lotus of Dahara, the ākās'a in the heart; He is "Honest and True" because in him there is no inconsistency between speech and thought. Wherefore as possessed of a form containing three eyes, etc. He is subject to enjoyment of pleasures and pains pertaining to the body.

(*Answer*):—No, because there is a difference. There exists, indeed, a difference between Brahman's bod and the bodies of jīvas, which latter are meant for the enjoyment of pleasure and the suffering of pain; for, He has assumed the body at His own wil', whereas their bodies have been brought into existence by their respective Karma. Wherefore the s'ruti describes Parames'vara as "free from sin, free from old age, free from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, desiring nothing but what He ought to desire, and imagining nothing but what He ought to imagine,"†

\* Mahanarayana Upanishad 11-

† Chhandogya Upanishad 8-7.

\* Bhagavadgītā. 11-9.

and thus devoid of the attributes pertaining to the body of a samsārin. But not so is jiva, the samsārin. Therefore it is that in the passages like "with perfect limbs, He is many-formed and fierce,"\* the Parames'vara's voluntarily assumed forms of great beauty—the divine forms which are free from sin, old age, death, grief and so on—are declared to be perfect and eternal. Wherefore, the Parabrahman, the Supreme Lord, being different from jiva, He cannot be tinged with any of the defects pertaining to the body. The *Upakrama* and other test-passages point to the conclusion that the divers-eyed Brahman is the highest of all and is the Being who ought to be worshipped. To explain in the *Upakrama* or opening passage beginning with "Subtler than the subtle,"† the Lord has been described to be a very glorious being, as dwelling in the caves of the hearts of all creatures, as also being cognized by that person who, by the great Grace of the Lord, has been freed from all grief. Again in the passage "the seven prāṇas arise from Him" the same Being endowed with the Supreme Sakti is described as the upādāna or material cause of the universe which is composed of prāṇa etc. Then in the passage, "That great sage, Radrā, who was the first, before all gods, above all universe, saw the Hiranyagarbha being born," He is referred to as the cause, as being above all universe, as being omniscient, as being the generator of the Hiranyagarbha, the first of all emanations. The same Being, dwelling in the cave of the Supreme Akāśa, is described to be attainable as the Supreme Immortal Being by those aspirants who perform all acts without longing for fruits, who know the drift of the Vedānta, who have subdued their senses. Then as the question arises as to the way by which to reach Him, contemplation in *Dhāra* is recommended. There it has been said—but only in a general way—that the Being who dwells in the lotus of *Dhāra* ought to be worshipped. Then the question arising as to who that Being is, the s'ruti says that it is He who is the Supreme Being called Mahādeva. Then again the question arises as to what His form is; and in answer to this question the s'ruti concludes by saying that He is possessed of a form containing divers eyes and so on. Nārāyaṇa who is incidentally mentioned in the chapter referred to should be construed as the worshipper, on the principle explained in the preceding *adhikaraṇa*. Though all

have to worship Parames'vara, Nārāyaṇa is specially mentioned here, because he is the highest of the worshippers. We can justify the description of Nārāyaṇa here by Brahman's attributes,—regarding Nārāyaṇa the worshipper as not distinct from the divers-eyed Brahman, the object of worship,—on the ground that it is a description of Nārāyaṇa who is the upādāna or material cause of the universe and who is ensouled by Him the Supreme Brahman.

### Adhikaraṇa-3.

(He is) the Devourer, because of the mention of the moving and the unmoving. (I. ii. 9)

The passage which is to be discussed here occurs in the Kathopanishad and reads as follows:—

"Who then knows where He is, He to whom the Brāhmanas and Kshatriyas are (as it were) but food, and death itself a condiment?"\*

Here a doubt arises as to whether the Being who is described as the devourer of the whole universe of sentient and insentient existence—which is referred to by the mention of Brāhmanas and Kshatriyas and which forms as it were a morsel of food mixed with the condiment of death—is the Parames'vara or some other being.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—The highly Merciful and all-Gracious Being cannot be the devourer of all. It is cruel to put an end to other's lives. Anger is the sprout from which springs up the act of cruelty. The root of anger which is an evil passion is none other than Moha or delusion. The cause of delusion which is the source of all destruction is *Tamas*. Wherefore the devourer of all is a Tāmasic Being. Tāmasic nature consists in being devoid of all light, the light of knowledge etc. being enshrouded by *Tamas*, the darkness of ignorance. To speak of Brahman as the destroyer of all is to attribute ignorance, darkness, delusion, anger and other evil qualities to Him who is ever pure, who is the repository of unmixed good, who is free from all taint of samsāra. Then such attributes, as omniscience and ever-contentedness, which have been conclusively shown to form the characteristic marks of His essential nature, would be meaningless. Therefore some other being distinct from Brahman and possessed of the attributes referred to must be the destroyer.

(*Siddhānta*):—It is Brahman who is spoken of as the all-destroyer.—Why?—Because of the mention—

\* Kathopanishad. 2-25.

\* Rik-Samhitā 2-7-17.

† Mahanarayana-Upanishad 10.



the moving and the unmoving. As to the contention that it is not right to regard Brahman as the devourer of the whole universe of moving and unmoving objects, we say that that very description marks the characteristic nature of Brahman, inasmuch as a Jīva who is of limited powers has not got the power of destroying all the moving and unmoving objects. "To that Destroyer, to that great Devourer, I bow," thus is Parames'vara described in the Atharvas'iras as the all-destroyer never as a Jīva so spoken of. "Who all these worlds sacrificed,"\* thus Brahman is described as offering all the worlds as an oblation in the fire of His own light. A Jīva who is classed as an oblation can never possess this power. When the Supreme Lord remains alone, having absorbed into Himself the whole universe, everything other than Himself, moving or unmoving, sentient or insentient, then all luminaries such as the sun and the moon being absent, all division of time into day and night being done away with, all forms and names having disappeared, all this universe remains as mere Tamas (darkness), there being no perception of gross and subtle objects, of men, Devas, or other beings. Even then remains He alone, the Supreme Lord, of infinite light, the Witness of all. Accordingly the s'ruti says, "When the light has risen, there is no day, no night neither existence nor non-existence: S'iva alone is there."†

Here the words "neither existence nor non-existence" do not preclude even the bare existence of Jīva and bondage—of *paś'u* and *pāś'a* spoken of as *existence* and *non-existence*,—but they only indicate that these are not gross enough to be invested with distinct forms and spoken of by distinct names.

*Objection* :—Despite the existence of the ever-luminous S'iva, the Supreme Brahman, how can the universe be mere darkness?

*Answer* :—No. How can it detract from the self-luminous S'iva, the all-witness? There can be no perception of the universe by Jīvas whose body and senses are powerless with regard to sense-objects which, as having then no forms nor names, are beyond perception, while their faculty of spiritual wisdom (Jñāna) is overpowered by original sin (*mala*). Even the self-luminous S'iva does not perceive (the universe) as before. Wherefore this grand state of Supreme Sushupti or Sleep, when there is no cogni-

sing whatever of created existence in any particular aspect of its manifestation is spoken of as Tamas. Accordingly the smṛiti says :

"This was mere Darkness, unknown, without any characteristic marks."\*

S'iva is said to have existed *alone*, possessed of the potency of the universe, of sentient and insentient existence in its subtlest form, undistinguishable by name or form. Again, at the time of creation He manifests His Primal S'akti or Energy and then creates from out of Himself and brings into manifestation all sentient and insentient beings,—each with its own form and name—by His own mere thought, without having recourse to an external material cause. Hence the saying of the learned :

"The Deity, the self-conscious A'tman, brings, like a Yogin, the whole existence which lies within, into manifestation without, by means of His will (Ichchhā), without an upādāna or material cause."

*Objection* :—Māyā and Purusha are spoken of as the upādāna or material cause in the following passages of the s'ruti :

"Let him know Māyā to be Prakṛiti and the Possessor of Māyā to be the Mahes'vara."†

"From Him Viraj was born."‡

How can it be said that no upādāna or material cause existed?

*Answer* :—True. In the production of a jar by a potter, the clod of earth is found to be distinct from the body of the potter and is the material cause of the jar; not so, however, is Māyā and the like—which are held to be the upādāna of the universe—found to exist distinct from the Parames'vara, inasmuch as it is from out of the Parames'vara Himself who puts on the form of Māyā that the universe is evolved. Hence no incongruity. Wherefore the Supreme Puruṣhā Himself whose subtle Māyā has no independent existence apart from Himself, is said to be also the upādāna or material cause of the universe. Accordingly the Atharvas'ikhā says

Whatever has to be contemplated, let him contemplate it as the Lord. Brahmā, Vishnu, Rudrā, Indra,—all these are born as well as all the sense-organs and the elements of matter. The Cause of causes is not a contemplator. On the other hand, the

\* Atik-Samhitā, 8-3-16.

† S'vetā, Up. 4-18.

\* Mṛnu-Smṛiti, 1-5.

† S'vetas'vatara-Up. 4-10.

‡ Purusha-Sukta.

Cause is ever to be contemplated, He who is endued with every kind of power, the Lord of all, the source of all Good abiding in the middle of Light."

Thus, where all beings undergo dissolution, thence only is the origin of all beings, and therefore so long as these beings which are infinite in number are held in dissolution, they abide there alone, in Śiva, of infinite potencies (Śaktis). So it is Śiva, the all-destroyer is the Being denoted by the word 'Brahman.'

As to the contention that, because destruction is an act of cruelty, Brahman becomes tinged with anger, the cause of the cruel act, and other evil qualities, we merely answer that this contention arises from absence of enquiry the quality of Tamas, which is the root of anger and other evil passions, being an attribute of Prakṛiti. As to the Parames'vara being above all darkness, the divine s'ruti itself is the authority which says,

"Umā being His help-mate, the Supreme Lord,... the Witness of all, above Tamas (darkness)."\*

The Purāṇic saying given below also declares that the Parames'vara is ever possessed of Jñāna etc. which prevent delusion and other like sources of evil

"Knowledge, indifference to worldly objects, lordly power, austerity, truth, forgiveness, fortitude, creative power, spiritual wisdom, and mastery—these ten ever exist undiminished in Śaṅkara."

The Purāṇa says also

"He whose pure unfailing intelligence comprehends all objects of knowledge; He is a youth who delight in the joy arising from the tasting of the nectar of His own Śakti."

It is indeed the Parames'vara of infinite glory who, desirous to create, resorts to His own Śakti,—to His Māyā, to His Will (Ichchhā),—with a view to become

the manifold universe, said in the s'ruti, "He desired, may I become many." Then, as the s'ruti says "He brooded over Himself,"\* He thinks of the materials, by which to bring into existence bodies suited to the different Jivas according to their respective Karma, by His power of knowledge (Jñānaśakti) spoken of as *tapas* (penance) in the s'ruti. And having thus brooded, He rouses into being the whole panorama of the universe on the wall of Māyā or Ichchhāśakti by resorting to his Kriyāśakti which is quite capable of accomplishing all that He has thought of, as declared in the following passage, "He created all this."\* Then, as the s'ruti says, "Having created it, He entered into the same,"\* He enters the whole creation, and in association with these three Śaktis He becomes the whole universe including the three Mūrtis—the three embodied manifestations of the Lord as caused by the three *gunas* *saṭva*, *rajas* and *tamas*—and other beings. So, who here can gauge the greatness of the omnipotent and omniscient Śiva. Wherefore we may conclude that the all-destroyer is the Parames'vara.

And because of the context (I. ii. 10.)

The passage under discussion occurs in a section devoted to Parames'vara, as the following texts in the same section show

"The wise who knows the A'tman as great and omnipresent does never grieve."\*

"That A'tman cannot be gained by the Veda."†

For the foregoing reason also it is evident that the all-destroyer is the Supreme Brahman, the Parames'vara, and none else.

A. MAHĀDEVA ŚĀSTRĪ B. A.

(To be continued.)

\* Kāṭhāya-Upanishad.

\* Taittirīya-Upanishad 2. 6.

† Kāṭhā-Upanishad 2—22. 23.

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — O R — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH Ś'RI'KANTHA  
BHA'SHYA.

(Continued from page 54.)

### Adhikarana 4.

The next adhikarana proceeds to show that the Parames'vara, who has been proved to be the all-destroyer in the adhikarana just closed, is ever associated with Jīvas, the manifestations of His own glory, as declared in the following passage

“Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating.”\*

Those who entered into the cave are verily the two  
Atmans, because so it is seen. (I. ii. 11).

The passage to be discussed in this adhikarana runs as follows :

“There are the two, drinking their rewards in the world of their own works, entered into the cave (of the heart), dwelling on the highest summit (the ether in the heart). Those who know Brahman call them shade and light ; likewise those householders who perform the Trināchiketa sacrifice.”\*

Here two beings are spoken of, as distinct from each other as shade and light, those two who have entered into the cave of the heart in the body of a brāhman or other person,—which is spoken of as ‘the world of their own works’ and as ‘the highest summit.’—and who are the eaters of the fruits of works. A doubt arises as to whether these two are Buddhi and Jīva, or Jīva and Parames'vara.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—The two are none other than Buddhi and Jīva.—Why?—Because the words “drinking the rewards” show that the two are enjoyers. Parames'vara is not an enjoyer, because we find it said that “the other looks on without eating.” It is a well-known fact that Buddhi and Jīva are enjoyers. Moreover, there exists no such thorough distinction between Jīva and I's'vara who are both sentient, as between shade and light. Buddhi being insentient,

\*S'vetāsvatara-Upanishad 4—6.

\*Katha-Upanishad 3—1.

there is a distinction between Buddhi and Jīva. Thus Buddhi and Jīva are the two beings spoken of here.

As against the foregoing we hold as follows: the two beings who lie in the cave are none other than Jīva and Parames'vara, because we find it said that they have entered into the cave in the following passage:

"Him who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, who is the ancient."\*

As to the contention that I's'vara is not an enjoyer, it is wrong to say so; for, the words "whose delight is in prāṇa, whose bliss is in manas" show that even Brahman who delights in A'tman is in the enjoyment of His own inherent bliss which is accessible to manas alone. The Purāṇa also says

"He is a youth who delights in the joy arising from the tasting of the nectar of His own S'akti; who as a rule tastes only the sweet honey of the supreme infinite bliss."

Every one knows that Jīva is the eater of the fruits of his own Kārmā. Though we are thus told that the two are alike enjoyers, a distinction has to be made in accordance with the nature of the two enjoyers. When, for instance, we say 'the king and his servant eat food' we mean that each eats that kind of food which is suited to his rank.

As to the contention that there is no distinction between them, we cannot assent to it; for, though the passage "the eternal of the eternal ones, and the sentient of the sentient ones" † declares the equality of Jīva and I's'vara in so far as they are eternal and sentient, there still exists a distinction between them caused by the existence of beginningless mala (original sin) in Jīva and its absence in the other. The S'ruti "there are two, one knowing and the other unknowing, both unborn, one strong and the other weak" ‡ declares that there is a distinction caused by knowledge and ignorance, by independence and dependence and such other attributes.

(Objection):—While both of them are alike associated with a body, how is it that one of them is afflicted with ignorance and other evils while the other is untouched by any evil?

(Answer):—There is no room for any such objection. Their occupation of the same body has nothing to do with the blissful condition of the one or the miserable condition of the other. On the other hand it is the

independence of the I's'vara that makes Him blissful, and it is the dependence of Jīva that makes him miserable. Accordingly the S'ruti says:

"On the same tree man sits grieving, immersed, bewildered, by his own impotence. But when he sees the other, the Lord, contented, and knows His glory, then his grief passes away."

The traditional interpretation of this passages is given as follows: The Jīva bound by the shackles of beginningless Karma, having entered into many a body made of Māyā—each suited to the enjoying of a particular fruit—is subjected to a lot of incurable misery; and unable to ward it off on account of his impotence, he does not know what to do and grieves. He is thus immersed in the ocean of grief caused by his great delusion. When, however, by the Lord's Grace he intuitively sees Him who as the Impeller dwells within himself, who is gracious to all, who is ever associated with Umā, then he attains to the unsurpassed greatness of the Lord, free from all grief. Wherefore though S'iva, who is independent and who has been free from saṁsāra from time without a beginning, is in contact with the body, he is not subject to its evils as the Jīva is. Wherefore it is Jīva and Parames'vara that are said to lie in the cave of the heart.

The Sūtrakāra again explains:

And because of the specific attributes. (1. 11. 12),

Moreover, in this section of the upanishad, Jīva and Parames'vara are specifically described. Jīva is described as follows: "The knower is not born, nor does he die,"† and so on. The Parames'vara is described as "smaller than small, greater than great."‡ How can this specific description apply to Jīva and Buddhi? Hence the conclusion that it is Jīva and the Parames'vara that have entered into the cave of the heart and dwell therein as the impelled and the Impeller, as the body and the Embodied.

### Adhikarana 5.

Here will be mentioned another place for worshipping Parames'vara who has been shewn to be the object of worship dwelling in the cave of the heart.

(Parames'vara is the Being) who is within (the eye)

because (to Him the attributes are) applicable. (1. 11. 13).

The subject-matter of discussion in this section occurs in a passage of the Chhândogya-Upanishad, which reads as follows:

\* Katha - Upanishad. 2. 12.

† Katha - Upanishad 6-13.

‡ Svetâsvatara-Upanishad 1-9.

\* Mundaka - Upanishad. 3-1.

† Katha - Upanishad. 2-18.

‡ Ibid. 2-20.



"The person that is seen in the eye, that is the Atman. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman."\*

Now, who is the person within the eye spoken of as 'the immortal' etc? Is he the I's'vara or some other being?

(Pūrvapakṣa):—Such a doubt arising, we hold that he is a being other than the Parames'vara; for, in the Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad 10, 11 etc., the Parames'vara is spoken of as dwelling only in the heart-lotus. On the other hand, Jīva enters into the organ of sight when perceiving colour etc., in virtue of his connection with the manas. He is the person in the eye. Or, it may be the reflected person.

(Siddhānta):—As against the foregoing *prima facie* view we explain as follows: It is the Parames'vara Himself who is spoken of as the person in the eye; for, to Him alone are applicable such attributes as immortality and fearlessness in their absolute sense.

As to the contention that the I's'vara is nowhere spoken of as dwelling in the eye, the Sūtrakāra says:

And because He is declared to be seated and so on. (I. II. 14.)

I's'vara is declared to be seated in the eye and to rule it within, in such passages as the following

"He who dwells in the eye, and within the eye, whom the eye does not know, whose body the eye is, and who rules the eye within, he is thy Atman, the ruler within, the immortal."†

Wherefore it is verily the Supreme I's'vara.

The Sūtrakāra now proceeds to show an incongruity in case it is held that the reflected image of the person is spoken of in the passage referred to

And verily because of the declaration that he is endued with bliss. (I. II. 15.)

The person referred to is the I's'vara for the very reason that he is declared to be endued with bliss in a former passage which runs as follows:

"Bliss is Brahman, ākāśa is Brahman."‡

Indeed no bliss can exist in the reflected image of a person.

As to the contention that the person in the eye is the Jīva, the Sūtrakāra says:

\* Op. Cit. 4-15.

† Brih. Up. 5-7.

‡ Chhāndogya Upaniṣad 4-10.

And for that very reason he is Brahman. (I. II. 16.)

Because to Upakosala who was afraid of saṃsāra, and sought to know Brahman the s'ruti beginning with the passage "Bliss is Brahman, ākāśa is Brahman," teaches that "what verily is bliss, that verily is the ākāśa and what verily is the ākāśa, that verily is bliss,"\* therefore the ākāśa spoken of as "Kha" is none other than Brahman. Is there any such appropriateness in the case of Jīva? Indeed in Jīva there cannot exist the absolute bliss. Wherefore, the very Brahman who has been spoken of in the opening passage as the infinite bliss being afterwards declared to be the person seated in the eye, Parames'vara is the being spoken of as the person in the eye.

In the Pūrvapakṣa there is, moreover, an incongruity, as the Sūtrakāra says:

And because of the mention of the path of those who have learned the Divine Wisdom. (I. II. 17.)

Because the s'ruti which begins with the words "He goes to light, from light to day" and ends with the words "there is a person not human; he leads them to Brahman; this is the path of the Devas, the path that leads to Brahman; those who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man, yea, they do not return;"\* teaches, in connection with him who has known of the 'person in the eye,' the path of light etc.,—the path which has to be learnt by those who have known of the nature of Brahman,—therefore, the person spoken of is neither Jīva nor the reflected image in the eye; on the other hand, he is none other than the I's'vara.

### Adhikarana 6.

Owing to looseness and impossibility, not the other. (I. II. 18.)

The passage which has to be discussed here occurs, in the Mahopanishad and reads as follows

"The thumb-sized Puruṣa, seated in the thumb, the Lord, the Master of the whole world, the eater of the whole, is pleased.†

Here a doubt arises as to whether the being spoken of as 'thumb-sized' and so on is the Parames'vara or some one else.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—Inasmuch as this passage occurs in the section of Prānāgnihotra, and because the Puruṣa is spoken of as small—by the epithet 'thumb-sized'—we have to understand that it is Prāṇa or the Vital air which is the eater of the five oblations. And

\* Chhāndogya Upaniṣad 4-10, 15.

† Op. Cit. 35.

it cannot be urged that Prāna cannot be the eater ; for, even the air is spoken of as an eater in such passages as the following :

"The waters and the earth are the food, and the fire and the air are the eaters."

From all points of view the passage refers to the vital air.

(*Siddhānta*):—It is none other than Parames'vara who is spoken of here ; for, if the attribute of lordship over the whole universe and that of being the eater of the whole be (somehow) applied to the other (Prāna), then these attributes are too loosely applied.\* These attributes cannot be strictly applied to it (prāna). Wherefore none but I's'vara can be such a being. He is declared to be an object of worship even in the form of prāna, as the s'ruti speaks of Him as the seat of prāna in the following words :

"Thou art the knot of all prānas (senses),  
Thou art Rudra, the destroyer (of pain) ; do  
Thou enter into me."†

As to His being spoken of as "thumb-sized," there can be no inconsistency, inasmuch as He is so described only for the purpose of meditation. Though the vital air is found described in several places as the eater, it cannot be 'the eater of the whole.' Accordingly we should understand that the I's'vara is here described to be of the form of prāna and has to be worshipped by Prānāgnihotra.

#### Adhikarana. 7.

For the purpose of contemplative worship, it has been shown that S'iva, the Supreme Brahman, is seated in the orb of the sun, in man's heart-lotus, and so on, though He is all-knowing, all-powerful, all-benign, and all-pervading. This section proceeds to shew that He is seated everywhere.

(He is) the Inner Ruler abiding in the Devas, in the worlds and so on, because of the mention of His attributes. (I. ii. 19).

The text which forms the subject of discussion in this section occurs in the Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa and runs as follows :

"He who dwells in the earth, within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, and who rules the earth within, he is thy A'tman, the ruler within, the immortal."‡

\* That is, they become applicable to many other entities.

† Māhānārāyaṇa Upanishad 37.

‡ Brihadāranyaka-Upanishad 5-7.

A doubt arises as to whether he who is thus spoken of as the Inner Ruler in all beings,—in all things mentioned in the series extending from earth up to A'tman,—is the Parames'vara, or Jīva, or the Virāt-Purusha, or the Pradhāna.

(*Pūrvapaksha*):—It becomes only Jīva to enter into the sense-organs of all beings for the enjoying of the variegated fruits which he has earned. It becomes the Virāt-Purusha to enter into all beings, as he is the upādāna (material cause) of all sentient existence. Or, it is right to maintain that it is the Pradhāna which pervades all, as it becomes transformed in the form of the mahat and so on. It cannot be that the Parames'vara who, as superior to the universe, is declared in the s'ruti to have crossed beyond all phenomenal existence (vikāra) has entered into the universe of phenomenal forms. Wherefore the Antaryāmin, the Inner Ruler, must be one of the three mentioned above,—Jīva, Virāt-purusha, or Pradhāna,—but not the Parames'vara.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : He who is described to be the Antaryāmin, the Inner Ruler in the earth and so on, is none but Parames'vara, because of the mention of the attribute of being within all and the like. In the Atharvas'iras also the Parames'vara is found described to have entered into all beings as their A'tman. In the words "He is thy A'tman, the ruler within, the immortal," S'iva alone is described as immortal and liberated from time without beginning, it being said in the Jābāla-Upanishad that "these are verily the designations of the Immortal." Just as the Parames'vara is described in the s'ruti as superior to the universe, He is also described as all-formed in the words "all verily is Rudra," and so on. In every subsequent passage of the section (following the one quoted in the opening part of the adhikarana from the Brihadāranyaka-upanishad) the word 'immortal' is used evidently to show that He is not in the least tinged with the phenomenal change though He is present in all changing phenomena. In that section of the Atharvas'iras which begins with the passage "He verily who is Rudra is the Blessed Lord ; He is Bhūh, Bhuvah, Suvah, as well as he who is known as Brahmā ; to Him, verily, we bow, we bow," the Parames'vara is described as Brahmā, Vishnu, Rudra, Umā, Laksmī, Sarasvatī, Ganes'a, Skanda, Indra, and other guardian spirits of the world, the seven worlds comprising the earth etc., the five material elements comprising earth etc., the sun, the moon, the planets;

the state, time and so on,—in each case repeating in its turn) all that has been said when describing Him as Brahmā in the opening passage of the section here quoted. And even here, with a view to prevent the notion that owing to His entrance into all sentient and insentient existence He may become tainted with evil, the word “Bhagavat” (blessed Lord) has been used in each case, thus showing that He is always endued with the excellent divine attributes of lordship and so on. Wherefore it is but right to hold that S’iva, the Supreme Lord, is superior to all and is the A’tman of all.

As to the contention that Pradhāna etc. may be spoken of as the Antaryāmin, the sūtrakāra refutes it as follows :

And not what the smṛiti speaks of, there being no mention of its attributes; nor is it the embodied. (I. ii. 20).

And we cannot hold that what the s’ruti speaks of as Antaryāmin, the Inner Ruler, is the Pradhāna mentioned in the smṛiti (of the Sāṅkhyas), there being no mention of its attributes, such as changeability, inertness and so on. Nor can the embodied Virāt-Puruṣa be the being here referred to, inasmuch as he cannot be the ruler of all.

And it is not Jīva either :

Both alike, verily, declare Him as different. (I. ii. 21).

Both the schools, the Kānyas as well as the Mādhyandinas, declare the Antaryāmin as different from the Jīva, in the words “He who abides in the vijñāna,” and “He who abides in the A’tman,” and so on. Wherefore it may be concluded that Parames’vara is alone the Inner Ruler of all, not the Pradhāna, nor Virāt-Puruṣa, nor Jīva.

### ADHĪKĀRANA 8.

This adhikāraṇa is introduced with a view to shew that the Parames’vara, who has been declared to be embodied in the visible forms of the earth etc., is not Himself visible like them.

(Parames’vara is the being) possessed of the attributes of invisibility and so on, because of the mention of (His) attributes. (I. ii. 22.)

The passage which forms the subject of discussion in this adhikāraṇa runs as follows

“But the higher knowledge is that by which the indestructible (Akshara) is apprehended; that which cannot be seen, nor seized, which has no family and no caste, no eyes nor ears, no hands nor feet, the eter-

nal, the omnipresent, infinitesimal, that which is imperishable,—it is that which the wise regard as the source of all beings.\*

Here a doubt arises as to whether the indestructible (Akshara) refers to Pradhāna, Jīva, or Parames’vara.

(Pūrvapakṣa) :—Here Akshara refers to Pradhāna, inasmuch as it can be the source of all beings, transforming itself into mahat and so on. Or, Akshara may refer to jīva. He, can indeed, be rightly spoken of as Akshara, as said in the following passage of the s’ruti :

“That which is perishable (Kshara), the Pradhāna, the immortal (amrita), the indestructible (ākshara).”†

He can be the source of all beings through his Karma. Wherefore Akshara may refer to one of the two.

(Siddhānta) :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : The Akshara is none other than Parames’vara, His attributes being spoken of in the words “From Him who perceives all, and who knows all, whose penance (tapas) consists of knowledge”‡ and so on. Indeed, such attributes as omniscience can pertain to none other than Parames’vara. As to the contention that Pradhāna and Jīva can be the source of all beings, we say it is wrong to say so, inasmuch as they are (respectively) insentient and possessed of limited knowledge, and are therefore incapable of the act of creating all beings§.

Again, the Sūtrakāra proceeds to show that ‘Akshara’ cannot properly refer to Jīva and Pradhāna :

And because of the mention of qualifications and a distinction, (it is) not the two others. (I. ii. 23).

Here the Upanishad opens with the enunciation of the proposition that, one being known, all is known, in the words “Which one, O blessed Lord, being known, all this becomes known?”§ Besides this, there are other qualifications. Owing to a mention of such qualifications ‘Akshara’ cannot here mean Pradhāna. Neither does ‘Akshara’ refer to Jīva, inasmuch as the Akshara is described to be different from Jīva in the words “higher than the high, higher, than the imperishable.

And because of the description of (His) form (I. ii. 24.)

The Akshara is described to be of the form of the three worlds in the following passage

\* Mundaka-Upanishad 1-1-5, 5.

† Svetasvatara-Upanishad 1-10.

‡ Mundaka-Upanishad 1-1-9.

§ Ibid. 1-1-3.

¶ Ibid. 2-1-2.

"Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon, the quarters his ears, his speech the Veda disclosed, the wind his breath, his heart the universe; from his feet came the earth, he is indeed the inner Atman of all beings."\*

And for this reason, Parames'vara, the A'tman of all, is alone referred to by the word 'Akshara.'

### Adhikarana 9.

It was shewn in a former section that Parames'vara is to be worshipped as the seat of prāna. This section proceeds to shew that He is to be worshipped as the fire in the stomach.

The fire (Vais'vānara is Parames'vara), because of the specification of the general designation. (I. ii. 25.)

The following scriptural text forms the subject of discussion in this adhikarana:

"But he who worships the space-limited Vaisvānara A'tman as identical with himself, he eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all A'tmans.†

Here a doubt arises as to whether the Vais'vānara here presented as an object of worship refers to Parames'vara, or to some other being.

(Pūrvapakṣa:—The word 'Vais'vānara' denotes the fire in the stomach; for we find the word used to denote the fire in the stomach in the following passage:

"Agni Vais'vānara is the fire within man, by which the food that is eaten is cooked, i. e., digested. Its noise is that which one hears, if one covers one's ears. When he is on the point of departing this life, he does not hear that noise."‡

Or it may refer to 'fire' the third of the five 'great elements,' the word 'Vais'vānara' being applied to fire in such passages as the following:

"This fire, verily, is the Vais'vānara."§

Or, the word may denote the god known by that name, inasmuch as he, as the god to be worshipped, is declared to be the giver of the reward in such passages as the following

"When a son is born, oblations should be offered to the Vais'vānara in twelve cups."¶

It can never refer to Parames'vara, since the s'ruti teaches us that Vais'vānara is a finite being, in the words "space-limited."

(Siddhānta:—)As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Parames'vara Himself is referred to by the word 'Vais'vānara.'—How?—Though the word Vais'vānara' is a common designation, yet in this section of the upanishad it is defined by such specific designations as 'Brahman'—which are peculiarly applicable to Parames'vara,—in the following passages:

"Who is our A'tman? What is Brahman?"\*\*

"You know at present that Vais'vānara A'tman; tell us that."

This specific designation cannot be applied to the fire in the stomach etc. Wherefore Vais'vānara is none but Parames'vara.

The Sūtrakāra adduces another piece of evidence to show that Parames'vara is meant here:

Inasmuch as what is repeated may form a mark by which to infer. (I. ii. 26.)

In such passages as "Fire is his head, his eyes the sun and the moon,"† Parames'vara is declared to be embodied in the form made up of the regions extending from heaven to earth. Such a form is spoken of in the section of the upanishad we are here discussing in the following words

"Of that Vais'vānara A'tman, the head is Sutejas (having good light), the eye Vis'varūpa (multiform), the breath Prithagvartman (having various courses), the trunk Bahula (full), the bladder Rayi (wealth), the feet, the earth."‡

The form here spoken of forms the mark by which we may infer that Parames'vara is meant here.

If (you hold it is) not (so) because by word etc. It is said to be established within, we cannot (grant it) because of its being so taught for the sake of contemplation, and on account of its incongruity; and, moreover, they declare him to be Purusha. (I. ii. 27.)

(Objection:—)This Vais'vānara fire is none other than the fire in the stomach, because of its being spoken of as the three fires and as the receptacle of the oblations offered to the prānas, in such passages as the following:

"The heart is the Gārhapatya fire, the mind the Anvāhārya fire, the mouth the A'havaniya fire.

\* Ibid 2-1-1.

† Chhandogya-Upanishad 5-18.

‡ Brhadāraṇyaka-Upanishad 7-9.

§ Taittirīya-Saṃhitā 3-3-8.

¶ Ibid 2-2-5.

\* Chhandogya-Upanishad 5-11.

† Mundaka-Upanishad 2-1.

‡ Chhandogya-Upanishad 5-19.



Therefore the first food which a man may take is in the place of *homa* ; \*

and also because of its being declared to be established within man in the following passage

“ He who knows this *Vais’vānara* fire to be of the human form and established within man.”†

The *Vais’vānara* fire is not *Parames’vara*.

(Answer) :—Not so ; because it is taught that He has to be worshipped in the form of the fire in the stomach, and that it is impossible to hold that the fire in the stomach is of the form of the three worlds and so on. Moreover, in the words “ this *Vais’vānara* fire is he who is known as *Purusha*, ” the *Vājasaneyins* declare this *Vais’vānara* to be the *Purusha*. Moreover, none but *Parames’vara* can be strictly spoken of as *Purusha*, as the *s’ruti* says

“ By that *Purusha* all this is filled.”‡

Wherefore it is right to hold that *Parames’vara* is meant here.

Hence only, neither the God nor the element. ( I. ii. 28. )

Because this *Vais’vānara* has the three worlds for his body and is known by the name of *Purusha*, therefore neither the fire-god nor the third element ( of fire ) is meant here.

It having been proved that *Parames’vara* is denoted by the word ‘ *agni* ’ ( fire ) as having to be worshipped in the form of the fire in the stomach, the *Sūtrakāra* now proceeds to show how other teachers ( *achāryas* ) have variously explained the application of the word ‘ *agni* .’

*Jaimini* ( sees ) no incongruity even in literally ( applying the word ) ( I. ii. 29. )

The application of the word ‘ *agni* ’ to *Parames’vara* is justifiable not merely on the ground that He has to be worshipped in the form of fire, but also on the ground that the word can be literally applied to *Parames’vara* himself — leading ( the devotees ) to the front. Thus *Jaimini* sees no incongruity in applying the word to *Parames’vara*.

\* *Chhândogya-Upanishad* 5-18, 19.

† *S’atapathabrahmanam* 10-6-1-11.

‡ *Mahānārāyaṇa Upanishad* 1.

*A’s’marathya* ( holds it to be ) for manifestation’s sake! ( I. ii. 30. )

*Sage A’s’marathya* holds that the Unlimited becomes limited in space occupied by the regions from the heaven down to the Earth, with a view to manifest Himself to his devotees.

*Badari* ( holds it to be ) for recognition’s sake, ( I. ii. 31. )

*Bādari* holds that the representation of the regions from the heaven to the earth as the head, feet and other parts of the body is meant for recognition, that is, for the attainment of Brahman.

*Jaimini* ( holds it to be ) for exaltation’s sake ; so, indeed, ( the *s’ruti* ) reveals. ( I. ii. 32. )

*Jaimini* thinks that it is with a view to exalt in thought the oblations to *prāṇa* etc.—taught in connection with the worship—to the rank of an *Agnihotra* that the chest etc. of the worshipper are represented as the altar and so on in the following passage

“ The chest is the altar ; the hairs, the grass on the altar ; the heart, the *Gārhapatya* fire ; the mind, the *Anvāhārya* fire ; the mouth, the *Ahavārya* fire.”\*

And accordingly the *s’ruti* says : “ He who offers this *Agnihotra* with a full knowledge of its true purpose.”†

And they declare Him to be therein. ( I. ii. 33. )

The *Taittirīyakas* declare that the *Parames’vara* dwells in the devotee’s body when oblations are offered to *prāṇa* etc., as the recipient of those oblations, as the following passages show :

“ O oblation ! enter into me as *S’iva*, that there may be no sensation of burning.”‡

“ The Lord is pleased, the eater of all.”§

Wherefore in the opinion of all teachers, as also in point of reason, it is right to hold that *Parames’vara* alone is to be worshipped in the form of the fire in the stomach, by the *prāṇa-agnihotra*.

*End of the Second Pāda of the First Adhyāya.*

A. MAHĀDEVA S’A’S’TRI, B. A.

( To be continued. )

\* *Chhândogya-Upanishad*, 5-18.

† *Bṛihad—Up.* 5-24.

‡ *Mahānā. Up.* 35-36.

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — O R — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA

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THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪKANTHA  
BHA'SHYA.

(Continued from page 79.)

### THIRD PA'DA.

This pāda will be concerned with an enquiry into the meaning of such of the Vedāntic passages as contain explicit marks of Brahman, as also incidentally with determining as to who is qualified (for the study of this science):

The abode of heaven, earth etc., is the Parames'vara, owing to the word 'self' (I. iii. 1).

The passage referred to here occurs in the Mundaka-Upanishad and reads thus:

"In him the heaven, the earth and the sky are woven, the mind also with all the senses. Know him alone, the A'tman, and leave off other words. He is the bridge of the immortal."\*

Here a doubt arises as to whether the being spoken of as the abode of the heaven and the earth is the Parames'vara or some other being.

\* Mundaka-Upanishad 2—2—5.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—It seems that some being other than Parames'vara viz. Vāyu, is the abode of the heaven, the earth etc., for he is declared to be the abode of all in the following passage:

"By air, as by a thread, O Gautamā, this world and the other world, and all creatures are strung together."\*

As against the foregoing, we hold as follows:

The Parames'vara is the abode of the heaven, the earth etc., because of the word 'A'tman' in the passage "Know him alone, the A'tman."

What is the objection to Vāyu, the Sūtrātman, being denoted by the word 'A'tman'?

The Sūtrakāra answers thus

And because of the declaration (that he is) reached by the liberated (I. iii. 2)

It is none other than Parames'vara, because that Being is to be reached by the liberated souls,—those who are liberated from name and form generated by the meritorious and sinful acts—as declared in the following passages:

\* Brihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad 5—7—2.

"When the seer sees the brilliant maker and lord (of the world) as the person who is the source of Brahman, then he is wise, and shaking off good and evil, he reaches the highest *Samyam* free from passions."\*

"As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and their form, thus, a wise man, freed from name and form, goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great"†

How can this be possible in Vāyu? Vāyu becomes the Sūtrātman only as ensouled by Parames'vara, inasmuch as Vāyu is one of the eight forms of the Parames'vara. Hence the conclusion that it is not Vāyu.

Not the subject of inference, for want of its designation; nor the living being (I. iii. 3.)

It cannot be maintained that what is spoken of as the abode of heaven, earth etc., refers to Pradhāna as known by inference, inasmuch as it is the upādāna or material cause of all; for, there is no word denoting Pradhāna. Neither can it be the Jīva, for, then, it would involve an incongruity.

Because of the mention of a distinction (I. iii. 4.)

Here a distinction is made between I's'vara and Jīva in the following passage:

"On the same tree man (purusha) sits grieving, immersed, bewildered by his own impotence. But when he sees the other Lord contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away."‡

Wherefore He who is the Supreme Lord (Parames'vara) in Himself can alone be the abode of heaven, earth etc.

By the context (I. iii. 5.)

This section, indeed, treats of the Supreme, and begins thus:

"Now the supreme knowledge by which that Indestructible is known."§

Wherefore also, the Parames'vara is here referred to.

And on account of presence and eating (I. iii. 6.)

And also because, after having said that Jīva eats the fruits of his actions, the s'ruti speaks of Him who shines forth without eating, in the following passage:

"Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating."¶

Hence the conclusion that it is the Parames'vara Himself, distinct from the Jīva, who is spoken of as the abode of heaven, earth etc.

### Adhikarana 2

The Sūtrakāra proceeds to shew that unsurpassed Bliss is the result of reaching Parames'vara who, as has just been described, has to be reached by the liberated souls:

The Infinity (is Parames'vara) because of its mention after serenity (I. iii. 7.)

In the Chāndogya-Upanishad, after declaring that "Infinity only is bliss," the s'ruti describes the nature of the Infinity as follows:

"Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, that is the Infinite."†

Here arises a doubt as to whether it is the Parames'vara or some other being who is denoted by the word 'Infinite.

(Pārupaksha):—The Infinite is some being other than Parames'vara, namely Prāna. When, as regards 'name' and other things mentioned in the previous passages, Nārada asked "Is there something better than a name?"‡ Sanat Kumāra mentions "speech" and other things, in such words as "speech is better than a name;"§ but, after Prāna, s'ruti introduces the Infinite without resorting to a question and an answer. Because Parames'vara is thus not the subject of discourse here, therefore Prāna is the Infinite.

As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Parames'vara alone is denoted by the word 'Infinite,' as coming after 'serenity.' 'Serenity' means Jīva as spoken of in the s'ruti "Now that serene being which etc."|| And he is referred to by the word 'Prāna.' After him, the Infinite is declared as something different from him in the words. "But in reality he declares what is beyond who declares the Highest Being to be the true,"¶ and so on. Here, after declaring that He who understands Prāna

\* Mundaka-Upanishad 3-1-3.

† Ibid 3-2-8.

‡ Mundaka Upanishad 3-1-2.

§ Mundaka Upanishad 1-1-5.

\* Ibid 3-1-1.

† Op. cit. 7-24-1.

‡ Ibid. 7-1-5.

§ Ibid. 7-3-1.

|| Ibid 8-3-4.

¶ Ibid 7-17-1.

declares that which is beyond in the words, "He who sees this, perceives this, and understands this, declares what is beyond ;\* the s'ruti indicates, by the word 'but,' that he who declares the Highest Being to be the True is superior to him who is mentioned above, —to him who declares that Prāna is the Being who is beyond all. Therefore it is to be concluded that the being who is called the True and is the subject subsequently spoken of as the Highest Being, is superior to Prāna previously spoken of as the Highest Being. It is that Being who is described in a succeeding passage as possessed of the attribute of infinitude. He is even spoken of as A'tman in a passage next succeeding it, in the words "Next follows the explanation of the Infinite as the A'tman."† Wherefore the Infinite is the A'tman, none other than the Parames'vara, who is Superior to Jīva spoken of by the word 'Prāna.'

And owing to the appropriateness of the attributes (I. III. 8).

The attributes that He rests in His own greatness, that He is the Atman of all, that He is the cause of all, and so on, are taught in the following passages :

"O Lord, wherein does He rest? In His own greatness."‡

"A'tman is all this."§

"From the Atman comes Prāna ; from the A'tman, hope."||

These are appropriate only when applied to Parames'vara, not to Jīva denoted by the word 'Prāna.' Wherefore, it may be concluded that Parames'vara alone is the Infinite, not the other.

(Objection) :—In the preceding adhikarana it was shewn that the liberated souls attain equality with Brahman, as said by the s'ruti "He reaches the highest equality free from passions."¶ Accordingly it is to be concluded that the liberated souls who have attained union with Brahman remain separate from Him. In the passage "where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite,"\*\* it is declared that, when Brahman denoted by the word 'Infinite' is seen, there can be no perception of the universe as opposed to Brahman. How to reconcile this ?

\* Ibid. 7. 15-4.

† Ibid. 7-25-2.

‡ Chh. Up. 7-24-1.

§ Ibid. 7-25-2.

|| Ibid. 7-26-1.

¶ Mūṇḍaka-Upanishad. 3-1-3.

\*\* Chh. Up. 7-22-1.

(Answer) :—The meaning of the assertion that "one sees nothing else" when the Infinite is immediately perceived, may be explained as follows : He whose nature is unsurpassed bliss, in whom—when immediately seen—merged, a man does not seek to perceive colour and other sense-objects with a longing for any more pleasures, He is the Infinite, He is Brahman. Indeed, the various kinds of sensuous pleasure are only the infinitesimally small fractions of Brahman's bliss. Accordingly the S'ruti says, "All other creatures live on a small portion of this bliss."\* Wherefore here, as regards Brahman, there can be no denial of duality. We need not specially investigate, as to how the perception of the universe which is alien to the highest end of man can be avoided so long as the universe exists. For, in the case of liberated souls, it is not the material (Prākṛita) universe which is perceived by them. On the other hand, it is Brahman Himself, whose essential nature is unsurpassed bliss, that forms the object of perception in the form of universe. Accordingly the S'ruti says :

"That, then, he becomes ; Brahman whose body is Light (ākāś'a), whose nature is true, whose delight is in Prāna (Śupreme S'akti), whose bliss is in Manas."†

There, the liberated soul is introduced in the words "He attains to the state of self-effulgence, he attains to the mastery over manas," and so on. In "he is the master of speech" and so on, he is said to be endued with speech and other sense-organs which are under his own control, which are non-material (aprākṛita) and perfectly pure. To him, then, on attaining to that condition, this visible array of the material (prākṛita) universe becomes the very Brahman whose body is ākāś'a, i. e., whose body is the light of spiritual consciousness. This is the hidden meaning of the passage. Wherefore equality of the liberated souls with Brahman consists in their perceiving the universe as one with Brahman in essence. Hence the propriety of the whole doctrine.

### Adhikarana. 3

The Akshara (is Parames'vara) because of the supporting of (the universe) including a'ka's'a. (I. III. 9).

The passage which forms the subject of discussion here occurs in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka, and runs thus :

\* Bri. Up. 6-3-32.

† Tai. Up. 1-6.



"O Gargî, the Brāhmanas call this the Indestructible Akshara. It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long, neither red nor fluid; it is without shadow;"\* and so on.

Here a threefold doubt arises as to the meaning of the word 'Akshara': does it refer to Pranava, Jīva or Parames'vara?

(Pīrvapaksha):—One of the two, Pranava or Jīva, is denoted by the word 'akshara.'—How?—It is but right that it should refer to Pranava inasmuch as the word 'akshara' is synonymous with 'letter.' It is also right that 'akshara' should refer to Purusha or Jīva, as said in the scriptural passage 'Purusha is termed akshara.'† Wherefore they alone are referred to by the word 'akshara'.

As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Here, it is Brahman who is denoted by the word 'akshara.' Why? Because the Akshara is said to support everything including ākās'a. When Gargî asked "In what then is the ākās'a woven like warf and woof?"‡—that ākās'a which is described as the basis of all phenomena in the passage, "That of which they say that it is above the heavens, beneath the earth, embracing heaven and earth, past, present, and future, that is woven, like warf and woof, in the ākās'a,"§—Yājñavalkya said, "O Gargî, the Brāhmanas call this the Akshara. .... In that Akshara then, O Gargî, the ākās'a, is woven, like warf and woof."|| We are taught that the Akshara so described supports the universe including ākās'a. Where else is this possible except in the Paramātman? Wherefore Parames'vara alone is the being denoted by the word 'Akshara.'

And that, by the command. (I. iii. 10).

And we are taught that this support is owing to the high command, as the S'ruti says, "By the command of that Akshara, O Gargî, Sun and Moon stand apart."¶ Jīva cannot exercise such a command over the world, as the S'ruti says that there cannot be a second in the command of the world, in the passage, "One alone is Rudra they are not for a second"\*\*\*. Wherefore Parames'vara alone is denoted by the word 'Akshara.'

And because of the exclusion of distinction (I. iii. 11.)o

"Distinction" means being a separate entity. The concluding portion of the passage,—namely, "This Akshara, O Gargî, is unseen, but seeing; unheard, but hearing; unperceived, but perceiving; unknown, but knowing,"—excludes the idea of the Akshara being distinct from Parames'vara, inasmuch as neither Jīva nor Pranava can be spoken of as seeing and being at the same time unseen. Hence the conclusion that Parames'vara alone is the Akshara.

#### Adhikarana.—4

This Adhikarana is intended to show that the Parames'vara, though beyond the reach of sensuous perception, yet becomes immediately perceptible to His devotees, as a result of His Supreme Mercy:

He is the object of perception, because of the mention (of His attributes). (I. iii. 12.)

The passage which forms the subject of discussion here occurs in the Pras'na Upanishad and reads as follows:

"Again he who meditates with this syllable 'Aum' of three mātṛas, on the Highest Purusha, he comes to light and to the sun. And as a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed from evil. He is led up by the Sāman verses to the Brahma-world, and then Him who is superior to the Jīva-mass he sees the Higher Purusha lying in the body."\*

Here a doubt arises as to whether the entity spoken of as the object of perception is the Parames'vara or some other being.

(Pīrvapaksha):—He is not the Parames'vara. He is none other than the Hiranyagarbha, as the s'ruti speaks of the attainment of his regions, in the words, 'by the Sāman verses, he is led up to the Brahma-world.' And the world 'Highest' too is applicable to him who is the highest of the Jīvas. Or, it may be Nārāyaṇa; for he is the being denoted by the word 'Puru-ha'. He can also be spoken of as higher than the Hiranyagarbha who is the aggregate of the Jīvas. He alone is known to be designated by Pranava. His abode alone is declared in the s'ruti to be intimated by the wise, in the words, "That supreme abode of Vishnu do the wise ever see;"† and in the concluding verse this fact is thus referred to:

\* Op. Cit. 5-5.

† Taittirīya-Sambhitā 4-2-9.

\* Bri. Up. 5-8-8.

† Bhagavad Gita. XV. 16.

‡ Bri. Up. 5-8-7.

§ Ibid 5-8-7.

|| Bri. Up. 5-8-11.

¶ Ibid. 5-8-9.

\*\*\* Atharvas'iras.

"Through the Rik-verses he arrives at this world, through the Yajus-verses at the sky, through the Sāman-verses at that which the wise teach."\*

As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Here the object of the act of perception is the Parameśvara, because of the mention of His distinguishing attributes such as tranquillity in the following passage:

"The wise arrives at that which is tranquil, free from decay, from death, from fear,—the Highest"†

Indeed, in the Hiranyagarbha who is a creature of the Parameśvara, no such attributes as tranquillity can exist. The term 'Brahma-world' means the region of Śiva—the Para-brahman—which is worthy of attainment. He, indeed, who is 'higher than him who is superior' to the Hiranyagarbha, the aggregate of Jīvas spoken of as 'Jīva-mass'—is declared as the object of meditation. Hence the untenability of the view that the Hiranyagarbha is meant here (to be the object of perception).

As to the assertion that Nārāyaṇa is meant here, it needs investigation. How can he be spoken of as eternally free, as the cause of fearlessness, as the supreme, beyond all universe, as taught in the words "free from death, from fear, and highest"? He is, indeed, of the form of the universe. And how then to explain the statement that the devotee directly sees Him who is higher than Nārāyaṇa—than him who is superior even to Hiranyagarbha the 'jīva-mass,'—Him who lies in the body as the Antaryāmin and is therefore called Puruṣa, Him who is Para-brahman? Indeed, the s'ruti declares as follows:

"Superior to Nārāyaṇa is Brahman."‡

"True, real, the Supreme Brahman, the spirit (Puruṣa), dark and yellowish, celebate, diverse-eyed"§

Wherefore it is but right to maintain that the s'ruti—"he sees the Puruṣa lying in the body, Greater than the Great,"—declares as the object of perception Him who is called Puruṣa as dwelling in the Dahara-lotus in the body; who is denoted by the Pranava, as declared in the s'ruti, "Designated by that (Pranava) which is merged in its root (the syllable a) is He who is the Highest, the Mahesvara (Great Lord);" who, as said in the s'ruti "Brahman who is greater than Nārāyaṇa," is greater than Nārāyaṇa

who is the form of universe; who is true and real, as devoid of all divergence in speech and thought; who, as possessed of three eyes, is said to be diverse-eyed; who, as coloured by the Supreme Energy (Para-s'akti) called Umā—a word formed of the constituent sounds of the Pranava in their reversed order,—is described as dark and yellowish; who is the supreme all-transcending Brahman. Now as to the assertion based on the s'ruti "That Supreme abode of Vishnu": there is no incongruity whatever, inasmuch as that very supreme form of Vishnu which, when looked apart from the universe, is made of unsurpassed bliss, is itself the Supreme Brahman called Śiva. That is to say, there is no essential distinction between Vishnu and Śiva, the material and efficient causes of the universe, except what is due to a difference of state.

#### Adhikarana 5.

Thus, it has been shown here that the Śakṣhātkāra or direct perception of Parabrahman, the diverse-eyed,—who is above the universe including Vishnu, Brahmā and so on, who, lying in the body as an act of Grace to the devotee, is called Puruṣa, who is associated with Umā, the Supreme Energy (Parama-s'akti),—enables His devotees who are always intent on His name, Pranava, to attain Him, by way of bringing about the cessation of all saṃsāra. This adhikarana proceeds to speak of His residence in the body and of His worship:

Dahara (is Parameśvara), because of the next-mentioned (attributes) (I. iii. 13).

The passage which forms the subject of discussion here occurs in the Chhândogya-Upanishad and reads as follows:

"There is this city of Brahman, and in it the palace, the small (dahara) lotus and in it that Dahara (small) akāśa. Now what exists in that Dahara-ākāśa, that is to be sought for, that is to be understood."\*

Here a doubt arises as to whether it is the material ether (Bhūtākāśa), or Jīva, or Parameśvara that is denoted by the word 'dahara.

(Pārapakṣa):—The application of the word 'ākāśa' being restricted to the material ether, 'Dahara-ākāśa' denotes bhūtākāśa or material ether. Or, the word 'dahara' refers to Jīva, because the word means 'small in size' and is therefore applicable to

\* Prana-Upanishad 5-7.

† Ibid 5-7.

‡ Ishana-Upanishad.

§ Ibid.

\* Op. Cit. 8-1-1.

Jīva who is *anu*, of atomic size. "Dahara" cannot denote the all-pervading Paramesvara.

As against the foregoing we hold as follows: 'Dahara-ākāśa' is none other than the Paramesvara. Why? Because of the attributes next mentioned, such as the attributes of being free from sin and so on, thus declared in a subsequent passage of the section:

"This A'tman is free from sin, free from old age, free from death and grief, free from hunger and thirst, of unfailing desires, of unfailing will."\*

How can these exist in the Jīva who is a samsārin, a being of the world? Wherefore Dahara-ākāśa is none other than the I'svara, possessed of the attribute of being free from sin, and so on.

And because of going and of the word. So indeed it is found; and there is an indicating mark (I, iii, 14).

'Dahara-ākāśa' denotes Paramesvara, also because it is declared that the creatures daily go into this Dahara-ākāśa, and because it is spoken of as 'Brahma-loka' in the following passage in the same context:

"As people who do not know the country walk again and again over a gold treasure that has been hidden somewhere in the earth and do not discover it, thus do all these creatures day after day go into the Brahma-loka, and yet do not discover it, because they are carried away by untruth."†

So, indeed, elsewhere the s'ruti speaks of the creatures thus going to the Paramesvara, as found in the following passage:

"In the same manner, my son, all these creatures, when they have become merged in the True, know not that they are merged in the True."‡

We also find the word Brahma-loka applied to the same in the following passage

"This is Brahma-loka, O King."§

Moreover, even leaving out of consideration the fact that the s'ruti speaks *elsewhere* of the creatures daily going to Brahman and refers to the Dahara-ākāśa by the word 'Brahma-loka,' we find ample evidence, showing that Dahara-ākāśa is Paramesvara, in the section under discussion which speaks of all creatures going daily to Brahman and contains the word 'Brahma-loka' referring to Dahara-ākāśa.

Because of His greatness—the supporting (of the universe)—being found in this (Dahara-ākāśa). (I. iii. 15)

The act of supporting the universe, which constitutes the Paramesvara's greatness, is predicated of this Dahara-ākāśa, in the following passage:

"Now that A'tman is the limit the support, so that these worlds may not become jumbled up."\*

And this supporting of the universe forms the greatness of Paramesvara, as the following s'ruti declares.

"He is the lord of all, the master of all beings, the protector of all beings. He is the limit, the support, so that these worlds may not become jumbled up."†

Wherefore also, Dahara-ākāśa is Paramesvara.

And it being well-known (that He is to be worshipped there). (I. iii. 16).

The Mahopanishad says:

"There is that small lotus situated in the body's midst, free from sin, the abode of the great; and therein is the Dahara (small) ākāśa, free from grief; and that which is there within has to be worshipped."‡

The Kaivalya-Upanishad says:

"Having regarded the heart-lotus as free from all stain,.....and having contemplated the Lord Paramesvara, with His helpmate Umā, as the Trilochana (three-eyed), as Nīlakantha (dark-necked) as serene....."

From such passages as these it is clear that Paramesvara associated with Umā is to be contemplated as dwelling within the small lotus. For this reason also, Dahara-ākāśa is Paramesvara.

(*Objection*):—From such passages in another Upanishad as "In that ākāśa within the heart, there reposes the ruler of all, the lord of all, the king of all,"§ it is clear that the Paramesvara is to be contemplated as dwelling in the Dahara-ākāśa within the small lotus. Here He is to be contemplated as the Dahara-ākāśa itself. There is thus a self-contradiction in the Upanishads.

(*Answer*):—Even here it is the Paramesvara dwelling within the Dahara-ākāśa that has to be con-

\* Ibid. 8-1-5.

† Ibid. 8-3-2.

‡ Ibid. 6-3-2.

§ Bri. Up. 6-3-32.

\* Chhā. Up. 8-4-1.

† Bri. Up. 6-4-22.

‡ Mahānā. Up. 10.

§ Bri. Up. 6-4-22.

templated. But, inasmuch as sinlessness and other attributes of Parames'vara are found predicated of Dahara-ākās'a, Parames'vara may also be spoken of as Dahara-ākās'a when conceived as *Chid-ambara*, as enrobed in the Spiritual Light.

(If you say that)—owing to reference to the other—that (other) is meant here, (we reply) no, owing to impossibility (I. iii. 17.)

(Objection):—The other, namely jīva, is referred to in the following passage:

“Now that serene being who, after having risen from out this earthly body, and having reached the highest Light, appears in his true form, that is the A'tman: thus he spoke.”\*

Therefore the ākās'a under discussion can be no other than the Jīva.

(Answer):—No; because the attributes mentioned above, such as freedom from sin, cannot pertain to him. Wherefore ākās'a properly refers here to none other than Parames'vara to whom those attributes belong.

(If you say that it is jīva) because of the subsequent (passage), (we hold that it speaks of jīva) whose true nature has manifested itself (I. iii. 18.)

(Objection):—In the sequel, in Prajapati's words, the s'ruti declares that Jīva is devoid of all sin and so on, thus:

“The A'tman who is free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, whose desires never fail, whose will is ever true, He it is whom we must search out; He it is whom we must try to know. He who has searched out that A'tman and understands Him obtains all worlds and all desires.”

The s'ruti also speaks of the characteristic mark of Jīva—namely his association with the three avasthās or states—in the following passages:

“That person who is seen in the eye, he is A'tman; thus he said.”†

\* Chhā. Upanishad 8-3-4.

† Chhā. Upanishad 1-15.

“He who moves about happy in dreams, he is the A'tman.”\*

“When a man being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest, sees no dreams, that is the A'tman.”†

Therefore it is right to say that Jīva is here referred to.

(Answer):—There is no force in this contention. Here the s'ruti describes Jīva whose attributes, such as sinlessness, had been veiled by the body generated by his own beginningless sin and karma, but who, when afterwards become united to the Supreme Light, has his own true nature manifested, as well as the attribute of freedom from sin and the like; it is not the Jīva who is of samsāra.

But the Dahara-ākās'a denotes the Being whose several blessed inherent attributes are never hidden. Thus, the Dahara-ākās'a here spoken of is neither bound nor liberated.

The reference serves a different purpose. (I. iii. 19.)

The manifestation of Jīva's true nature on reaching the Supreme Being denoted by the word Dahara-ākās'a is spoken of in the following passage:

“Having risen from out this earthly body, and having reached the highest light, he appears in his true form.”‡

Here the reference to Jīva serves to show that such is his greatness. Hence no contradiction.

(If you hold that Jīva is here referred to) because of the s'ruti speaking of smallness, this has been answered. (I. iii. 20.)

As to the objection that, as dwelling in a small place, the Dahara-ākās'a must be a limited being, and that it is therefore not the Supreme Being here referred to,—it has already been answered in the sūtra I, ii, 7.

A. MAHĀDEVA S'ĀSTRĪ, B. A.

(To be continued.)

\* Ibid 8-10-1.

† Ibid 8-11-1.

‡ Ibid. 8-3-4.



# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — O R — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA

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## TRANSLATIONS

### THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪKANTHA BHA'SHYA.

(Continued from page 103.)

And because of his resemblance. (I. iii. 21).

The Jīva's resemblance to the Supreme Light referred to by the word 'Dahara-ākāśa' is spoken of in the sequel :

"That limit day and night do not pass, nor old age, death and grief; neither good nor evil deeds. All evil-doers turn back from it; for the world of Brahman is free from all evil. Therefore he who has crossed that limit, if blind, ceases to be blind; if wounded, ceases to be wounded; if afflicted, ceases to be afflicted. Therefore, when that limit has been crossed, night becomes day indeed; for the world of Brahman is lighted once for all."\*

\* Uha-Up. 3-4-1, 2.

Here, indeed, the sinlessness and constant luminosity of the Dahara-ākāśa which has to be reached are given out as the reason why, like the old age etc. which are the result of sin, the evil of blindness etc. ceases to be on reaching the Dahara-ākāśa, and why then there is a constant light. That the former is the cause of the latter is clearly seen in another passage which reads as follows

"Free from all taint, he attains to highest equality."\*

Thus we have that he who has reached the Dahara-ākāśa attains the result mentioned above, namely, the resemblance thereto by way of attaining equality. This will hold good only when the Jīva is distinct from the Dahara-ākāśa. And therefore it may be concluded that Jīva is not the being spoken of here.

Again, the sūtrakāra cites yet another authority on the subject :

And, moreover, (it is so) said in the Smṛiti. (I. iii. 22).

It is said in the Smṛiti that Brahman dwells within the small lotus and is the object of worship

\* Mundaka. Up. 3-1.

"Or, from the teaching of a Guru let him know Paramātman whose body is the Supreme Bliss, who is Purusha, dark and yellow. By practice, O Gārgī, the righteous perceive Brahman in the city of Brahman, in mid-ākāśa of the small lotus, and do thou also proceed in the same way."

Accordingly it may be concluded that the Parabrahman whose nature is the Supreme Light, who has to be reached by the liberated, who is associated with Umā as His Supreme Energy, should be contemplated as dwelling within the ākāśa in the small lotus, as possessed of sinlessness and other attributes inherent in his own nature.

#### Adhikarana.—6.

Now the Sūtrakāra proceeds to treat of another form in which Parames'vara may be worshipped:

By the text itself He is declared. (I. iii. 23.)

The passage which forms the subject of discussion here occurs in the Katha-Vallī:

"The Purusha, of the size of a thumb, stands in the middle of the body, the Lord of what was and what is yet to be; thenceforward he fears none."\*

Here a doubt arises as to whether the Purusha, said to be 'of the size of a thumb,' is Jīva or Parames'vara.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—It is but right to say that Jīva is here spoken of; for, Jīva is declared to be of the size of a thumb, in the following passage

"He assumes all forms; he is led by the three guṇas, following the three paths. He is the lord of life and migrates through his own works. He is of the size of a thumb, brilliant like the sun, endowed with thoughts and egoism."†

And the words "stands in the middle of the body," show that the Purusha here spoken of dwells in the middle of the body. The all-pervading Parames'vara cannot be the Purusha here spoken of.

As against the foregoing we hold as follows: It is well to say that it is Parames'vara who is spoken of as thumb-sized Purusha; for the passage under discussion describes the characteristic marks of Parames'vara, in the words "He is the lord of what has

been and what is yet to be;" and so on. The S'ruti declares (elsewhere) that He alone is the lord of all, in the words "endued with all power, the lord of all, S'ambhu dwells in the ākāśa's midst."

How, then, to explain the finitude frequently predicated of the Parames'vara? As regards this, the Sūtrakāra says

But (it is so said) because of (His being) in the heart, while teaching what man has to do. (I. iii. 24.)

It is with reference to the heart of the devotee that Parames'vara, though infinite, is said to be thumb-sized; and the injunctions of the science of Upāsana (contemplation) are to human beings. The Parames'vara who is supremely merciful assumes the form of the same size as the heart of the human devotee, thus rendering contemplation possible. Hence the conclusion that the Parames'vara who is full of light, dwells within the heart of the devotees in the form of *linga* or the subtle form.

#### Adhikarana.—7.

In the adhikarana just closed, it has been shown that the worship of Parames'vara is intended for man alone. How is it that the Atharvas'iras speaks of Devas worshipping the Parames'vara, in the words, "Then the Devas saw not Rudra, and those Devas (began to) contemplate Rudra"?

In reply to this question, the next adhikarana proceeds as follows:

Even above them, as Ba'dara'yana holds; because it is possible. (I. iii. 25.)

The passage which forms the subject of discussion occurs in the Atharvas'iras and reads as follows: "Those Devas contemplate Rudra."

Here a doubt arises as to whether it is possible or not for Devas to engage in the worship of Parames'vara.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—It is not possible. He alone is qualified for Vedic ritual who is possessed of an aspiration, who is able, wise, and not excluded by the S'āstra. They have not the requisite ability, for want of a body. Indeed it is the embodied ones that can engage in the act of adoring, contemplating, and the like. It cannot be maintained that they do possess bodies, on the authority of such passages as "Indra raised his thunderbolt (*vajra*) against Vritra"; for those passages which are subservient to the inculcation of an injunction cannot point to any thing other than that injunction. Even supposing that they

\* Op. Cit. 4-12.

† S'vetas'vatara-Upanishad 5-8-9.

do possess bodies, they have nothing to aspire after, inasmuch as their abode and that of Parames'vara are one and the same. From the passage "Devas went to the region of svarga, and these Devas asked Rudra 'who art Thou?'," we understand that the region of svarga is itself the abode of Rudra, the Parabrahman; and that is also the region of Devas. We also learn that even the Mukta or liberated soul has ultimately to attain to the region of svarga, from such passages as the following

"He attains to the region of svar."\*

Nor do they possess requisite knowledge, since, in the absence of Vedic study preceded by the sacramental process of upanayana, no Vedantic enquiry is possible and they cannot therefore acquire a knowledge of Brahman. Hence, too, their exclusion (from worship) by the S'āstra. Wherefore the Devas are not qualified for the worship of Brahman.

(Siddhānta):—Even the Devas are competent for the worship of Brahman.—Why?—Because there is room for aspiration in their case. And it cannot be said that the abode of the Devas and the abode of the Parames'vara are same; for, the word 'Svarga,' though signifying bliss in general, denotes a particular kind of bliss according to the context. The word 'Is'vara,' for instance, signifying 'master' in general, applies to a king who is the ruler of a country, in virtue of the context, as in the following passage

"And one should also visit the king (Is'vara) for the sake of acquisition and security."

But the same word occurring in a section treating of Brahman signifies unsurpassed power and applies to Brahman. So also, in virtue of the context and of the explanation afforded by other sources of knowledge concerning the subject, the word 'Svarga' signifying 'bliss' in general denotes the abode of Devas which affords a (comparatively) small amount of bliss, tainted as it is with the defect of being liable to decay and of being less exalted than some other kind of bliss. On the other hand, it denotes S'iva the Parabrahman's abode as being unsurpassed bliss itself, and as the place from which there is no return. Thus it is quite possible that the Devas who dwell in a place where happiness is tainted with the evil of being less exalted than some other kind of happiness, aspire to attain to Brahman's abode which is marked with unsurpassed bliss. On the authority of passages speaking of subjects subsidiary to an injunction,

it may also be seen that the Devas are embodied entities, and, as such, are efficient agents of action. Though such passages as "the sun is the sacrificial post," and "Fire is the antidote to the frost," which figuratively speak of things subsidiary to the main injunction, are not intended to inculcate what they literally convey, still, such subsidiary statements as "Indra raised the thunderbolt against Vritra," which are neither contradicted by other authorities nor vouchsafed by any other sources of knowledge, may justly inculcate what they speak of as a truth to be accepted. It is also possible that,—either because, in virtue of their exalted power, the Vedic doctrine reveals itself to them, or because they have not forgotten what they had learnt before,—they possess requisite knowledge. The S'āstra having enjoined divine worship on all in general, it cannot but be intended for the Devas, so that there is not the slightest ground for the exclusion of Devas. Wherefore Devas are competent for Brahmanvidyā.

The Sūtrakāra supposes an incongruity resulting from the Devas being embodied and refutes it as follows:

If you urge an incongruity in ritual (Karma), (we answer), no, the assumption of more than one (body) being revealed. (I. iii. 26.)

(Objection):—While the Devas are embodied entities, it should at the same time be supposed that, being invoked in the several sacrificial rituals performed in various places, they are simultaneously present in all those places. This does not hold good. Thus arises an incongruity in the matter of ritual.

(Answer):—No such incongruity can be urged here. It is declared that, though embodied, Saubhari and others have assumed more than one body. Hence no incongruity whatever.

Let there be no incongruity in the matter of ritual; but an incongruity does arise in the matter of Vedic Revelation. As against this objection the Sūtrakāra proceeds as follows:

If (you urge an incongruity as to) Revelation, (we answer) no, because of the origin thence, (as may be seen) from the direct (revelation) as well as (the indirect revelation or) inference. (I. iii. 27.)

(Objection):—Though there may arise no incongruity in the matter of ritual, an incongruity does arise in the matter of Vedic Revelation.—How?—Being made up of parts, the Devas are naturally impermanent. From this it necessarily follows that Indra and other

\* Taittiriya. Up. I. 6.

Devas had also a birth. Then it is necessarily either that, previous to their birth and subsequent to their death, such Vedic words as 'Indra' have no meaning, or that the words are impermanent. If impermanent, they must have proceeded from an individual person; and then the injunctions and prohibitions lose their authority, and the rituals therein enjoined have no ground to rest upon. Thus many are the evil logical consequences of the doctrine. Accordingly, to avoid incongruity as to the Vedic Revelation, the doctrine that the Devas are embodied should not be assented to.

(Answer):—Not so; for, thence i. e., from the very Vedic words such as 'Indra,' Indra and other beings were created. If 'Indra' and other words denote particular individuals, then, indeed, it would follow either that on the extinction of the beings denoted by those words they will have no objects to denote, or that they are impermanent. We maintain that, like the word 'cow,' such words as 'Indra' merely denote a general form. Accordingly, a potter thinks of a general form suggested to his mind by the word 'pot,' and then produces a pot; so too, on the disappearance of a former Indra, Brahmā thinks of the particular form of that Indra suggested by the Vedic word 'Indra' and produces another Indra of the same form, and so on. Wherefore, though Indra and other individuals may disappear, the several general forms do not cease, and the words are accordingly eternal. Hence no incongruity whatever. If you ask for authority on this point we appeal to *S'ruti* (direct revelation) and *Smṛiti* (indirect revelation). Thus says the *S'ruti*:

"By Veda, Prajāpati projected the forms, existent (or sensuous) and non-existent (or super-sensuous)."<sup>\*</sup>

"He uttered "Bhūh," and he created the earth."<sup>†</sup>  
The *Smṛiti* says:—

"The names and acts of all, severally, and the various forms, He created at first from the Vedic words themselves."<sup>‡</sup>

And hence, indeed, (its) eternality. (I. III. 22).

Hence alone, though Vis'vāmītra and others are the authors of mantras—as may be seen from such passages as

<sup>\*</sup> Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa. 2-6-3.

<sup>†</sup> Ibid. 2-4-4.

<sup>‡</sup> Maṇḍ. I. 21.

"He should invoke the authors of mantras."<sup>\*</sup>

"This is Vis'vāmītra's Sūkta (hymn)."<sup>†</sup>

still, such words having reference only to general forms of things, the eternality of the Veda which is made of *mantra* and *brāhmaṇa* becomes explicable. For, Brahmā recollects by Vedic Word what things are to be created and then creates them. He being endued with the power of seeing the mantras without learning them from a teacher. Accordingly, on the expiry of the *Naimittika-Pralaya*—i. e., the deluge of the three worlds taking place at the end of a day of Brahmā—Brahmā recollects, by the Vedic word, the several forms, such as that of Vis'vāmītra, belonging to preceding cycle, and creates others possessed of the same form and endued with the same powers, and these give out all the mantras without having studied them at all. Thus they are the authors of the mantras, while at the same time the Veda is eternal.

(Objection):—It may be so in the case of the *Naimittika-Pralaya*. But how to explain the eternality of the Veda in the case of the *Prākṛita-pralaya* or Kosmic Dissolution when Brahmā and the word called the Veda disappear altogether?

In answer, the *Sūtrakāra* says:

They being of same names and forms, no incongruity in the return (of the Kosmos) either, as shown by Revelation and *smṛiti*. (I. III. 29).

Because the things to be created are of same names and forms, there is no incongruity in the Kosmos coming again into being after the *Prākṛita-pralaya*. To explain:—The Prameśvara, the original Creator, who is Omniscient and Omnipotent, and who is beyond the whole universe, recollects the form of the preceding Kosmos and creates again a Kosmos of the same form, and He also recollects the Vedas as they were arranged before and gives them to Brahmā, His son.—How is this known?—By *S'ruti* and *Smṛiti*. *S'ruti* says:

"The sun and the moon, the Creator made as before, as also heaven and the Earth, the Mid-Air and Svarga."<sup>†</sup>

"Who creates Brahmā first, and who gives Him the Vedas."<sup>‡</sup>

*Smṛiti* also says.

<sup>\*</sup> Apastambha-Pravaraśāstras 1-7.

<sup>†</sup> Taittirīya-Saṃhitā 5-2-3.

<sup>‡</sup> Mahānārāyaṇa—Up.

<sup>§</sup> Svetā—Up. 6-18.



"He first created water alone, in that He cast seed. That became a golden egg, like in splendour to the thousand-rayed (sun); in that was born spontaneously Brahman, the grand parent of all the worlds."\*

"He first created Brahman and gave Him the Vedas."

Wherefore, even though the whole Kosmo has to come afresh into being after the Prākṛita or Kōsmic Pralaya, the Vedas are eternal.

The Sūtrakāra proceeds to state another view :

Owing to impossibility in Madhu etc., Jaimini holds that they are not qualified (I. iii. 30).

In Madhu-Vidyā† and other such Upāsānās, the Vasus and other Devas are themselves the objects of contemplation and form the goal of the worship. Now it is impossible that the Vasus should form the objects of their own worship, owing to the impossibility of one and the same entity being the agent and object of the same act. Moreover, as they are themselves Vasus, the state of the Vasus has been attained already and cannot form an object yet to be attained. Jaimini, therefore, thinks that the Vasus and other Devas are not qualified for them (i. e., for the Madhu-vidyā and other Upāsānās).

And because they are (qualified) for the Light. (I. iii. 31).

Though Parabrahman, the Light, has as a matter of course to be worshipped by the Devas in common with men, the S'ruti (specially) declares that they should worship Him, in the following words :

"Him, the Light of lights, Devas (should) worship as life, as immortal."

From this, it seems quite reasonable that they are not qualified for the worship enjoined in the Madhu-brāhmaṇa.

The Sūtrakāra now declares his own view :

But Bādarāyana (holds that they) do possess (the qualification), because there is (a possibility) I. iii. 32).

Bādarāyana thinks that the Vasus and other Devas are qualified even for Madhu-Vidyā and the like; for, though they are Vasus etc., they may worship Brahman in the form of the Vasus, and they may also seek to attain to the state of the Vasus etc. in the next cycle (Kalpa). Here Brahman has to be worshipped both as the cause and as the effect. In the passage beginning with the words "The sun is indeed the honey of the Devas"‡ Brahman to be worshipped is

presented as the effect, endued with the names, forms, and functions of the A'dityas, the Vasus, and so on, and in the passage beginning with the words "When from thence he has risen upwards he neither rises nor sets"\* Brahman to be worshipped is presented as the Cause, dwelling as the Antarātman or the Inner Ruler of the subtle sun devoid of all names, forms, and functions. The result of the worship of Brahman in both the aspects consists in the attainment of the position of Vasus etc., in the next cycle (kalpa), and the attainment of Brahman on the expiry of the terms of both the effects. The passage "He who thus knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, and with Agni at their head, he sees the nectar and rejoices"† speaks of the result which consists in the attainment of the position of the Vasus etc.; and the passage "to him who thus knows the secret of Brahman, the sun does not rise and does not set; for him there is day once and for all,"‡ speaks of the result consisting in the attainment of Brahman. Thus the Devas are qualified for the Madhu-Vidyā and the like. Wherefore the Devas are in every way qualified for Brahman-Vidyā.

#### Adhikarana.—8.

Now, from the sūtra I. iii. 24 it would appear that men in general are all qualified. As against this supposition, the sūtrakāra says :

Because his grief is shown by the hearing of the taunt and by his running up (to the teacher). I. iii. 33).

The passage which forms subject of discussion here occurs in the Chhândogya-Upanishad and reads as follows

"You have brought these, O S'ūdra; but only by that mouth did you make me speak."§

Here the teacher addresses the pupil as S'ūdrā. So, a doubt arises as to whether S'ūdras also are qualified for Brahman-Vidyā or not.

(Pūrvapakṣa :) They do possess the qualification, because of the possibility of their aspiring for it. It cannot be restricted to the three castes, inasmuch as it has been shewn that, though coming under none of the three castes, the Devas are yet qualified for it. To this one may object as follows Though Devas are

\* Manu, I. 8, 9.

† Vide Brihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad. 4-5.

‡ Chhā. Up. 3-1-1.

\* Ibid. 3-11-1.

† Ibid. 3-6-3.

‡ Ibid. 3-11-3.

§ Op. Cit. 4-2-5.

not formally initiated by *upanayana* and do not learn the Vedas from a teacher, yet it is possible for them to attain knowledge inasmuch as the Vedic doctrine reveals itself to their minds; how is this possible in the case of these (the S'ūdras)? This objection is untenable; for, even in the case of these, knowledge can be attained by listening to the Purāṇas etc., and it is even possible that they are qualified for initiation into the grand truths (Mahāvākyas), on the principle of *nishīda-sthapati* (vide Jaiminīya-Mīmāṃsā 6-1-51, 52). Wherefore it is but proper to say that they are qualified for Brahmanvidyā.

As against the foregoing we hold as follows: S'ūdras have no right to Brahmanvidyā; for, in the absence of Vedic study, it is not possible for them to attain that knowledge of the Deity to be worshipped and of His attributes, to which such a study forms an essential means. The Itihāsas and Purāṇas form a means only as expatiating on the teaching of the Veda, but not independently of it. And the permission accorded to the S'ūdras listening to the Itihāsas and Purāṇas is merely intended to bring about the extinction of their sins. Vidura, the Dharma-Vyādhā and the like were devotees of Brahman because of the knowledge they had acquired in the previous births not having vanished. If you ask how, when teaching Brahmanvidyā, the master addressed the disciple as S'ūdra, we reply as follows: He was addressed here as S'ūdra, not because he belonged to that class, but because he was found to be overpowered with grief for not having attained Brahman-jñāna. That he was overpowered with grief is indicated by the fact of his having heard the swan's taunting reference to him for not being possessed of Brahmanvidyā, and by the fact of his running up immediately to the master. He having been addressed as S'ūdra not because he belonged to that class, the S'ūdra has no right to worship Brahman.

For the following reason also, the disciple is addressed as S'ūdra, not as belonging to that class:

And it being known that he is a Kshatriya. (I. iii. 34.)

It being known that Jānas'ruti, the disciple, is a Kshatriya, he is addressed as S'ūdra not because he belongs to that caste. At the commencement of the episode, Jānas'ruti is described as the master of the wealthy, and as the giver of an abundant quantity of prepared food, thus:

"There lived once upon a time Jānas'ruti-Putrāyana (the great grandson of Jānas'ruti), who was a pious giver, bestowing much wealth upon the

people, and always keeping open house. He built places of refuge everywhere, wishing that people should everywhere eat of his food."\*

In the middle, he is spoken of as directing a charioteer, in the following words:

"As soon as he had risen in the morning he said to his charioteer."†

At the end he is spoken of as offering many towns in the following words:

"There is this wife and this village in which thou dwellest."‡

"These are the Raikva-parṇa villages in the country of the Mahāvṛshas where Raikva dwelt under him,"§

From these characteristic marks, Jānas'ruti appears to be a Kshatriya.

And because of the indicatory mark in the sequel in connection with Chaitraratha. (I. III. 35.)

In the sequel of this Samvaga-Vidyā, we find references to the Brāhman and Kshatriya castes alone, in such passages as the following:

"Once while S'aunaka-Kāpeya and Abhipratārin Kakshaseni were being waited on at their meal, a religious student begged of them."||

Abhipratārin, a descendant of Chitraratha, appears to be a Kshatriya, because of his connection with a priest belonging to the family of the Kāpeyas. The S'ruti does speak of Chaitraratha's connection with a Kāpeya priest, in the following words.

"The Kāpeyas caused Chaitraratha to perform the sacrifice: him alone they made a master of food."

Thus, though, on account of a difference in the name, he is not identical with Chitraratha, it is certain that he belongs to the same family for generally, members of one and the same family become priests of the others who are members of one and the same family. As a member of Chitraratha's family, he must be a Kshatriya, as evident from a complementary passage occurring elsewhere: "From him, one Chaitraratha is born, a Kshatriya nobleman." Accordingly, it is concluded that Abhipratārin who is mentioned as connected with a Brāhman of the family of the Kāpeyas is a Kshatriya.

\* Chhând. Up. 4-1-1.

† Ibid. 4-1-5.

‡ Ibid. 4-2-4.

§ Ibid. 4-2-6.

|| Ibid. 4-3-5.

Similarly, it may also be inferred that Jānas'ruti who is connected with the Brāhman Raikva is a Kshatriya. Wherefore, he is addressed as S'udra while in fact he is a Kshatriya.

As to the allegation that, on the principle of *Nishūda-Sthapati*, the sūdra is merely entitled to initiation into the Grand Truths (*Mahāvākyas*), the *Sūtrakāra* says :

Because of a reference to the sacrament and of the mention of its absence. (I. iii. 36).

At the commencement of *Brahma-Vidyā*, in such passages as "I shall initiate thee;" Him did he initiate;"\* reference has been made to the sacrament of upanayana. And in some passages such as, "There is no sin in a Sūdra, and he is not fit for a sacrament;"† and "the Sūdra, the fourth caste, has one birth alone;"‡—the *smṛiti* speaks of its absence in the case of a Sūdra, for both these reasons, he is not entitled to *Brahma-vidyā*. Because of the injunction "Let him cause a *Nishūda-sthapati* to perform a sacrifice," there is no objection in that particular case. There is no scriptural injunction anywhere permitting the initiation of a Sūdra into the Grand Truths (*Mahāvākyas*), in spite of the absence of Upanayana.

And because he proceeded (to initiate) on ascertaining its absence. (I. iii. 37.)

A Sūdra is not entitled to it, inasmuch as master proceeded (to initiate), to ordain and to teach the *Vidyā* only after ascertaining that Jāhala was not a S'udra because he told the truth, as the S'ruti says

"No one but a true Brāhmana would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you. You have not swerved from truth."§

(*Objection*):—Does the prohibition of the uttering of the Veda in the absence of Upanayana apply to some cases only or to all cases? It does not apply to all cases, for notwithstanding the absence of Upanayana in the case of a child, there is an injunction to the effect that the child should recite the Veda while

making an offering to the manes, as declared in the following passage :

"Let him not be made to utter the Veda, except when making an offering to the manes."\*\*

It is therefore proper to hold that the prohibition applies only to a few cases. Wherefore the uninitiated S'udra is prohibited from uttering the Veda while performing the *pākayajñas* (small sacrificial rituals), but not when learning the *Brahma-Vidyā*.

As against the foregoing objection, the *Sūtrakāra* says :

Because of the prohibition of the hearing, studying, and (knowing the) meaning (of the Vedas.) (I. iii. 38.)

The hearing of the Vedic texts by a S'udra is prohibited in such passages as the following :

"Therefore, Vedas should not be recited near a S'udra.

To one who should not hear the Veda, whence comes the study etc. thereof ?

And on account of the *Smṛiti*. (I. iii. 39).

The *Smṛiti* lays down punishments in the case of a S'udra hearing the Veda and so on, in the following words :

"Now, when hearing the Vedas, his ears should be filled with (molten) lead and wax ; when uttering the Vedas, the tongue should be cut asunder ; when keeping the Vedas in mind, his body should be torn."†

In the face of this prohibition of the recitation of the Vedas in the S'ruti and the *Smṛiti*, how is an enquiry into the teaching of the Vedas possible in the case of a S'udra ? It is therefore to be concluded that, except after the sacrament of Upanayana, such as is performed on a Brāhman eight years old (and so on), no study of the Vedas is anywhere possible to any one under any circumstances. Therefore, the S'udras are not entitled to *Brahma-vidyā*.

A. MAHĀDEVA SĀ'STRI, B. A.

(To be continued.)

\* Chhând. Up. 4-4.

† Manu 10-126.

‡ Gautama 10-50.

§ Chhând. Up. 4-1-5.

\* Gautama 2-5.

† Gautama 12-4-6.

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — O R — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA

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## TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDA'NTA-S'UTRAS WITH S'RĪ'KANTHA  
BHA'SHYA.

(Continued from page 127.)

### Adhikarana 9.

Having thus incidentally shewn what sort of a person is qualified for Brahmanvidyā, the Sūtrakāra now proceeds with the main subject.

Because of trembling. (I. iii. 40.)

In the Katha-Vallī, in the section treating of the thumb-sized Puruṣa, it is said as follows

"Whatever there is, the whole world, when gone forth (from the Brahman) trembles in the breath; (it is) a great terror, the thunderbolt uplifted; those who know it become immortal."\*

Here a doubt arises as to whether the cause of trembling is the Paramesvara or some other being.

(\*) Of cit. 6—2.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—Here the s'ruti speaks of the trembling of the whole universe by fear caused by the entity denoted by the word "breath". It is not right to say that the Paramesvara, who is so sweet-natured as to afford refuge to the whole universe and who is supremely gracious, is the cause of the trembling of the whole universe. Therefore, as the word 'thunderbolt' occurs here, it is the thunderbolt that is the cause of the trembling. Or, it is the vital air which is the cause of the trembling, because the word 'breath' occurs here. Since the vital air causes the motion of the body, this whole world which is the body as it were moves on account of the vital air. Then we can explain the passage "Whatever there is, the whole world, when gone forth (from the Brahman), trembles in the breath." Then, we can also explain the statement that "it is a great terror, the thunderbolt uplifted," inasmuch [as, like lightning, cloud and rain, the thunderbolt which is the source of great terror is produced by action of the air itself. It is also possible to attain immortality by a knowledge of the air, as the following s'ruti says

"Air is everything itself, and air is all things together; he who knows this conquers death."\*

\* Bri. up. 5—3—2.



(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing, we say that Parames'vara himself is the cause of the trembling. It is possible that, as the Ruler, Parames'vara is the cause of the trembling of the whole universe; and by the fear of His command all of us abstain from prohibited actions and engage in the prescribed duties; and it is by the fear of His command that Vāyu and others perform their respective duties, as may be learned from such passages as the following:—

“By fear of Him, Vāyu (the wind) blows.”\*

Though gracious in appearance, Parames'vara becomes awful as the Ruler (of all). Hence the śruti:

“Hence the King's face has to be awful!†

Wherefore as the Master, I's'vara Himself is the cause of the trembling of the whole universe.

#### Adhikarana. 10.

This Adhikarana proceeds to shew that the Parames'vara, who has been mentioned as the object to be worshipped in the Dahara and so on, is the Being to be reached (by the liberated)

The Light (is Brahman) because we find (it so). (I. iii. 41).

The passage which forms the subject of discussion here occurs in the Chhândogya-Upanishad

“That serene being, arising from this body, appears in its own form, as soon as it has approached the highest light. He is the highest person (Uttama—puruṣa).”

Here, a doubt arises as to whether the highest light said to be reached by the liberated is Parames'vara, or Nārāyaṇa the Embodied.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—It being found that the highest light to be reached by the liberated is spoken of as the highest person, the *Uttama Puruṣa*, and the designation “*Uttama Puruṣa*” being a specific designation of Nārāyaṇa, Nārāyaṇa is the highest light to which the epithet *Uttama-Puruṣa* is here applied.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: The highest light, here said to be reached by the liberated, is the Supreme Brahman called Parames'vara, it being found that, those alone do not return who have reached Him. How can it be right

that those who reach any other being than the Paramahman have no return? Though specifically applied to Nārāyaṇa, the epithet *Purushottama* is used to denote Brahman, who is above all Puruṣas, —all Jīvas. In the ritual of Brahmadeha, the word *Purushottama* is used as a synonym for Paramahman who has to be reached. Wherefore the highest light here refers to Parabrahman Himself.

#### Adhikarana 11.

A'kās'a (refers to Parames'vara), because of the mention of His being a distinct being, and so on. (I. iii. 42.)

The passage which forms the subject of discussion here occurs in the Chhândogya-Upanishads and reads as follows:

“He who is called A'kās'a is the creator of name and form. That within which these are contained is Brahman, the Immortal. He is Atman.”\*

Here a doubt arises as to whether the “A'kās'a” spoken of as the creator of name and form is Parames'vara, or the Ether, or Jīva.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—Here “A'kās'a,” refers to the Ether, since, by affording space for all beings to exist in, the Ether can be said to be the creator of name and form. Or, it may refer to Jīva, inasmuch as Jīva is declared to have some connection with the manifesting of name and form, in the following passage:

“In the form of this jīva, I will enter and make name and form manifest” †

As against the foregoing, we hold as follows:—Here, by the word, “Akās'a,” it is the Parames'vara who is declared as the creator of name and form, because of the mention of immortality and other attributes of His. Indeed neither of jīva nor of the ether can immortality and the like be predicated. Wherefore, “Akās'a” refers to Parames'vara Himself.

(*Objection*):—Because of the unity declared in the passage “That thou art,” Parames'vara is not a being distinct from the Pratyagātman.

In answer, the Sūtrakāra says:

(Because of His being declared) as distinct in sleep and death (I. iii. 43)

Parames'vara is a being distinct from jīva, because as conscious during sleep and death, He is declared

\* Tait: up. 2—8.

† Taitt. Brā. 3—8—23

\* Op. Cit 8—14—1.

† Chhā 6-3-2.

to be distinct from jīva who, in those states, is devoid of all consciousness, both subjective and objective, in the following passages :

"Embraced by the intelligent 'A'tman, (the jīva) knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within" \*

"Mounted by the intelligent A'tman, the jīva moves along groaning" †

It is He who is here spoken of as ākās'a.

And because of the words such as  
"Master." (I III 44.)

From the words such as "master" applied to the Intelligent embracing the jīva; it may be seen that He is distinct from the jīva. For, in the sequel, the scripture has the following :

"He is the ruler of all, the lord of all, the king of all. He does not become greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works. He is the lord of all, the King of all beings, the protector of all things." ‡

From such passages as the following :

"Bow to the Lord of Cattle, to the Lord of trees," § it is clear that the Parames'vara is the Lord of the world; and nowhere do we find it said that jīva is the Lord of the universe. Wherefore, the being here spoken of as ākās'a is the Parames'vara, distinct from jīva.

*End of the Third Pāda.*

*Fourth Pāda.*

**Adhikarana. I**

In the preceding Pāda were discussed such passages as contained clear and vague indications of Brahman. This Pāda proceeds to discuss certain passages which contain vague indications of Brahman.

If (you hold that) with some the inferential (is meant), (we say) no, because of reference to that which is included in the figure; and so the s'ruti says. (I. iv. 1).

The passage which forms the subject of discussion here is read by a school of the Kathas as follows :

"Beyond the senses (indriyas) there are the objects (arthas); beyond the objects there is the mind (manas); beyond the mind there is the intellect

(Buddhi); the Great (Mahat), A'tman is beyond the intellect.

"Beyond the Great, there is the Avyakta; beyond the Avyakta there is Purusha, the supreme; beyond Purusha here is nothing; this is the limit, the supreme Goal." \*

Here a doubt arises as to whether that which is spoken of as Avyakta beyond the Mahat is the Pradhāna of Kapila, or the body.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—It is the Pradhāna.—How?—For, Mahat, Avyakta, and Purusha are only known to us as treated of in the Sāṅkhya system of philosophy. As these are referred to here in the s'ruti, there is no occasion whatever to treat of the body. Therefore it is the Pradhāna of the Sāṅkhyas that is here spoken of.

Siddhānta maintains that the body is here spoken of; for in a preceding passage,—namely.

"Know A'tman to be sitting in the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the intellect (buddhi) the charioteer, and the mind (manas) the reins.

"The senses (indriyas) they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads." †

A'tman, the body, etc., which are the means of upāsana (worship), are represented as the chariot, and the driver in the chariot, with a view to show that they are to be brought under control; and it is the body included in this figurative representation, still remaining unnoticed (after all else has been noticed),—that is referred to by the word Avyakta. Indeed in the verse quoted above,—beginning with "beyond the senses there are the objects," and ending with "this is the goal, the highest road,"—one thing is spoken of as superior to another with a view to show that each should be brought in subjection to the one that follows. This the s'ruti declares in the sequel as follows :

"A wise man should restrain speech in manas; he should restrain that (manas) in the A'tman which is knowledge; he should restrain the knowledge in A'tman, the Mahat; he should restrain that (mahat) in A'tman, the tranquil." ‡

Therefore Avyakta here refers to the body.

\* Bri. Up. 6-3-21.

† Ibid. 6-3-35.

\* Bri. Up. 6-4-22.

† Taittiriya--Samhitā 4-5-2.

\* Katha-Upa. 3-10, 11.

\* Ibid. 3-3, 4.

\* Ibid 3-13.

(*Objection*):—By *Avyakta*, everybody understands *Pradhāna*. How can it refer here to the body?

In answer, the *sūtrakāra* says:

The subtle, verily, (is the body) because of the capability for it. (I. iv. 2.)

“The subtle” means *avyakta* or unmanifested.—Being capable of manifesting itself as the body, the unmanifested or subtle form of the body, it may be rightly held, is spoken of as “*avyakta*,”

The *sūtrakāra* adduces another reason.

As subject to *Īm*, everything serves its purpose. (I. iv. 3.)

*A'tman*, the body, and all, serve their purpose, i.e., conduce to the fulfilment of worship, when subjected to *Parames'vara*. *Parames'vara*, the Inner Ruler, impels all including *A'tman*. As such, as thus forming an accessory of worship, He is spoken of as the finality of the principles to be brought under control; and as the Being to be ultimately reached, He is spoken of as “the supreme Goal.” Therefore *A'vyakta* here means the body itself.

Because of the absence of all mention that it has to be known. (I. iv. 4.)

If the *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhyas* be here referred to by the word “*avyakta*,” then It would have been mentioned as a thing worth knowing; and there is nothing of the sort. Hence no reference to *Kapila's* *Avyakta*.

Now the *Sūtrakāra* proceeds to refute the objection that there is a mention made of the *Pradhāna* as worth knowing:

If (you urge that the *śruti* speaks of (it as such) (we say) no; for, by context, it is the Intelligent (I. iv. 5)

*Objection*:—The *Pradhāna*, too, is spoken of as a thing worth knowing in a subsequent passage, which reads as follows:

“Having perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal without end, beyond the *Mahat*, and unchangeable, one is freed from the jaws of death.”\*

*Answer*:—No, for, it is the *Prājña* or the Intelligent that forms the subject of discourse, as may be seen from the following:

“One should restrain speech in the mind”† etc.

Hence the “*Avyakta*” refers to the body.

The *Sūtrakāra* says that there is no occasion to speak of the *Pradhāna*:

And of three alone is this exposition and this question (I. iv. 6)

In this section, the question and the exposition are concerned with three things alone as worth knowing namely, the being to be worshipped, the worship, and the worshipper,—not with the *Pradhāna*. Their exposition is contained in the section beginning with the following passage:

“The wise who, by means of meditation on his *A'tman*, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss—as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind.”\*

The question is contained in the following passages: “There is that doubt, when a man is dead,—some saying, he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.”†

“That which thou seest beyond *Dharma*, and beyond *A'dharma*, neither cause nor effect, neither past nor future, tell me that.”‡

Wherefore, “*avyakta*” is the body, not the *Pradhāna*, as it is a thing with which the present section is not concerned.

Moreover, there is yet another thing pointing to this conclusion, as the *Sūtrakāra* says:

And like the *Mahat* (I. iv. 7).

Just as, on account of the word “*A'tman*” in the passage “beyond *Buddhi* is *Mahat*, the *A'tman*,” “*mahat*” cannot refer to the *mahat* technically so-called, so too, it may be concluded here that the word “*Avyakta*” cannot mean the *Pradhāna*.

### Adhikarana.—2.

(*Objection*):—Granted that there is no occasion here to speak of the *Pradhāna*, as the present section is not concerned with it. Elsewhere the *Pradhāna* itself is spoken of as the cause.

In answer, the *sūtrakāra* proceeds with this *adhikarana*:

\* *Katha-up.* 3-5.

† *Ibid.* 3-13.

\* *Ibid.* 2-12.

† *Ibid.* 1-20.

Presence of a differentiating mark, unlike "Chamasa." (I. iv. 8).

The passage which forms the subject of discussion here occurs in the Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad :

"There is one unborn being\* (female), red, white and black, uniform, but producing manifold offspring. There is one unborn being (male) who loves her and lies by her ; there is another unborn being who leaves her, having enjoyed all pleasures."†

Here a doubt arises as to whether the Prakṛiti which is spoken of as the cause of the whole universe and therefore as devoid of birth, is the one which the Sāṅkhyas have assumed, or the Supreme Prakṛiti (of the Parames'vara).

(Pūrvapakṣa) :—It is not right to say that it is the Prakṛiti assumed by the Sāṅkhyas ; for, it is declared to be 'unborn,' devoid of birth, to be the cause of all creatures ; and we also find a reference to the three guṇas indicated by the three colours, "red, white and black." We cannot hold that anything else can be of this nature.

(Siddhānta) :—It is not the Prakṛiti technically so-called that is here declared to be the cause. Indeed, by the mere mention of absence of birth, we cannot understand that that (Prakṛiti) alone is meant ; for there is no differentiating mark in the section, unlike the case of "Chamasa" in the passage "A vessel (chamasa) with aperture downwards"† which is followed by another sentence,—namely, "this (chamasa) is the head";—which indicates what particular kind of vessel is meant. For a word understood in its (generic) etymological sense to convey an idea of a particular thing requires some other word supplying a differentiating mark. Therefore it is not the Prakṛiti technically so-called that is here meant.

The Sūtrakāra proceeds to show what that Prakṛiti is which is distinct from the one technically so-called:

Accordingly, indeed, some read by commencing with  
Light. (I. iv. 9).

"The Light" means Parames'vara. 'This 'unborn' Prakṛiti is rooted in the Parames'vara as the cause. Accordingly, some, namely the Taittirīyas, read the verse treating of the nature of the Prakṛiti, so as to declare that which is rooted in the Parames'vara as its cause. Having started with a description of

Parames'vara in the words "subtler than the subtle, greater than the great," the upanishad speaks of the origin of the universe from Parames'vara in the words "From him emanate the seven prāṇas," and so on ; and it is while thus describing the universe as made up of him, that they read the verse (quoted above) beginning with "There is one unborn being." Because of this reference to him, it may be concluded that this unborn (Prakṛiti) is the one rooted in Parames'vara. Hence the untenability of the contention that the Prakṛiti technically so-called is meant here.

(Objection) :—As caused by the Parames'vara, this Prakṛiti is declared to be an effect. How can such a thing be also described as unborn ?

In answer, the Sūtrakāra says :

And because of the construction being taught there is no incongruity, as in the case of 'honey.' (I. iv. 10).

"Construction" means creation or emanation.—There is no incongruity whatever in the divine Prakṛiti being described both as unborn and as the effect caused by Parames'vara because of the creation taught in the following passage :

"That from which the maker (Māyin) sends forth all this—the sacred verses, the offerings, the sacrifices, the penances, the past, the future, and all that the Vedas declare—in that the other is bound up through that Māyā. Know then Prakṛiti is Māyā, and the great Lord the Māyin."\*

To explain : During the time of Pralaya, even the Māyā which is insentient (achit), though devoid of name and form, yet exists in a subtle form as the body of the Mahes'vara, and it may therefore be described as unborn ; and it is the effect caused Parames'vara, because it is invested with name and form at the time of creation. For instance, at the time of creation, A'ditya is the 'honey,' as the repository of the essence which the Vasus and other gods live upon ; he is, however, not an effect, inasmuch as he exists in such a very subtle form that he cannot be designated by any such word as 'honey,' as declared in the following passages in the Mād̥huryā

"The sun is indeed the honey of the Devas."†

"When from thence he has risen upwards, he neither rises nor sets. He is alone, standing the centre."‡

\* Śvetāsvatara-Up. 4-5.

† Bṛihadar-Up. 4-2.

\* S'v. Up. 4-9, 10.

† Chhā. Up. 3-1.

‡ Ibid. 3-11.



Accordingly there is no incongruity whatever in the Divine Prakṛiti being described both as unborn and as caused by Parames'vara. Wherefore the 'unborn' is not the Prakṛiti technically so called (by the Sāṅkhyas).

### Adhikarāna-3.

(*Objection*):—Elsewhere, again, the twenty-five principles (*tattvas*), established by the science (of Sāṅkhyas), are spoken of in the Sṛuti.

To prevent this supposition, the Sūtrakāra introduces a fresh Adhikarāna :

N3. despite the mention of the number; because of (their) being distinct and of excess. (I. iv. 11).

The following passage forms the subject of discussion here :

"Him in whom the five five-beings are established as well as the ākāśa, do I think to be A'tman; knowing the immortal Brahman, I am the immortal."\*

Here a doubt arises as to whether the things referred to as the "five five-beings" denote the *Tattvas* of the Sāṅkhyas system, or those spoken of in the s'ruti.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—The number twenty-five being prominent in the Sāṅkhyas system, and that number being mentioned here, the "five five-beings" undoubtedly refer to *tattvas* of the Sāṅkhyas system, and to none else.

As against the foregoing we hold as follows. Despite the mention of the number twenty-five—obtained by multiplying five by five,—the technically so called *tattvas* are not meant here. We are given to understand that the things mentioned here are rooted in the Parames'vara who is referred to by the words "Him in whom." As such, they are distinct from the *tattvas* (of the Sāṅkhyas system); and there is a mention of too many *tattvas*, owing to the separate mention of ākāśa. 'Mention of too many *tattvas*' means that the *tattvas* (here mentioned) are more than twenty-five in number. Wherefore it does not follow that the twenty-five *tattvas* are here referred to. Neither can it be held that there is here any reference to the number twenty-five. The compound "five-beings"—*pancha-jana*—is a *saṁjñā* or specific designation, meaning that there are some beings (each of whom is) known as a *pancha-jana*; and five such beings are here referred to, just as there are seven *saptarshis*.

\* Bri. Up. 6-4-17

Wherefore there is no room for the supposition that the *tattvas* of the Sāṅkhyas system are here mentioned.

What, then, are they? The sūtrakāra says:

Prāṇa and others, from the remaining portion of the section. (I. iv. 12).

The "pancha-janas" refer to the five *indriyas* (including prāṇa) as may be seen from what follows :

"Those who know the life (prāṇa) of life, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of the food, the mind of the mind,"\* etc.

From this also it follows that the *tattvas* of the Sāṅkhyas system are not meant here.

Again an explanation is given as follows :

By 'light,' according to some, in the absence of 'food.' (I. iv. 13).

'Some' refers to the Kāṇvas. In spite of the absence of the words "the food of the food" (in the Kāṇva recension), we may still understand that the five *pancha-janas* refer to the *indriyas*, because of the word 'light' occurring in the opening passage which reads as follows :

"Him the gods worship as the light of lights."†

Having thus said that the Brahman is the light of lights, the illuminator of the illuminators, the s'ruti then speaks of the five "*pancha-janas*." By this we are given to understand that those lights refer to the five *indriyas*.

And because of the mention, as the cause in ākāśa etc., of what is specifically declared (I. iv. 14)

All such Vedantic passages as "the non-existent, verily, this at first was;" ‡ and "This verily was then undifferentiated," § not declaring specifically of what nature the cause is which underlies such emanations as the ākāśa, we understand that the cause (referred to) is what is declared specifically in the passage "Atman alone, verily, this at first was;" || but not the *Avyākṛita* or the *Undifferentiated* of the Sāṅkhyas. So, too, we are to understand that the five *indriyas* specifically declared in other passages are here meant, but not the *tattvas* of the Sāṅkhyas.

The Sūtrakāra proceeds to show why the *tattvas* of the Sāṅkhyas cannot be meant here

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(To be Continued.)

\* Bri. Up. 6-4-18. (Mādhyandina recension.)

† Ibi. 6-4-16.

‡ Tai. up. 2-2-7.

§ Bri. up. 3-4-7.

|| Aitareya Upanishad 1-1.

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — OR — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA

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## TRANSLATIONS.

### THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRA WITH S'RĪ'KANTHA- BHA'SHYA.

*(Continued from page 150.)*

*By backward reference. (I. iv. 15).*

Because of the backward reference, in the passage "non-existent, verily, this at first was," to the Omniscient spoken of in a previous passage "He desired 'may I become many'," and because of the backward reference in the passage "He who has penetrated here up to the tips of the nails," to the *Avyākṛita* described before, we understand that He alone is meant; so, too, here, by backward reference, we are to understand that the five "*pancha-janas*" mean the five *indriyas*. Hence no incongruity whatever.

The discussion of the question as to whether the *Sāṅkhya's* Principle (*Pradhāna*) is referred to (in the *upanishads*) is over. Again the *sūtrakāra* proceeds to explain how *Parames'vara* is distinct from *Jīva*:

*Because it denotes the universe. (I. iv. 16.)*

The passage which forms the subject of discussion here occurs in the *Kaushitaki-Brahmana-Upanishad*. Commencing with the words "I shall teach thee Brahman," the *Upanishad* goes on thus:

"He who, O *Bālāki*, is verily the creator of all these beings, and whose deed this is, he verily should be known," and so on\*

Here a doubt arises as to whether it is *Parames'vara* or *Jīva* who is spoken of as the being that should be known

(*Pūrvapakṣa*.)—In the previous passages, such as "That being who is in the sun, him do I worship;... him who is in the moon... him who in the lightning"† it is seen that *Jīva* too can be the cause of all such beings as the sun here spoken of. The word "deed" denotes something newly produced (*apūrva*); and this new effect (*apūrva*) can only pertain to *Jīva*, inasmuch as it can never affect *Parames'vara* who is devoid of all connection with any deed whatsoever. So the being spoken of here is *Jīva* and no other.

\* Op. cit. 4-1

† Ibid 4 1.

*The Siddhanta:* As the word "deed" is put in apposition with word "this," and is capable of being interpreted to mean 'what is done,' it means 'the universe.' So that it is Parames'vara, whose deed is the whole universe, that is spoken of here. Jīva, indeed, can never be the creator of the universe.

Again an objection is raised and answered:

If (you hold it is not the case) because of the characteristic marks of Jīva and the Prāna proper, (we answer) no; that has been explained. (I. iv. 17)

It cannot be urged that Parames'vara is not referred to because of the characteristic marks of Jīva and the Prāna proper found in the following passages:

"As the master feeds with his people, nay, as his people feed on the master, so does this conscious A'tman feed with the other A'tmans; and so the other A'tmans follow this A'tman."\*

"When sleeping he sees no dream, then he becomes one with the Prāna alone"\*

For, in the Pratardana-Vidyā, the matter was clearly discussed. Here, too, when the preceding and the succeeding portions of the section are taken into consideration, it will be seen that the section treats of Brahman; so that the other characteristic marks should be interpreted accordingly. To explain: At first, in the opening section, Brahman has been introduced in the words "I shall teach thee Brahman;" in the middle, the passage "whose deed this is" speaks of a being who is the creator of the whole universe; and subsequently in the words "he who knows this conquers all sins and obtains pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty, supremacy;" the s'ruti speaks of sovereignty—accompanied with the destruction of all sins—being the result; a thing which necessarily results from nothing but the worship of Brahman. It being thus shown that the section is devoted to Brahman, those attributes which seem to pertain to Jīva and Prāna proper should be so interpreted as to refer to Him alone.

Another view is now set forth

It is verily, as Jaimini holds, for the sake of the other, (as may be seen) from the question and the answer; and, moreover, even so do some (declare). (I. iv. 1d.)

It is with a view to declare the existence of Parames'vara distinct from Jīva that the existence of Jīva as a separate entity from the vital airs etc. is expounded—by way of showing that the vital air does not respond though called by its name and that the person

arises when afterwards struck by means of a stick—in the following passage:

"The two together came to a person who was asleep. And Ajātas'atru called him saying 'Thou great one, clad in white raiment. Soma, king.' But he remained lying. Then he pushed him with a stick, and he rose at once."\*

That such is the case is shown by the following question and answer:

*Question:* "Bālāki, where did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence came he thus back?"†

*Answer:* "When sleeping he sees no dream, then he becomes one with that prāna;"‡ this answer being of the same meaning as the following passage occurring elsewhere:

"With the Existent, my dear son, he then becomes united"§

Some, that is, the Vājasaneyins, have a section in which the same thing is very clearly set forth in the form of a dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātas'atru, as follows:

*Question:* "When this man was thus asleep, where was then the person, the intelligent? and from whence did he thus come back?"¶

*Answer:* "When this man was thus asleep, then the intelligence of the senses absorbed within himself all intelligence, lies in the ether which is in the heart."||

Wherefore it may be concluded that it is Parames'vara Himself whose work is this whole universe.

### Adhikarana 5.

This adhikarana proceeds to show how it is that, while Jīva and Is'vara are everywhere spoken of as one, they are treated as distinct entities occupying one abode.

The passages pointing (all to him) (I. iv. 19.)

The passage which forms the subject of discussion occurs in the Brihadāranyaka and reads as follows:

"Verily, a husband is not dear for the husband's enjoyment; but for the A'tman's enjoyment the hus-

\* Kaushitaki. up. 4-19.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid 4-20

§ Chhândogya-Up. 6-8-1

¶ Bri-Up. 4-1-16

|| Ibid. 4-1-17

\* Kaushitaki. Up. 4-20.

band is dear..." "verily the A'tman is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected upon, to be contemplated."\*

(*Pūrvapakṣa*): It is Jīva that is spoken of here, inasmuch as by such words as "but for the A'tman's enjoyment" we are given to understand that the A'tman is a *samsārin* as endued with desire to enjoy.

As against the foregoing we hold that it is *Parames'vara* who is spoken of here.—Why?—The whole section opening with the statements such as

"But there is no hope of immortality by wealth;"

"When we see, hear, reflect upon, and know the A'tman, then all this is known;"

All this is that which we call A'tman;† and ending with the passage "How should he know Him by whom he knows all this?" points to *Parames'vara*; and accordingly *Parames'vara* is propounded here by first speaking incidentally of the jīva who is endued with an attachment for pleasures, Hence no inconsistency whatever.

How, in all these places, may *Parames'vara* be spoken of by the word denoting the jīva?—This the *sūtrākāra* explains according to an alien system:

A mark as to the proof of the proposition, as A's'marathya holds. (I. iv. 20).

A's'marathya thinks that the designating of *Parames'vara* by a term denoting the jīva serves to show that the jīva, as an emanation of the *Parames'vara*, is not quite independent of him, so that the proposition may be held as proved that by knowing one the whole is known, as said by the s'ruti, "when we see A'tman all this is known."

Because of the emancipated becoming so, as Audulomi holds. (I. iv. 21).

Audulomi thinks that it is because the liberated soul attains to the state of *Parames'vara* that *Parames'vara* is designated by the word A'tman.

Because of His dwelling; thus holds Kā's'akṛitsna. (I. iv. 22).

Kā's'akṛitsna thinks that it is because of *Parames'vara* dwelling as A'tman in the jīva-A'tman that the *Parames'vara* is designated by the word denoting the jīva.

It may be concluded that this is also the *sūtrākāra*'s view, because of its being mentioned in opposition to two other views already expounded, and because of the absence of a mention of any other. There moreover, here a strong affinity to the teaching of the

s'ruti. To explain In the first section of the *Atharvavāgīras*, it is declared that *Parames'vara* is the being denoted by all words, as due to His having entered into all beings, *chit* and *achit*, sentient and insentient, in the following passage.

"Devas verily went to the Svargaloka and asked Rudra, 'Who art thou?' He said, 'Alone I was at first, I am and shall be; none else distinct from Me. From the inner into the innermost I have entered; into the four quarters and their very midst. Such a being am I; I am the eternal and non-eternal; I am Brahman; I am the Eastern and the Western, I am the Southern and the Northern; I am up and down, the (four main) quarters and the various (intermediate) quarters; I am man, I am woman, Gāyatri I am, Sāvitrī I am; I am Trishtubh, Jagati, and anuṣṭubh the metre I am; I am Gārhapatya; I am Dakṣiṇāgni and A'bharṇi; I am the true; I am the cow, and I am Gauri; I am the oldest, I am the best, I am the highest. I am the waters, I am light. I am the Rik, the Yajus, the Sāman, and the Atharvāṅgiras. The perishable am I, and I am the imperishable, I am the secret, I am the forest. The sacred lake am I, as well as the holy one. I am the beginning and the end, and beyond and the front. I am verily the Light. He that knows Me all knows all."

In the second section also, as due to the very fact of His having entered into everything, it is declared that He is denoted by the words *Brahman*, *Viṣṇu*, *Mahesvara*, *Vināyaka*, *Umā*, and the whole universe of things, in the passage beginning with the following words:

"To That Lord who is called Rudra, to Him who is also called Brahman, to Him I bow."

Accordingly by an investigation into the harmonious teaching of the S'ruti, it is found that *S'iva*, the *Parames'vara*, is the Being denoted by all words, as embodied in all, having entered into all beings, sentient and insentient, as their *Anurāmin*, the Inner Regulator. Wherefore, it well to conclude that Kā's'akṛitsna's view alone agrees with the teaching of the S'ruti, of the Sūtra, and of the *devas*.

## Adhikarana. 6

In a former adhikarana, I. i. it was briefly indicated that *Parames'vara* is the upādhi material cause of the universe by quoting a passage which speaks of him by means of a word in the *abhiṭṭi* case.\*

\* Bri-Up. 4-1-5

† Ibid

\* Tatti up 3-1



"From whom all these beings are born."

This *adhyakaraṇa* proceeds to establish it at full length.

And He is *Prakṛiti* also, in accordance with the proposition and the illustration (I. iv. 23).

The passages to be discussed here are such as the following :

"From Him, verily, the *Ātman*, was born the *ākāśa*."\*

"The one God, producing heaven and earth."†

Here a doubt arises as to whether it is right or not to hold that Brahman is the twofold cause. Because the *nimitta* or efficient cause such as the potter is not found to form also the material cause such as clay, and that neither the material cause such as clay forms also the *nimitta* or the efficient cause such as the potter, how can we understand that he can form both the material and the efficient cause with the universe as the effect ?

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—He is only the *nimitta* or efficient cause of the universe, not the *upādāna* or material cause—Why?—Because it is impossible. Indeed, the potter who is engaged in making a pot does not make the pot by becoming clay himself, nor does a weaver making a cloth do so. If he would try to do so, it would be quite impossible. Wherefore it is impossible for Brahman, the *nimitta* or efficient cause, to be the *upādāna* or material cause as well. And it is useless to suppose that the efficient cause is also the material cause as well, inasmuch as the production of the required effect can be accounted for without such a supposition. For, we find the pot produced notwithstanding that the potter is distinct from clay. Wherefore Brahman is only the efficient cause, but not the material cause as well.

Against this we say as follows: The material as well as the efficient cause is Brahman himself. It is stated that by knowing the Commander all becomes known, that the Commander, the efficient cause, being known, the whole of the sentient and insentient universe becomes known, as the following passage shows :

"You are so conceited ; have you ever asked for that Command by which we hear what has not been heard, we think what has not been thought, we know what has not been known."‡

And in explanation of this, the illustration of clay has also been adduced in the following passage :

As when clay is known, all this which is made of clay becomes known.\*\*

If Brahman were the efficient cause merely, knowledge of the whole universe would not be possible when He is known. By knowing the potter, we cannot, indeed, know the pot etc., the effect ; but we can do so by knowing clay, the material cause of the pot. Wherefore seeing that this becomes possible when Brahman, the efficient cause, is also the material cause, we must conclude that Brahman Himself is the material cause.

"Command" (in the *s'ruti*) is put for Him who commands, namely, Brahman. To shew that the *upādāna* or material cause is not a thing distinct from Him, the *Sūtrakāra* adduces another reason :

And by the declaration of (His) desire (I. iv. 24.)

"He desired, may I become manifold ;"† in these words the *S'ruti* declares the desire of the intelligent and all-knowing Brahman Himself who is the *nimitta* or efficient cause to become the manifold existence in the form of the variegated universe. Wherefore the material cause is not a distinct entity from the efficient cause.

(*Objection*):—From the *s'ruti*—such as "Above the universe is Rudra the Great Sage and He saw the Golden-wombed (*Hiranyagarbha*) being born ;"‡ we understand that the *Parames'vara* himself who is above the universe and is the efficient cause thereof casts his gracious glance upon the *Hiranyagarbha*, the first of all gods, being born by His (*Parames'vara*'s) will from out of the *Prakṛiti* distinct from Him (the efficient cause). How can He ever become the *Prakṛiti* or material cause and assume the form of the universe. It is *Māya* that is declared by the *s'ruti* as *Prakṛiti*, in the following words "Let it be known that *Māya* is *Prakṛiti*."§ The *s'ruti* declares also that *Puruṣa* is *Prakṛiti* in the words "From Him was born, *Virāj*, and above *Virāj* is *Puruṣa*" || Thus it is proper that those two alone are the *Prakṛiti*, and as such assume the form of the universe.

(*Answer*) : The *Sūtrakāra* answers as follows :

\* *Tait. up.* 2-1.

† *Tait. Sam.* 4-6-2.

‡ *Chhā. up.* 6-1-3.

\* *Ibid* 6-1-4.

† *Ibid* 5-2-3.

‡ *Mahānarayana upaniṣad*. 10-

§ *Svet. up.* 4-11.

|| *Puruṣa Sūkta*,

And (He being directly declared as both (I. iv. 25.)

In some sections of the Vedāntas, the Parames'vara is directly declared to be of the form of the universe as its material cause, and to be the Lord of the universe as its efficient cause. To explain: just as the passages such as "Rudra is above the universe" indicate His being the Lord of the universe, in the same way such passages as "All verily is Rudra"\* declare that, as the material cause of the universe, He is also of the form of the universe. In the s'ata-rudriya, He is declared to be the Lord of the universe, in the section beginning with "Bow to the Golden-armed" and closing with "Bow to the Lord of robbers",† and from there up to "Bow to the leaf-born and to the one born in the cluster of leaves" He is declared to be of the form of the universe. Elsewhere, too, the s'rūti declares Him in both the aspects:

"Brahman was the forest, Brahman became that tree; Brahman governed the worlds, holding them in their place"‡

In the Atharvas'iras, he is described to be of the form of the universe in the subsequent portion. Wherefore He being directly declared to be both, it is but right that the Supreme Brahman, Siva, who is Parames'vara, is both the universe and the Lord of the universe, as the material and the efficient cause thereof.

The sūtrakāra says that there is yet another authority:

Because of His creating (it out of) Himself (I. iv. 26)

He made it out of himself by himself.§ Thus, it is seen that Parames'vara made Himself to be of the form of the universe. Wherefore He is the material as well as the efficient cause.

(Objection:)—Paramasiva is quite free from all trace of evil. He is the unlimited ocean of all excellent attributes; His glory is infinite and eternal, and He is above the universe. How can such a being ever become the Prakṛiti, the universe which is the basis of all illusion and change, and which has to be avoided as an evil?

By transformation (I. iv. 27)

It is quite explicable how Paramasiva, the efficient cause, who is the Bliss, ever pure, and who by nature is the unsurpassed Good, should assume the form of

the universe as the material cause thereof, by transforming Himself into the *chit* and *achit*, or sentient and insentient, forms of existence.

(Objection:)—Ah! Transformation (*parināma*) means change in the form of the cause, inasmuch as *parināma* is defined to consist in a change from one form to another form. How is Parames'vara thus subject to what is regarded as an evil?

(Answer:)—True; but transformation (*parināma*) can take place in such a way that the Efficient Cause is not affected by the change, notwithstanding that He is the Prakṛiti or material cause.

(Question:)—What is this unique transformation? We are curious to know what it is. Please explain.

(Answer:)—Listen; we shall explain.

"When it was dark, when there was no day, no night, no existence nor non-existence, then was Siva alone by himself. That is the Imperishable, the Adorable (Light) of the sun; and from Him, Wisdom Ancient went forth"¶

At the time when all this was darkness, without the light of the sun and the moon, without the division of day and night, devoid of the individual names and forms, undifferentiated into gross and subtle forms of the sentient and the insentient, into existence and non-existence, then there was Siva alone left by himself, without a second, self-luminous, with the potentialities of the sentient and the insentient existence inseparable from His being. That was then the Imperishable, Supreme Being; that too the Adorable light, as in dwelling in the sun, the primary source of the sun's light. From such a Being, wherein was latent the whole external universe of the sentient and the insentient existence, went forth the ancient supreme wisdom, the spiritual energy (*jñānasakti*), secondless, eternally existent,—the Great Flash of light dispelling all the then darkness. Then "He desired, 'may I become many';‡ then, Parames'vara the Cause, embodied in the subtle form of the sentient and the insentient being which was undifferentiated yet in name and form, willed that He should become embodied in the sentient and the insentient existence differentiated in name and form. And then "all this did He create, and whatever else there is;"§—He differentiated from himself His body, the sentient and the insentient being in its subtle form. Then having

\* Mahanarayana-up. 10.

† Sata-rudriya 5.

‡ Taitt. Brahman 2-8-9.

§ Taitt. up. 2-7.

¶ Svetā. up. 2-18.

‡ Taitt. up. 2-6.

§ Ibid.

created it He entered into it;”\* He entered of himself as their Atman into the sentient and the insentient which had been differentiated from him. Then “He became the manifest and the unmanifest,”† he became variously transformed into the universe, manifest and unmanifest. Thus as man is a child and then a youth, Brahman whose body is the universe, is the cause and the effect. The s’ruti says.

“Know verily Mâyâ as Prakriti, and Mâyin (the possessor of Mâyâ) the Mahesvara.

By that which forms His limb is all this universe pervaded”‡

From this we learn that Mâyâ the Prakriti (material cause) of all, that Mahesvara is the being endued with It, and that the whole universe is pervaded by His limb, by a portion of Himself, by a piece of his sentient energy (Chit-Sakti) which, when regarded as the enjoyer, is known by the name of Purusha. Just as the hair and nails and the like are not born of the body alone or of Atman alone, so the universe is not born of Mâyâ alone or of Mahesvara alone. On the other hand,—like the hair and nails being born of the embodied mortals, Purusha, the Prakriti (material cause) of the sentient and the insentient existence comes into manifestation from out of the Parames’vara united with Mâyâ. From I’s’vara this form, are born the Avyakta (the unmanifest the four-faced (Brahma), and so on. And accordingly S’ruti describes I’s’vara to be Purusha Himself in the following words

Purusha verily is Rudra.”§

Wherefore it becomes quite explicable how Paramesvara, who endued with the sentient and the insentient nature, forms the cause as well as the effect, according to the several stages through which He passes.

And it is indeed sung that He is the Prakriti (I iv. 28.)

It is directly declared that Paramesvara Himself is the Prakriti of all beings.

He whose helpmate is Uma; who is the supreme Lord (Paramesvara), mighty, three-eyed, darknecked, and serene, having mediated thus, the sage

reaches him who is the womb of all creatures, the witness of all, transcending darkness \*”

Thus the S’ruti declares that the Prakriti of all creatures is the Parames’vara himself, who is the witness of all, the omniscient; transcending all darkness, above all universe; associated with Umâ, the supreme energy (Parama Sakti). Therefore the Supreme Brahman Himself is the Upâdana (material cause) as well as the nimitta or efficient cause.

### Adhikarana 7.

By this, all have been explained; all have been explained (I. iv. 29.)

This exposition of Vedantic passages, carried on from I. i. 2 till now, forms also the exposition of those portions of the Mantra and Brâhmana which, as speaking of the characteristic marks of Brahman, are of the form of the Vedānta, such as the Purusha-sûkta and the Satarudriya which form integral portions of Karma-kanda; as also of the Smritis, Itihasas, Puranas, and the sayings of the adepts. Repetition of the words “all have been explained” is intended to shew that the adhyaya is over.

Here a doubt arises as to whether the Satarudriya and the Purushasukta which occur in the ritualistic portion (Karmakanda), as also the Smriti, Itihasas, and Puranas,—whether they do or do not point to Brahman, when we take into account the various marks by which to ascertain the purport of a scriptural text; this doubt arising from the sections being of a different character (as devoted to karma).

(Purrapaksha.) It is proper to maintain that the Purusha-sûkta and the like which occur in the ritualistic portion (karmakanda) are devoted to an exposition of jiva, the performer of actions; and that they do not point to Brahman, because there is no purpose served (by treating of Brahman). Even the smritis, Itihasas, Puranas, and the like do not treat of the oneness of Atman for some of them speak of Brahma as the Parabrahman some, of Vishnu some of Rudra some, of Sakti; Some, of Agni some of Sûrya; some, of Vayu; some of another. As thus, no definite conclusion can be arrived at, these cannot be held to treat of Brahman.

(Siddhānta.) As against the foregoing, we hold as follows:

\* Ibid.

† Ibid.

‡ Svata-up. 4-10.

§ Mahanarayanopaniṣad.

\* Kaivalya upaniṣad 7.

The *Parusha sūkt* and the like do teach Brahman, because of His characteristic marks being described therein. We find here described the characteristic attributes of Brahman, that He is the cause of all, that He is beyond darkness, that He is the cause of immortality,—as the following passages shew

“From him Virāj was born.”\*

“Of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness.”\*

Him thus knowing, one becomes immortal here.\*

Wherefore It's'vara Himself is here described as *Parusha*. And in *Satarudriya* we find *Paramesvara* described as the Lord of the universe, as the Atman of the universe, as darknecked and so on. It is therefore but right to hold that He is treated of in the section.

(*Objection*):—It would seem unreasonable that the *Paramesvara* who is the repository of the finest of the attributes should be the being treated of in the *Satarudriya*. For, in the very beginning, we find the Being associated with wrath—which is a despicable quality,—as the following words show: “Bow to Thy wrath (*manyu*) O Rudra.”†

(*Answer*):—We should not proceed thus. For here, the word “*manyu*” means ‘knowledge.’ Or, it does not matter even if we understand the word in the sense of ‘wrath’; for ‘wrath’ being a quality inhering

in the *Prakṛiti* which has been voluntarily put on by Him, it has nothing to do with *Paramesvara*.

The marks which serve to indicate the main drift of the *Puranas* etc. point to the inevitable conclusion that they, treat of Siva, the *Paramesvara* associated with *Umā*, who, as the Atman of all, is the being denoted by the several designations such as *Brahma* and *Vishnu*; who is Omniscient and Omnipotent; who is above all; whose glory is unequalled; the being to whom the name Brahman can be fully applied and who forms the final import of all the Vedantic texts interpreted in harmony with each other.

As to the contention that these occur in the ritualistic portion, we have only to say in reply that it is but right that ‘section’ must be made to yield to characteristic marks’ in determining the main drift of the teaching. On the same principle, wherever in the *Vedas* and other authoritative texts a sentient or an insentient being is declared as the cause of the universe and so on, we are to understand that it is Siva, the Atman thereof, who is there referred to. Wherever we find such attributes as mutability and nescience are predicated, it is a sentient or an insentient being forming the body of *Parabrahman* that is meant. Thus everything becomes explicable when properly understood.

End of the first *Adhyāya*.

A. MAHĀDEVA SĀSTRĪ B. A.  
(To be Continued.)

\* *Parusha sūkt*.

† *Satarudriya*, 1.



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## TRANSLATIONS

THE VEDA'NTA-SŪ'TRAS WITH S'RĪ'KANTHA  
BHA'SHYA.

(Continued from page 175.)

SECOND ADHYĀYA.

Adhikarana. I.

If (you urge that) it would lead to the fallacy of making no room for the smṛiti, (we reply) no, because (otherwise) it would lead to the fallacy of making no room for the other smṛitis. (II. 1. 1.)

It has been shewn that all Vedāntic texts as well as the smṛitis which are consonant with their teaching, point, as the main drift of their teaching, to the most highly merciful Sī'va, the Paraḥbrahman, who is Existence, Intelligence, and Bliss in His essential nature; who by nature is omniscient, omnipotent, and so on; who has been defined by His occasional attributes, that He is the Being from whom the universe is born, and so on; who is distinct from all, the Atman of all; who voluntarily assumes the beautiful form, divers-eyed;

dark and yellow, dark-necked, and so on; and who is known by such specific designations as *Bhava*, *S'iva*, *Mahādeva*, *Paramesvara*. Now, this adhyāya is intended to answer objections on the ground of the said construction being opposed to the smṛitis and arguments which point to a different conclusion from that of the vedānta.

The main subject of discussion in the whole of this adhyāya is the construction of the Vedānta made out in the preceding adhyāya.

First a doubt arises here as to whether the vedic teaching thus made out has to be modified or not in accordance with the teaching of the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti. —How?—The Veda teaches that Brahman is the cause of the universe, while Kapila's smṛiti declares Pradhāna to be the cause of the universe. Kapila is indeed, one of great wisdom (*Japas*), and, therefore, his word, too, is an authority. And the Blessed Veda is the Sovereign authority of all and cannot so much as smell of untruth. Accordingly a doubt arises as to which of them should prevail against the other.

(*Pūrva-pakṣa*.)—Now, the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti serving no other purpose, is stronger in its claim to be considered as an authority in this matter; whereas, the

Veda serves its purpose as teaching Dharma (ritual) and is therefore weaker in its claim. Thus it is but right to modify the Vedic teaching in the light of the smṛiti.

(*Siddhānta* :)—We say, no.—Why?—Because, other smṛitis, such as that of Manu, which are unopposed to the Veda, would then receive no recognition. To the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti whose foundations lie in a śruti of which the very existence has to be inferred from the existence of the said smṛiti, the orthodox enquirer should prefer that smṛiti which says “waters alone did He create in the beginning, and in them did He cast His energy,”\* and thus declares that Brahman is the cause, as taught in the now extant śrutis such as the following :

“He saw the Hiraṇyagarbha being born.”†

And because it is not found (in the Smṛitis) of others. (II. 1. 2.)

Since Kapila’s doctrine that the Pradhāna is the cause of the universe etc., is not recognized in the smṛitis of the omniscient teachers such as Manu, it is but right to say that the doctrine of the Pradhāna has no foundation in the śruti. Hence no necessity for modifying, in the light of the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti, the given construction of the vedic teaching.

### Adhikarana. 2

Thereby has Yoga been answered. (II. 1. 3.)

The Smṛiti of Hiraṇyagarbha, too, which treats of the means of attaining yoga speaks of the Pradhāna as the cause; so that a doubt arises as to whether the construction of the vedic teaching has to be modified or not in the light of that smṛiti, though it has to undergo no modification such as may be caused by its opposition to the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti declaring that the Pradhāna is the cause.

(*Pūrvapakṣa* :)—We say that modification is necessary.—Why?—In the S’vetas’vatara—Upanishad Yoga-vidyā is elaborately described as a means to the *sūkṣhīkārā* or intuitive perception of Brahman. So that, though the Sāṅkhya-smṛiti is founded only on a śruti whose very existence is a matter of mere inference, it would seem proper to modify the construction upholding the doctrine that Brahman is the cause, in the light of Hiraṇyagarbha’s smṛiti which declares that Pradhāna is the cause, and which is founded on an extant śruti.

\* Manu I. 8.

† Mahānārāyaṇa. up. 10

(*Siddhānta* :)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows. The given construction of the vedic teaching has to undergo no modification in the light of the yoga-smṛiti. From the sūtra “yoga is the restraint of the thinking principle,” onwards, it is devoted to the exposition of the vedic yoga with its eight *angas* or subsidiary stages, as the main point of its teaching, but not also the non-vedic doctrine that Pradhāna is the cause. If it should lay stress on this doctrine also it is but right to reject it as we have rejected the Sāṅkhya smṛiti. Wherefore, it quite stands to reason that the construction of the vedic teaching as tending to the inculcation of the doctrine that Brahman is the cause should undergo no modification in the light of Hiraṇyagarbha’s smṛiti which teaches that Pradhāna is the cause.

### Adhikarana. 3.

Again the sūtrakara first sets forth and then refutes an objection on the ground that the given construction of the Vedāntic teaching should be modified in the light of the Sāṅkhya’s course of reasoning.

(The universe is) not (an emanation of Brahman), being quite distinct. And that it is so (is known) from the Word. (II. 1. 4.)

A doubt arises as to whether the given construction of the Vedānta has, or has not, to undergo a modification in the light of the Sāṅkhya’s reasoning, while it need not undergo any modification in the light of his smṛiti.

(*Pūrvapakṣa* :)—From all points of view, the doctrine that Brahman is the cause has to be modified in the light of reasoning.—How?—The universe being of a quite distinct nature from Brahman, it cannot be an emanation of Brahman. If you ask how this distinction has come to be known, we reply, it is from the Śruti itself. For, the śruti “Intelligence as well as non-intelligence,”\* and so on, describes the universe as subject to change, as unintelligent, as something not to be sought for by man. It is, therefore, distinct from Brahman who is Existence, Intelligence and Bliss. How can they be related as cause and effect, any more than the cow and the buffalo.

Because of the specific mention and of association it is only a mention of the presiding Intelligence (II. 1. 5.)

Objection against the *Pūrvapakṣa* :—If this universe be insentient and, as such, distinct from the intelligent Brahman, then how is it that the created

\* Tait. up. 2. 6.

objects are spoken of as sentient, in the following passages :

"Him, the earth addressed."\*

"The waters, verily, desired."†

"Listen, O wise stones."‡

Wherefore, the whole of this universe is sentient. Hence no distinction between Brahman and the universe as sentient and insentient.

**Pūrvapakṣin's answer.**—Not so. For we are to understand such a mention of an intelligent procedure in every such case as referring to the Devatā or Intelligence associated with the object, the word 'Devatā' being specifically mentioned in such passages as the following :

"Ah ! I shall enter into these three Devatās and differentiate name and form."§

and the constant association, with the material object, of the presiding Devatā or Intelligence being expressly stated in the following passage :

"Agni became speech and entered the mouth."||

Wherefore, owing to its insentiency etc., the universe is quite distinct from Brahman. Thus the construction that makes Brahman the cause, and this universe the effect, should be given up in the light of reason.

It is, however, seen. (II. I. 6.)

**(Siddhanta).**—Though distinct in their nature, Brahman and the universe can be related as cause and effect, because the sentient scorpion is seen to take its birth in the insentient cow-dung, and that the insentient hair is found growing out of sentient man. Hence the conclusion that mere unaided reasoning cannot prevail against the exegetical interpretation of the śruti.

Again an objection is raised answered :

(If you urge that the effect would be) non-existent.

(we reply) no, because it is a mere denial. (II. I. 7.)

**(Objection.)**—The cause and the effect being distinct from each other the effect does not exist in the cause ; and so the śruti, says "Non-existent, verily, this in the beginning was."

**(Answer.)**—You should not say so. For, the śruti merely declares that the cause and the effect are not necessarily of the same nature. It does not, therefore, detract from the theory that the cause and the effect are one thing essentially.

\* Tait. Samhitā, 5-5-2.

† Tait. Brāhmaṇa, 3-1-5.

‡ Tait. Samhitā, 1-3-13.

§ Chhā. up. 6-3

| Anāreya-upaniṣad 1-2-4

#### Adhikaraṇa 4.

Because of His being subject to them like it in dissolution. It is not right. (II. I. 8.)

If, in accordance with the doctrine that the effect exists in the cause before manifestation and after disappearance, it be held that the universe and Brahman are one thing essentially, then a doubt arises as to whether the harmonious teaching of the Upanishads as to Brahman has to be rejected or not in the light of reasoning.

**(Pūrvapakṣa.)**—It has to be set aside.—Why?—Because it has been said that the universe and Brahman are essentially one thing. Then, indeed it is an inevitable conclusion that, like the universe, Brahman is subject to all such evils as change and ignorance. Accordingly what is taught by one accordant voice in all the Vedāntic texts becomes incongruous. Thus, the given interpretation of the Vedāntic teaching must be rejected.

But no, because there is an analogous case (II. I. 9.)

The word "no" shows that the Pūrvapakṣa has to be rejected. Such passages in the śruti as "Whose body is Atman," "whose body is Avyakta," and such sayings in the Purāṇas as "The body of the God of gods is this universe, moving and unmoving; this thing, the *paśū*s (jīvas) know not in virtue of the bond, (*pāśa*);" such passages show that *chit* and *achit*, the sentient and the insentient, are the body of Siva, the Parabrahman. Though He exists as both the cause and the effect, there is no incongruity whatever in the doctrine taught in one harmonious voice in all the Vedāntic texts, since there is an analogous case as to the proper distribution of good and evil.—How?—Just as when the human body and the like pass through the states of childhood, youth, and dotage, childhood and other changes of condition pertain only to the body, and pleasure etc., pertain only to the A'tman; so, here, such evils as ignorance and change which are found in the sentient and the insentient beings forming the body of Brahman pertain only to the sentient and the insentient being forming the body; and such attributes as faultlessness, immutability, omniscience, and un-failing will pertain only to the Parames'vara, the A'tman. Because of this analogy, there is no incongruity whatever in the teaching of the śruti concerning Brahman.

And because of inconsistency on his own side. (II. I. 10)

By trusting to reasoning alone, the Pradhāna-vādin will find the mutual confusion of the attributes of

Prakṛiti and Puruṣa difficult to explain according to his theory which holds that Prakṛiti acts in the mere presence of Puruṣa who is immutable. Puruṣa, immutable as he is, is not capable of this act of confusion which consists in attributing in thought the properties of one thing to another; and Prakṛiti which is insentient is altogether incapable of thought. Therefore, the theory which holds that Pradhāna is the cause should itself be set aside in the light of reasoning.

Because of the infinality of inference. (II. i. 11.)

Inference being not a final test in itself, and the doctrine of Pradhāna being founded thereon, and it being possible to infer even to the contrary, it is the doctrine of Pradhāna, not the doctrine of Brahman, that has to be rejected.

(If you say that It has to be inferred otherwise, (we say) even then there can be no deliverance. (II. i. 12.)

It is not right to maintain that the Pradhāna should be so inferred in another way that there can be no room for an inference to the contrary. For, even then, it is possible to suppose a contrary inference to this inference; and therefore there can be no release of the test of inference from the defect of being not a final test. Wherefore properly speaking, it is the doctrine of Pradhāna, based as it is on bare inference which has to be rejected, but not the doctrine of Brahman based on the strong authority of the S'ruti.

#### Adhikarana. - 5.

By this, even the heterodox doctrines have been explained. (II. i. 13.)

Just as the Sāṅkhya system has been rejected as being founded on inference, as not being final, and so on, so also, and on the same ground, it may be held that the heterodox systems of Kanāda, Akṣhapāda, etc., have to be rejected. That is to say, even the atomic doctrine of Kanāda and others has here, been refuted.

#### Adhikarana. - 6.

(If you say that) as He would become an enjoyer, there will be no distinction, (we reply) there can be (a distinction) as in the world. (II. i. 14.)

As to the declaration in the preceding adhyāya of the Viśiṣṭa Sivadvaīta or the unity of the conditioned Siva as based on the ground that Siva without a second, associated with sentient and insentient universe, is Himself cause and effect, a doubt arises as to whether this idea of unity derived by an exegetical

interpretation of the Vedāntic texts will have to be set aside as opposed to reason.

Now the *pūrvapakṣin* says: If it be admitted that Parames'vara has for His body the sentient and the insentient universe, then he becomes an embodied being. Being thus embodied, like the jīva He too may become subject to pain and pleasure attendant upon contact with the body. Then there will be no distinction between Parames'vara and the jīva who is in a state of bondage. Thus since nothing serves to distinguish the one from the other, it cannot be proved, on the theory of Parames'vara's being intimately associated with the universe, that He is by nature free from all evil.

*Siddhanta.*—There is no incongruity whatever. A distinction can be made between Jīva and Parmes'vara inasmuch as His form is free from all taint and blessed in every way. One becomes subject to evil not because one is embodied, but because one is subject to the control of another. For example, in the human world, the king who is an embodied being is not subject to punishment consequent upon the disobedience of his own command, simply because he is not subject to the control of another. Thus He is not an enjoyer in the same way that the other is. The independence of Is'vara and the dependence of Jīva are self-evident, as the S'ruti says:

"Knowing and unknowing are the two, the powerful and the powerless."\*

Hence no absence of a distinction between Parames'vara who is independent and Jīva who is a dependent being though they are alike embodied.

#### Adhikarana. - 7

Although a distinction can be made between jīva and Parames'vara on account of their mutually opposed attributes of independence and dependence and the like, still, it may be shewn that, as cause and effect, they are one, not distinct from each other.

They are not distinct, because of the word 'creation' and so on. (II. i. 15.)

A doubt arises here as to whether it is reasonable or not to maintain that Brahman and the universe, the cause and the effect, are not distinct, as the S'rutis declare in one voice. This doubt arises because they are marked off from each other by the mutually opposed attributes of sentience and insentience.

\* S'veta. Up. 1-9.



**‘Pāramārśika :—**How can their unity be explained? In the preceding *adhyakaraṇa*, *Paramesvara* and *jiva* have been distinguished from each other, the one being possessed of consciousness etc., the other being ignorant and subject to enjoyment and suffering. As to the insentient beings, they being of a quite different nature, there is no shadow of reason to hold that it is not distinct from Brahman. The fact of their being related to each other as cause and effect cannot prove that they are not distinct from each other; for we hold that the cow-dung and the scorpion are distinct from each other notwithstanding that they are related as cause and effect. Even in the case of clay and the pot, we find that they are quite distinct from each other because they are found in experience to serve quite distinct purposes, and so on. Or thus: if the cause and the effect are quite identical, the universe and Brahman must be quite homogeneous, so that we should not experience any distinction among things, such as we daily make between an act, its agent, and the object sought to be attained.

As against the foregoing we hold as follows: The universe, as an effect, is not distinct from Brahman, its cause.—How do you know it?—From the word ‘creation,’ and so on, in the following passages:

“A creation by speech is change as well as name; what is called clay is alone real.”\*

“Existent alone, my dear, this at first was, one only without a second.....

It willed ‘may I be many, and be produced.’  
..... All this is ensouled by It; That is real;  
That is Atman; That thou art, O S’vetaketu.”†

“The whole being, the variegated world, what has become in many forms, and what is becoming, all this is Rudra.‡

As to the contention that the relation of cause and effect cannot prove unity, the *Sūtrakāra* says.

And because of the perception (of the cause) during the existence (of the effect). (II. 1. 16.)

During the existence of the effect as the pot, we perceive that the very substance of clay is the pot. Therefore, the effect is not distinct from the cause. The same thing is taught also in the following passage:

“A creation by speech is change as well as name. What we call clay is alone real”§

That is to say, change of state as well as name merely enable us to speak of a thing and to use it for certain actual purposes. The very substance of clay, when assuming the form of a pot and named as ‘pot,’ serves certain actual purposes and enables us to speak of it in that form. In point of fact, the pot is real only as clay, so far as logical proof is concerned; for apart from clay, we find that no pot exists. Or, the above passage may be explained as follows: The effect, namely the pot, exists in so far only as we speak of it. It is the very substance of clay, and it is not a distinct substance,—only undergoing a change in state to serve certain purposes in our actual life. It is because the pot is mere clay—but not a distinct substance—that the term “clay” applied to the pot refers to a real substance, a substance whose existence can be proved by proper evidence. Because a pot is nothing but clay, therefore the effect is not distinct from the cause. As to the difference in the purposes they serve in actual life, it can be explained as due to their being different states of the same substances, while they (clay and pot) are in fact one in substance. Wherefore, like clay and pot, Brahman and the universe are one in substance, the one pervading the whole of the other. Hence the *Purāṇic* saying:

“From the S’akti down to earth, everything comes from the principle of S’iva. By Him alone is it pervaded, as the pot etc., are pervaded by clay.”

**(Objection)** We hold that the pot is pervaded by clay because we cognise that the pot is mere clay. Not so do we cognise that this universe is Brahman; and therefore the universe cannot be said to be pervaded by Brahman.

**(Answer):** We do find that Brahman as the existent pervades the universe, as we cognise that a pot exists, that a cloth exists, and so on everywhere. If the universe were not pervaded by S’iva in His aspects as the existent and the conscious, then how could we cognise that a thing exists and becomes an object of consciousness, detached as it is from existence and consciousness? It cannot be a reality at all. Wherefore, it may be concluded that as the pot etc. are pervaded by clay, so this universe, as the effect, is pervaded by S’iva, the cause, and is one with Him.

And because of the existence of the other. (II. 1. 17.)

Because the effect exists in the cause, the effect is not distinct from the cause. It is because the pot etc. were clay itself before, that we now perceive the pot etc. to be mere clay.

\* Chhandogya Upanishad 6—1.

† Ibid.

‡ Mahanarayan Up. 16.

§ Chhā. Up. 6-1.

(If you hold that it is not so) because of its being mentioned as non-existent, (we say) no; because it is due to a different condition, as shown by the sequel, by analogy, and by other passages. (II. 1. 18.)

(Objection:—) The effect does not exist in the cause, because the S'ruti says that the effect was non-existent:

"Nothing whatever of this (universe) existed at first."\*

(Answer:) No. The universe is mentioned to have been non-existent because it was in a different condition, i. e. in a subtle form as opposed to its present gross form.—How do you know?—Because in the sequel the S'ruti says "While non-existent, it thought 'may I be.'" Even thinking is possible only in an existent thing. There is also an analogy pointing to the conclusion that the mention of the universe as non-existent is due only to a change of state. It is only in reference to the clay's mutually opposed, but positive, states of being as lump, as pot, and as potsherd, that we say that the pot did not exist before, that it now exists, and that it will not exist at a certain time in the future. When we thus see how clay itself which exists in all these states may be spoken of as a pot non-existent, it is unnecessary to assume a state of 'abhāva' or "nullity," a different state of being altogether, corresponding to a pot non-existent. Accordingly the S'ruti says elsewhere:

"This, verily, existed then undifferentiated it was (since) differentiated in name and form."†

The main conclusion may be stated as follows: At first Siva is pure, endued with the Paras'akti, the Supreme Energy inseparable from Himself, and composed of the sentient and the insentient existence

in so subtle a form that they cannot be differentiated in name and form. Then He projects out of himself and evolves that Sakti, which is Himself, in a gross form as opposed to the previous state, in the form of the sentient and the insentient existence capable of being differentiated in name and form. When the Energy is withdrawn from manifestation, then takes place *pralaya* or dissolution; when it is manifested, creation takes place. Accordingly, the authorities say:

"It is, verily, the Divine Being Himself, the Chidānāman who manifests the whole objective existence out of Himself from within like a yogin, by His will, without resorting to an upādāna."

That is to say, without resorting to an upādāna external to Himself, by Himself becoming the upādāna or material cause. Wherefore, the created universe is one with the Supreme cause, S'iva, the Parabrahman.

Another example is given as follows:

And like a cloth (II. 1. 19.)

Small when folded, a cloth becomes when extended a large one, and in the form of a hut becomes an effect. So, too, Brahman is the cause when contracted, and when extended in form He becomes the effect.

And like prāṇa and the like (II. 1. 20.)

Just as the Vāyu, one in itself, assumes different forms as prāṇa or upward breath and so on, according to its several activities, so, too, Brahman, in virtue of the various activities of S'akti assumes manifold form such as Sadāsiva and so on. Wherefore it is but right to maintain that the universe as the effect is one with Brahman, the cause.

A. MAHĀDEVA ŚĀSTRĪ, B. A.

(To be continued.)

\* Taitt. Brahmana 2—2—9.

† Bri. up. 3.4.7.

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — OR — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA

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## TRANSLATIONS

### THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪ'KANTHA BHA'SHYA.

(Continued from page 198.)

#### Adhikarna 8.

The Sūtrakāra raises and refutes an objection to the foregoing theory :—

(Jīva) being mentioned (to be one with) the other, there follows an incongruity such as neglecting what is good. (II. i. 21).

(Objection) :—Because in the words "That thou art,"\* and "This Atman is Brahman,"† Jīva, the effect, is mentioned as one with Brahman, the cause, it has been shown that they are not distinct from each other. In that case it would follow that the all-knowing and all-pervading Paramēs'vara undoes the universe for His own good and creates it for His own evil. Then it may be asked, how is it that

I's'vara, who is all-knowing and of unfailing will, and who knows that the pain of jīva who is no other than Himself is His own pain, engages in the creation of the universe, which as leading to saṃsāra is an evil, and does not abstain from creation for His own good. Accordingly once it is proved that Jīva and Paramēs'vara are one, there follows this incongruity, that Paramēs'vara, though all-knowing, is guilty of a want of sense in so far as He abstains from what is good to Himself and engages in what conduces to His own evil. Wherefore it does not stand to reason that Jīva and I's'vara, the cause and the effect, are one.

(Answer) :—In reply we say as follows :

But (the Cause is) superior, because of the mention of a distinction. (II. i. 22).

Though the cause and the effect are one, the Cause is declared in the S'ruti to be superior to the effect, to the sentient and insentient in such passages as the following

"Superior to the universe Rudra the Mighty Sage."\*

So, a distinction is also made between Jīva and Paramēs'vara in the following passages

\* Mahimā. 10.

\* Chhā. Up. 6-8.

† Mandūkya. Up. 1

- "But he who controls both, knowledge and ignorance, is another."\*
- "The one God rules the perishable (Pradhāna) and Ātman."†
- "Thinking that Ātman is different from the Mover (the Lord)."‡
- "Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree."§
- "Two Brahmanas ought to be known, the superior and the inferior."||
- "There are two, one knowing, the other not-knowing; both unborn; one strong, the other weak."¶
- "He is the eternal among eternal, the sentient among the sentient."\*\*
- "Having entered within, He is the Ruler of the creatures."††
- "Know then Prakṛiti is Māyā, and the great Lord the Māyin."‡‡
- "From that the Māyin sends forth all this; in that the other is bound up through that Māyā."§§
- "When he sees the other, the Lord, contented... then his grief passes away."|||
- "He is the master of nature and of man, the lord of the three qualities."¶¶
- "Of these creatures (paśus), the Paśūpati is the Lord."\*\*\*

Wherefore quite superior to the universe is Brahman, otherwise called Śiva.

(Objection):—By establishing non-duality in II. i. 15, and duality in II. i. 22, you have only proved duality-and-nonduality of Brahman and the universe.

(Answer:—No; we do not establish that sort of Viśiṣṭādvaita which takes the form of duality-and-nonduality. We are not the advocates of an absolute distinction between Brahman and the universe as

between a pot and a cloth, because of its opposition to the śruti declaring that they are not quite distinct from each other. Neither are we the advocates of an absolute identity as of the mother-of-pearl and silver, one of them being illusory; for, it is opposed to the śruti which points to a difference in the inherent attributes of Brahman and the universe. Nor do we hold to duality-and-nonduality, which is opposed to the nature of things. On the other hand, we maintain that the unity of the conditioned Brahman—as the cause and the effect—is like that of the body and the embodied, or like that of the substance and its attribute. By unity of Brahman and the universe, we mean their inseparability like that of clay and the pot as cause and effect, or like that of the substance and its attribute. A pot, indeed, is not seen apart from clay nor is the blue-lotus seen apart from the colour blue. Similarly, apart from Brahman, no potentiality of the universe can exist; nor is Brahman ever known apart from His potentiality of the universe just as fire is not seen apart from its heat. Whatever is not known apart from something else, the former must ever be conditioned by the latter, and this latter is naturally one with the former.

Wherefore Brahman who is in no way separable from the universe is said to be one with the other. And there is a natural distinction between the two; so that the supreme Brahman is ever higher than the universe. As to their distinction as the cause and the effect, it has been already explained in II. i. 9. Wherefore this theory is quite unopposed to the Śrutis declaring distinction as well as non-distinction.

And as in the case of stone etc; it is incongruous, (II, i, 23.)

(Objection:—Under all conditions, Jīva and Is'vara are one, because of the śrutis declaring non-duality.

(Answer:—No, because of an incongruity. Jīva and Is'vara cannot be identical, because, like the insentient stone, timber, grass, etc, the jīva also is, on account of ignorance etc, said to belong to quite a distinct class from the Is'vara who is possessed of such attributes as omniscience. Therefore Is'vara is a distinct entity from Jīva. Thus even the Jīva, sentient as he is, cannot be identical with Is'vara owing to this difference, that the latter is superior. Much less can the insentient existence which is essentially different be identical with Is'vara. From all standpoints of view, by Śruti, Smṛiti and reasoning, we see that the omniscient and omnipotent Parames'vara is quite

\* Śvetā. Up. 5-1.

† Ibid. 1-10.

‡ Ibid. 1-6.

§ Ibid. 4-6

|| Maitrīyaṇī Up. 6-22.

¶ Śve. Up. 1-9.

\*\* Ibid. 6-13.

†† Tait. A'ra. 3-11.

‡‡ Svet. Up. 4-10.

§§ Ibid. 4-9.

||| Ibid. 4-7.

¶¶ Ibid. 6-16.

\*\*\* Tait. Saṁhitā, 3-1-1.



superior to the whole universe, sentient and insentient though, as His own emanation, it is not altogether distinct from Him.

#### Adhikarana 9.

(If you urge that) it is not so, because we see an assemblage, (we say) no; as in the case of milk, indeed. (II. i. 24).

In such passages as "One alone, without a second;" and "The one God, producing heaven and earth"; we are told that one alone, *Parameśvara*, is the cause of the world. Is it reasonable or not that He, one alone as He is, is the cause of the variegated world?

Such a doubt arising, the *Pūrvapakshin* says: It is not reasonable, as involving an incongruity. This creation, made up as it is of ether, air, fire and water, is various. How can this be without the cause being variegated? Indeed, we find an assemblage of many factors in producing such things as car. Wherefore it cannot be that the cause is one.

*Siddhāntin* says: Such a view cannot be maintained. It is possible for even a single cause to be transformed into an effect, as, for example, in the case of milk which, alone, becomes transformed into curd. Wherefore the universe is the effect of the single cause, Brahman.

As to the contention that variety in the effect presupposes a variety in the cause, we say it is wrong, because we see the formation of a variegated effect such as hair, nail, etc., out of the one sentient man. Wherefore in producing the variegated effect of the universe, Brahman requires no other cause. Now, the sūtrakara says that everything is possible for the mighty:

And also, as in the case of Devas etc., in the world. (II. i. 25).

Just as the Devas, of whose powers we are told in the Sāstras, can put on as many forms as they like, so also, in the case of *Parameśvara*, of whose powers we are told in the sāstras, everything is possible. The *śānti* declares that the power of *Parameśvara* is infinite, in the following words:

"He who rules these worlds by His highest creative and ruling powers." What is impossible for Him?

#### Adhikarana -10.

Either it leads to the whole (becoming the effect), or there will be a contradiction of the teaching as to partlessness (II. i. 26).

Now, there arises a doubt as to whether the aforesaid doctrine that Brahman becomes transformed into the universe, is consistent or not with reason?

(*Pūrvapaksha*):—How can we reconcile with reason the doctrine that the One alone is transformed into the universe? In case that He becomes entirely transformed into the universe, as milk is transformed in its entirety into curd, then it would follow that Brahman as a whole becomes the effect, that no Brahman is left as such. Or, if it be only in part, it will contradict the *S'ruti* which declares that Brahman has no parts. Wherefore Brahman's transformation is not consistent with reason.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows:

But (it is so) by *S'ruti*, revelation being the only source. (II. i. 27).

The doctrine that the universe is a transformation of Brahman is quite explicable, because the *s'ruti* says so. *S'ruti* is the sole authority on the matter, there being no other authority. Because it is taught in the *s'ruti*, the doctrine is not stultified by Brahman's possession of uncommon powers, He being quite different from all the things we know of from other sources of knowledge. Thus it is quite possible for Him who is quite full to be Himself the cause as well as the effect. The doctrine of *guṇa*, for instance, holds that the one *guṇa* is present as a whole in each of the individuals of infinite number and utmost variety; no objection being allowed in the matter on the analogy of other things. Hence no incongruity whatever. Revelation being the only source of knowledge regarding the nature of Brahman.

And so in *Ātman*. They are, indeed, various. (II. i. 28)

Simply because *Jīvātman* belongs to a distinct class, we find him possessed of the attributes of the sentient as opposed to the attributes of the insentient existence. Even the individual objects of the insentient class such as fire, water, etc, are found to be possessed each of a distinct class of attributes, and are therefore quite various. Accordingly Brahman, too, of whom our knowledge is based solely on the authority of the Revelation, is possessed of various and infinite potentialities. Hence no contradiction whatever.

And because of an incongruity in his own theory. (II. i. 29).

As to the incongruities, such as the whole cause having to become the effect, they can only vitiate the theories of *Pradhāna* and other such causes, which are said to be without parts and which are brought under the category of the insentient existence, but

not the theory of Brahman based solely on the authority of Revelation.

The Sūtrakāra proceeds to declare that everything is explicable because Brahman is omnipotent.

And His Sakti is all-embracing as declared in the śruti. (II. 1. 30)

We are given to understand that all potentiality is centred in Brahman, in the following passages :

"His Supreme Energy (Parā-S'akti) is declared to be various, His inherent energy of knowledge and strength."

"Let it be known that Māyā is the Prakriti, and that the Māyin is the Mahes'vara. By His limb, as it were, is all this universe pervaded."

Wherefore, possessed as He is of all powers, what is not possible for Him ?

If you say He cannot be (the cause) as having no sense-organs, (we reply) it has been answered. (II. 1. 31)

(Objection) :—Brahman is said to be without sense-organs in the following passage.

"For Him there exists neither body nor the senses." Wherefore He cannot be the cause.

(Answer) :—No; this objection has already been answered by saying that Brahman should be known as declared in the S'ruti which is the sole authority in the matter. The Holy Divine S'ruti—such as "Let it be Known that Māyā is the Prakriti, and that the Māyin is the Mahes'vara: by His limb, as it were, is all this universe pervaded;"—is the sole authority as to Parames'vara, endued with the Supreme Sakti of Māyā possessed of various and infinite potentialities,—assuming the form of the universe by a piece of His Sakti, while in Himself He is beyond the universe. On this subject the Purāna also has the following :

"Bow to Him, whose thoughts are various and rise higher and higher above the universe; in a piece of whose power the whole is comprehended; whom, as the Master of all paths, the path-knowers declare as the Path; who is distinct from the whole universe."

Thus there is no room whatever for any discussion as to what is possible or what is impossible in Śiva, the Parames'vara, the Parabrahman, who is devoid of all taints, and whose omnipotency is based on the sole authority of Revelation.

## Adhikarana. II

Again, the Sūtrakāra raises an objection and answers as follows:

No, because of every action having a purpose (II. 1. 32).

It has been decided that Brahman who, as the Śāstra says, possesses all powers, can be the cause of all effects. Still, all activity having some purpose in view, a doubt raises as to whether it is consistent or not to hold that Parames'vara who has attained all desires engages in the creation of the universe and other such acts.

(Pūrvapakṣa) :—How is that possible? Indeed, Śiva is said to be the unsurpassed Bliss itself and is contented, in such passages as the following :

"Bliss is Brahman"

"All-pervading Consciousness and Bliss; formless and wonderful; associated with Umā."

How can He engage in creation and other activities without any purpose in view? If His activity should have a purpose in view, then he could not be ever-contented; if not, He would be doing something out of the way like a senseless being.

(Siddhanta) :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows

Still, as in the world, it is a mere sport (II. 1. 33).

It cannot be urged that the Ever-contented Brahman cannot consistently engage in the creation of the universe and other such acts, which, having no purpose to serve, must be purposeless. Even purposeless activity is consistent on the part of Paramesvara, as a mere matter of sport. Just as, in the world, such activity as the beating of a ball goes on as a matter of mere sport without any purpose in view, so also Paramesvara, though He has attained all desires, engages in creation etc., as a matter of mere sport. Hence no incongruity whatever.

## Adhikarana. 12.

No partiality nor mercilessness, because of reference to an external standard. So, indeed, the Śruti declares. (II. 1. 12).

It has been shown that, notwithstanding the absence of all purpose, Paramesvara engages in the creation of the universe etc., as a mere matter of sport. Here again a doubt arises whether this is possible or not.

(Pūrvapakṣa) :—The act of creation, even as a matter of sport, is not consistent on the part of Paramesvara, who, as all--full, is devoid of likes and dislikes.

As equal to all, Parames'vara must be quite indifferent. Creating happy bodies, like those of the Devas etc., for some beings, and painful bodies like the human for some others, He cannot but be guilty of partiality. Moreover, creation being preceded by destruction, Parames'vara who instantaneously destroys the whole, is also guilty of mercilessness. Therefore of what avail to Parames'vara is the act of creating the universe which brings on what is undesirable?

(Siddhānta :)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: All things considered, Parames'vara cannot be charged with partiality and mercilessness when He creates the universe, inasmuch as variety in the creation is determined by Karma. So the śruti says:

“Those of good conduct attain good birth, and those of evil conduct attain evil birth.”

If you urge that no Karma exists because of the absence of differentiation, (we reply) no, because it is beginningless. It is quite consistent and found in experience (II, 1. 35)

(Objection :)—Before creation there is no karma, because of the absence of kshetrajñas (jīvas); and the absence of these is indicated by the state of non-differentiation, declared with a determinateness in the words, “Existent alone, my dear, this at first was.”

(Answer :)—No; just as the Jīvas are beginningless as declared in the śruti, “one knowing and the other unknowing are the two, the unborn, one strong, and the other weak,” so also their Karmas are beginningless. Indeed, we do see that Samsara is the result of a continuous stream of Karma. Paramesvara, indeed, omniscient as He is, sees the various Karma of the jīvas; and by means of Sakti He creates the seat of enjoyment, the body of a Deva or the like, just suited to their respective Karma. Thus, variety in creation is due to Karma. And the destruction of the universe cannot render Parames'vara guilty of mercilessness, inasmuch as, like sleep it is a source of rest to those jīvas who are oppressed with the mundane life.

(Objection :)—If Karma alone is to decide the happiness and misery of the jīvas, of what avail is Parames'vara, a useless being?

(Answer :)—Even Karma being subject to His control, it does not detract from His independence. Against this it should not be urged that, like a thief who wants to evade payment of toll arriving at dawn at the very toll station after wandering the whole night with a view to get beyond the city limits by an uncommon route, this contention again makes the Parames'vara guilty of partiality and mercilessness, inasmuch as Karma is not independent of Him. For, Parames'vara merely assortments the infinite Karmic potentialities latent in Māyā. Karma being, thus, by its own power, the cause of variety in creation, there can be no partiality on the part of Him who merely assigns to each Jīva his respective Karma.

(Objection :)—The insentient Karma being unable to create the bodies of jīvas when uncontrolled by the sentient, it should be admitted that Parames'vara who is a sentient being, is the sole efficient cause. How can it be that Parames'vara, so merciful, again unites the jīvas with the body which is the cause of samsara, though they have been free from all pain of Samsara with all the organs of enjoyment destroyed?

(Answer :)—Without Karma becoming ripe no knowledge can arise in the jīvas; without knowledge, there can be no Moksha, the unsurpassed bliss; and Karma cannot become ripe without enjoyment of fruits. With a view to the enjoyment of the fruits of Karma, the all-benign Parames'vara again creates the body etc., for the jīvas. When Karma thus becomes gradually ripe, He enables the pure-minded jīvas to attain to a knowledge of Himself, and manifests to them the wealth of Moksha, the unsurpassed bliss.

A. MAHADEVA SASTRI.

(To be continued.)

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — OR — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA

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## TRANSLATIONS.

### THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪKANTHA BHA'SHYA.

(Continued from page 221.)

(*Objection*):—Parames'vara being thus mighty and extremely merciful, why should He not instantaneously cause the Karma of all jīvas to ripen and manifest the bliss of Moksha to all alike?

(*Answer*):—Yes, Parames'vara is equally benign to all. But those of ripe *mala* (sin) are alone liberated, while those of unripe one have still to bide their time. Though, for instance the rays of the sun are equally distributed, it is only the ripe lotuses that open, but not the unripe ones. Thus, Parames'vara, blessed in Himself, does everything for the sole benefit of others. Accordingly the Purāna clearly sets forth the whole of the foregoing doctrine by way of showing that Parames'vara is all-benign

"As without the sun all this world would be dark, so would this whole world be dark without S'iva. As without a physician unhappy patients would suffer, so without Siva, the world would be

unhappy and suffer much. As medicine is by nature an antidote to diseases, so, it is in the nature of Siva to be an antidote to all evil of Samsara. As this terrible sphere of samsara has been in time without a beginning, so, Siva, the Deliverer from samsara, has been in time without a beginning."

Wherefore it is possible that Paramesvara, who acts only for the benefit of all, engages in the creation of the world and other activities.

And because of the applicability of all attributes. (II i 36)

In short, whatever attributes cannot be applied to Pradhāna, to the atoms, to Karma, to Time or the like, are all of them applicable to Brahman. Wherefore it is but right to say that Brahman, who is above all, is the cause of the creation of the world, and so on

End of the first Pāda in the second Adhyāya

## SECOND PĀDA.

### Adhikarana. I.

The inferred (Pradhāna) cannot be (the cause), because then there can be no creation; and because of its possibility (in the presence of a sentient agent.) (II II. 1)

In the preceding Pāda, the Vedantin's own theory has been established by answering the objections



raised by the Sāṅkhya and others on the strength of reasoning. Now, again, on the strength of reasoning the Sāṅkhya and other opposed schools are criticised. First, an enquiry is started as to whether the Sāṅkhya doctrine of Pradhāna is reasonable or not.

The cause of doubt in all these cases is clear and may be easily made out.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—We see that the doctrine that Pradhāna is the cause of the universe is alone reasonable. For, Pradhāna is made up of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. This alone is fit to be the cause of the universe, inasmuch as we find everywhere its effects, namely, pleasure, pain, and delusion. Such things as cloth are pleasurable when found, as serving us to cover our bodies with. When taken away by others, they are sources of pain. When neglected as serving no purpose they are committed to oblivion. As pleasure etc. are thus constant in all things, the cause of the universe must be Pradhāna, made up of the three *gunas* or constituents.

As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Pradhāna is not the cause of the universe, because it is insentient. To explain: We see that a piece of wood or the like, when not acted upon by a conscious agent, can be effectual in building a car or a palace; and we see that when acted on by a conscious agent, some effect is produced. Wherefore Pradhāna, not governed by a conscious agent, cannot be the cause of the universe. As to the allegation that pleasure etc. is constant in all effects, we say that it cannot be, because pleasure, and the like are internal *i. e.* subjective, whereas the cloth etc. are external, *i. e.* objective. Wherefore the theory that Pradhāna is the cause is not consistent with reason.

A question is raised and answered:

(If you say it can be the cause) as milk and water  
(we say) even there (it is not so). (II. ii. 2).

(Objection):—Just as milk and water become curd and hailstone without being acted on by a conscious agent, so Pradhāna can become the universe.

(Answer):—No, even there, the reason cannot hold good; for milk and water, being insentient objects, fall within the sweep of our inference. Moreover,

And because, when it is independent, the opposite state  
can never come about (II. ii. 3).

If the insentient being can evolve effects without being acted on by a conscious agent, then creation

will be constant, and there can be no *pralaya* or dissolution, the opposite of creation. Wherefore, the insentient cannot be the cause of the universe.

It cannot even be as in the case of grass (eaten by a cow),  
because of failure elsewhere (II. ii. 4).

It does not stand to reason to contend that, like the grass eaten by a cow becoming milk, Pradhāna, though insentient, can be the cause; for, since we find no transformation into milk in the case of grass eaten by a bull or not eaten by any being, even grass must be acted on by a conscious agent.

(If you say it is possible) as in the case of man and loadstone,  
(we reply) even then (it cannot be) (II. ii. 5).

(Objection):—The Puruṣa causes Pradhāna to act by his mere presence, though the latter is insentient, like a lame man leading another who is blind, or like a loadstone causing iron to move. Thus there is no necessity for a conscious entity.

(Answer):—Even then, it is not possible for Pradhāna to act, since Puruṣa remains unaffected. The lame man and the loadstone do undergo a certain change by way of teaching the way or by way of being taken to the proximity of iron, and so on. Wherefore, mere presence of the immutable Puruṣa cannot account for Pradhāna's activity.

Also because of the inexplicability of (the relation) as the  
main (and the subordinate) (II. ii. 6).

The Sāṅkhyas say that the universe comes out of the *Gunas* which become related to each other as the main and the subordinate, when one of them gets an ascendancy over the others. This relation, as the main and the subordinate, assumed to come into being at the time of creation, cannot be explained, inasmuch as the *Gunas* which attain to a state of balance during dissolution, undergo no disturbance whatever. For this reason also, the creation of the universe cannot be properly accounted for according to the theory of Pradhāna.

Even when inferring to the contrary, (it is inexplicable)  
because of the absence of the power of intelligence  
(II. ii. 7).

Even if you infer that Pradhāna acts otherwise than in the manner referred to, the theory will still be open to objection, inasmuch as, in the absence of intelligence, Pradhāna is not capable of the intelligent plan (we find in the creation of the inverse).

Because, even when assumed, it serves no purpose (II. ii. 8)

If any purpose has to be served by assuming Pradhāna, we may assume it some how or other.

There is no purpose whatever served by the assumption. For, Puruṣa being immutable, he cannot be affected by way of perceiving Pradhāna or undergoing any other change, and therefore it is not possible to maintain that Puruṣa becomes subject to enjoyment and suffering by ascribing to himself the properties of Pradhāna and that he attains liberation by right discrimination thereof. Wherefore, in the absence of all purpose, there is no need to assume Pradhāna.

And owing to contradiction, it is unsound. (II. ii. 9.)

We see a thousand contradictory attributes assumed, such as that Puruṣa is the perceiver, the enjoyer, immutable, and so on. For this reason, too, Kapila's theory is quite unsound.

### Adhikarana 2.

Thus it has been shewn that the doctrine of Pradhāna being the cause of the universe has no support of a proper authority. Now this adhikarana proceeds to refute the theory which maintains that atoms (paramāṇus) are the cause of the universe.

What is big or possessed of length (comes out of) the short and infinitesimal ones (II. ii. 10).

Here a doubt arises as to whether the theory which maintains that the atoms are the cause of the universe is consistent with reason or not.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—The doctrine of Pradhāna not admitting a supreme Lord (Paramesvara) governing the universe, it is no doubt opposed to reason to maintain that Pradhāna is the cause of the universe. But, the theory that atoms are the cause of the universe is supported by reason. To explain: When the universe is in a state of dissolution, on Paramesvara conceiving a desire to create, by Karma of the sentient beings is induced first activity in the motionless atoms. In virtue of this activity one atom conjoins with another atom, and from that conjunction a *dvyanuka*, i. e., a molecule composed of two atoms, comes into being. Three *dvyanukas* form one *tryanuka*, and so on. In this way the whole universe is created. Thus there is no objection to the theory that atoms are the cause of the universe.

(Siddhānta):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: According to the theory of Kāṇāda, from out of short and extremely small atoms (called *paramāṇus*) are produced *tryanukas* which possess length and appreciable size, and *dvyanukas* which are short

and possess the size of an atom. How is this possible? To explain: *Paramāṇus* are endowed with the size called *pārimāṇya*, with the size which is smaller even than an *anu* or atom. Out of two such *paramāṇus* which have not the size even of an *anu* or atom is produced, as the Vaiseshikas say a *dvyanuka* (two-atomized molecule) which has the size of an *anu*. So also, out of the *paramāṇu* which are short, a *dvyanuka* is said to be produced which has no length. From out of three such *dvyanukas*, they say, is born a *tryanuka* which possesses length, but not the size of an atom (*anu*). All this is inconsistent, because it is opposed to their theory as to what takes place in the qualities of the cause. Parts of a whole, having each six sides, combine with one another and produce that whole which is bigger in size than any one of the parts. Since *paramāṇus* have no sides, they cannot combine together to produce a bigger substance. Wherefore the doctrine of *paramāṇus* is unsound.

The Sūtrakara points out another inconsistency:

In either way, no activity; hence its absence. (II. ii. 11).

Because of the absence of first activity in atoms, there can be no conjunction of atoms, caused by that first activity. If the activity be independent of the ripeness of the *adrishtas* (Karmas) of the jivas, then activity may arise in the atoms even before the Jivas' *adrishtas* become ripe. If, on the other hand, it should depend on the *adrishtas* of the Jivas, then it cannot be that those *adrishtas* produce activity in the atoms only on certain occasions. No such quality as ripeness residing in the *adrishtas* is ever perceived by us. On the other hand, we can say that an act becomes ripe only when and where according to the *sruti* enjoining the act, the act is destined to produce its effect. Those acts as to which no specific time is mentioned, become ripe in the absence of all other acts which are stronger than the act and obstruct its natural course. *Adrishtas* are by nature, such as tend to produce effects in accordance with the acts of which they are results. Wherefore it is not possible to suppose that acts, done by the infinite number of souls, as productive of fruits of different sorts and at different times, become ripe all at one time and in one form. Hence the untenability of the doctrine of atoms as the cause of the universe.

There is again another inconsistency, as the sūtrakara says:

And because it likewise (involves the fallacy of) infinitality,  
owing to the postulate of samavāya. (II. ii. 12).

A relation called *samavāya* or intimate relation is postulated. Hence an inconsistency.—How?—Even in the case of *samavāya*, as in the case of *jāti* (genus) and *gunas* (qualities)—the postulate being that these are supposed to become related to the substance by the relation of *samavāya*—we will have to postulate a separate relation by which *samavāya* may become related to the substance, and so on, infinitely. This involves the fallacy of *anavasthā* or infinite regress. Hence another inconsistency in Kanāda's doctrine.

(The members conjoined must also be) quite eternal, because, (Samavāya is constantly) present. (II. ii. 13).

It is postulated that *samavāya* is an eternal relation ; and this is not possible unless the members related to each other by *samavāya* are also eternal. Thus, it would follow that the parts and the whole made up of those parts are also eternal. Wherefore the theory is unsound.

And as endued with colour etc., the reverse, must be the case as we find it in experience. (II. ii. 14).

It is here postulated that *paramānus* possess colour etc. Then they cannot be eternal ; for we find that pots etc. which are possessed of colour etc. are perishable. Wherefore also, the theory is unsound.

And because of inconsistency in either way (II. ii. 15).

If, to avoid the conclusion that *paramānus* are perishable, it be postulated that they are devoid of colour etc, then it cannot be maintained that all qualities in an effect are produced by those inhering in the cause. If, again, with a view to maintain this, it be postulated that the *paramānus* are endued with colour etc, this postulate would lead to the undesirable conclusion that they are perishable, and so on. Thus, in either case, Kanāda's theory is open to objection and is therefore unsound.

Having no following, it has to be aside altogether (II. ii. 16).

The Sāṅkhya theory, though opposed to S'ruti and reason, is accepted by the orthodox followers of the Vedic doctrine in some points, such as *satkāryavāda*, the doctrine which maintains that the effect exists in the cause even before its manifestation. Kanāda's theory being, on the other hand, not accepted in any of its parts, those who seek Moksha should neglect it altogether.

### Adhikarana. 3

In both the causal aggregates, it (the aggregation) cannot take place. (II. ii. 17)

The theory of the so-called Vedic systems has been

refuted. Now, the theory of the non-vedic systems, will be refuted. First the question is started as to whether the doctrine of aggregates, as propounded in the Buddhistic systems, can be upheld by reason or not.

*Pūrvapakṣa* :—It is reasonable. They propound the doctrine as follows :

There are two aggregates, external and internal. The external aggregate comprises earth etc. The internal one comprises the mind and its functions. The whole universe consists of the two aggregates. To explain *Pramāṇas* are the cause of the external aggregate. They are of four sorts, those of earth, of water, of light and of air. Out of these simultaneously combining together, the external aggregate is born. Of the internal aggregate the cause is the five *skandhas* or bodies. These *Skandhas* are respectively composed of forms (*rūpa*), feelings (*Vedanā*), ideas (*Vijñāna*), names (*saṁjñā*) and tendencies (*samskāra*) as perceived by the mind. The *Rūpa-skandha*, the body of forms, is composed of sound, touch, colour and the like. When manifested in thought they constitute the *Vijñāna-skandha*, the body of ideas. The pain caused by this last forms the *Vedanā-skandha*, the body of feelings. *Devadatta* and other names compose the *Sanjñā-skandha*, the body of names. The latent impressions of these make up the *Samskāra-skandha*, the body of tendencies. Out of these combining together, the internal aggregate is formed. Thus in the doctrine of aggregates there is no inconsistency whatever.

As against the foregoing we explain as follows The theory that the two aggregates are the cause of the universe is untenable. They (the buddhists) hold that everything is momentary. How is it possible for momentary things to form an aggregate. The causes existing only for one moment, they vanish as they come into being and are therefore incapable of producing any effect.

If you say that it is possible because (*avidyā* and attachment) are the cause of each other, (we say) no, because (*avidyā*) cannot cause aggregation (II. ii. 18)

(The Buddhist)—The *avidyā* which regards the impermanent as permanent, and such feelings as attachment, are the cause of each other, and thus aggregation becomes possible.

(Vedāntin) :—No, for *avidyā* cannot cause aggregation. The mother-o'-pearl cannot actually serve the purpose of silver, by mere *avidyā*, i.e., when the

mother-o'-pearl is only mistaken for silver. To one who knows the truth, the avidyā vanishes then and there, and then no attachment or anything of the sort caused by avidyā can possibly arise. Wherefore the theory that the aggregates are the cause of the universe cannot stand.

The sūtrakara adduces another argument:

**And because of the disappearance of the first at the birth of the second (II. ii. 19.)**

Because when the second moment of a pot comes, the first moment thereof has disappeared, and because abhīva exists ever the same as the cause, everything may be produced everywhere and at all times.

**If not existent, there is a contradiction of the hypothesis. if otherwise, there is a simultaneity. (II. ii. 20.)**

If the cause does not exist when the effect arises, then it will be contrary to the hypothesis that the sense-organs, light and such other auxiliary circumstances produce cognition. Now, if the cause were to abide till the effect is produced, then two pots\* would be simultaneously seen in one. If the cause were not to abide till the effect is produced, then the contact of senses with objects will be simultaneous with the (resultant) cognition.

**Cessation accompanied with an act of thought and cessation unaccompanied with an act of thought cannot be established, because there is no interruption complete.**

Cessation means destruction without leaving any residue. This is not possible in either of its two alleged forms, gross or subtle. For, the destruction of a pot, for instance, consists in its being reduced to the state of fragments; and thus something continues to exist when the pot is said to be destroyed. Wherefore momentariness of things cannot be established.

**Because of its being objectionable in either way (II. ii. 22).**

Whether it be that what has come into being is reduced to nothing, or that something comes out of nothing, in either case the theory is open to objection. For, it is not possible for any thing to come out of nothing; and what comes out of nothing must itself be nothing. As the theory is open to these objections, it is untenable.

**Not even as to Akāśa, there being no difference whatever. (II. ii. 23).**

Even Akāśa cannot be regarded as a nonentity, inasmuch as our uncontradicted experience testifies

\* It being held that a pot as it existed at the previous moment and its idea are necessary causes for a pot and its idea to arise at a given moment.

to its reality as the element where the hawk and other birds can fly.

**And because of recognition (II. ii. 24).**

Also because of recognition, momentariness cannot be established. "This is (the same as) that"; thus, by the relation of opposition between the two words, 'this' and 'that' we come to understand that one and the same thing can exist in the past as well as in the present. It is the contact of the objects with the senses of the man, who retains the impressions of a former experience, which has given rise to this recognition. Wherefore, as propounding such doctrines as that all things are momentary, the theory which maintains that the aggregates are the cause of the universe is quite incoherent.

#### Adhikarana 4.

Of those who hold that external objects have an independent existence, the theory of those Buddhists who hold that the cow and the pot and the like are perceived by the senses has been refuted. Now the sūtrakara proceeds to refute the theory that the existence of external objects has only to be inferred from our cognitions thereof:

**Not (an attribute) of the non-existent, because it is never seen. (II. ii. 25).**

Here a doubt arises as to whether the contention of some of the Buddhists that the existence of an external world is to be inferred from our cognition is consistent with reason or not.

**Pūrvapakṣa:**—From a variety found in the cognitions, the cogniser has only to infer a corresponding variety in the external world which impresses its form on the cognition and then disappears.

**Siddhānta:**—This does not hold good; for, an external object is admitted to exist but for a moment; and we have seen nowhere any attribute of a non-existent object which has vanished out of sight attaching itself to something else.

**Then even the indifferent would attain the end (II. ii. 26).**

It being admitted that everything is momentary, it would follow that one performs an act while another reaps the fruit thereof; so that even to those who make no effort at all everything will accrue. Thus this theory is very hard to explain.



**Adhikarana 5.**

(The external object cannot be) non-existent, because we perceive it. (II. II. 27)

Here a doubt arises as to whether the pure Vijnānavāda is consistent with reason or not.

*Pūrvapakṣa*:—It is reasonable. For Vijnana (cognition) in its various forms is alone real. External objects are not real, inasmuch as, in *svapna*, we find all experience brought about by the mind alone in the absence of external objects. Similarly, the *Jagrat* experience can be explained. Wherefore Vijnana alone is real.

As against the foregoing we hold as follows. It is not possible to maintain that external objects do not exist; for the external object enters into consciousness as its object which the perceiver has to take note of as expressed in the words "I know it." When consciousness is spoken of as putting on the form of an object, it simply means that the person is thereby enabled to know the particular object as it is and act upon that knowledge.

As to the contention that, on the analogy of *svapna*, the *jagrat* experience is void, the Sutrakara says:

On account of a difference, it is not like *svapna* etc. (II. II. 28).

Unlike *svapna* and the like, the *Jagrat* consciousness is not illusory, inasmuch as the latter differs from the former in so far as there is no defect in the sense-organ and the *jagrat* consciousness is never falsified by subsequent experience. Wherefore it cannot be that *vijnana* alone is real.

The Sutrakara adduces another argument:

There can be (no cognition without an object,) as it has never been so found. (II. II. 29).

No cognition can possibly exist without a corresponding object, since such a cognition is never met with in experience. It is quite possible that even the *svapnic* cognition has an object corresponding to it.

Hence the incongruity of the theory that cognitions alone are real.

**Adhikarana 6**

And because of its incongruity in every way (II. II. 30).

The question raised in this *adhikarana* for settlement is whether the doctrine that everything is void is reasonable or not.

*Pūrvapakṣa*:—It is reasonable. It may be explained as follows. The universe as a whole is not existent, because it is falsified by other experience. Neither is it non-existent, because we are conscious of it. Neither is it both existent and non-existent, as such a conception involves a contradiction. We cannot say it is neither existent nor non-existent, since such a conception is impossible. On the other hand all is a mere void, not coming under any one of the four alternatives. Its appearance as an object of sensuous perception is due to *samvṛiti*, *avidyā* or illusion. Hence the soundness of the theory of Nihilism.

*Siddhānta*:—The doctrine that everything is void is untenable—Why?—For, as when we speak of the universe being existent, so when we speak of it as non-existent or something else, the subject spoken of cannot be a non-entity; and accordingly the words *sat* and *asat*, existent and non-existent, as well as the ideas corresponding to them, all refer to a really existing entity spoken of as subject to the mutually opposed conditions of existence and non-existence.

As to the contention that the fact of the universe becoming an object of sensuous perception is a creation of *samvṛiti* or illusion, it is ridiculous to advance any such statement. If all is void, who is subject to the illusion? To whom does the illusion present itself? Therefore the theory that all is void is opposed to all experience.

A. MAHADEVĀ SĀSTRĪ.

(To be continued.)

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH OR — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA

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## TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪ'KANTHA  
BHA'SHYA.

(Continued from page 146.)

### Adhikarana 7.

We have done with the Buddhists. The doctrine of the Jainas is refuted as follows:—

It cannot be because of its impossibility in one. (II. ii. 31).

The Jainas, indeed, explain contradictory states in one and the same thing by the logic called *Sapta-bhangi-naya*, or "the system of the seven paralogisms." The question is whether this doctrine of theirs is reasonable or not.

Their theory runs as follows: There are two *padārthas* or predicaments, *Jīva* and *Ajīva*, soul and non-soul. *Jīva* is sentient, of the size of the body, and composed of parts. *Ajīva* again is of six classes: one class comprises such things as trees, mountains, and the like; the remaining five classes are *Āsrava*, *Samvara*, *Nirjara*, *Bandha* and *Moksha*. *Āsrava* is the

aggregate of the senses, so called because it is by their means that *jīva* moves towards external objects. *Samvara* comprises *aviveka*, non-discrimination, etc., so called because *viveka* or discrimination is thereby concealed. *Nirjara* is the self-mortification, such as the plucking out of the hair and the getting on a hot stone, so called because desire, anger and the like is thereby completely brought to decay. *Bandha* or bondage is the series of births brought about by the eight forms of *Karman* or action,—the four sinful acts of injury and the four virtuous acts of non-injury. *Moksha* is the incessant upward march of the *Jīva* when liberated from those acts. These seven predicaments should be determined by the logic of *Sapta-bhangi-naya* which is stated as follows: "May be, it is," "May be, it is not," "May be, it is and it is not," "May be, it is not explicable," "May be, it is and yet not explicable," "May be, it is not, and not explicable," "May be, it is and it is not, and not explicable." "May be" here means somewhat. Accordingly, the seven predicaments are established on the logic of *Sapta-bhangi-naya*. This is unreasonable; for it is impossible for one and the same thing both to be and not to be, to be both eternal and non-eternal, to be both different and not different. Such mutually

opposed conditions of being and non-being, of clay-lump, of pot, and pot-shreds, which come into being one after another, can never co-exist simultaneously in a substance. The Jain doctrine, therefore, is full of contradictions.

So also is the Non-universality of A'tman. (II. ii. 32).

So also, the non-universality of A'tman is incongruous. If A'tman be of the size of the body, it will follow that he will be wanting in some parts when passing from a big body to a smaller one. It is, therefore, quite unreasonable to maintain that A'tman is of the same size as the body.

Nor can the incongruity be averted by supposing a fresh condition, because of change etc. (II. ii. 33.)

The foregoing incongruity cannot be explained away by supposing that A'tman assumes a smaller form afresh; for, then, it would lead to the undesirable conclusion that A'tman is subject to change etc.

Both being eternal owing to the persistency of the final (size), there is no difference. (II. ii. 34.)

The final size, the size in the state of moksha, persisting the same, it is the natural size of A'tman. Thus A'tman as well as his size being alike eternal, the size must be the same in the preceding state also. When A'tman assumes the sizes of the different bodies, imperfectness is inevitable. Wherefore, by the theory that one and the same thing both is and is not and so on, and by the theory that A'tman is of the size of the body, the Jain system is quite full of contradictions.

### Adhikarana 8.

The Lord (Pati) (cannot be a mere efficient cause), because of an incongruity. (II. ii. 35.)

The Tāntrikas, the so called orthodox, those who profess to follow the Parames'vara's A'gamas, without knowing the real import of their teaching, hold that Pati, the Parames'vara, is a mere efficient cause, though, according to S'ruti, He is both the (material and the efficient) cause of the universe. Now, a doubt arises whether this theory is reasonable or not.

Now, the *Lurayaksha* may be stated as follows: The potter and others, who are, not of course, the material cause, become the agent as merely wielding the stick etc. So, too, the I's'vara, a by-stander, is the mere *Nimitta* or efficient cause. *Mâyâ* is the *Upādāna* or material cause. *S'aktis* are the instruments. Otherwise, if I's'vara be the *Upādāna* or material cause like clay etc., it will follow that He is likewise subject to change. Wherefore, Parames'vara is merely an efficient cause

As against the foregoing we hold as follows: It is not reasonable to maintain even that I's'vara, the Lord (Pati), is a mere efficient cause, because the theory is incongruous as opposed to S'ruti and reasoning.

The Sūtrakāra proceeds to show how it is opposed to reasoning:

And because of the incongruity of rulership (II. ii. 36.)

It cannot be explained how the Parames'vara who has no body can act upon *Mâyâ*, the material cause. In ordinary experience it is found that an embodied being alone such as the potter can operate on a material cause such as clay-lump. The analogy therefore, of the potter does not hold good. When *Maya* is not operated upon, there can be no such *Isvara* as has been contended for, and thus we are led to the Sankhya theory, there being no use of supposing the existence of *Isvara*. Wherefore, it cannot be that the Parames'vara is a mere Efficient cause.

An objection is raised and answered as follows:

If you hold (that He is without a body) like the sense-organs, (we say) no, because He would be subject to enjoyment etc. (II. ii. 37.)

(Objection):—No body is necessary for Him in operating upon the material cause. Just as a sense-organ, though having no body, yet operates upon the physical body, so does *Isvara* operate upon *Pradhāna*.

(Answer):—No; for, He would be subject to enjoyment of pleasure and pain pertaining to *Pradhāna*. Just as A'tman, who has no body, becomes subject to pleasure and pain pertaining to the body, while operating upon the body, so, too, Parames'vara will become subject to pleasure and pain pertaining to *Pradhāna* while operating upon *Pradhāna*. Wherefore, I's'vara is no mere efficient cause.

Finitude and limited knowledge, too. (II. ii. 38.)

(Objection):—Like the potter, Parames'vara has a body; and as the potter operates upon a lump of clay standing apart, so does He operate upon the material cause, standing apart from it.

(Answer):—No. If so, like the *sam-ârin*, *Is'vara*, the Lord, would be a finite being and would not be an omniscient Being. As He would thus be subject to pleasure and pain, and so on, *Is'vara* cannot be one who operates on *Pradhāna*.

(Objection):—Though operating upon *Pradhāna*, Parames'vara would not be subject to pleasure and

pain, inasmuch as the Śruti declares that "the other, not eating, merely witnesses".\*

(Answer):—If so, we should not rely on the strength of reasoning; we should, on the other hand, look to Śruti alone. Accordingly it should be admitted that Parames'vara is also the upādāna or material cause of the universe, as declared in the following passages: "that A'tman made Himself (into the universe), of Himself."† "May I be born many."‡ "All is verily Rudra."§ Though Parames'vara is thus both the efficient and the material cause of the universe, yet He is not subject to change as we may understand from the śruti which declares that He is "without parts, without action."|| In the Vāyu Samhita, we are told that, in the universe comprising Mâyā and so on, Siva Himself with His śaktis or potentialities forms the material cause in the following words:

"Śakti was the first-born, followed by the Santyati-tapada. Thence came Maya; thence Atyakta. From the Lord Siva endued with Śakti, the Santyati-tapada was born, and thence the Santipada, in succession."

Again it says:

"From Śakti to the Earth, all is born from the Siva-tattva. By him alone is all pervaded, just as a pot is pervaded by clay."

From this we understand that the universe is pervaded by Siva, the material cause, as the pot is pervaded by clay. And on the authority of the A'gamas it may be held without fear of contradiction that Parames'vara is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe, as declared in the following passage:

"It is the Divine Being Himself, the self-conscious A'tman, who, like a Yogin, by His will manifests externally all the things which existed within himself, without resorting to any material cause."

Former A'chāryas (teachers) maintain that this Adhikarana is intended to set aside the theory, advanced in parts of Ś'iva-A'gama, that Ś'iva, the Parabrahman, is a mere efficient cause. On the contrary, we see no difference between the Veda and the Ś'ivāgama. Even the Vedas may properly be called Ś'ivāgama, Ś'iva being the author thereof. Accordingly Ś'ivāgama is twofold, one being intended for the three (higher castes), the other being in-

tended for all. The Vedas are intended for people of the three castes, and the other for all. Ś'iva alone is the author of both. That He is the author of the Veda is declared in the following passages of Śruti and Smṛiti:

"He is the Lord of all Vidyās."\*

"(The Veda) is the breath of the Mighty Being."†

"Of these eighteen Vidyās of various paths, the original author is the wise Ś'ūlapāni Himself. So says the Śruti."

Elsewhere also the Parames'vara Himself is thus spoken of. Wherefore, the author being the same, both teach the same thing and are alike authoritative.

Or, the question may be viewed thus:—The Vedas and the A'gama are both authoritative inasmuch as we find, in both alike, Brahman, Pranava, the Panchākshari, Prāsāda and other mantras; mention of Pasu, Pati, Pā'sa and other things; such lofty Dharmas as the smearing of ashes, the wearing of tripundra, worship of Linga, the wearing of rudrāksha, and all other such things. The author being the same, and both expounding the same thing, they are not opposed to one another. Wherefore we maintain that this adhikarana refers to the Yoga-Smṛiti of Hiranyagarbha which speaks of Is'vara as the mere efficient cause. Therefore this adhikarana is properly intended to overthrow the Hiranyagarbhāgama.

Or, as some one says, there is nothing objectionable (in this adhikarana being made to refer to Ś'ivāgama) inasmuch as it is intended to remove an incidental doubt arising with reference to the teaching of the Ś'ivāgama itself, just as the doubt concerning the origin of ākāśa will be removed (Vide. II. iii. 1.) Any how, our conclusion is that Is'vara is not a mere efficient cause.

### Adhikarana. 9.

Because of the impossibility of birth. (II. H. 39.)

The Pancharatra system was revealed by Vasudeva. It speaks of Jīva as being born, and so on. A doubt arises as to whether such a thing is possible or not.

Pūrvopākṣa:—It is possible. For, what has been revealed by the Blessed Lord, Vasudeva, must be an authority. The theory therein expounded may be stated as follows: The Blessed Lord, Vasudeva, is one alone, and is Paramatman, the Supreme Spirit. From

\* Mund. Up. 3-1.

† Tait. Up. 2-7.

‡ Chha. Up. 6-2.

§ Mahāna. Up. 16.

|| Ś'vo. Up. 6-10.

\* Mahānā. Up. 46.

† Bri. Up. 6-5-11.



Him is born Jiva, known by the name of Sankarshana. From Jiva comes Manas, called Pradyumna, and from Manas comes Ahankara or Egoism called Aniruddha. These four groups form the essence of everything. Wherefore, Vasudeva being superior to Hiranyagarbha and all the rest, his revelation must be authoritative, and all that is thus taught therein must be true.

(Siddhanta) :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: This Sāstra, which speaks of Jiva being born and so on, is not authoritative; for, the birth of Jiva is an impossibility, since then it would follow that deeds go for nothing and that something accrues from what is not done. When some one who has done acts of virtue and sin dies away at the time of *pralaya*, then, (at the time of creation), some other jiva reaps the fruit. Thus something accrues to a jiva from what he has not done; and what the other has done is lost to him. Wherefore the sāstra which speaks of the birth of jivas is no authority.

The Sūtrakara proceeds to point out another incongruity:

Neither can the sense-organ come out of the agent. (II. ii. 40).

It is said that from jiva called Sankarshana, manas called Pradyumna was born. It is impossible that a sense-organ should be born from Jiva, the agent, inasmuch as the sense-organ, which is evolved out of Prakriti or matter, cannot have been evolved out of consciousness.

(Suppose the opponent explains as follows:)

Or, no denial thereof, as they become consciousness etc. (II. ii. 41).

'Consciousness' means jiva. Here jivas etc., are not spoken of as having birth. On the other hand, sankarshana etc., are said to become jivas etc. To become jivas etc., to govern them from within. Accordingly the authority of the sāstra should not be denied. Thus explains the opponent.

(This objection is answered as follows:)

And because of its rejection. (II. ii. 42.)

Though the mention of the birth of Jivas is thus explained away, the system of Pāncharātra cannot be accepted, because it is rejected as teaching that the doctrine of Is'vara which is opposed to the teaching of S'ruti conduces to moksha, and as inculcating the duty of having certain symbols branded on the body. Wherefore, the system of Pāncharātra is inconsistent. And it is specially prohibited in passages such as the following:

"In Pāncharātra or in Buddhism, or in Kālāmukha, be Ye initiated with faith, O dregs of the Brāhmanas."

Being thus rejected, the system of Pāncharātra is no authority.

(Objection:)—In such passages as "Purusha is verily Rudra," Parames'vara Himself is spoken of as Purusha, as Vāsudeva; and by knowing and worshipping Him, one will gradually attain to the goal, to Parames'vara, as the S'ruti says. If the Pāncharātra, which treats of His worship, be no authority, then it would follow that He should not be worshipped.

(Answer):—Though, as contradicting the S'ruti, the Pancharatra is no authority, how does it affect Him? For, it is possible to worship Him in the way pointed out by the S'ruti. Hence no inconsistency whatever.

End of the second Pāda.

### THIRD PA'DA.

#### Adhikarana. I.

All the course of reasoning which has been adopted by the rival systems of thought has been set aside. Again, in the remaining part of the adhyāya, the Sūtrakāra proceeds to explain apparent contradictions in the Siddhanta itself:

A'kās'a is not (born), there being no s'ruti. (II. iii. 1.)

As having no parts, ākās'a may seem to be unborn; and therefore a doubt arises as to whether the birth of ākās'a is reasonable or not.

(Pūrvapaksha): It seems that ākās'a is not born. For, it is not so declared in the S'ruti. To explain: In the Chhândogya-Upanishad, creation of elements commencing with light is declared in the words. "Existent alone. My dear, this at first was. It created light." There no mention is made of the birth of ākās'a.

As to the passage "from Atman, ākās'a was born," occurring in the Taittiriya, it must be understood only in a figurative sense for it is difficult to trace the material cause etc., which could give rise to akasa. Wherefore, akasa is not born any more than Jiva.

As against the foregoing, we hold as follows

But there is (II. iii. 2).

A'kās'a has a birth, because the S'ruti says "Thence, from the Atman, is akasa born;" and so on. But Atman has no birth, because it is denied in the words. "The knower is not born, He does not die." Page 169

no Śruti which denies the birth of ākāśa. Wherefore ākāśa is born.

As to the assertion that the passage speaking of the birth of ākāśa should be understood in a figurative sense, the Sūtrakāra explains the opponent's position as follows :

It is figurative, because of the impossibility and the Śruti.  
(II. III. 3).

Because the Śruti declares that light was first created in the words, "It created light,"\* the passage "Akāśa was born"† should be understood in a figurative sense, in as much as it is impossible that the ākāśa which has no parts can ever be born, and that the śruti declares it to be eternal in the words, "the air and the ether, both these are imperishable."‡

And like word 'Brahma' it is possible for one word to be used both ways.

It is possible for one word 'born' to be used in a figurative sense when predicated of ākāśa, and in its primary meaning when predicated of others, though used in one and the same context, as it is possible when a word is repeated in two different passages in the śruti. The word 'Brahman', for instance is used in a figurative sense when spoken of as Prakṛiti or the material cause, in the following passage :

"Thence, this Brahman (the Prakṛiti) is born as name, form and food."§

And the same word is used in its primary sense when repeated in the following passage.

"By meditation Brahman grows."§

So also here. Wherefore it does not stand to reason to hold that ākāśa is born.

Now follows the refutation of the opponent's position :

The original proposition can be upheld by non-distinctness  
(II. III. 5).

"Whereby what is not heard becomes heard." (||) This proposition that from a knowledge of the one comes a knowledge of the whole can be maintained only when the ākāśa etc. are not distinct from Brahman as being produced out of Brahman. Therefore it cannot be that the word "born" is used in a figurative sense, since it would lead to the giving up of

the original proposition. The passage should be so construed as not to militate against the original proposition.

From texts (II. III. 6).

Light is regarded as the first object of creation simply because ākāśa is not mentioned in the Śruti "It created light." This cannot prevent one from holding that ākāśa has a birth as declared in the passage, "from A'tman ākāśa was born."

The division, however, is meant for the whole creation, as in ordinary speech. (II. III. 7.)

"All this is made up of this A'tman." From these words, we may understand that even ākāśa etc., are to be regarded as created; and therefore we are to conclude that the mention of objects of creation from light onwards points to the whole created existence. In ordinary speech, for example, a man says that he has ten children and then speaks of the birth of a few only of them. So, too, here. Wherefore it is quite reasonable to maintain that ākāśa had a birth.

## Adhikarana. 2

Whereby the air has been explained. (II. III. 9).

In the Sūtra II. iii. 10, the Sūtrakāra is going to speak of light; and accordingly, the air is separately considered here.

A doubt arises as to whether, like ākāśa, the air has a birth or not.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—The air has no birth; for, in the Chhandogya-upanishad, creation commences with light, and no creation of the air is spoken of; and in the Brihadaranyaka-upanishad it is said to have no birth in the words, "The air is a being which never disappears."\* On all accounts, the air is not born.

Siddhānta :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : Though, in the Chhandogya-upanishad, the air is not said to have been born, yet on the principle that we may understand in one place what has been declared in another place on the same subject, the birth of the air which has been spoken of in the Taittiriya-upanishad may be taken to have been declared in the Chhandogya-upanishad as well. The words that "this being never disappears" used with reference to the air are meant as a mere praise, as it occurs in a section treating of the contemplation (upāsana) of the air. Wherefore the air, too, has a birth.

\* Br. Up. 3-6-22.

\* Chha. Up. 6-2.

† Taitt. Up. 2-1.

‡ Bri. Up. 4-3.

§ Mundake. Up. 1-1.

|| Mund. Up. 1-1.

## Āhnikarāṇa 3.

The existent has no birth indeed, because it cannot be explained.  
(II. III. 9).

It has been shown that from Brahman, the Existent, akāśa etc. have been born, as the śruti says : "The Existent alone, my dear, this at first was." Now a doubt arises as to whether Brahman, the Existent, the cause of all, Himself takes His birth from some cause, or not.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*) :—Now, it is maintained that Brahman, too, has a birth, just as the akāśa, which is a cause, has a birth. Only it being declared that "the Existent at first was," it had its birth before all objects of creation. If you ask what its cause is, we say it is the non-existent, because the śruti says "Non-existent this at first was; thence verily was born the Existent." Therefore, Brahman, too, the Existent is born.

*Siddhānta* :—Brahman is not born; for it is emphatically declared that Siva, Brahman, alone was in the following passages :

"The Existent alone, my dear, this at first was, one alone without a second."

"When there was no darkness, no day nor night, no existence and non-existence, Siva alone was, isolated from all." 3

He has therefore no birth, as the existence of all else is thus denied. All else has a birth, since the contrary is impossible.

(*Objection*) :—Just as Brahman is declared to be the cause of all, so the śruti speaks of something else as the cause of Brahman in the following words :

"Non-existent alone this at first was; thence verily the existent was born."

Thus the non-existent is the cause of the existent.

(*Answer*) :—It is wrong to say so, because it is denied in the words "How can the existent be born from the non-existent." If the existent should be born out of the existent, it would involve the fallacious view that a thing is based in itself. Wherefore Brahman alone the Existent has no birth; while all else has a birth, because, otherwise, the proposition that all becomes known when the One has been known becomes untenable.

A. MAHĀDEVYA SASTRI

(To be continued.)

## SERMONS IN STONES.

I. "Salutation to the God, who is manifested in various forms, from earth to the performer of a sacrifice,\* who is an universal soul, to be apprehended only by contemplation of saints and who pervades all.

2. "Salutation to the unborn God.† († Brahma, the creator himself not created, and therefore termed unborn) who makes the worlds production, its continuance, and ultimate destruction, and the recollection of whom serves as a vessel of transport across the ocean of mundane ills.

3. Salutation be to the husband of Lacshmi; to him who reposes on Śeṣha as on a couch, to him who is Vishnu extracting the thorns of the three worlds; to him who appears in every shape; ‡ Vishnu, who reposes on the serpent Ananta or Śeṣha, and who has been incarnate in various shapes, to relieve the world from oppressors.

4. "Salutation be to the blessed foot of Parvati§ (§ Bhavani or Durga slew Mahiṣasura. The legend is well known) which destroyed the demon mahiṣa by whom all had been overcome; and which gives felicity to the world.

श्रीगणेशायनमः.

क्षित्यादिकजकनान्तं मूर्तेर्वैविस्वकात्मने ।

मुनिनाम्भ्यस्त्वगव्याक सक्त्स्वत्त्वत्वेनयः ।

अनायवगदुत्पत्तिं स्तिताप्रकथकारिणे ।

संसारसागरोत्तारं पीतसंस्पृष्टवेनमः ॥

I. "Salutation to Ganesa. I bow to sambhu graced with the beautiful moon crowning his lefty head; himself the pillar, which upholds.

2. The origin of the three worlds\* (Siva or Mahadeva is figured with the moon as a crest. According to mythology, he upholds the creator. This, and the two following stanzas, seem to be the same which are found, but in a different order, at the beginning of the inscriptions on the plates preserved at the temple of Conjeeveram with some difference, however, in the reading and interpretation). May he, whose head is like an elephant's, the son of Hara the cause of uninterrupted supremacy, the giver.

3. Of boons, and the luminary which dispels darkness preserve us. May the auspicious primeval boar (the incarnation of Vishnu as a boar etc. is well known by whom closely embraced, the earth exists, grant us vast prosperity.

\* Siva, manifested in eight material forms: viz. Earth, water, Fire, air, Ether, the sun, the moon, and the person who performs a sacrifice.

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — OR — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA

*A Monthly Journal, Devoted to Religion, Philosophy, Literature, Science &c.*

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## TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪKANTA  
BHĀ'SHYA.

(Continued from page 270, Vol. II.)

### Adhikarana.—4.

Hence (comes) light, &c., indeed. It says. (II. III. 10.)

Here a doubt arises as to whether the air and other objects of creation are born of Brahman directly, or of the causes which immediately precede them.

*Pūrvapakṣa*: Each of them is born of the cause immediately preceding it. To explain From the scriptural passage. "From ākāś'a is the air born,"\* it is seen that the air is born of ākāś'a, not of Brahman directly. So, also, light is born of the air. Accordingly, the S'ruti says "Light is born of the air."

Waters. (II. III. 11.)

"From fire come waters."† in these words the S'ruti says that waters, too, come from fire.

Earth (II. III. 12.)

"From waters comes earth:"\* this S'ruti declares that earth comes from waters alone. Wherefore the elements (*bhūtas*) are not born of Brahman directly.

Because of the section, colour, and other passages (II. III. 13.)

In the Chhândogya also, it is earth that is spoken of as 'food' in the passage "they created food;" for, the section treats of creation of elements (*bhūtas*), and the S'ruti speaks of the colour in the words, "The black colour pertains to the food;"† and there is a distinct S'ruti, "from waters (was born) earth." Wherefore it is earth that is born of waters. On this principle, Brahman is not directly the cause of all, but it is only indirectly that He is their cause.

*Siddhānta* is stated as follows:

He (is the cause) verily because of His characteristic mark, namely,

His act of willing (II. III. 14.)

It is indeed from Brahman alone that all the elements take their birth. Accordingly in the passage beginning with the words "From him, from this Atman verily, was ākāśa born,"‡ it is not declared that the

\* Taitt. Up. 2—1.

† Ibid.

\* Ibid.

† Chhā Up. 6-2.

‡ Taitt. Up. 2—1.



elements beginning with air and ending with earth are each born of that which just precedes it; on the other hand, it is declared that it is from Brahman, the cause, assuming the form of ākāśa etc., that all the succeeding effects such as air are produced, each in its turn. Thus it is Siva alone, the Paramātman, who is the direct generator of all elements; for, as in the passage "It (the Existent) willed 'may I become many'", so in the passages "That light willed 'may I become many'", and "those waters willed 'May I become many'",\* there is His characteristic mark, namely, the act of willing. It is from Brahman assuming the form of Sadāsiva, etc., from the Atman dwelling in sound etc., that air etc. are born, as declared in the following passage:

"Sadāsiva is of the form of sound, I'svara is of the form of touch; Rudra is of the form of light; Janārdana is of the form of rapidity itself; the Four-faced (Brahmā) is of the form of smell: these are the five forms."

. These, verily, Sadāsiva etc., designated as the five Brahman, the Atmans dwelling in the five elements, constitute the body of the Parabrahman. From Parabrahman, verily, embodied in the five Brahman, proceed the creation etc., of the universe. These, Sadāsiva etc., having become the five elements, are born of Paramātman.

(Objection): The passages such as "ākāśa was born," speak of the birth of the elements alone; creation of Sadāsiva etc. is not directly spoken of.

(Answer): It is in fact declared. It has to be understood from other S'rutis. Accordingly, the birth of Brahmā etc. as well as of the sense-organs is declared along with that of the elements in the Atharvas'ikhā as follows:

"One should contemplate I's'āna; all this should be contemplated (as I's'āna). From Him they are born, Brahmā, Vishnu, Rudra and Indra, and all the sense-organs, along with the elements. The Cause of causes is not the contemplator; the Cause is ever to be contemplated, He who is endued with all powers, the Lord of all, S'ambhu who dwells in the midst of ākāśa (of the heart)."

It is thus declared that S'ambhu should be contemplated in the middle of the supreme ākāśa as the cause of causes. Hence the conclusion that the birth of all effects proceeds directly from Brahman assuming the forms of the various causes.

### Adhikarana. 5.

And the order contrary to this (order of creation) can also be explained. (II. III. 15).

Here a doubt arises as to whether the order of creation indicated in the preceding adhikarana is reasonable or not.

Pūrvapakṣa: It is not reasonable. For, in the Mundaka-Upanishad, it is declared that prāna etc., are born before ākāśa etc., in the following words:

"Hence is born prāna, manas, and all the sense-organs; ākāśa, air, light, water, and earth which maintains all."\*

And in the Atharvas'ikhā, a simultaneous birth of Brahmā etc., as well as of elements and sense-organs is declared in the words, "They are born, Brahmā, Vishnu, Rudra and Indra, and all the sense-organs, along with the elements." Wherefore it is held that the foregoing order of creation of ākāśa etc., is not reasonable.

Siddhānta: The foregoing order of creation is quite reasonable. In the words "Manas, indeed, my dear, is made up of food (earth); prāna is made up of water, and speech is made up of light,"† the Upanishad teaches that prāna etc., is made up of elements, so that they are comprehended in the elements and therefore no separate order of creation need be mentioned in their case. Brahmā etc. are said to be born simultaneously with the elements because the former are embodied in the latter and are therefore comprehended in them. Wherefore there is no inconsistency whatever in the foregoing order.

If you say that the intellect and manas come between them in order, because of the intermediate work. (we say) no, because they are effluents. (II. III. 16).

(Objection):—The Mundaka-s'ruti declares, indeed, that the sense-organs and manas are successively born midway between prāna and the elements; and this is pointed to by the attributing the elements—such as "ether, air, light"—to have been created in the same order in which they are said to be created in another s'ruti. Wherefore the Mundaka-s'ruti also points to a definite order of creation.

(Answer): No; for the words "Hence is born." have to be construed like separately along with all entities beginning with water and ending with earth.

\* Chhe-Up. 6—2.

\* Mundaka-Up. 2.1.

† Chhandogya-Up. 6.3.

Therefore, I's'vara alone is the cause of all. Hence the purāṇic saying :

"All things beginning with S'akti and ending with earth are born from the principle of S'iva. The whole is pervaded by that one Being, just as a pot is pervaded by clay."

The existence of a definite order, too, points to the birth of all from the principle of S'iva. Wherefore it is proper to maintain that Brahman is the cause of all.

#### Adhikarana.—6.

The designation of Brahman by words denoting the moving and the unmoving objects is not secondary, because of His having cherished the idea of becoming these objects (II. III. 17.)

In a former section it was shewn that Brahman is spoken of as ākās'a etc. This forms the subject of discussion here.

A doubt arises as to whether the words designating things animate and inanimate, moving and unmoving, is directly applicable to Brahman or not.

(Pūrvaapaksha:)—It cannot be directly applied to Brahman, inasmuch as a word designating one thing cannot be directly applied to another. To explain: in the expressions such as "The sun is the sacrificial post"\* and "the sacrificer is the stone"† the sacrificial post etc., are spoken of as the sun etc., merely because of some resemblance such as similarity in form, but not directly. Here also, in such expressions as "That light willed," Brahman, the sentient Being dwelling in light etc., is merely indicated indirectly by the words 'light' etc., inasmuch as the insentient light cannot possess the power of willing; just as it is in the case of the expression "the sofas (i. e., people occupying the sofas) are crying." Therefore, it is only by a figure of speech that Brahman dwelling in ākās'a is spoken of as ākās'a etc.

Against the foregoing we hold as follows: The designation of Brahman by words applicable to moving and unmoving objects of creation is not secondary; on the other hand, they are directly applicable to Brahman; for, for the differentiation of names and forms of all things, Brahman is said to have cherished the idea of entering into them as their respective A'tman, as their indwelling soul, as the following s'ruti declares:

\* Taitt. Brāhmaṇa 2-1-5.

† Taitt. Brā. 3-3-9.

"Of these beings there are three germs, and three only, the egg-born, the womb-born, and the earth-born. That Divine Being willed, "Ah! I will myself enter these three Divine entities in the form of this jīva, as their A'tman, and differentiate name and form.\*"

The sacrificial post and the like cannot be spoken of as the sun etc., directly, inasmuch as there is no reason for it. In the case of the sofas, the people lying therein cannot be directly spoken of as the sofas because they merely abide in them. But here, inasmuch as Brahman has entered into the universe as its very A'tman, He can be directly spoken of by the word denoting it. A'tman for instance, who has entered into the body of a brāhmin and so on is directly spoken of as a brāhmin and so on; otherwise, the sacraments of upanayana and the like enjoined in the words "one should initiate a brāhmin of eight years"† would apply to the body alone, and it would follow that A'tman is not regenerated by the sacrament; and then the text,—namely, "He who has undergone these forty sacraments and who is endued with the eight attributes of A'tman will attain unity with Brahman;"‡—which holds out a certain result to the A'tman who has passed through the sacraments, would be meaningless. Moreover, such injunctions as "let the brāhmin sacrifice," would be vain. Therefore Brahman is directly designated by the words denoting all moving and unmoving objects of creation into whose bodies He has entered.

#### Adhikarana.—7.

A'tman is not (born), as the S'ruti says, and because of his eternality as declared by them (S'rutis) (II. III. 18).

In a former section, A'kās'a etc., are said to have been born directly from Brahman. Here a doubt arises as to whether, on the same principle, jīva also is born of Brahman or not.

(Pūrvaapaksha:)—Jīva is born of Brahman; for the s'ruti declares emphatically that Brahman alone existed prior to creation and that there was neither the existent nor the non-existent, in the following words:

"When there was no darkness, neither day nor night, neither the existent nor the non-existent, then was S'iva alone"§

\* Chhāndogya-up. 6-3.

† Gautama-Dharmasūtras 8-23.

‡ Ibid.

§ S'vetāsvatara-up. 4-18.

"One alone, secondless."\*

Therefore jīva is born of Brahman at the time of creation. The illustration by sparks of fire is also consonant with the birth of jīvas, the śruti declaring as follows:

"Just as from fire, small sparks proceed in a number, just so from this A'tman, all lives, all worlds, all Devas, all beings, all A'tmans proceed in a number."†

Wherefore as sparks are born of fire, so are A'tmans born of Brahman.

(Siddhānta):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: A'tman is not born; for the śruti declares, "the Intelligent has neither birth nor death;"‡ and he is also declared to be eternal in the following śrutis

"The eternal among the eternals, the sentient among the sentients."§

"Knowing and unknowing are the two, the unborn, the Mighty and the weak."||

The emphatic declaration of the unity of Brahman prior to creation is due to the Jīva as well as the insentient matter having been resolved into Brahman, and to their names and forms having been consequently undifferentiated, but not to the non-existence of jīvas in their essential nature. The Śruti illustrating creation by sparks of fire only points to their manifestation in name and form, but not to their birth; otherwise it would involve the fallacy of one's deeds being destroyed without yielding their fruits, and to other such fallacies. Wherefore jīva is not born of Brahman.

A. MAHĀDEVA S'A'STRY, B. A.

(To be continued.)

## SERMONS. IN STONES.

### I

Adoration be to the auspicious Swayambhu Natha, or Self-existent Protector."

1. "I prostrate myself before Sambhu: whose glorious head is adorned with the resplendent moon; and who

From the Curugode stone Inscription. A. D. 1173.

is the chief prop of the foundation of the three worlds.

\* Chhā-ūp. 6-2.

† Bri-ūp. 4-1-10.

‡ Katha-ūp. 2-18.

§ Katha-ūp. 5-13.

|| S'vetā-ūp. 1-9.

2. "May Swayambhu be propitious: he, who won immortal renown; who grants the wishes of those that earnestly intreat him; who pervades the universe; the Sovereign Lord of Deities; who destroyed the state and arrogance of the demons; who enjoyed the delightful embraces of Parvatī; to whom the learned prostrate themselves: the God above all gods.

3. "I prostrate myself before Sambhu; whose unquenchable blaze consumed the magnificent Tripura; whose food is the nectar dropping from the beams of the moon; who rejoiced in the sacrifice of heads by the Lord of Rācshasas; whose face is adorned with smiles, when he enjoys the embraces of Gauri.

(The foregoing stanzas are Sanscrit: the fourth, which is Praerit is unexplained. Those which follow are in Canara).

5. "By the Consort of Devi whose divinity is adored, the spouse of Parvatī, resplendent with the glorious light of gems, reflected from the crowns of the Lords of Gods and demons whose heads lay prostrate at his feet, with a face ever lighted up with smiles; he is the self-existent deity: May the wealth, and the stations of his saints, be ever granted to us.

6. "The beams of whose sight, like the frequent waving of the lotus flower, flash reflected from the numerous crowns of glorious kings, and of the Lord of Demons; who exists in all things, in all elements, in water, air, earth, ether, and fire, in the sun and moon: the renowned deity manifested in eight forms; Sambhu; may he grant our ardent prayers.

7. "Cheerfully I bow to Sambhu in the lotus of the heart; to him who increases and gives life to all; who holds supreme command over all, who, through his three divine attributes, created and animated fourteen worlds; who ever resides in the minds of his saints.

### II

"Om! Well be it! Auspicious victory and elevation

From the Ujjaini Inscription. A. D. 1144.

"Victorious is He, whose hair is the etherial expanse; who, for creation, supports with his head that lunar line which is a type of the germ in the seed of the universe.

"May the matted locks of love's foe, reddened by the lightning's ring that flashes at the period of the world's end, spread for you nightless prosperity.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS WITH ŚRĪKĀNTA  
BHĀṢHYA.

*(Continued from page*

### Adhikarana. 8.

*Hence is he a knower. (II. iii. 19).*

In the preceding section it has been shewn that Jīva is eternal. Again, a doubt arises as to whether he has knowledge inherent in him or not.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*.)—Jīva is not endued with knowledge inherent in his nature. For, in the 'ruti "The two, the one knowing and other unknowing," it is declared that jīva is ignorant. Therefore quite unknowing is jīva who is mere consciousness (*chaitanyā*) in essence. But in virtue of the power of Māyā, he is endued with the body and sense-organs and is bound by egoism, which makes him regard himself to be a man or a god and perceive such objects as a cloth and a pot to be external to himself. Thus he passes from world to world. As possessing knowledge only in

the state of saṃsāra, jīva is not a knower in his essential nature. Otherwise, how can he attain salvation

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows. This A'tman (jīva) is a knower. Manas is the knowledge constituting his essential attribute, as may be seen from the following s'rutis

"He who feels 'I smell this,' he is A'tmar,.... he sees by manas those objects of desire which are in the region of Brahman and is delighted."\*

"Manas is his divine eye."\*

Wherefore he is a knower in himself.

As to the contention that in virtue of the power of Māyā, he is a knower in the state of saṃsāra, we admit that it is true. By association with material manas, jīva indeed transmigrates as the enjoyer of pleasure and pain, as the knower identifying himself with the body and the egoism, while his inherent power of intelligence is overpowered by the power of Māyā. But, when he shakes off the connection with the triple dirt by knowledge and constant contemplation of Brahman, then he becomes equal to Brahman, and, with his inherent unsurpassed attribute of

\* Chhā-up. 8-12.



knowledge then manifesting itself. he is said to be liberated.

Moreover, 'the śruti,' "Delighting in prāṇa and enjoying by manas,"\* gives us to understand that Brahman has a natural sense-organ in the form of manas by which He perceives His own unsurpassed bliss. From this we may understand that the liberated jīva, as possessed of similar attributes, is endued with manas, an internal sense-organ quite independent of the external organs of sensation, and which is a means of enjoying his own inherent bliss. The śruti which speaks of the two as "the knowing and the unknowing" implies only that jīva is of limited knowledge. It declares that Parames'vara who is not a saṁsārin is omniscient. Wherefore, while in saṁsāra, A'tman is of limited knowledge, and when liberated he is omniscient. Thus A'tman is a knower.

#### Adhikarana. 9.

(As the śruti speaks of his) departure, going and returning, (A'tman is very small). (II. iii. 20)

As the A'tman, who has been proved to be a knower in the preceding section, is declared to have a departure and so on, he must be very small (*anu*) in size. Here a doubt arises as to whether this holds good or not

(*Pūrvapakṣa* :)—He cannot be very small (*anu*). As the Ś'ruti "This A'tman is, indeed, great and unborn"† shows that jīva is all-pervading, and as the śruti "I have surpassed the whole universe"‡ shows that, by pervading all, he has surpassed the whole universe, this A'tman must be all-pervading from all standpoints of view.

(*Siddhānta* :)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows. This A'tman is *anu*, i. e., extremely small, because the śruti speaks of his departure, his going and returning. His departure is thus declared: "With that flash, that A'tman departs."§ "His going is declared in the following words: those who depart from this world go to the moon."|| His return is thus spoken of "from that world they come back to this world for action."¶ If jīva be all-pervading, his departure, going and returning cannot be explained.

It is true that A'tman, though all-pervading, may be said to depart when separated from the body; but going and returning cannot thus be explained as the sūtrakāra says

And (because) the last two (can be accomplished) by himself: (II. iii. 21.)

A'tman must be extremely small, inasmuch as the last two, namely, going and returning, can be accomplished only by himself. As to the ś'ruti "Atman is great and unborn," it occurs in a section treating of I's'vara, and does not therefore refer to jīva. As to his surpassing the whole universe by his all-pervasiveness, it has to be explained as referring to the liberated jīva whose s'akti or intelligence coming into manifestation on the removal of the veil of dirt, sends out its rays everywhere. Therefore Atman is quite small.

Sūtrakāra raises an objection and answers:

(If you say that He is) not small because of the ś'ruti teaching the contrary, (we say) no, because it is a different section. (II. iii. 22.)

(*Objection.* :)—The ś'ruti "That Atman is indeed great and unborn" shows that jīva is not small.

(*Answer:* :)—No; because this ś'ruti occurs in a section treating of Parames'vara, commencing thus:

"He who knows and contemplates A'tman, etc."\*

And because of the very word and measure (III. iii. 23.)

He is spoken of as *anu*, as extremely small, in the following ś'ruti:

"This extremely small A'tman can be known by the mind he in whom prāṇa has entered five-fold."†

And his measure is also given in the following śruti:

"The lower one is indeed known to be in size like the point of the iron thong at the end of a whip."‡

Thus A'tman is extremely small. *Measuring* consists in citing a thing which is like an atom and declaring that A'tman is of that size.

If jīva be very small, whence then is the experience of a feeling all over the body? The Sūtrakāra says:

There is no incongruity as in the case of sandal (II. iii. 24.)

Just as a drop of sandal ointment, though remaining in one place, yet produces pleasure extending over the whole body, so too, here there is nothing incongruous.

Again, the sūtrakāra raises an objection and answers:

\* Bri-Up.—6-4-13.

† Mundaka-Up 3-1-9.

‡ Sv'etā-Up. 5-8.

\* Taitt-up. 1-6

† Bri-Up. 6-4.

‡ Taitt-Up. 3-20.

§ Bri-Up. 6-4.

|| Kaushitaki-Upanishad, 1-2.

¶ Bri-Up. 5-4.

If you say (that the two cases are not similar) because there is a special abode (in the case of sandal.) (we say) no, because we admit it (in the case of j'iva): indeed j'iva is said to abide in the heart.

(II. iii. 25)

(*Objection*):—The sandal-ointment abides in a special abode.

(*Answer*):—This objection cannot apply to us: for we admit that A'tman also has a special abode, as the s'ruti says

"In the heart, indeed, is this A'tman."\*

"He who is within the heart, in the prāṇas, full of consciousness, that light which pervades all."†

So (i.e., by the illustration of sandal-ointment) do some Vedāntins explain (how a small thing can produce a feeling extending all over the body.)

The Sūtrakāra states his own view as follows

Or by his attribute as in the case of light. (II. iii. 26)

A'tman experiences—by pervading the whole body—by means of intelligence which constitutes his inherent quality; just as a gem illumines an adjacent object, by way of pervading it by means of its own light. Therefore, there is no incongruity whatever.

As to the contention that intelligence and A'tman are not distinct, the sūtrakāra says

There is a distinction as in case of odour—so, indeed, the s'ruti declares. (II. iii. 27).

Just as we say that earth is that which has odour so when we say I know we perceive intelligence to be an attribute of A'tman. Accordingly there is a distinction between intelligence and A'tman. The s'ruti declares the distinction in the following words

"This person does know."

Because of its being mentioned separately. (II. iii. 28)

Intelligence is mentioned separately from A'tman in the following s'ruti

"There is no failure of the intelligence of the intelligent one."‡

Thus it has been shewn that A'tman has the attribute of intelligence which is eternal. Then, how is it that, while A'tman has intelligence for his attribute, he is spoken of as intelligence itself? The sūtrakāra answers as follows:

Indeed because that is his chief attribute, he is given that designation, like the Wise. (II. iii. 29).

Because A'tman's chief attribute is intelligence, the designation of intelligence is given to him—not be-

cause He is mere intelligence itself,—just as the Wise (Prajña, Brahman) is spoken of as "Truth, Intelligence," though He is one possessed of intelligence. Therefore there is nothing wrong in designating A'tman as mere intelligence.

Again he explains as follows:

Because it is co-extensive with A'tman, there is nothing wrong, as we do use it (elsewhere). (II. iii. 30)

As intelligence inheres in the nature of A'tman, it is not wrong to designate him by it. We do find an individual cow designated as cow in virtue of the attribute of cow-ness, merely because that attribute inheres in her. Accordingly inasmuch as the attribute of intelligence inheres in A'tman, he is designated as intelligence.

How can intelligence which does not exist in sleep (sushupti) and other states, be said to be co-extensive with A'tman? The Sūtrakāra says:

As in the case of virility, it may exist (in sushupti) and come into manifestation (thereafter). (II. iii. 31).

Intelligence does inhere in the essential nature of A'tman, because, while existing unmanifested in sushupti and the like, intelligence springs into manifestation in jāgrat or the waking state and so on; just as the seventh principle, (namely, the semen), which constitutes the characteristic ingredient of a human body of the male sex, though present even in childhood manifests itself only in youth. Wherefore, it is not wrong to maintain that intelligence is intimately associated with A'tman's nature.

The sūtrakāra now speaks of the purpose served by maintaining that A'tman is a knower and is infinitely small:

Otherwise, there would be an eternal perception and non-perception, or either of them exclusively. (II. iii. 32).

Otherwise, i.e., if A'tman were omnipresent and mere consciousness, then because he is eternal and subject to no limitation, there would be a constant perception, of him; and A'tman being ever in the same condition his non-perception, too, must be constant. The same objection applies to the theory that A'tman is all-pervading and that his intelligence is only accidental for, all A'tmans being alike present everywhere, the causes of perception, such as conjunction with manas, are common to all. If the cause of perception be *adrishta*, something unseen (such as past karma), even this cause is common to all, and there is nothing which goes to restrict it. Or, perception and non-perception being quite opposed of 241

\* Prae-a up. 2.6.

† Bri-up. 6.3.7

‡ Bri-up—3.3.30.

each other, the causes (referred to) may either give rise to perception exclusively, or to non-perception exclusively. Then, there would be either the one or the other exclusively.

Wherefore, what was declared above alone holds good.

### Adhikarana. 10.

(Atman is the) doer: as the s'āstra must have a purpose.  
(II. iii. 33).

It has been shown that A'tman is a knower and is infinitesimally small. A doubt arises as to whether or not he is a doer.

(Pārcapaksha):—A'tman, who is immutable, cannot be a doer. Properly speaking, either the buddhi (intellect) or prakṛiti (the root of all matter, must be the doer. Atman appears to be the doer by falsely assuming to himself the agency of the other. Therefore, it is not right to say that Atman is the doer.

(Siddhanta):—A'tman no doubt the doer; for the s'āstra must have a purpose. Otherwise the s'āstra which enjoins and prohibits would serve no purpose.

And because of the declaration of his taking and wandering.  
(II. iii. 34).

He is the doer, undoubtedly for it is declared that he takes and wanders, as in the following s'ruti

"Thus, verily, does he take these prāṇas and wanders as he likes in the body."\*

As to the contention that agency pertains to the buddhi and the Prakṛiti, the sūtrakāra argues against the agency of the buddhi in the following words:

And because of its declaration in reference to the ritual. If not, there would be a difference in declaration. (II. iii. 35).

"Consciousness achieves sacrifice";† in such words as these, Atman is spoken of as the agent, and therefore he is certainly the doer.

(Objection):—The word 'consciousness' denotes the buddhi, not the A'tman.

(Answer):—No. If so, the wording would be different, in the form "with the consciousness." Elsewhere when the buddhi has to be spoken of, we find the word 'consciousness' used in the instrumental case, as in the s'ruti "Having taken, with the consciousness, the consciousness of these prāṇas (senses)."<sup>‡</sup> Hence

the conclusion that buddhi, being an instrument, cannot be an agent.

The sūtrakāra objects to the view that Prakṛiti is the agent

As in perception, there could be no restrictive. (II. iii. 37.)

If Prakṛiti were the agent, then, as it is common to all, there would be nothing to restrict the result of an act to an individual; any more than in the case of perception already discussed.

And because of a reversal of the potentiality (II. iii. 38)

If Prakṛiti were the agent, then, inasmuch as the agent of an act should also be the enjoyer of its fruits, Prakṛiti would itself be the enjoyer. Thus, then, A'tman would cease to be the enjoyer.

And because of the absence of the contemplation. (II. iii. 39).

Moreover, if Prakṛiti were itself the agent, there would be no room for the contemplation that "I am distinct from Prakṛiti." Wherefore, A'tman is the agent

And, like a carpenter, he (proceeds) in both ways. (II. iii. 39).

If A'tman is the agent, he acts when he wills to act and he ceases to act when he does not will to act; and thus there is here a defined order of procedure, as in the case of a carpenter's procedure in his own calling.

(Objection):—Possibly, the will to act also pertains to buddhi; and thus here alike, the definite procedure can be explained.

(Answer):—No; for, will is the attribute of a sentient being. Wherefore, it may be concluded that A'tman is the agent, but not the buddhi nor Prakṛiti.

### Adhikarana. 11.

From the Supreme, indeed, because of the declaration. (II. iii. 40.)

It has been shown that Atman is the knower and the agent. Now, a doubt arises as to whether this agency abides in himself or is dependent on the I's'vara.

(Pārcapaksha):—It abides in himself. Otherwise, as impelling jīva to good and evil acts, I's'vara would be guilty of partiality and so on. Moreover, if the activity of jīva be dependent on I's'vara, then, jīva would no longer be the agent; and thus all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions would be vain. Wherefore Jīva's activity is dependent on jīva himself.

(Siddhanta):—Jīva's agency is dependent on Parames'vara, upon himself, because of the s'ruti, "He who being within, controls A'tman."<sup>‡</sup>

A. MAHA'DEVA SASTRY, B. A.

(To be Continued.)

\* Br.-Up. 4.1.18.

† Taittī-Up. 2-6.

‡ Brī-Up. 4.1.17.

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH

— OR —

## SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA.

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### TRANSLATIONS.

#### THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪKANTA BHA'SHYA.

(To be continued from page 29.)

Now, as to the contention that I's'vara, as impelling jīva to action, would be guilty of partiality and the like, and that all scriptural injunctions and prohibitions addressed to him would be vain, the sūtrakāra says :

But with a view to the efforts made (by jīva), in order that the injunctions and prohibitions may not be purposeless, and so on  
(II. III. 41.)

Jīva, of his own accord, makes an effort towards activity or cessation of activity, in virtue of his karma having become ripe. With reference to this effort made by Jīva which leads to activity or cessation from activity, the Supreme Being impels jīva to action by giving His consent, as may be seen from injunctions and prohibitions having a purpose to serve and from the grace and punishment meted out by him. Just as a boy who, with the help of a stronger person, manages to convey a very heavy beam of wood, is

still amenable to injunctions and prohibitions so far as his own efforts is concerned, so, though jīva engages in activity with the help of the Paramesvara, he is himself amenable to injunctions and prohibitions. Accordingly, as acting solely with reference to the efforts made by jīva, I's'vara, who impels jīva to acts, is not guilty of partiality; and inasmuch as, even in the case of jīva, there exists an activity for which he has to rely on himself, it cannot be, we may conclude, that injunctions and prohibitions are purposeless.

#### Adhikarana. 12.

(Jīva is) an integral part (of Brahman), because of the declaration of a distinction. And it is even otherwise; that (Brahman) is one with fishermen and so on, some do declare.  
(II. III. 42).

It has been shown in the foregoing sections that Jīva is eternal, intelligent, extremely small; that he is an agent engaging in action with the help of Paramesvara. Here, a doubt arises as to whether jīva is Paramesvara Himself, or His integral part.

(Pūrvapakṣa :)—Jīva is Paramesvara Himself. Paramesvara Himself is manifested in the form of



jīva on account of the multifarious upādhis or media of manifestation, just as the one ākāśa manifests itself in various forms and is limited in space owing to the upādhis such as a pot. Accordingly the s'ruti says "This A'tman is Brahman."\* Therefore, I's'vara Himself has become jīva owing to ajñāna or nescience.

*Siddhānta* :—The jīvātman is indeed an *ams'a* of Parames'vara, an integral part of His body, as the s'ruti declares a distinction between them in the following passages :

"Entering into them in the form of this jīva, I shall differentiate name and form."†

"He who dwelling in the A'tman . . ."‡

"Thinking of the A'tman and the Impeller as separate . . ."§

"Know then Prakṛiti is Māyā, and the Mahes'vara the possessor of Māyā. This whole world is filled with what constitutes a member of His."||

As to the contention that Brahman Himself is jīva because of the s'ruti teaching "This A'tman is Brahman," the sūtrakāra says as follows: The oneness has to be explained otherwise. From such passages as "That thou art," "this A'tman is Brahman," we are to understand that jīva and Brahman are a unity because one pervades the other. Moreover, some clearly declare a unity of this sort in the following words. "The fishermen are Brahman, the servants are Brahman, these rogues are Brahman." Thus though jīva is an integral part of Brahman, he may be spoken of as Brahman, as pervaded by the latter, just as a faggot or the like, pervaded by fire, is spoken of as fire itself. Still, fire and faggot are not, indeed, one and the same. Therefore an integral of Brahman in himself, jīva attains to the form of Brahman. If we assume that Brahman Himself becomes jīva by ajñāna or nescience, it is impossible to avoid contradicting many a passage in the s'ruti.

Because of the mantra. (II. iii. 43.)

"A foot Thereof are all beings: this Mantra gives us to understand that jīva is only a part (*ams'a*) of Brahman. The s'ruti,—namely,

\* Bri. Up. 4-5-19.

† Chhā. Up. 8-3-2.

‡ Bri. Up. 5-7-22.

§ Svetāsvatara-Upanishad 1-6.

|| Ibid. 4-10.

¶ Taiitt. Aranyaka. 3-12.

"Know then Prakṛiti is Māyā, and Mahes'vara the possessor of Māyā. This whole world is filled with what constitutes a member of His."—

declares that Māyā is the prakṛiti or material cause, that Mahes'vara is endued with that Māyā, and that the whole universe constitutes His member. Wherefore, Parusha or Jīva is only a small portion of Parames'vara who is endued with Māyā.

It is even declared in the smṛiti. (II. iii. 44.)

"A'tman is the eighth form of S'iva, the Paramātman, which penetrates other forms; the universe, therefore, is S'iva Himself."

From this passage in the smṛiti, A'tman is only one portion of S'iva's body.

But as in the case of lustre etc., not thus is the Supreme.

(II. iii. 45.)

Though jīva is a portion of Brahman, yet the Parames'vara is not of the same nature and form as jīva. On the other hand, He is indeed endued with omniscience etc.—How?—Like lustre etc. Just as the lustre of gems etc. which possess it as their attribute constitutes a part thereof an integral part of the composite whole, so, as embodied in Jīva, Brahman has jīva as an attribute of His, and the jīva forms a portion of Brahman.—The word "etc." (in the phrase "lustre etc." is intended to bring under the same category *jāti* (genus) and *guna* (quality) which always constitute attributes of substances.—Though attributes, as integral parts of the substances, constitute part and parcel of those substances, yet it involves no contradiction to maintain that they are distinct things, as shown by such passages of the s'ruti as the following :

"He who abides in A'tman."

And so the smṛiti also declares. (II. iii. 46.)

"The body of the God of Gods is this universe, moving and unmoving. This thing the souls (*pas'us*) know not, owing to the strong bond (*pās'a*). And so on the smṛiti says. Wherefore, jīva is only a portion (*ams'a*) of Brahman. Brahman being the possessor of the portion, there is an essential distinction between them.

Permission and prohibition is due to connection with the body, as in the case of light etc. (II. iii. 47.)

(Objection:)—"Though all jīvas are alike portions of Brahman, how is it that permission to study the vedas etc. is accorded to some, while it is prohibited in the case of others?"

(Answer) This may be explained as due to the connection with the brāhman body and so on, just as a distinction is made in the case of fire according as it is found in the house of a pious man or in the cremation ground.

As limited in space, they are all alike. (II. iii. 48.)

As different in the different bodies, as limited here and there in their atomic size, and thus not pervading everywhere, knowledge, pleasure and the like are of one sort in the case of those who identify themselves with the bodies feeling thus 'I am stout' 'I am lean'; 'I am happy'; 'I am miserable'; 'I am a brāhmin'; 'I am a kṣatriya.'—What is this tantamount to saying?—Because those who identify themselves with the body are alike limited in extent, their limited knowledge, pleasure etc., which are peculiar to saṃsāra, are of one and the same sort and do not get intermixed. From this it follows that in the case of those liberated souls who cease to identify themselves with the body, and who, by their all-pervasive nature, have risen to universal egoism, the saṃsāric knowledge etc., gives place to the inherent knowledge etc., which are eternal and infinite.

As to the contention that Brahman Himself becomes associated with ajñāna and upādhi, the sūtrakāra replies that, in that case, there would be no definite order of things:

And it is a mere semblance. (II. iii. 49.)

The arguments adduced on behalf of both the theories,—namely that Brahman Himself becomes jīva when bound by an upādhi, be it real or unreal,—are only semblances of reasoning.

To explain:

Because it cannot be defined by adrishta. (II. iii. 50.)

If A'tmans or jīvas be the creatures of real or unreal upādhis, then, since ajñāna and upādhi pertain to Brahman Himself, the relative positions (of Brahman and jīva, or of jīvas among themselves) cannot be defined even by adrishta (the unseen effect of actions) generated by them.

Moreover,

And so, too, in the case of purposes etc. (II. iii. 51.)

So, too, even as regards purposes which are the causes of adrishta (the unseen effects of actions,) the definite relations cannot be explained.

(If it be said that it is due to (difference in space) (we reply) no, because of comprehensiveness. (II. iii. 52.)

(Objection): The distinction is due to the distinction in the parts of Brahman associated with different upādhis.

(Answer):—No; for, when the upādhis are gone, all parts are comprehended in Brahman. Wherefore, according to either of the theories that Brahman is jīva when limited by upādhi, be it real or unreal, the distinction cannot be explained. Wherefore it is quite reasonable to maintain that jīva is a part of Brahman and that jīva is of the nature of an attribute of Brahman.

## THE FOURTH PĀDA.

### Ahikarana—1.

So, the prāṇas. (II. iv. 1.)

It has been shewn before that bhūtas or elements of matter are born of Brahman, and that jīva is eternal. Now we have to enquire whether the sense-organs (indriyas) have a birth like the elements of matter, or they are eternal like jīvas. Just as, being eternal, the jīva is not born, so also are the sense-organs not born; for, there is the S'ruti which says that they also, like the jīva, are eternal. Accordingly, the S'ruti declares the continuance of sense-organs (prāṇas) at the time of pralaya or cosmic dissolution, in the following passages:

"Non-existent this at first was. They asked what that non-existent was. *Rishis* indeed were the non-existent at first. Then they asked who are those *Rishis*? Prāṇas are verily the *Rishis*.""\*

Wherefore the sense-organs (prāṇas) are not born of Brahman.

As against the foregoing we hold as follows:

It is used in a secondary sense, because of an impossibility; and because the s'ruti declares that (to have existed) first. (II. iv. 2.)

The sense-organs did not exist prior to creation. On the other hand, it is Parames'vara that then existed, as the s'ruti declares "Existent alone, My dear, this at first was"† The words *rishi* and the word *prāṇa* apply only to Parames'vara. As He cannot be many, the use of the plural is only secondary. Hence the existence of Brahman alone prior to creation, not of the sense-organs.

The Sūtrakāra adduces another argument:

Speech being preceded by it. (II. iv. 3.)

All others receive their names and forms only after Parames'vara's creation. The word *prāṇa* used with reference to the time (prior to creation) cannot denote

\*Sā'atāpathabrāhmaṇa. 6-1-1.

† Chhā. Up. 6-2-1.

the sense-organs. Therefore, Brahman alone is the prior.

### Adhikarana. 2.

Because seven are taught and specifically enumerated.  
(II. IV. 4).

Now, a doubt arises as to how many in number are the sense-organs which have been shewn before to have been born of Brahman.

*Pūrvapakṣa*:—Seven.—Why?—Because seven only are enumerated in the following passage:

“When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state,”

“And also because the number seven is specifically mentioned in the following passage

“Seven prāṇas are born of Him.”

As against the foregoing, the sūtrakāra says:

But there are hands etc., when (jīva) abides (in the body);  
wherefore it is not so. (II. IV. 5).

The sense-organs are not seven only. Hands etc., too, are sense-organs, inasmuch as they are alike instruments of the jīva so long as he abides in the body. The sense-organs are, on the other hand, eleven in number, because of the s’ruti and the smṛiti.

“These ten are the prāṇas (sense-organs) in the person; and manas (ānman) is the eleventh.”†

“The sense-organs, ten and one.”‡

Buddhi etc. are not separate senses; but they are only different functions of manas. As to the speaking of the steadiness of seven sense-organs and their specific enumeration as seven it is due to their importance. Wherefore, sense-organs are not seven, but they are eleven in number.

### Adhikarana. 3.

And (they are) small. (II. iv. 6).

A doubt arising as to whether those senses are all-pervading or very small, it may at first be thought that they are all-pervading, because of the eye and other sense-organs having the power of perceiving

things at a distance. In reply we say that they are very small; for, the s’ruti says, “The prāṇa departing, all prāṇas (sense-organs) depart after it.”\* They are not all-pervading. If they were all-pervading their departure is not possible. The eye and other sense-organs have the power of perceiving things at a distance, not because they are all-pervading, but because they are luminous and very small and therefore pass very quickly. Wherefore the sense-organs are very small.

### Adhikarana. 4.

And the chief. (II. iv. 7).

Here a doubt arises as to whether the vital air, with its five fold function—spoken of in the s’ruti as the chief of all prāṇas or vital activities in the words “The prāṇa departing, all prāṇas depart after it.”—is born of Brahman or not.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—The vital air is not born, because of the activity of the vital breath being declared to have existed, even prior to creation, in the words “It breathed windless.”\*

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Even the prāṇa-vāyu, the vital air, is born. The word ‘breathed’ does not refer to the activity of vital air, inasmuch as the word ‘windless’ points to its absence. It denotes only the existence of Brahman. Wherefore the prāṇa or vital air cannot be beginningless,

(*Objection*):—Granted that this vital air has a birth; but it is not distinct from the activities of sense-organs, as said in another s’ruti in the words “A general function of the sense-organs are the five vital airs such as prāṇa or upward breath;”† or, it is not distinct from the material air as declared in the s’ruti “This vitality is the air”‡

(*Answer*):—As against the foregoing, the Sūtrakāra says:

A. MAHADEVA SASTRI, B. A. F. T. S.,

(To be continued).

\* Karm. Up. 2-6-10.

† Mahānārāyaṇa. Up. 12.

‡ Bri. Up. 5-9-1.

§ Bhagavad-gītā 13-5.

\* Bri. Up. 6-4-2.

† Taitt. Brāhmana. 2-8-9.

‡ Sāṅkhya-kārikā. 23.

§ Bri. Up. 5-1-5

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## TRANSLATIONS.

### THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪKANTHA BHĀ'SHYA.

(To be continued from page 29.)

It is neither the air nor the activity, because of its separate mention. (II. iv. 8.)

This vitality with its fivefold function is not the air; nor is it the general function of the sense-organs, as it is separately mentioned in the S'ruti

"Hence is prāna born, manas and all sense-organs, ākās'a, air, light, waters, the earth which maintains the whole universe."\*

Wherefore prāna is quite distinct from the air and from the function of the senses.

Though distinct from the air, still it does not constitute a distinct element of matter by itself, as the Sūtrakāra says :

Like the eye etc., indeed, because of its being mentioned along with them, and so on. (II. iv. 9).

Though distinct from the air, it is not a distinct element of matter like fire etc. On the other hand,

the air itself, acquires the power of keeping up the body, because it is rooted in the Parames'vara, as the following passages shew :

"Himself the supporter, being supported by Parames'vara he supports, the one Deva who dwells in many a form."

"Thou art one, having entered many."\*

"Thou art the knot of the vitalities, O Rudra. Enter not as destroyer."†

Mereover, prāna is the jīva's instrument like the eye and other organs, inasmuch as in the dialogues among prānas or vital organs, prāna or the vital breath is mentioned along with the eye, etc., as subserving the jīva's purposes in the same way as the sense-organs do, as being the chief of them all, and so on.

And there can be no objection on the ground of its inactivity. According'y, indeed, the s'ruti says there is no objection. (II. iv. 10).

No objection can be raised against the foregoing on the ground that prāna does no service to jīva. For, the s'ruti itself declares that the vital breath is the cause of the body and the sense-organs not being

\* Taitt. Aranyaka 3.14.

† Mahānārāyaṇa-Upanishad. 35.

\* Mundaka-Up. 2.1.3.



unloosed. When Prajāpati said (in the dialogue among prāṇas, "Whosoever departing, this body looks very wretched, he is the chief among you,"\* the sense-organs such as speech departed one by one at a time; but, on each occasion, the body and the other sense-organs did remain in their places. When, however, prāṇa or vital body left the body, the body and the sense-organs are said to have been unloosed.

It is declared to be of fivefold function, like *manas*. (II. iv. 11.)

The one prāṇa or vital breath is designated differently as prāṇa or upward breath, as apāṇa or downward breath, and so on, after its own five different functions, just as the one *manas* is spoken of as desire (*kāma*) etc. Wherefore, it has to be concluded that the one prāṇa, which is distinct both from the element of matter called air and from the function of the sense-organs, subserves jīva's purposes.

#### Adhikarana. 5.

And it is minute. (II. iv. 12).

A doubt arises as to whether this prāṇa in its fivefold function is minute like the senses, or all-pervading.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—It is not minute. Prāṇa is all-pervading, being the support of all, as the s'ruti says:

"He is equal to a grub, equal to a gnat, equal to an elephant, equal to these three worlds, nay equal to this universe."†

"In prāṇa all is established."‡

"All this, verily, is enveloped by prāṇa."

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing view, we hold as follows: The vital air is minute, because of its passage declared in the S'ruti "Prāṇa departing."§ The prāṇa of the plane of cosmic intelligences, known as the *Hiranyagarbha*,—the prāṇa in the aggregate,—is all-pervading while the prāṇa of the individual organism is not. Thus there is no self-contradiction. Wherefore, minute is the prāṇa in its fivefold function.

#### Adhikarana 6.

The dominion over the eye, etc., is verily dependent on *Parames'vara*, because of its being so declared; as also of the living soul, on account of the word. (II. iv. 13.)

The s'ruti declares that the sun, etc., are the lords of sight etc., in the following words:

"The sun became sight and entered the eyes."||

\* Chhā. Up. 5-1-7.

† Bri. Up. 3-3-22.

‡ Pra. Up. 2-6.

§ Bri. Up. 6-4-2.

|| Aita-Up. 1-2-3.

Jīva, too, is said to be the lord of the eye, etc., with the object of perceiving colour etc., in the following words:

"Thus does that soul take these various senses and moves about, according to his pleasure, within his own body."\*

Now a doubt arises as to whether the lordship of the sun etc., as well as of jīva, over the sense-organs is dependent on *Parames'vara*, or quite independent.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—In the passages such as "The sun became sight and entered the eyes," the sun etc. are said to be independent, and their dominion is therefore not dependent on *Parames'vara*.

(*Siddhānta*):—The dominion of the sun etc., over the sense-organs etc., is dependent on *Parames'vara*. Why? For, the s'ruti declares as follows:

"Who, dwelling within, controls the sun.\*"

"Who, dwelling within, controls the A'tman;"\* and all activities proceed from the will of *Parames'vara*. Wherefore, the dominion of Jīva and of the sun etc., over sense-organs etc., is quite dependent on *Parames'vara*.

And because of its eternality. (II. iv. 14.)

*Parames'vara*'s control over everything is eternal. For this reason also is their dominion quite dependent on *Parames'vara*'s will.

#### Adhikarana 7.

They are the senses, because of the designation being applied to other than the chief. (II. iv. 15.)

Now, a doubt arises as to whether speech and other sense-organs mentioned before are distinct from the functions of prāṇa or not.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—They are the functions of the chief prāṇa or vital breath, because of their being declared to be forms of prāṇa in the words "of him alone did all become the form;"† and because, at death when speech etc., are quiescent, it is generally held that life is gone. Wherefore the senses are not distinct from prāṇa or vital breath.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: The senses are distinct from the chief prāṇa or vital breath; for, in the words "the senses, ten and one,"‡ it is sight and others that are designated as the senses, thus shewing that those vital activities (prāṇas) which are distinct from the chief prāṇa are the senses.

Because of their separate mention and of a distinction in their nature. (II. iv. 16.)

"Hence is born prāṇa, *manas* and all senses:§ in these words the s'ruti speaks of the birth of prāṇa and

\* Bri. Up. 4-1-18.

† Bri. Up. 3-5-21.

‡ Bha. Gītā. 13-5.

§ Munda. Up. 2-1-3.

the senses separately. We also see a distinction in their nature, which consists in the functions of *prāṇa* not ceasing during the quiescence of the senses. Wherefore, too, the senses are distinct from the functions of *prāṇa*.

### Adhikarana 8.

Creation of names and forms verily belongs to Him who triples, because it is so taught. (II. iv. 17.)

In a former section, it has been said that the *A'kās'a* and other elements of matter with their presiding deities such as *Sada'siva*, are born of *Parames'vara*. A doubt arises as to whether, when they thus born, the subsequent creation of names and forms of *Devas* etc., proceeds from Him alone, the First Cause, or from some one else.

(*Pārapaksha*):—From the passage "That light willed, may I be born as many, and It created waters," we learn that *Rudra*, the Intelligence identifying Himself with light, creates waters and casts therein His own seed that in them arises *Vishnu* endued with *sattra*. *Vishnu* is called *Nārāyana* because the principle of water which is born of *Rudra* is His abode, as the *s'ruti* says "Waters are born of *Nara*, and *Nara* is *Rudra*." *Nārāyana*, the Intelligence identifying himself with the water, creates earth spoken of as food in the *s'ruti* "The waters willed and they created food."\* There, in the egg made up of the earth-principle, arises *Hiranyagarbha*. Accordingly the *s'ruti* says: "The Golden Egg in the midst of the ocean was first born of *Rudra's* seed. Therein *Vishnu* was born as *Brahmā*, with his wisdom manifest"

*Mann* says:

"He created the waters alone first and placed his seed in them. That seed became a golden egg, in brilliancy equal to the sun in that egg he himself was born as *brahmā*, the progenitor of the whole world. The waters are called *Nara*; as they were his first residence (*ayana*), he then is named *Nārāyana*. *Nārāyana* transcends *Avyakta*; from *Avyakta* is the birth of the egg; within the egg are these worlds, as well as the earth with its seven islands."†

*Purāna*, too, says,

"The form of the *Deva* called *Rudra* becomes a tangible body. By Him identifying Himself with the body was the seed cast in water. That seed became an egg, in brilliancy equal to the sun. *Vishnu* entered into it directly, by My great power, indeed.

Again, by My command, he obtained the designation of *Nārāyana*. In this connection they quote the following verse regarding *Nārāyana*: 'Water, it should be known, is the subtle essence, and water is called *Nāra* as born of *Nara*. Thence came *Brahmā*. *Nara* is declared to be *S'iva* Himself. *Nāra* is said to be His residence and therefore He is called *Nārāyana*. *Brahmā* also, O best of men, entered the body of odour.

Thus, in accordance with the *s'ruti* "by *Veda* *Prajāpati* developed the forms, manifested and unmanifested,"\* either the *Hiranyagarbha* dwelling within the egg must have created the names and forms of *Devas* etc., dwelling within the egg, or their creator may be *Nārāyana*, as declared in the *s'ruti*, "the egg was born of waters and of the essence of earth,"† but the *Parames'vara* who is beyond the *Brahmāṇḍa* cannot be their creator.

(*Siddhānta*):—The order of creation explained above is not sound. On the other hand, it is *Brahman*, designated the Existent, that is the cause of the five elements of matter, as the following passage shews:

The Existent alone, my dear, this at first was, one alone without a second... It willed, may I become many, and created light."‡

It was already shewn that light was not the first thing created. Accordingly, *Brahman* assuming the form of elements from *A'kāśa* down to earth under the designations of *Sada'siva* and so on, every preceding element is the cause of that which immediately succeeds it, as may be learned from the *s'ruti* "It willed... the light willed... the water willed

From the passage "I shall enter these three elements in the form of this *Jiva* and differentiate name and form; I shall make each one of them threefold,"§ we learn that it is *Parames'vara* Himself—who triples the elements—that, assuming the form of the air etc., enters the three elements of light, water and earth through the *jīvas*, viz. *Brahmā*, *Vishnu*, and *Rudra*, and creates name and form. Therefore it is reasonable to hold that He alone, who triples the elements and who ensouls the Four-faced *Brahmā* and others, creates all names and forms. The tripling of elements is not possible for the four-faced *Brahmā* alone, inasmuch as the Egg is born of the tripled elements of light, water and earth. After this comes the

\* *Taitt.-Bra.* 2-6-2.

† *Taitt. A'ranyaka.* 3-13.

‡ *Chhā. Up.* 6-2.

§ *Chhā. Up.* 6-3.

\* *Chhā. Up.* 6-2-3.

† *Op. Cit.* 1-8...11.

four-faced Brahmā's creation, as said in the following s'ruti :

"The golden egg in the midst of the ocean was first born of Rudra's seed. There Vishnu was born as Brahmā, with wisdom manifest."

(Objection :)—It is possible that the four-faced Brahmā himself is the author of the tripling of elements. The process of tripling that takes place among jīvas created by the four-faced Brahmā subsequent to the creation of the egg is taught in the s'ruti as follows

"Do thou, my dear, learn from me how indeed these three elements, entering the creatures, become each threefold. The food eaten is resolved into three. The grossest ingredient of it becomes the dung, the middling one becomes flesh, the subtlest becomes manas."\*

(Answer): The Sūtrakāra refutes the objection as follows :

Flesh etc., is earthen; and as to the other two, according to the word. (II. iv. 18)

In the passage "the food eaten is resolved into three," something other than the tripling process previously declared,—namely, the process of transformation that takes place in the food etc., eaten by persons dwelling in the egg—has been described; but not the tripling process. Otherwise, flesh and manas, being subtler than the dung, would have been respectively composed of water and light. So that, the commencement of the tripling process of the earth alone as started in the words "The food eaten is resolved into three," would be inconsistent with the declaration that manas is made up of earth as stated in the passage "made up of food, verily, is manas, my dear." Similarly the threefold division of the other two, viz., water and light, would involve a contradiction. Therefore the sūtrakāra says, "Flesh etc., are earthen; and as to the other two, according to the word." Like the dung, flesh and manas also are earthen; so, like the urine, blood and vitality are watery; and so too, like the bone, marrow and speech are made up of light.

(Objection):—If the elements have been tripled already, then everything must be made up of the three elements. How then, can we speak of food (earth), water, light?

(Answer) The sūtrakāra says :

Owing to preponderance, verily, are they spoken of as such. (II. iv. 19).

Owing to the preponderance of food (i.e. earth) we speak of a thing as food (earth). Wherefore it is quite reasonable to maintain that Parames'vara who triples the elements also creates all names and forms, by ensouling the four-faced Brahmā etc.

END OF THE FOURTH PĀDA IN THE SECOND ADHYĀYA.

### THIRD ADHYĀYA

#### FIRST PĀDA.

#### Adhikarana I.

In attaining to another (body), (the jīva) runs embraced (by subtle elements), as the question and the answer shew. (III. i. 1.)

In the second adhyāya have been answered all objections against the theory which was established in the first adhyāya as the one taught by the Upanishads in one voice, the theory, namely, that Brahman is the cause of the universe. To go into further details: in the first pāda of the second Adhyāya, all objections brought against the theory on the strength of the Sāṅkhya and other modes of reasoning were answered; in the second pāda was shewn how the doctrine that the Pradhāna was the cause, and other such doctrines were opposed to reasoning; in the third pāda, it was first shewn how the passages speaking of the creation of elements of matter are not contradictory, and then jīva was defined as eternal, and so on; in the fourth, after describing the nature of prāṇa or vital breath as well as senses and declaring that they were all born of Brahman, it was shewn how the names and forms of all things were differentiated. Now, the first pāda of the third adhyāya will treat of the departure and the return of the eternal jīva; the second pāda will treat of the essential nature of I'svara, after first explaining the Jīva's avasthās or states of consciousness; the third will shew how we are to gather together the various details of the prescribed modes of worshipping the I'svara as given in different places in the Veda; and the fourth pāda will treat of the duties of the āsramas or religious orders, and so on.

Now in the first adhikarana of the first pāda, a doubt arises as to whether the jīva, in going to and returning from the other world, does or does not carry with him the subtle elements of matter wherewith to create another body.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

### THE VEDA'NTA SUTRAS WITH S'RĪKANTHA BHĀ'SHYA

(To be continued from page 88)

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—When departing from the body, the jīva does not carry with him any subtle elements of matter which may form the seeds of the future body, inasmuch as all the trouble goes in vain, the elements of matter being easily found everywhere.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: That the jīva leaves this world embraced by the subtle elements of matter whereby to obtain another body is shown by the question and the answer occurring in the *Panchāgni-Īdyī*, the contemplation of the five fires.—How?—There the question was, "Do you know how in the fifth oblation, the waters come to be spoken of as Puruṣa?" The answer was, "Thus verily in the fifth oblation the waters come to be spoken of as Puruṣa." Their meaning may be briefly explained thus: the jīva dwelling in the body of a brāhmana or the like

offers oblations and does other acts. Leaving this body with a view to enjoy their fruits, he departs, embraced by the subtle element of water combined with other elements existing in the present body, and reaches heaven represented as a fire. Embraced by the same waters which become transformed into a body full of nectar, he becomes subservient to the Gods (*Devas*), and in their company he enjoys the peculiar pleasures of the region. With the residual Karma which will give him the body of a brāhmana or the like, he again comes to this world to do works, and embraced by the same waters he reaches the clouds which are represented as a fire. Then, with the rain drops, he descends to the earth also represented as a fire. Thence, with paddy and other grains, attaining the form of food, he reaches the body of a man who is represented as another fire. Then, embraced by the same waters converted into the semen in man, he reaches a woman represented as yet another fire. Embraced by the waters converted there into a body which may be called a human being, he is born with the body of a brāhmana or the like according to karma. All this will become clear later on. Wherefore when jīva has to attain to the next body, he goes embraced by the subtle elements.



(Water includes other elements) because of the triple character (of everything), (but they are referred to by water) because of its predominance. (III. 1. 2.)

Everything is of a threefold nature, because everything was tripled; and therefore it is only water combined with other elements that is referred to by the word "waters." They are so designated because of the predominance of water among them. There is, therefore, nothing wrong in speaking of water alone in the passage "In the fifth oblation, waters come to be spoken of as man.\*

And because of the departure of the senses. (III. 1. 3.)

"When prāṇa departs, all the senses depart after it."† This passage speaks of the departure of the senses along with the jīva, and we are therefore to understand that the body also, which is the seat of the sense-organs, departs. Wherefore, when the jīva departs, he is certainly embraced by the body of the body of the subtle elements.

The Sūtrakāra raises an objection and answers :

(If you say that it is not so) because of the S'ruti speaking of them as going to Agni and so on, (we say) no, because it is a figurative language (III. 1. 4.)

(Objection):—The S'ruti says :

"When the speech of this dying man goes to Agni, his vital breath goes to the air, the eye to the sun,"‡ and so on.

In this passage the S'ruti speaks of the senses going to Agni and so on. Therefore the senses do not go with the jīva.

(Answer):—No, because of the words 'speech' and the like being figuratively applied to the Gods who identify themselves with the sense of speech &c. They are indeed spoken of along with the hair &c. which do not certainly go to the Gods who identify themselves with them. The S'ruti says. "The small hairs go to the plants the big hairs to the trees."

(If you object to this) because of the absence of their mention in the first, (we answer) no, for they alone (are referred to) as may be explained. (III. 1. 5.)

(Objection):—In the first, i. e., when speaking of the first fire, namely, the region of heaven, waters are not mentioned and therefore they do not depart. There the S'ruti says "In this fire, the gods pour the oblation of faith."|| speaks only of faith (S'raddhā).

(Answer):—No; it is only waters that are spoken of as 'faith.' Why? For, what follows can be explained only when the oblation of S'raddhā means that of waters. And the word 'faith' may be used to denote waters, because the S'ruti says "faith, verily, is the waters."\*

The Sūtrakāra again raises an objection and answers :

(If you say that Jīva is not meant) because he is not mentioned, (we say) no, because of the doers of sacrificial rites and the like being referred to. (III. 1. 6.)

(Objection):—Here, in the question and in the answer, waters alone are mentioned, not the jīva embraced by them.

(Answer):—No, for, in the sequel the S'ruti says: "But they who living in a village practise (a life of) sacrifices, works of public utility and alms, they go to the smoke, from smoke to night, from night to the dark half of the moon, from the dark half of the moon to the six months when the sun goes to the south. But they do not reach the year. From the months they go to the world of the fathers, from the world of the fathers to the ether, from the ether to the moon. That is Soma, the King. Here they are loved (eaten) by the Devas, yes, the Devas love (eat) them. Having dwelt there till their (good) works are consumed, they return again that way as they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. Then the sacrificer, having become air, becomes smoke, having become smoke, he becomes mist, having become mist he becomes a cloud, having become a cloud, he rains down. Then he is born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesamum and beans. From thence the escape is beset with most difficulties. For whoever the persons may be that eat the food and beget offspring, he henceforth becomes like unto them"†

This passage speaks of the performers of sacrifices who enjoy the fruits of their good Karma in heaven with the body of nectar here spoken of as the King Soma, and who, on the exhaustion of their good Karma, again come here and enter into the womb; and the same individuals are again referred to as king Soma, in the following passage.

"On that altar the Devas offer the S'raddhā libation. From that oblation rises Soma, the King."‡

Therefore, even in the question and the answer, it is found that it is jīva, embraced by waters and

\* Chhā. 5-9

† Bri. 6-4-2

‡ Bri. 5-2-12.

§ Ibid.

|| Chhā. 5-4.

\* Tai. Brāh. 3-2-4.

† Chhā. 5-10.

‡ Ibid. 5-4.

having those waters for his body, that is spoken of as waters. \*Hence no contradiction.

It is only a figure of speech, because of his ignorance of Atman; so indeed the Śruti shows. (III. 1-7).

(*Objection*):—The water cannot stand for jīva, because it is spoken of as being eaten by the Devas when it attains to the state of Soma, the king, in the words, "That is Soma, the King. Here they are eaten by the Devas, yes the Devas eat them."\*

(*Answer*).—It is only by a figure of speech that they are said to be eaten; and it simply means that they, as not knowing Atman, are mere instruments of enjoyment for the Devas. Accordingly, indeed, does the Ś'ruti declare that those who do not know Atman are like cattle—mere instruments of enjoyment for the Devas, in the words "Like an animal, he is to the Devas."† It should therefore be understood that as the knowers of Atman are the instruments of Parame'svara, so are those who are ignorant of Atman the instruments of the Devas. It may thus be concluded that when jīva departs from here to take another body, he goes there embraced by subtle elements.

### Adhikarana 2.

On the exhaustion of works (the soul returns) with a residual karma—as the Śruti and the Smṛiti says,—as he had gone and otherwise. (III. 1-8).

In the preceding section, it has been shown how Jīva is endued with a body of subtle elements of matter, when he goes to svarga and other regions and there enjoys fruits consonant with his own karma in the body of a Deva and so on. Now, then, a doubt arises as to whether, when that jīva descends to this world again after enjoyment, he is accompanied with any residual portion of karma, or he returns to the earth after having enjoyed the whole of his karma.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—Now it is but proper to maintain that the soul descends to this world from svarga without *anus'aya*, without any residual karma at all. *Anus'aya* means residual karma, so called because it remains (*s'ete*) with (*anu*) jīva. No residual karma can exist in him who descends from svarga, the fruits of that karma having been enjoyed in svarga. Accordingly on this subject the śruti says: "Having dwelt there till their karma (*sampāta*) is consumed, they return again that way as they came"‡ Here *sampāta* means the aggregate karma. They remain

there in svarga till their whole karma is exhausted. Wherefore, after enjoying all the fruits of their karma, the jīva descends from svarga without any karma at all.

(*Siddhānta*):—When, on the exhaustion of good works, the jīva descends again to this world, he comes accompanied with a residual Karma.—Where is it so said?—Of course, in the ś'ruti and in the Smṛiti: The Ś'ruti says:

"Those whose conduct has been good, will quickly attain some good birth, the birth of a Brāhmana, or a Kshatriya, or a Vais'ya. But those whose conduct has been evil will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog, or a hog, or a chandāla."\*

The Smṛiti says "they are born so and so by good karma." Otherwise, there can be no enjoyment of pleasure and pain for an infant just born, in the absence of Dharma and Adharma, etc. Therefore, when returning the way he went up and otherwise also, the soul is certainly accompanied with a residual karma. To explain: on his return he descends to the ākāś'a on his way to the air, and so far follows the way he went up; but he does not pass through the region of the Pitris and so on, and so far the order of ascent is violated.

Again the Sūtrakāra raises an objection and refutes it first according to another's view

If you say (that the existence of residual Karma cannot be proved) because of the word 'conduct,' Karsīṇajñi replies that the word indirectly points to it (III. 1-9.)

(*Objection*):—It is the word 'conduct (*charana*)' which occurs in the Śruti quoted above. That does not prove the existence of residual karma. The word 'charana' denotes the moral conduct spoken of in the Smṛitis.

(*Answer*):—No. Here, the word 'conduct (*charana*), stands indeed for residual karma (*anus'aya*), inasmuch as the latter alone can produce happiness and the like.

If you say that conduct would (then) be of no use, (we say) no because the other stands in need of it (III. 1-10)

(*Objection*):—If so, the moral conduct inculcated in the religious institutes (Smṛitis) would be of no purpose and therefore taught in vain.

(*Answer*):—No, merely because all good work stands in need of it, as said in the scriptural passages like the following "Who is without *Sandhyā* (morning and evening devotion); is impure, and, as

\* Chhā. 5-10.

† Bri 3-4-10.

‡ Chhā up. 5-10-5.

\* Ibid 5-10-7.

such, is unfit for all works, whatever other work he does, he attains not its fruit." Such is the view of Kārṣṇājini.

But Bādari holds that the word means good deed and evil deeds. (III. i. 11)

But Bādari maintains that the word 'conduct' (charana) in the Sruti quoted above denotes the good and evil deeds themselves, as the common usage shows. This is also the view of the Sūtrakāra. If Bādari holds that the word 'conduct' denotes the good and evil deeds primarily, but not by a mere figure, then it is tantamount to his admitting that karma (work), to be effective, stands in need of moral conduct inculcated in the smṛiti.

Wherefore it may be concluded that, when jīva descends from svarga, he comes accompanied with the residual traces of good and evil works he had done.

### Adhikarana 3.

It is declared even for those who have done no works of utility and the like. (III. i. 12).

Here a doubt arises as to whether, just as those who do works of public utility and sacrificial acts go to the moon, others also go to the moon or not.

(Pūrvapakṣa :)—Certainly, even those who have not done any acts of public utility or sacrificial acts go to the moon. The Sruti declares that all alike go to the moon in the words "Whoever depart from this world, all of them go to the moon."\*

No doubt the sinners have no enjoyment there; still, it must be admitted that they do go to the svarga, so that the fifth oblation is accomplished and the body formed which is assumed on return to the earth. It therefore stands to reason that even those who have not done acts of public utility and sacrificial acts go to the moon.

(Siddhānta :)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows:

But others ascend and descend by experiencing in Samyamana, as the Sruti shows their passages. (III. i. 13).

Those who have done no acts of public utility and sacrificial acts or the like do not go to the moon. On the other hand they enjoy the fruits of their karma in the world of Yama and then return to earth. Such only are their ascent and descent as declared in the Sruti. "The son of Vivasvat is the goal of the born creatures."†

One goes to svarga to enjoy, but not to make up the fifth oblation, because in the case of Drona and the like, the principle of five oblations fails, the oblation of woman being absent. Wherefore it is but right to maintain that sinners go to the world of Yama.

And the Smṛiti says so (III. i. 14).

This thing is declared in the smṛiti as follows: "All these, O Lord, verily come under the control of Yama."\*

And also seven (narakas). (III. i. 15.)

The Smṛiti speaks of sinners going to the seven great hells (narakas) such as Raurava.

And because of his influence even there, there is no contradiction. (III. i. 16).

Even there in the hells which are ruled by Chitragupta and others, Yama their leader is active by way of guiding them. It does not therefore contradict the statement that they are under the control of Yama.

Vidyā and Karma being verily the things spoken of (III. i. 17.)

One goes to Brahman or to the moon for the enjoyment of the fruits of Vidyā (Upāsana) and Karma respectively. It is Vidyā and Karma that are spoken of as leading to Brahman and to the moon in the following passage:

"Those who know this, and those who in the forest follow faith and austerities go to light. But they who living in a village practise sacrifices, works of public utility and alms, they go to the smoke."†

Wherefore it can never be made out that sinners go to them.

(There is no necessity for going to svarga) in the third, because of the s'ruti so declaring. (III. i. 18.)

Neither can it be maintained that even the sinners must go to svarga, on the ground that even in their case the body can be formed only on passing through five oblations. For the s'ruti expressly declares that they do not go to svarga, in the following words:

"On neither of these two ways those small creatures (flies, worms, etc.) are continually returning of whom it may be said, Live and die. Their's is a third place. Therefore that world never becomes full."‡

The "third place" means men of sinful deeds. Wherefore sinners do not go to heaven.

A. MAHADEVYA SASI, B.A.

(To be continued.)

\* Kaushitaki Upanishad 1.2.

† Taittiriya-Aranyaka 4.1.

\* Vishnupurana.

† Chhândogya Upanishad 5-10.

‡ Ibid.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDA'NTA SŪ'TRAS WITH S'RĪ'KANTHA  
BHA'SHĪYA.

*(Continued from page 58.)*

And it is said in the world. (III. i. 19)

In the world it is said that even in the case of persons of virtuous deeds such as Draupadī, one of the five oblations is dispensed with in the formation of the body.

And because we find (a passage in the Sruti (III. i. 20).

Moreover, we find it declared in the following passage of the Sruti

"Of all living things there are indeed three origins only, that which springs from an egg (viparous), that which springs from a living being (Viviparous), that which springs from a germ"\*

Here, in the case of the sweat-born and the germ-born, we find one of the five oblations (viz., woman) is dispensed with.

(Objection :)—In the Sruti quoted above, there is no mention made of the sweat-born.

(Answer :)—The Sūtrakāra answers as follows :

The sweat-born is included in the third word. (III. i. 21).

The sweat-born is also included in the mention of the germ-born. Therefore the conclusion is that sinners do not go to heaven.

## Adhikarana 4.

He attains to a similar form, because it is reasonable. (III. i. 22).

In the preceding adhikarana it has been shown that in his descent from svarga after the enjoyment of the fruit, the soul is accompanied with a residual Karma. The sruti declares that while descending he becomes ether (Akāsa) and so on, in the following words :

Then they return again that way as they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. Then the sacrificer, having become air, becomes smoke having become smoke, he becomes mist having become mist, he becomes a cloud : having become a cloud, he rains down.\*\*

\* Chhā. Up. 6-3-1.

• Chhā. Up. 5-10.



Here a doubt arises as to whether the sou' becomes embodied in the ether and the like or becomes similar to them.

(*Pūrvapakṣa* :)—From the words "having become," it appears that the soul becomes the ether and so on.

(*Siddhānta* :)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : When descending, the soul does not become embodied in the ether and so on ; but he becomes similar to them ; for, there he experiences no pleasure and pain. It is only for the experiencing of pleasure and pain that the soul assumes the several bodies ; and it cannot be that one thing actually becomes another thing. Hence the only rational conclusion that, while descending, the soul attains to a form similar to ether and so on.

### Adhikarana 5.

Not very long, because of the specific mention (III. i. 23)

A doubt arises as to whether the descending jīva lingers or not according to circumstances, or he does not as a rule linger at all.

(*Pūrvapakṣa* :)—In this connection, the s'ruti declares that jīva attains to the state of the rice-grain and so on in the following words :

"They are born here rice-grains barley-grains, plants, trees, sesamum-seeds, and beans."\*

Prior to this attaining to the state of the rice-grain etc., the soul may or may not linger in the ākāśa etc., according to circumstances, there being no specific rule as to the one or the other.

(*Siddhānta* :)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : Prior to attaining to the state of rice-grain etc., the jīva does not linger long in the ākāśa and so on.—How ?—For, the s'ruti says that it is difficult to escape from the state of the rice-grain etc., in the following words :

"Thence it is very hard indeed to escape."†

Thus, as the jīvas are said to linger long in the rice-grain and the like, we have to infer that in other places they pass on swiftly, and we therefore conclude that in ākāśa etc., the jīva does not linger.

### Adhikarana 6.

(It is only a contact with the rice-grain etc.) indwelt by another (jīva), because of the mention similar to the above. (III. i. 24.)

Now a doubt arises as to whether the jīva comes in mere contact with the rice-grain etc., or he is born as the rice-grain etc.

(*Pūrvapakṣa* :)—He is born as the rice-grain etc., because the s'ruti says that they 'are born' as the rice-grain and so on.

(*Siddhānta* :)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : The jīva comes in mere contact with the rice-grain etc., in which other jīvas abide. Because of the s'ruti not declaring the cause of the birth (in the rice-grain etc.) of the descending jīva any more than when passing into the ākāśa, the words of the s'ruti "are born" should be understood in a secondary sense. Where the jīva is born as a brāhmaṇa and so on, there the s'ruti speaks of the causes of such births in the words "those of good conduct,...those of evil conduct..." Wherefore, because of the s'ruti declaring that he is born only as a brāhmaṇa and so on, the conclusion is that mere contact is meant in other cases.

(If you say that there was) an impure act. (we reply) no, because of the word (III. i. 25.)

(*Objection* :)—Of the sacrificial rites which had been formerly performed by the descending jīva, such rites as Agniṣomīya were impure acts, because they involved cruelty to animal life. To reap the fruits of those acts, he should be born as rice-grain etc.

(*Answer* :)—No ; for, the s'ruti declares that such cruelty to animals is no cruelty, in the following words :

"Golden-bodied, to the upper svarga does it go."

"Not indeed dost thou die, nor wilt thou be ruined."\*

Therefore (the descending jīva) is not born as the rice-grain etc.

The sūtrakāra gives yet another explanation

Contact with the semen-shedder (is declared) in the sequel. (III. i. 26.)

In the sequel, the s'ruti speaks of jīva's mere contact with him who sheds semen, in the following passage :

"Whoever, indeed, eats the food and whoever sheds semen, full of that does he verily become."†

Wherefore, in the preceding case of rice-grain etc., the s'ruti must mean mere contact.

From the womb (comes) the body (III. i. 27.)

When he reaches the womb, then alone is the body produced. Prior to this, there can be a mere contact.

Thus Ends the First Pāda of the Third Adhyāya.

\* Chhā. Up. 5-10-6.

† Ibid.

\* Rik-samhitā 1-162-21.

† Chhā. Up. 5-10-6.

## SECOND PADA.

## Adhikarana I.

In "the intervening state is (Jiva's) creation : indeed (the Sruti) says. (III. ii. 1).

The preceding section has treated of the jiva's departure and return. Here his avasthās or states of consciousness will be discussed. In the intervening state, i.e., in svapna or dream, the Sruti speaks of creation in the following words

"There are no (real) chariots in that state, no horses, no roads but he himself sends forth (creates) chariots, horses and roads."\*

A doubt arises as to whether this creation is the jiva's or the Paramesvara's act.

(Pīrvapakṣa :)—It seems to be an act of the jiva ; for the Sruti declares that Jiva himself who is conscious of the dream is the agent, in the following words :

"But he himself sends forth (creates) tanks, lakes, and rivers. He indeed is the maker."†

And as the maker, some (declare), (creating the objects of desire such as) sons and so on. III. ii. 2.)

Some Upanishads declare that in Svapna the jiva himself is the creator of the objects of desire, in the following words

"That Purusha who is awake in us while we are asleep, shaping one lovely sight (kāma) after another."‡

Here the word 'kāma' must mean sons and the like, the objects of desire ; for, having said at first, "Ask for all objects of desire as you choose," § the Upanishad says, by way of explanation, "Ask for sons and grandsons who will live a hundred years." || For this reason also, the creation of objects in Svapna is only an act of jiva.

(Siddhanta :)—As against the foregoing, the following is said in reply :

But it is mere Maya, (Jiva's) nature being not fully manifested. (III. ii. 3).

All the objects such as chariots created in Svapna are mere Māyā, created by Isvara, not created by jiva, intended to be experienced by him who sees the dream, and ending with the end of the dream. They are

said to be māyāmātra, mere māyā, because they are very strange. Jiva can have no power of creating chariots and so on, inasmuch as his unfailing will is quite obscured. Therefore the 'Purusha,' who is said in the Upanishad to create the objects of desire, does not mean Jiva. On the other hand, the 'Purusha' is the Isvara Himself, as the sequel shows

"That indeed is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond."\*

As pointing to the same Being, the words "He indeed is the maker"† refers indeed to Isvara. Wherefore the creation of objects in Svapna is an act of the Paramesvara.

The Sūtrakara gives the reason why Jiva's true nature is obscured :

By the will of the Supreme, indeed, is it obscured : thence, verily, are his bondage and the opposite state. (III. ii. 4).

Owing to the continuous current of Jiva's beginningless transgression, his unfailing will and other (divine) powers are obscured by the will of the Paramesvara. By the same will of the Paramesvara, caused by his transgression and its continuance, jiva is subject to bondage and liberation, bandha and mukti. According to the Sruti says :

"When he finds freedom from fear and rest in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the fearless. For, if he makes but the smallest distinction in it, there is fear for him."‡

Or it may even be on account of contact with the body. (III. ii. 5).

The Jiva's true nature becomes obscured at the time of creation by contact with inert matter in the form of bodies, such as the bodies of Devas, men and the like, while during pralaya or dissolution his true nature is obscured by contact with inert matter in a very subtle form, with matter undifferentiated in name and form. Thus, the power of creating strange objects in svapna which last for the time being cannot exist in jiva whose unfailing will and other powers are obscured.

The Sūtrakara affords another explanation :

And foreboding indeed it is, as the s'ruti says. And its precursors also declare. (III. ii. 6.)

Svapna is indeed indicative of good or evil, as the s'ruti declares in the following passages :

\* Ibid 5-8.

† Bri. Up. 4-2-10.

‡ Taittiriya. Up. 2-7.

\* Bri. Up. 4-3-10.

† Ibid.

‡ Kaba. Up. 5-8.

§ Ibid 1-25.

|| Ibid 1-23.

"If during sacrifices which are to fulfil certain wishes, he sees in his dreams a woman, let him know success from this vision in a dream, yea, from this vision in a dream.

"Next come the dreams. If he sees a black man with black teeth and that man kills him,"\* and so on.

The proficient in the science of svapna speak of particular dreams which are indicative of good or evil. The objects seen in the dream are not created by the jīva. If they be jīva's creation, then those objects which may forebode evil would not be created at all. Therefore it stands to reason that creation in svapna is an act of Parames'vara.

## Adhikarana. 2.

Its cessation is in the nādis and in the Atman because of its being declared. (III. ii. 7.)

'Its cessation', the cessation of svapna, here points to *sushupti*, or dreamless sleep. We are given to understand that during *sushupti* jīva sleeps in the nādis (tubes) in the puritat (pericardium), and in Brahman, as the following passages declare :

"And when a man is asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest, so that he sees no dream, then he has entered into those nādis (tubes)."<sup>†</sup>

"Next when he is in profound sleep and knows nothing, there are the seventy-two thousand nādis called *Hita*, which from the heart spread through the body. Through them he moves forth and rests in the surrounding body."<sup>‡</sup>

"When a man sleeps here, then, my dear son, he becomes united with the *Sat*, the True."<sup>§</sup>

There arises a doubt as to whether jīva sleeps in any one only of these, or in all of these together.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*.)—It is in some one only or other of the places (nādis etc.) that jīva goes to sleep; for, sleep which has to be produced is but a single purpose. Just as, when the Veda enjoins "let him sacrifice with rice," and "let him sacrifice with barley" we understand that they form two alternative courses open, since the cake to be produced is but one purpose, so also, sleep which has to be produced being but a single purpose, it may be served by any one only of the

places; the jīva may at one time sleep in the nādis, at another time in the Puritat, at another time again in Brahman. So that it is proper to understand the *śruti* to mean that they are alternative cases.

(*Siddhānta*.)—The *śruti* means their conjunction. —Why?—For, more purposes than one have to be served. To explain Nādis serve as a means, as passages by which jīva goes to Brahman dwelling in the heart. Jīva may sleep in the Puritat and Brahman at the same time, the last two forming as it were a hall and a bed therein. Thus, jīva approaches by means of nādis and reposes in Brahman in the Puritat; so that, the different places serving different purposes, a conjunction of them all is meant here.

For this reason also: from Him is the waking. (III. ii. 8.)

"When they have come back from the True, they know not that they have come back from the True." In these words the *śruti* declares that jīva wakes from Brahman. Therefore the conjunction (of all the places) must be meant here. If, indeed, an alternation is meant, then the interpretation is open to eight objections. To hold, in the first place, as one of the alternatives, that jīva lies in the nādis only at one time, is to detract for the time being from the *prima facie* authority of the statement that he lies in the Puritat and Brahman, and to admit that they are false, which no one ever suspects. And then again to hold, as the second of the alternatives that jīva lies in the Puritat and Brahman is to grant to the statement the authority denied to it before and to deny the falsity which was ascribed to it before.

Thus to interpret the passage as pointing to an alternation is to subject the statement that Jīva lies in the Puritat and Brahman to four objections: the abandoning of what is *prima facie* evident, the admitting of what is not evident, the admitting again of what has been abandoned, and the abandoning of what has been admitted. Similarly, it may be shown that the statement that jīva lies in the Nādis is subject to the same four objections. Thus the interpretation of a passage as pointing to alternation involves eight objectionable points. Therefore, when a conjunction is possible, it is improper to resort to alternation.

A. MAHĀDEVA ŚĀSTRĪ, B. A.

(To be Continued.)

\* Chhā. Up. 5-2-9.

† Aitā. Aranyake. 3-2-4-16, 17.

‡ Chhā. Up. 8-6-3.

§ Bṛi. Up. 2-1-19.

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — OR — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

### THE VEDA'NTA SŪ'TRAS WITH S'RĪ'KANTHA BHA'SHYA.

(Continued from page 136.)

#### Adhikarana-3.

It is himself indeed, because of the acts, of the memory, of the word, and of the injunction. (III. ii. 9).

Here the passage to be discussed is the following

"With the True, My dear son, he then becomes united,"\*

In the last section, jīva's state of sushupti has been treated of. Now arises a doubt as to whether he who awakes is the very one that went to sleep in Brahman, or some one else.

(Pūrvapakṣa :)—It must be some one else, because of the impossibility of the return of one who has attained to Brahman. It is impossible that the jīva who attained equality with Brahman and unsurpassed Bliss should again return to the mundane existence

which is full of misery. How can he come out who became one with the True? Where is the distinction between the two?

(Siddhānta :)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Though he became one with the True yet the same jīva who went to sleep rises again on awaking from sleep; for, in the absence of knowledge, he has yet to reap the fruits of the acts done already. He, moreover, remembers what he has experienced before. Further, the following passage declares that the jīva becomes again what he was before:

Whatever these creatures are here, whether a tiger, or a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a mosquito, that they become again and again."\*

Otherwise, all passages that teach of the means of attaining salvation would be of no purpose. In sleep the jīva does not become quite absorbed in Brahman as he does in mukti, because the s'ruti declares the absence of all knowledge of the bliss of Brahman, in the words "They come back from the True, and they know it not."† Wherefore it is proper to hold that he alone who first went to sleep awakes again.

\* Chhṛ. Up. 6-8-1.

\* Ibid. 6-10-2.

† Ibid.



**Adhikarana—4.**

When stupefied, it becomes half (death), as the only alternative left (III. ii. 10).

We speak of a person being stupefied or unconscious; and this points to the experience of a state (avasthā) called stupefaction (Murchhā). A doubt arises as to whether this state is distinct from sushupti, etc. or not distinct from them.

(Pārapaksha:)—As no state distinct from the jāgrat, svapna and sushupti is known to us, it must be one of them.

(Siddhānta:)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows. The state of a person who has been stupefied is equivalent to half death. Thus, as the only alternative left, it is different from sushupti, etc. It cannot be brought under jāgrat or svapna, because in it is absent all consciousness of the universe. And the state of stupefaction must be different from sushupti because of this difference: in sushupti the face, etc., are calm and serene, whereas stupefaction is marked by a distorted face, etc.

**Adhikarana—5.**

Though abiding (in all) no (taint attaches itself) to the Supreme; for, both attributes (are described) everywhere. (III. ii. 11).

In the former sections have been described the essential attributes of jīva—spoken of as 'thou',—his departure and return, as well as his various states of consciousness (avasthās). Now will be described the essential attributes, etc., of the Parames'vara, spoken of as 'That' in 'That art thou'. The S'ruti speaks of Parames'vara entering into all by becoming one with them, in the following passages:

"He entered within from within; He entered all the quarters within." \*

"He who dwells in the Earth....." †

A doubt arises as to whether, when dwelling in all states of being as the Inner Regulator of all, He is or is not subject to the taint of evil of the various sorts.

(Pārapaksha:)—He is subject to evil.—To explain. The S'ruti denies form, etc., to the Parames'vara in such words as the following:

Not stoni, not small, not short." ‡

Partless, actionless, tranquil, sinless, taintless." §

\* Atharvas'iras.

† Bri. Up. 3-7-3.

‡ Bri. Up. 3-8-8.

§ S'vetā. Up. 6-19.

Lest any such evil may be attributed to Him, He is described as mere consciousness, infinite and true, in the following words:

"True, Consciousness, Infinite is Brahman."\*

If He be said to have any connection with the material phenomena, He, too, like jīva, should be subject to all the evils of material phenomena.

(Siddhānta:)—No. Though dwelling in all states of being as the Antaryāmin (the Inner Regulator) of all, still, Parames'vara is subject to no taint of evil whatever.—Why?—For, everywhere in the S'ruti, as is well known to all, both the attributes are mentioned,—that He is free from all taint of evil, and that He is the repository of unsurpassable excellences,—in such passages as the following:

"It is A'tman, free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, of unfailing desires, of unfailing will." †

"There is that one who is the seat of excellent qualities which are infinite in extent, who is the creator of all worlds, who is distinct from pas'us (jīvas) and pās'a (bondage, matter)."

Wherefore, though dwelling as the Antaryāmin in the Earth and so on, He is not subject to evil.

(If you say that He is tainted by evil) because of the variety (of being), (we say) no, because of the denial in every case. (III. ii. 12).

(Objection:)—Just as the jīva, who in himself is free from sin and possessed of such other attributes, is yet subject to evil because of his being connected with the body of a Deva or the like and being thus placed in a variety of state of being, so even the Parames'vara may be subject to evil because of His being connected with a body—as declared in the words "whose body is Earth"—and being thus subject to various states of being.

(Answer:)—No, because of the declaration, in every case, that He is not subject to evil. In all such passages as "Whose body is Earth, ....." the Antaryāmin, the Inner Regulator, is indeed said to be free from all evil, in the words, "He is thy A'tman, the Antaryāmin the Immortal."‡ As to jīva, on the other hand, it has been said that his essential nature has been obscured by the will of the supreme.

Moreover, so do some (declare). (III. ii. 13).

Moreover,—literally to the effect that, between jīva and Is'vara, though dwelling in one and the same

\* Taitt. Up. 2-1.

† Chhā. Up. 8-1-5.

‡ Bri. Up. 3-7-3.

body as its tenants, there is this difference, namely, that the one is subject to evil while the other is not,—some declare as follows :

“Two beauteous-winged companions, ever mates, perch on the self-same tree ; one of the twain devours the luscious fruit, fasting its mate looks on.”

Wherefore, unlike jīva, Is'vara is not subject to evil.

Now, the sūtrakāra proceeds to shew that, though alike dwelling in the body, there is a difference in the mode of their dwelling :

Quite like the formless, indeed, is He, that (differentiation) being His chief (concern.) (III. ii. 14.)

That Brahman, that Parameśvara, though dwelling in the bodies of Devas and the like as their tenant, remains altogether like a thing that has no form.—How ?—Because He is chiefly the creator of names and forms. Accordingly the S'ruti says :

“He who is called A'kās'a is the creator of names and forms ; That which is contained within these names and forms is the Brahman.”\*

He dwells within names and forms altogether untouched by their effects. It is said that He dwells within them, simply to shew that He is independent of them ; whereas, indeed, jīva dwells in the body to enjoy the fruits of actions. Hence the difference between the two.

And like light, (He must have divine qualities), since (the scriptures are) not meaningless. (III. ii. 15).

Just as Brahman is said to be Consciousness itself, because He is self-luminous as declared in the scriptural passage—“The True, Consciousness, the Infinite is Brahman,”—which must have a meaning, so, too, Brahman must be taintless, the seat of excellent attributes, if the hundred and more passages such as the following should have a meaning at all :

“Partless, actionless, tranquil.”†

“Devoid of sins.”‡

“Existence itself, with delight in life, and with bliss in manas.”||

“Who is omniscient, who knows all.”§

“The Lord of Pradhāna and Jīva, the Ruler of Gunas.”¶

“He is said to have a Supreme Power (Parā Śakti), of various nature.”\*

“Now, why is He called Mahādeva ?—Because He is the Being who, rising above all states of being, excels in the great power of the knowledge of A'tman and of Yoga, therefore He is called Mahādeva.”†

And (the S'ruti) declares (Him to be) that alone. (III. ii. 16).

The S'ruti, “the True, Consciousness, the Infinite is Brahman,” says merely that Brahman is the Infinite Consciousness. It denies not other (attributes), because thereby no additional meaning is conveyed ; nor is there any incompatibility between them. To speak of a crown as made of gold is simply to declare that it is formed of gold ; it does not deny that there are no gems and the like set therein. So, too here, the S'ruti “the True, Consciousness, the Infinite is Brahman,” simply declares that the Parabrahman, as a Mighty Light in Himself, is nothing but Supreme Consciousness in essence. How can it also deny the wisdom, or omniscience of Brahman to be subsequently spoken of. He is wise, because He has consciousness which sees all things of various kinds. Hence no incompatibility.

And the S'ruti reveals it, as also the Smṛiti. (III. ii. 17).

The Blessed S'ruti itself reveals everywhere Brahman of both characters, as free from evil qualities, and also as endued with good qualities. The S'ruti says :

“Brahman is luminous in body ; the existence itself, with delight in life, with bliss in mind ; replete with peace, and immortal ; thus do thou, O Prāchīna-Yogya, contemplate.”‡

Brahman is A'kās'a, that which shines everywhere, the Light, the all-pervading Intelligence (Chidambara). He is the Existence. He delights in life, i.e., in Himself, not in external things. His bliss lies in manas, in mind, not in external senses. Here ‘manas’ means Intelligence, the inner sense (antah-karana) and it is in virtue of His knowledge—which stands in no need of external organs, and by which the whole external universe in manifestation is immediately perceived, and which is ever free from taint,—that Brahman is said to be omniscient. He is said to enjoy bliss in mind because by mind He enjoys the infinite bliss which constitutes His very nature. He is replete with peace, being quite free from attachment, aversion, and other evil qualities ; He is quite devoid of all evil taint. He

\* Chhā. Up. 8-14-1.

† S'vet. Up. 6-19.

‡ Chhā. 8-1-5.

|| Taitt. Up. 1-6.

§ Mund. Up. 1-1-10.

¶ S'vet. Up. 6-16.

\* Ibid. 6-16.

† Atharvas'iras.

‡ Taitt. Up. 1-6.

is immortal from time without a beginning; He is the True, Consciousness itself; He is omniscient, manifesting His inherent nature of unsurpassed bliss of A'tman; He is free from all evil. The S'ruti thus shews that the Supreme Brahman is of a twofold nature. The following passages also declare that Brahman is of this twofold nature:

"Partless, actionless, tranquil"\*

"Who brings good and removes evil, the Lord of bliss."†

"Him, the Highest the great Lord of lords."‡

The smṛiti also declares that Brahman, designated as S'iva, is of the twofold nature:

"The All-pervading Being, whose nature is quite pure particularly because of the absence of all connection with the beginningless sin (mala), is called S'iva."

"The Lord, who is infinite bliss itself and possesses excellent qualities, is called S'iva by the wise who know the real nature of S'iva."

That is to say, Brahman who is devoid of all taint of evil, who is the Supreme Goal of man, is said to be perfect in His qualities as designated by the word 'S'iva' which denotes a Being of Supreme purity and excellent attributes. Brahman being thus denoted by the word 'S'iva', we conclude that Brahman is endued with the twofold nature.

Hence, indeed, the simile, like the reflected sun, etc., (III. ii. 18).

It is because Parames'vara, though abiding in the earth and everywhere, is free from all taint and is the repository of excellent attributes that He is compared in the scriptures to the sun reflected in water, and so on, in the passages like the following:

"Just as the one A'kās'a (ether,) becomes, indeed, different in the pot and the like, so the one A'tman (becomes different) abiding in many, like the sun in the several bodies of water."

The author of this passage cites two illustrations—the A'kās'a (ether) which really exists (in the different places), and the sun not really existing (in the different reflections)—with this idea in mind. Just as the ether, which is one alone, really exists differently in the different objects such as pots, so, the Parames'vara who is one alone exists really in the different things, such as earth, as their A'tman. Thus on the analogy of ether we can

understand that Parames'vara, though one alone, can actually dwell in many things. Again, just as the sun, who does not actually abide in the various bodies of water wherein he is reflected, is not affected by their changes and other evil aspects, so is the Parames'vara, though actually dwelling in the earth and other objects, unaffected by their changes and other evil aspects. Thus, by the analogy of the sun, we are to understand that the Parames'vara, the Inner Regulator (Antaryāmin) within all, is untainted and has all His essential attributes intact. Thus, on the analogy of the ether and the like, the Parames'vara, the A'tman of all is, we may conclude, endued with the twofold nature.

Here the following objection is raised:

Not being understood as in the case of water, indeed it cannot be so (III. ii. 19).

(Objection:)—The sun in water is regarded as unreal, but not so is the Parames'vara in the earth (unreal). On the other hand, it is regarded that He actually dwells there. So, how can He be free from all taint?

The objection is answered as follows:

(No) liability to growth or decline by dwelling within, because (then alone) the two (similes) will have a consistent meaning, as also because (similes are) found in similar (use). (III. ii. 20).

(Answer:)—The word 'no' occurring in the preceding Sūtra should be understood here.—Notwithstanding the fact of His abiding actually within the earth and the like, the Parames'vara is not liable to the growth and decline to which they are subject. We come to this conclusion, because then alone the two similes will have a due significance. Indeed, it has been already said that the use of the two similes—the sun who does not actually abide (in the reflections) and the ether which actually does abide in all objects—points to the conclusion that the Parames'vara, though abiding in all objects, is unaffected by their evil as though He does not abide in them. We do find similes used, pointing merely to a similarity in some particular attribute, as for example, "the moon-like face." Hence the conclusion that I's'vara, though really abiding in the earth and other objects, is endued with the twofold nature.

A. MAHA'DEVĀ S'A'STRY, B.A.

(To be continued).

\* Svetā. Up. 6-19.

† Ibid. 6-8.

‡ Ibid. 6-6.

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH OR SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA.

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THE VEDA'NTA SŪTRAS WITH S'RĪKANTHA  
BHĀ'SHYA.

*(Continued from page 160.)*

Or, (to interpret the last reason in another way),—even in the S'ruti we find a simile employed, pointing to a similarity only in some particular attribute, as in the passages like the following :—

“ Having shaken off sin as the horse shakes off the hair.”\*

Thus, the two similes being reconcilable only on the ground of similarity in some particular attributes, it may be concluded that Brahman is endued with the twofold nature.

### Adhikarana—6.

The Sūtrakāra imagines an objection based on the impossibility of the twofold nature, and answers as follows :

\* Chhā. up. 8-13-1.

50

(The S'ruti) denies, indeed, His being only so much, and so says again. (III-ii. 21).

In the preceding Adhikarana it has been shewn that Brahman is of a twofold nature. Now a doubt arises as to whether this conclusion is falsified or not.

(Pūrvapakṣa :)—Having declared—in the words “ there are two forms of Brahman, the material and the immaterial,”\*—that Brahman is in the form of the universe, material and immaterial, as made up of earth, water, light, air and ether, the S'ruti says “ next follows the teaching : (He is) not thus, not thus.”† As the word ‘ thus ’ refers back here to what has been said already, what has been said regarding Brahman—viz., that He is in the form of the universe, material and immaterial—is denied.

(Siddhānta :)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : The words “ not thus, not thus,” do not deny what has been already taught,—viz., that Brahman is in the form of the universe,—inasmuch as it is not proper to deny what has been taught as a new thing, as unknown before. On the other hand, we ought to understand that the words only go to deny that Brah-

\* Bri. Up. 2-3-1.

† Ibid 2-3-6.



man is not merely what He has been here declared to be; for, subsequently in the following words, the S'ruti again speaks of attributes which have not been already declared:

"For there is nothing else higher than He (who has been) declared to be 'not thus.' Then comes the name, 'the True of the true'; the lives are verily the true, and He the True of them."\*

This passage teaches that there exists nothing else higher than Brahman who has been described in the words "not thus, not thus." Then His name is declared in the words "the True of the true." The meaning thereof is then explained in the words "The lives are, verily, the true, and He the True of them." Here "lives" mean jivas, the individual souls, and they are true because unlike ether (A'kâśa) they have no birth. Even of these jivas, the true ones, He is the True, because unlike them, His knowledge is never obscured. Thus the words "not thus, not thus," going only to deny the limitation of His attributes to those which have been already declared, it does not detract from the former conclusion that Brahman is of a twofold nature.

(Objection:)—The True (Brahman) corresponds to the existence which is present in all things, of which we speak in the terms "the pot existing," "the cloth existing," and so on. Everything else, such as the pot, the cloth, etc., which varies, is denied (i.e., is said to be not Brahman (by the S'ruti in the words "not thus, not thus."

Answer:—As against this, the Sūtrakāra says:

It is unmanifested, (the S'ruti says) indeed. (III. ii. 22.)

The essential nature of Brahman is revealed by no other pramāna or organ of knowledge such as pratyakṣa or sensuous perception. The S'ruti says, "His form stands not within the vision's field, with the eye no man beholds Him, by mind...is He revealed; † therefore, the existence which is revealed by sensuous perception cannot be Brahman.

The Sūtrakāra proceeds to shew what the organ of perceiving Brahman is:

But (it is revealed) in ecstasy as (told) by direct and indirect (Revelation). (III-ii. 23).

But the essential nature of Brahman is apprehended in ecstasy by the mind attaining to the state of intense meditation. That to those who contemplate Brahman, regarding themselves as Brahman, the essential nature

of Brahman becomes accessible is known from the following passages of the S'ruti:

"This A'tman is not obtainable by explanation, nor yet by mental grasp, nor by hearing many times; by him whomso he chooses, by him He is obtained. For him, the A'tman His proper form reveals."\*

"Then does one, in ecstasy, Him free from parts behold." †

The following passage of the smṛiti is also to the same effect:

He is not in the ken of sensuous perception.

And as in the case of light, etc., so exactly here.

And the manifestation (takes place) by constant practice of the act. (III-ii. 24.)

They to whom, as a result of constant worship of meditation, Brahman manifests Himself,—they, when seeing by that vision of Brahman, find that like consciousness, bliss, etc., sovereignty over the universe is alike His attribute. To explain: that those who meditate upon Brahman realise in themselves all the attributes of Brahman as a result of the meditation of unity is declared by the S'ruti in the following passages:

"I have become Manu as well as the Sun."‡

"Do thou meditate upon me as life, as immortality." §

Such passages as "I give thee divine sight, see my divine power," do indeed testify to the manifesting in Krishna and the like of the Divine power as the result of a constant meditation of unity. And by constant meditation of Brahman, Viśvāmitra, Agastya and others attained the power of creating another Svarga, of drinking the ocean, and the like. In the world of to-day, those who take to the repetition of mantras (incantations) develop, by meditating upon *Gurūda* the peculiar properties of *Gurūda*. Thus it is clear that, when the idea of unity with Brahman has attained perfection, the Upāsakas attain to the peculiar state in which they find themselves in possession of all the peculiar attributes of Brahman. It is therefore unreasonable to maintain that Brahman is the mere existence revealed by sensuous perception, and found in association with all objects such as a pot. Thus, because con-

\* Katha-up. 2-23.

† Mund. up. 3-1-8.

‡ Bri-up. 1-4-10.

§ Kaush. up. 3-2.

‖ Bh. Gitā-11-18.

\* Ibid.

† Katha Up. 6-9.

contemplation (nididhyāsana) and other means of attaining an intuitive perception would otherwise have no purpose to serve, and because the mere existence (even supposing that it is not apprehended in sensuous perception) is not declared anywhere to be possessed of the attributes of Brahman, it does not at all stand to reason to say that Brahman as mere existence is immediately perceived and that the S'ruti, "not thus, not thus," denies all else.

Wherefore (He is endowed) with infinite (attributes). Hence, indeed, His nature.

(III-ii. 25).

Because wisdom, bliss, supreme dominion and other characteristic attributes of Brahman manifest themselves even in those who devoutly contemplate Him, therefore it may be concluded that Brahman does possess excellent qualities, infinite in number, as mentioned in the s'ruti "There are two forms of Brahman" \* Hence the twofold nature of Brahman.

(Objection :)—The assertion of the s'ruti—in the words "There are two forms of Brahman" \* etc,—that the universe is the form of Brahman can be explained only by regarding Brahman and the universe as brought together by illusion, by way of mistaking one for the other; their mutual relation being incapable of any other explanation. Wherefore, it is but right to hold that the passage, "Next follows the teaching: He is not thus, not thus," † points to a denial of the reality of the universe which has been supposed to exist owing to illusion.

(Answer :)—The sūtrakāra, before explaining the relation in his own way without resorting to the hypothesis of illusion, first states (two) other theories :

Because of the mention of both, (He is) verily like the serpent and the coil. (III. ii. 26).

(i) Because of the assertion of both unity and diversity of Parames'vara, as made in such passages as "All verily is Rudra;" ‡ "Heaven and Earth producing, the Divine is one", § the earth and other forms of being spoken of in the s'ruti—"There are indeed two forms of Brahman," etc.—pertain to Parames'vara Himself, just as the serpent may be in either form, straight or coiled.

Or, (it is) like (the unity of) light and its abode (which are one) because both of them are luminous things. (III-ii. 27).

(ii) Though light, and its abode are substantially different, yet they are regarded as one because both of them pertain to the genus of luminous objects; so also, Brahman and the insentient are regarded as one, both of them coming under the one genus (of Brahman). This forms another explanation of the unity of Brahman and the Earth, etc.

Or as before. (III-ii. 28).

The word 'or' shews that what follows is quite distinct from the two theories above referred to. In a former section it was shewn that *chit* or spirit constitutes a portion (of Is'vara), inasmuch as it forms an integral part of the composite whole (Is'vara), standing, always in an attributive relation (to Is'vara) genus, qualities, and bodies like light. So, too, in the case of *achit* or matter. It is possible to speak of spirit and matter in one word, as is done in the passage "All verily is Rudra," \* only when they constitute the form of one Entity and are related in the way mentioned above. In the case of the two other theories, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Brahman is impure. And we conclude that the *chit* and the *achit*, spirit and matter, constitute the body of the eight-formed Brahman, on the authority of the following passages of s'ruti and smṛiti :

"Whose body is Earth." †

"Whose body is Atman. ‡

"They call sentiency vidyā and insentiency avidyā. The whole universe made up of vidyā and avidyā is no doubt the form of the Lord, the Lord of all; for the whole universe is in his control."

And because of the denial, (III-ii. 29).

Though Brahman ensouls *chit* and *achit*, spirit and matter, He is said to be devoid of their attributes in such passages as the following :

"Not by the decay of this does It decay." ‡

Not gross, not subtle, not short." §

And for this reason, too, that Brahman, though associated with *chit* and *achit*, is free from evil, and is the repository of all excellent qualities.

\* Bri. 2-2-1.

† Ibid. 2-3-6.

‡ Mahānā. 16.

§ Ibid. 1-12.

\* Mahānā. 16.

† Bri. up. 3-7-3.

‡ Chhm. 8-1-8.

§ Bri. up. 3-8-8.

That is to say : Though Brahman or (Siva) is the cause of *chit* and *achit* and is associated with them, He is ever free from mutability, ignorance and other undesirable qualities, and is ever endued with such supremely excellent qualities as omniscience, eternal bliss, eternal wisdom, absolute independence, undiminished power, infinite potentialities.

### Adhikarana-7.

Now the Sutrakāra first raises an objection with a view to declare ultimately that there exists nothing higher than He, the odd-eyed Siva, the supreme Brahman, the one homogeneous essence, with the Supreme Energy (Paramas'akti) manifested in the form of the whole sentient and insentient existence, free from passions, thought-impressions, and taints of all kinds—the ocean of all auspicious attributes such as omniscience.

(There is something) beyond Him, because He is spoken of as a bridge, while a measure, relation and separateness are predicated of Him. (III-ii. 30.)

A doubt arises as to whether there exists or not something even beyond that Parames'vara, who has been described, from I-ii-2 up to III-ii-29, as the Supreme cause.

(*Pūrvapakṣa* :)—There does exist something beyond. To explain : This Parabrahman is said to be a bridge, a something to be crossed over, a thing capable of measurement, and a thing leading to something else in such passages as the following :

“Now, this Ātman is a bridge, the sustainer” \*

“Having crossed this bridge, though blind, one is no longer blind.” \*

Four-footed is Brahman.” †

“To the Immortal He is a bridge.” ‡

Wherefore, even higher than He, there exists something.

Now Siddhānta follows

But (it is) because of a resemblance. (III-ii. 31.)

(*Siddhānta* :)—The word ‘but’ shews that Siddhānta follows as opposed to the *pūrvapakṣa*. It is not proper to say that there exists anything higher than He,

\* Chha. 8-4-1.

† *Ibid.* 3-13-2

‡ Mund. up. 2-2-5.

than Siva who is higher than all. “Higher than all, is Rudra, the mighty Sage.”\* From these words of the *sruti* we understand that He is higher than all. And as to His being spoken of as a bridge, it is only because of a resemblance, in so far as He prevents all worlds from getting into confusion. The *Sruti* says :—

“This Ātman is the bridge, the sustainer, that there may be no confusion of these worlds” †.

It is Brahman,—who is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe as declared in the *s'ruti* “All this, verily, in Brahman,” ‡—that is to be reached, as we may understand from the passage “To Him, hence departing, shall I go.” Elsewhere, too, the *s'ruti* says :

“Him.....who is Three-eyed, Dark-necked, and Serene : having meditated Him thus, the sage reaches Him who is the womb of all beings, the witness of all, transcending darkness.” §

Here it is Brahman—who is beyond darkness, who is the cause of all, the Omniscient, the Three-eyed and so on—that is spoken of as the Goal beyond all. Accordingly to cross here simply means to reach. Otherwise, if there should exist a thing even above the Supreme Cause, above the Supreme Goal higher than all, then it follows that there might exist another thing even beyond that, and so on ; and thus the Vedāntic texts do not teach any thing definitely. Accordingly the Paramas'iva is beyond all, and hence the supremacy of Brahman over all.

As to Brahman being capable of measurement, the *sūtrakāra* says :

(It is) for the sake of contemplation, as (when speaking) of feet. (III-ii. 32).

It is for the sake of contemplation that the *s'ruti* speaks of Brahman as four-footed, as when speaking of speech as a foot of the four-footed Brahman. ||

(It is) on account of the particular place, as in the case of light etc. (III-ii. 33).

It is true that Parames'vara is altogether immeasurable. Still it is proper to think of Him as limited, in virtue of the seat of his manifestation, just as light appears limited with reference to the window or any other place through which it comes.

Mahān. 10-19.

† Chha. 8-4-1.

‡ *Ibid.* 3-14.

§ Kaivalya up.

Chha. 3-18-2.

The sūtrakāra says that, though He is the Goal. He is also the one who leads the devotee to the Goal :

And because of the propriety. (III ii. 34)

It is but proper that Brahman who is Himself the Goal is also the one who leads the devotee to the Goal, as the s'ruti says "He is attainable to him alone whom He chooses."\* Wherefore we may conclude that there exists none higher than Parames'vara.

### Adhikarana-8.

Similarly, (there is none equal to Him). because of the denial. (III-ii. 35).

In the preceding adhikarana it has been shewn that there is none higher than the Supreme Brahman, the odd eyed (Virūpākṣa) Siva. Now, again, a doubt arises as to whether there exists one equal to him.

(Pīrṇipakṣa :)—Though there is no being higher than Parames'vara, there exists a being who is equal to Him in so far as he is the cause of the universe, the lord, and so on. So, indeed, the s'ruti speaks of a soul (Purusha) as "Thousand-headed Purusha, thousand-eyed, thousand-footed." † In the words "Thousand-headed Purusha" and so on, the Purusha is represented to have many faces and feet. In the words "A foot of his are all the creatures" ‡ the s'ruti shews that he is associated with the universe. "Three feet of his are immortal, in the shining (heaven)" † in these words the s'ruti says that he dwells in the Paramākāśa the Supreme Light. "From him was the Virāj born, and next to Virāj, the Purusha;" † in these words he is represented to be the upādāna or material cause of the Atyakta and the Hiranyagarbha. In the words "Sun-coloured, (he is) verily beyond the darkness." † he is said to be above darkness. "Knowing him thus, one becomes immortal here:" from these words we learn that he is then cause of moksha. Again, he is spoken of as the "Thousand-headed God," † as "the Lord of the Universe," as "Nārāyaṇa and the Supreme Brahman," † and "as Paramātman abiding in the heart" † i. e., as the being who has to be contemplated in the heart. Wherefore this being, Nārāyaṇa, is equal to Parames'vara in attributes. These, indeed, are the attributes of Parames'vara also. The Mantropanishad says :

"Whose faces, heads and necks, are those of all, who lieth in the secret place of every soul.

spread over the universe is He, the Lord. There fore the all-pervader is Siva."\*

The Mahopanishad says :

"With eyes on every side, and with faces on every side."

Even in the Śiva-Sankalpa, He is declared to have faces on all sides. In the Atharvas'iras, the Parames'vara is said to have many faces, feet, and so on. He is said to be associated with the universe as an integral part of His being :

"(This) Māyā, indeed, as Prakṛiti, man should know and the possessor of Māyā as the Mahes'vara. All this universe is pervaded by that which forms a limb of His."†

He is said to be the cause of the Hiranyagarbha in such passages as "seeing the Hiranyagarbha being born."§ He is said to be beyond Darkness in the words "Who is the witness of all, beyond Darkness."|| He is said to be the Being whom we have to contemplate in the Dahara (small bright space in the heart), in the words "who is the small (Dahara), free from sin,"¶ and in the words "having known Śiva one attains limitless peace,"\*\* He is said to be the cause of Moksha. In the words "Endued with lordship over all"†† we are given to understand that He is the Lord of all. Hence the equality in attributes such as that of being of all forms. In the Smritis and other scriptural works, enjoining divine worship, it is declared that either of the two, Parames'vara or Nārāyaṇa, may be worshipped as alternatives of equal importance; "worship either Śiva or Vishnu. And in fact in the world we find places of worship. Purāṇas and Āgamas devoted to both of them alike. Wherefore Purusha or Nārāyaṇa is equal to Parames'vara.

(Siddhānta :)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Just as there is none higher than Parames'vara so there is none, indeed, equal to Him, because of the declaration that none else can be the cause and the lord of the universe. The following passages declare that none other than Parames'vara can be the cause of the universe :

\* S'vet. Up. 3-11.

† Op. Cit. 1-12.

‡ S'vet. Up. 4-10.

§ Manānā. 10-19.

|| Kaivalya. Up.

¶ Mahānā. 11.

\*\* S'vet. 4-14.

†† Atharvasiklā.

\* Katha up. 2-23.

† Tait. Aranyaka. 3-12.

‡ Mahānā. 11.



"There is the One, Rudra alone,—they are not for a second,—who rules these worlds with the powers of ruling and creating."\*

"Heaven and earth producing, there is one Deva."†

"The One who is called Rudra."‡

"The One Deva, Hara, rules the perishable and the Âtman." §

"When, like a skin, men shall roll up the sky, then (only, not till then) shall end of sorrow be without men knowing God." ||

"Siva alone, the Beneficent one, should be contemplated, abandoning all else." ¶

When there is no darkness, there is no day nor night, nor being, nor non-being; Siva alone there is" \*\*

Wherefore, there is none equal to Parames'vara. As possessed of the Supreme Energy (Paramas'akti), Parames'vara alone is the Nimitta or efficient cause. Since Purusha is the upâdana or material cause, he is the cause of Hiranyagarbha. He being the material cause, and Parames'vara the efficient cause, both are said to be the cause of the universe. Hence we understand that the s'ruti "from Him was born Viraj" only declares that Purusha is the upâdana or material cause; and Parames'vara is declared to be the efficient cause in such passages as "the heaven and the earth producing, there was the one Deva." From Siva, the omniscient, omnipotent Parabrahman who is above the whole universe, there arises first the Supreme Power (Parâsâkti) the ultimate Prakriti or Material cause. When the Power is manifested as the Primal Bhoktri or conscious experimenter, we have what is called Purusha, spoken of in the s'ruti as "the thousand-headed Purusha." It is from Siva thus ensouling the Purusha that the whole evolution of the sentient universe takes place. Hence it is that the s'ruti starts with speaking of Parames'vara as the All, in the words "All verily is Rudra," and then speaks of Purusha or Narayana as the all, because of his being the upâdana or material cause. The question arising as to how Purusha can be the All, the s'ruti declares that even Purusha is but a mighty manifestation of Parames'vara's being and, as such, is in the form of the universe, as witness the following passages:

"Purusha, verily, is Rudra." ††

Let us contemplate Purusha and let us meditate upon the thousand-eyed Mahadeva. †††

\* Atharvas'iras. † Mahânâ. 1-12. ‡ Tai. Ara. 1-12.  
§ Svetâ. 1-10. || Ibid. 6-20. ¶ Atharvas'ikhâ.  
\*\* Svet. up. 4-18. †† Mahânâ. 10. †† Ibid. 1-21.

The very Supreme Brahman, who is omniscient, omnipotent, ever contented, independent, "higher than the universe, the efficient cause of the universe, wills "May I become manifold" and evolves this Purusha from Himself. By this Purusha who is evolved from, and forms a part of, Himself, the Supreme Brahman manifests Himself as the universe, as the following passages in the S'ruti clearly shew:

"Having created it, He entered into it; and having entered into it, both being and beyond did He become." \*.

"(This) Mâyâ, indeed, as Prakriti, man should know, and the possessor of Mâyâ as the Mahes'vara. All this universe is pervaded by that which forms a limb of His. †

The upâdana state grows out of the will of the efficient cause, and therefore the efficient cause is superior to the material cause. Because of the inseparability of the upadana from the efficient cause, the attributes of the efficient cause are applied to the upadana. Therefore there exists nothing equal or superior to Parames'vara.

The sūtrakâra says that, for the following reason also, there exists none whatsoever equal or superior to Parames'vara:

Hence His omnipresence, (as may be learned) from the S'ruti speaking of the vast extent and so on. (III-ii. 36.)

Through Purusha,—who is the Upâdana, who is the part and parcel of Parabrahman,—the efficient cause, i. e. the Parabrahman, pervades all, as declared in the following passages of the S'ruti speaking of His presence throughout the whole universe:

"Whose faces, heads, and necks are those of all." ‡

"Whose eyes are everywhere, and whose faces are everywhere." §

"Smaller than the small.....All verily is this Rudra." ||

"He who is called Rudra is the Lord.....He who is the True ....." ¶

Wherefore, the whole universe being but a manifestation of Parames'var there exists none either equal or superior to Him.

\* Taitt up. 2-6. † Svetâ-up. 4-10. ‡ Svetâ. 2-11.  
§ Mahânâ. 1-12. || Ibid. 10-16. ¶ Atharvas'iras.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪ'KANTHA  
BHA'SHYA.

(Continued from page 200).

### Adhikarana 9.

The Sūtrakāra now proceeds to shew that, being thus the Lord of all and the all-penetrating Entity, the Parames'vara Himself is the dispenser of the fruits of all actions, either Himself directly or in the form of the respective Gods concerned :

Hence is the fruit, because of the propriety. (III. li. 37.)

Here a doubt arises as to whether the dispenser of the fruits of all actions to those who perform them is the Parabrahman Himself who has been declared in the preceding adhikarana to be the Lord of all, or some one else.

\* (Pūrvapakṣa) :—Karma (action), though vanishing away the moment it is produced, has yet the power of yielding the fruit at some future time through the medium of the apūrva (the unseen form which action

is said to assume prior to the realisation of its fruit). Thus action itself being capable of yielding its fruit, it seems unnecessary to postulate a distinct unknown entity in the form of the Parames'vara. Therefore, the Parames'vara cannot be the dispenser of the fruits of actions.

(Siddhānta) :—It is from the Parames'vara duly worshipped that all obtain the fruits of their actions ; for, it is reasonable. It stands to reason that devotees should obtain the fruits of their actions from the Parames'vara who is worshipped, as from a king to whom service is rendered. Certainly, neither the insentient action itself nor the insentient apūrva (its invisible form) has the power to discriminate and dispense the fruits of several actions just in accordance with their respective nature ; for, we do not find any such power possessed by service which is insentient. Here, Parames'vara, as known through the scriptures, is not a mere postulate, and there is therefore no fault of a needless assumption. It is in fact said :—

“ For He makes him, whom He wishes to lead up from these worlds, do good deeds ; He makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed.”\*

\* Kaush. Up. 3-8.

In these words the S'ruti declares that I's'vara alone dispenses the fruits of the acts of Dharma and Adharma and impels people to them. On the other hand, it is the postulating of the apūrva not taught in the scriptures that involves the fault of needless assumption. Hence the conclusion that Parames'vara Himself worshipped by works dispenses the fruits of actions; not the actions themselves.

And because so He is declared to be. (III. ii. 38.)

Indeed the Parames'vara is declared to be the lord of all works,—as worshipped by their means and as the dispenser of their fruits,—in the following passages:

"...Rudra, the Lord of hymns, the Lord of sacrifices, possessed of medicaments that confer delight.\*

"Secure Rudra, the king of sacrifice..."†

The Smṛiti, too, based on these passages of the S'ruti, declares that the Parames'vara is the lord of all sacrifices:

"Let everyone worship, by soma, the Divine Being who is associated with Umā and who is adorned with the moon."

And the Rāmāyana, too, says:

"There is no sacrifice, higher than the horse-sacrifice (as'vamedha), in the matter of Rudra's worship."

And in the Chamakās also (Taittirīya-Samhitā IV. vii. 1—11)—which read "May food (come) to me, may permission (come) to me; ....may Dhātri (come) to me, may Vishnu (come) to me"—all things such as food, and all Gods such as Vishnu are declared as things to be given, so that,—as the sole alternative left,—the Parames'vara alone is the dispenser of the fruits of all actions. Therefore it is the Parames'vara alone who is to be worshipped by all sacrifices, and who is the dispenser of all fruits.

For the same reasons, Jaimini holds that it is Dharma. (III. ii. 39.)

Jaimini thinks that Dharma itself is the dispenser of the fruits for the same reasons, i. e., because it stands to reason and because it is so declared in the s'ruti. It stands to reason, because in the case of tilling, crushing, and so on, we see that the result is produced either directly or indirectly by the action itself. That the act itself in the form of apūrva

yields its fruits may be taken as declared in the s'ruti, inasmuch as we cannot otherwise account for the injunction of an act as the means by which he who seeks a particular result can attain it.

But Badarayana (thinks it is) the former, because He is mentioned as the cause. (III. ii. 40.)

The blessed Badarayana thinks that the Parames'vara Himself mentioned before is the dispenser of the fruits of actions, inasmuch as in the very injunctions of works,—such as "he who seeks prosperity should sacrifice a white animal in honour of Vāyu; Vāyu indeed is the swiftest God...and he alone leads the sacrificer to prosperity,"\*—Vāyu and other Gods, ensouled as they are by the Parames'vara, are mentioned as the sources of the fruits. It is only in the absence of a God that we will have to postulate that the transitory act assumes the form of Apūrva. On the other hand, when in the sequel of the section enjoining the act the s'ruti itself explains—with a view to satisfy the natural curiosity that arises close upon the injunction—who it is that dispenses the fruit, that explanation alone must be accepted, just as from the passage "they are very well established, they who perform these rites"† the fruit of the act enjoined—without which the injunction is not complete—is accepted as declared in the sequel. From the Atharvasiras, which reads "He who is called Rudra is the Lord," we understand that the I's'vara is in the form of all Gods such as Vāyu. In the same upanishad, in the words "He who knows me knows all Gods" it is declared that by knowing Him one gets a knowledge of all Gods who are all ensouled by Himself. Hence the conclusion that it is the Parames'vara,—the Supreme Brahman, S'iva, Umā's Lord Himself—who is in the form of all Gods, who has to be worshipped by all acts, and who is the dispenser of all fruits.

### THIRD PA'DA.

#### Ādhikarana—I.

In the preceding portion of the work has been determined the nature of the Pas'u, the worshipper (upāsaka), spoken of as 'thou' (in "Thou art That"), and endued with the attribute of eternality etc.; as also of S'iva, the Lord (Pati), the object of all worship, spoken of as 'That', and endued with omniscience.

\* Rig Veda 1-43-4.  
Ibid. 4-3-1.

\* Tait. Sam. 2-1-1.  
Tāndyā. Br. 23-2-4.

science and other attributes. Now a question arising as to how to worship Him, the answer comes in the sequel :

What is enjoined in all Vedāntas (is the same) because of the absence of all difference in the command etc.

(III. iii. 1).

In all the Vedāntas (upanishads) the Dahara-upāsana and the like are treated. A doubt arises as to whether the upāsana treated in different upanishads is one and the same or differs with the different recensions.

(Pūrvapakṣa) As context (prakaraṇa) differs with difference in recension (Sākhā), the upāsana differs with different sākḥās. Now, in the Chhândogya and the Taittirīyaka, the Dahara-upāsana is treated. In the one, such attributes as sinlessness are described in the passage which begins with the words, "The Ātman who is free from sin, free from old age, free from death,"\* etc. In the other, in the passage "The right, the true,"† etc., such attributes as dark-brown-ness are mentioned. Here, owing to the difference in the attributes, the upāsana differs. In the Chhândogya, again, the Panchâgni-Vidyâ (the contemplation of Five Fires) is designated as Kauthuma, while it is designated as Vâjasaneyâ in the Brihadâraṇyaka. Here, owing to the difference in the designation, the upāsana differs. In the Mundaka-sākhâ is spoken of a rite called S'irovrata (the ceremony of carrying fire on the head) in the words,

"Let a man tell this Brahma-vidyâ (science of Brahman) to those only by whom the s'iro-vrata has been performed according to the rule."‡

S'irovrata is a special ceremony connected with the study of the Vedas and it is enjoined on the Atharvanikas (the students of the Atharva-Veda), not on others. Owing to this difference in the rite, the upāsana differs. Thus, the upāsana differs owing to the difference in the sākḥâ etc.

(Siddhânta) :—The Dahara-upāsana and the like, taught in all the different upanishads, are one and the same; for, as in the case of injunctions of sacrificial works, so here, the words of injunction (cho-danâ), the results to be attained, the form of the Devatâ, and the designations (of the upāsanas) are all same. In the first place, the terms of injunction—such as "let him know", "let him contemplate"—

are same in the different sākḥās. Even the results to be attained,—such as the attaining of Brahman,—are same. The objects of worship, too, are same, such as the Vais'vânara-Brahman. And even the designations are same, such as the Vais'vânara-Vidyâ and so on. Therefore the Upāsana is one and the same. Notwithstanding the use of different verbs—such as 'let him know', 'let him contemplate',—the upāsana does not differ. In the Chhândogya; the Dahara-Vidyâ is enjoined in the words, "What exists within that small ether, that should be sought for;"\* and the Taittirīyâ enjoins it in the words "What is there within, that should be contemplated."† In this case, since the seat of contemplation etc., are same, since Brahman, the object of contemplation, is the same, and since the attributes mentioned in the two upanishads are not opposed to one another, the Vidyâ (upāsana) is the same. The Brihadâraṇyaka and the Chhândogya-Upanishads describe the nature of the five fires to be contemplated,—namely, heaven, rain, earth, man and woman; and the nature of these fires is described in the same way in both. Hence no distinction in the vidyâ (upāsana).

If (you say it is not so) because of the distinction (implied), (we reply that the distinction is possible) even (when the upāsana is) one. (III. iii. 2).‡

(Objection) :—Repetition of the same thing, combined with difference in the context (prakaraṇa) or sākḥâ, points to a difference in the upāsana. Therefore the upāsana taught in different sākḥās is not one and the same.

(Answer) :—Though the upāsana is one and the same, repetition of the same upāsana in a different context (prakaraṇa) or sākḥâ can be accounted for by the fact of the people who learn the vidyâ from that other sākḥâ being different. Therefore, the fact does not point to a distinction in the upāsana.

(The s'iro-vrata) pertains to the recitation of the text, because as such, indeed, it is treated of in the ritualistic section.

And as in the case of sava, it is restricted to them.

(III. iii. 3).

The s'iro-vrata enjoined in the Atharva-Veda in the words "To them alone let him tell this Brahma-Vidyâ"† is intended as an appendage to the recitation of that Veda (svādhyâya), not as an appendage to the Vidyâ or Upāsana; for, the passage "He shall not study it who has not performed the rite"§

\* Op. cit. 8-7-1.

† Mahânâ. 11.

‡ Mund. up. 3-2-10.

\* Op. cit. 8-1-1.

† Mahânâ. 10-23.

‡ Mund. Up. 3-2-10.

§ Ibid. 3-2-11.



shows that the rite pertains to the recitation of the Vedic text, and in the *samāchāra-grantha*, i. e., in the work called *Samāchāra* (ritual) it is declared to be a *Veda-Vrata*—a ritual pertaining to the Vedic recitation—in the words “This, too, has been treated by the treatment of the *Veda-Vrata*.” In the phrase ‘*Brahma-Vidyā*’, the word ‘*Brahman*’ means *Veda*. Therefore just as the *Sava-homa* is confined to the followers of the *Atharva-Veda*, so is the *s’iro-vrata* confined to them alone, so that it does not point to any distinction in the *Vidyā* or *Upāsana* itself.

The (*S’ruti*) also declares. (III. iii. 4.)

The *S’ruti* itself shows the unity of *upāsana*. In the section of the *Dahara-Vidyā*, the *Mahopanishad* and the *Kaivalya-Upanishad* describe the form of the *I’s’vara* as follows :

“The Right, the True, the Supreme Brahman, in person dark-brown, chaste, divers eyed.”\*

“Associated with *Umā*, the *Parameś’vara*, the Lord, Three-eyed, *Nilakantha* (dark-necked, tranquil).”†

From this one may think that, as a corporeal being, the *I’s’vara* is subject to sin, decay, death and the like. It is to prevent this supposition that the *Chhândogya-Upanishad* declares that He is possessed of the eight attributes mentioned in the passage beginning with the words “Now, as to the small lotus in the city of Brahman” etc.‡ In these cases repetition can be accounted for by different attributes being spoken of in different *sākhās*. So, there is no room for the supposition that it points to a difference in the *Vidyā* itself. Accordingly, since the terms of the injunction are identical, i. e. owing to the absence of a difference in the terms of injunction, etc., pointing to a difference in the *Upāsana*, the *Upāsana* taught in all the *Upanishads* is one and the same.

### Adhikarana—2.

The *sūtrakāra* now proceeds to state what is aimed at in shewing the unity of the *Upāsanas* enjoined in all the *Upanishads* :

A collection (should be made of attributes) owing to identity of the purpose. As in the case of the appendages of an injunction, so, too, in the case of (an *Upāsana* which is) similar (in kind) (III. iii. 5.)

Here, though oneness of *Upāsana* has been established, a doubt arises as to whether the attributes

mentioned in one *sākhā* should be gathered in another *sākhā* or not.

(*Pūrvapakṣa* :)—They should not be gathered. To explain : in the *Chhândogya* are mentioned in the *Dahara-Vidyā* the attributes such as sinlessness, but not in the *Taittirīya-Upanishad*. The attributes mentioned in the *Chhândogya-Upanishad* should not be gathered in the *Taittirīya*, because they are not mentioned in the latter. As to the purposes of the *Upāsana*, they are served by the attributes mentioned there, namely ‘dark-brown’ etc. What need is there for the gathering of attributes mentioned elsewhere, for which there is no direction in the *sruti* ?

(*Siddhānta* :)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : In all cases, where the *Upāsana* is one, such attributes as sinlessness mentioned in the *Chhândogya* in connection with the *Dahara-Vidyā* etc., should be gathered together elsewhere in connection with the *Daharavidyā* etc., taught in the *Taittirīyaka* and other *Upanishads*, inasmuch as the purpose of these attributes is the same, namely, to subserve the *upāsana*. Just as the subsidiary acts (*angas*) enjoined (in different *sākhās*) as parts of one main act enjoined are gathered together in the case of the *Agnihotra* and the like, so in the case of the *Dahara-Upāsana* or the like, where the terms of injunction etc., are same, the attributes (mentioned in different *sākhās*) should be gathered together. Wherefore, it stands to reason that the attributes mentioned in different *sākhās* in connection with the same *Upāsanas* should be gathered together.

### Adhikarana—3.

(If you maintain) that they are different because of the scripture, (we reply) no, because of the non-distinction. (III. iii. 6.)

In the *Brihadāranyaka-upanishad* and in the *Chhândogya-upanishad*, the contemplation of the *Udgitha* song as *Prāna*, leading to the enemy’s defeat, is enjoined. A doubt arises as to whether there is, or there is not, a unity of *upāsana* in this case.

(*Pūrvapakṣa* :): Since the terms of injunction etc. are same, there is a unity of *upāsana*.

(*Objection* :)—The object of the *upāsana* as *Prāna* enjoined in the *Brihadāranyaka* is the agent in the act of singing, i. e., the one that sings the *Udgitha*, as may be known from the following passage :

\* *Muhana*. 12.

† *Kaivalya*. *Up*.

‡ *Op. cit.* 8-1-1.

"Then they said to the breath in the mouth: 'Do thou sing for us.' 'Yes,' said the breath, and sang."\*

But in the case of the Chhândogas the object of contemplation is the Udgîtha, itself which is sung, i.e., which is the object of the act of singing, as may be seen from the following passage:

"Then comes this breath (of life) in the mouth. They meditated upon the Udgîtha as that breath."†

Therefore, the upāsanas are different.

(Answer:)—The opening statements in both are the same. The Brihadāranyaka opens the section with the following words: /

"There were two kinds of descendants of Prajāpati, the Devas and the Asuras. Now the Devas were indeed the younger, the Asuras the elder ones. The Devas who were struggling in these worlds, said 'Well, let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices by means of the Udgîtha.'"‡

The Chhândogya opens the section with the following words:—

"When the Devas and Asuras struggled together, both of the race of Prajapati, the Devas took the udgîtha thinking they would vanquish the Asuras by it."§

Therefore as the opening statements are same, the upāsanas are identical.

(Siddhanta:)—The sūtrakāra states the conclusion as follows:

\* Bri. Up. 1-3-7.

† Chha. Up. 1-2-7.

‡ Op. Cit. 1-3-1.

§ Op. Cit. 1-2-1.

Or (they are) not (one) owing to a difference in the context, as (in the contemplations of the udgîtha) as greater than the great, etc. (III. III. 7).

The Vidyās taught in the two upanishads are not one and the same, because of a distinction in the context (prakarana). Now, the contemplation taught by the chhândogas refers to the Pranava which is a part of the udgîtha as declared in the passage "Let a man meditate upon the syllable Om, (a part of) the Udgîtha."\*

But the contemplation taught by the Vajins refers to the whole udgîtha. Thus owing to a distinction in the way they begin, the forms contemplated upon are different, and the upāsanas, therefore, are also different. Just as among the Udgîtha-upāsanas taught in one and the same sâkhā, the contemplation of the udgîtha as 'greater than the great' differs from the contemplation of the same as 'golden,' so, too, here the upāsanas differ.

The Sūtrakāra raises an objection and answers:

If (you think they are same) owing to (an identity in) the designation, that (is answered by what) has been said (above). This (identity in designation) is possible indeed. (III. III. 8).

It should not be contended that the upāsanas taught in the two sâkhās are same because of the identity in the designation 'Udgîtha Vidyā.' For, though the things enjoined are different, the identity of designation is possible. For instance, in the case of the daily Agnihotra and the Agnihotra pertaining to the Kundapayin's sacrifice, though the names are same, the rites are different. So here also. Hence no discordance.

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(To be continued.)

\* Chha. Up. 1-1-1.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

### THE VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS WITH ŚRĪKANTHA BHĀṢHYA.

*(Continued from page 235).*

#### Adhikarana-4

And because (of the Pranava being mentioned as the object of contemplation) throughout, it is but right (to say that Pranava is the object of contemplation). III III. 9

In the Chhandogya it is said "Let a man contemplate the syllable 'Om' the Udgitha."\* Now, a doubt arises as to whether the contemplation here enjoined refers to Udgitha and Pranava as two distinct objects of contemplation comprehended for facility's sake in one act of contemplation, or it refers to one of them only.

(Pārvapakṣa):—It is true that Pranava and Udgitha are grammatically in the same case, put in apposition to each other and thus referring to one and the same thing; and this is possible when one of them is

the substantive and the other an attributive qualifying it. Still, there is nothing to shew either that the Pranava is the substantive qualified by the Udgitha, or that the Udgitha is the substantive qualified by the Pranava. The contemplation therefore relates to them as two distinct things comprehended in one act of contemplation.

(Siddhānta):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: the contemplation does not relate to the Pranava and the Udgitha as two distinct things comprehended in one single act of contemplation. In the first prapāthaka of the Chhandogya, the upakrama or the opening words of the section are, "let a man contemplate the syllable 'Om' the Udgitha; for, with 'Om'\* people begin to sing the Udgitha."† As in the opening words, so, even in the sequel the Pranava is pointed to as the object of worship here intended: "Such indeed is the full account of this very syllable."‡ Thus the Pranava is here the substantive qualified by Udgitha,‡ and it is therefore right to hold that the

\* This shews that 'Om' is the thing to be contemplated upon.

† Op. Cit. 1-1-10.

‡ This is to say that Pranava which occurs in the Udgitha song should be contemplated here.

\* Op. Cit. 1-1-1.

Īpāsana refers to Pranava alone. Accordingly, Pranava alone is the object of contemplation here enjoined.

#### Adhikarana-5.

Owing to identity in all respects, these (should be understood) elsewhere. (III. iii. 10).

"He who knows the oldest and the best becomes himself the oldest and the best. Prāna (breath) indeed is the oldest and the best:"\* in these words do the Chhandogas and the Vājins, when enjoining the contemplation of Prāna, speak of Prāna as the oldest and so on, as also the Kaushītakins. By all the three, the seniority of Prāna has been explained in one way, namely, on the ground that the stay of speech and all other sense-organs as well as their functions depend entirely on Prāna. That Prāna partakes of the richness of the sense-organ of speech and so on is declared in the Chhândogya and Brihadâraṇyaka in the following words :

"Then the tongue said to him: 'If I am the richest, thou art the richest.' The eye said to him: 'If I am the firm rest, thou art the firm rest.' The ear said to him: 'If I am success, thou art success.' The mind said to him: 'If I am the home, thou art the home.'"†

Now, a doubt arises as to whether the Kaushītakins should or should not include in their contemplation attributes such as richness and so on which are not taught in their Upanishad.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—Those attributes should not be included, inasmuch as such attributes alone as are spoken of in the Kaushītaki-Upanishad are emphatically prescribed for contemplation, in the words "He who contemplates *thus*," etc.‡

(Siddhānta):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Though not mentioned in their Upanishad, richness and other attributes should be included by the Kaushītakins in their contemplation of Prāna; for, by the word 'thus' even those attributes which are not mentioned in their Upanishad are referred to as well as those mentioned therein; and Prāna,—of which all these attributes are predicated—being one and the same, all its attributes are naturally present in the mind. Just as Devadatta who was once seen to teach the Vedas in the city of Madhurā is recognised as a teacher of the Vedas when after-

wards seen in the city of Māhishmatī though here he does not actually teach the Vedas, so also, Prāna, described in the Chhândogya and other Upanishads as rich and so on, comes up again elsewhere to the mind as possessed of the same attributes though not there described as possessed of those attributes. Therefore, as they are referred to by the word 'thus', richness and other attributes should be included by the Kaushītakins in their contemplation of Prāna.

#### Adhikarana-6.

Bliss and other (attributes should be gathered together, owing to the identity) of the main thing. (III. iii. 11).

"Owing to identity": these words should be understood here. In treating of the contemplation of the Supreme, bliss and other attributes are spoken of in connection with Brahman,—'the main thing,' the chief object of contemplation,—in the following passages :

"Real, consciousness, infinite is Brahman."\*

"Bliss is Brahman."†

"Right, real, the supreme Brahman, is Purusha, dark and brown."‡

"Brahman whose body is ākāśa, whose nature is true, whose delight is life, whose manas is bliss, who is replete with peace, who is immortal."§

A doubt arises as to whether it is necessary or not necessary to think of all of them in all contemplations of the Supreme.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—It is not necessary to gather them all together in all cases; for, Brahman is one, and if many different attributes are predicated of Him, He becomes many, different attributes making different substantives.—Or thus: It is not necessary to gather all attributes together because the contemplation of the Supreme as taught in one Upanishad is perfect in itself on embracing the attributes mentioned therein.

(Siddhānta):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Brahman, the object of contemplation, and of whom these attributes are predicated, is one and the same, and therefore bliss and other attributes should be gathered together in thought in all contemplations of the Supreme, wherever taught. Black, white, red: broken-horned and full-horned: it is only such sets of opposite attributes as these that make the

\* Chhā. up. 5-1-1. and Bri. up. 8-1-1.

† Chhā. up. 5-1-13.

‡ Op. Cit. 4-20.

\* Taitt. Up. 2-1.

† Ibid. 3-6.

‡ Mahānā. 12.

§ Tai. Up. 1-6.



substantive different, but not such sets of attributes as 'black, sweet-smelling, big lily.' Therefore the several attributes of Brahman being not opposed to one another, they do not make Him different. Accordingly, owing to the identity of Brahman, of whom these attributes are predicated in all the several Upanishads, bliss and other attributes occurring here and there should all be brought together.

#### Adhikarana-7.

Is room for such (attributes) as joy-headedness; for, increase and decrease result from differentiation. (III. III. 12).

"Joy, verily, is His head";\* in such passages as these, joy-headedness and the like are spoken of as the attributes of Brahman. A doubt arises as to whether even these should be included in the contemplation of the Supreme, like bliss and other attributes.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—What objection is there to including these also, along with the attributes such as "of unfailing will?"

(Siddhānta):—We reply as follows: Joy-headedness and the like should not be gathered together in the contemplation of the Supreme; for, they cannot be regarded as attributes of Brahman, in the same way as we can regard the attribute, "of unfailing will." To class them among the attributes of Brahman is to regard Him as composed of parts; and this will subject Him to increase and decrease. If joy-headedness and the like be the inherent attributes of Brahman, He will be differentiated. These attributes cannot therefore be taken into account in connection with the contemplation of the Supreme.

There is no such objection in the case of omniscience and the like attributes, inasmuch as they are inherent in the very nature of Brahman. So, the Sūtrakāra says:

But the others (should be gathered together in thought), because of the similarity in the nature of things. (III. III. 13).

The others,—namely, omniscience, ever-contentedness and so on—are inherent in the very nature of Brahman. As such, they are all similar (to bliss and the like) in their nature and should therefore be brought together; whereas joy-headedness and the like are not inherent in the nature of Brahman and cannot therefore be included in the contemplation of the Supreme.

#### Adhikarana-8.

(The annamaya and others need not be contemplated) because of the absence of use in the devout contemplation. (III. III. 14).

Now, a doubt arises as to whether it is absolutely necessary or not necessary to contemplate the annamaya (physical) and other A'tmans also, in the same way that we should contemplate the A'nandamaya or Blissful A'tman above referred to.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—Their contemplation is absolutely necessary, because it is impossible to contemplate the Innermost A'nandamaya or Blissful A'tman as the Innermost Being dwelling in the annamaya and other A'tmans, without contemplating at the same time the annamaya and other A'tmans themselves.

(Siddhānta):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: The contemplation of the annamaya and the like is not quite necessary, because it is of no use. The purpose of their exposition is only to shew clearly the nature of Brahman, the Blissful (A'nandamaya). Accordingly it is necessary to reflect upon the annamaya and the like only till Brahman is reached. Their contemplation is therefore not absolutely necessary.

And because of the word Atman. (III. III. 15).

"Having united with the annamaya-A'tman,"\* etc. In this and the subsequent passages the word 'A'tman' is used along with each; and this shews that 'annamaya' and other words denote the intelligences functioning in the physical body and so on. Since all intelligences other than Brahman are excluded as unworthy of contemplation by the seekers of liberation, they should not form objects of contemplation at the time of Meditation (of the Supreme). Accordingly the Atharvasiras says, "Siva the Beneficent alone should be meditated upon, abandoning all the rest." This passage declares that none other than S'iva should be meditated upon by the seekers of liberation. Therefore it is not necessary to contemplate the annamaya and others.

A'tman is referred to, as in the other case, (as shown) by the sequel. (III. III. 16).

Here, the passage, "Yet another inner A'tman is the blissful,"† refers to the A'tman, the Supreme Soul (A'tman), not to the pratyagātman or the individual soul, just as the word 'Atman' refers to the Supreme Soul in the passage "From A'tman is the ether born."‡

\* Tel. Up. 2-8.

† Ibid. 2-5.

‡ Ibid. 2-1.

\* Ibid. 2-5.

This is proved by the sequel, "Having united with the Blissful Soul (A'tman)." Therefore the contemplation of the Blissful Soul is the paramount one, being the contemplation of Brahman Himself.

If it be urged that because of the constant presence (of A'tman, the annamaya, etc., also should be contemplated), we reply that we still hold to our view because of the special stress.

(III. iii. 17).

(Objection):—Since the word 'Atman' is used even along with annamaya and so on, there is nothing wrong in contemplating them also as the Paramātmān, as the Supreme Soul.

(Answer):—No; for, from the words "yet another inner A'tman is the Blissful," we understand that the Blissful,—the Paramātmān, S'iva,—is distinct from the annamaya and so on; and the passage "S'iva, the Beneficent, alone should be meditated upon, abandoning all else,"† emphatically declares that S'iva alone should be contemplated, all others being abandoned. By the word 'S'iva' here is denoted the Supreme Brahman as devoid of all taints, as the repository of all beneficent qualities. Indeed, mukti, the attainment of equality with Brahman, accrues from a continuous contemplation of Him who is Divers-eyed (Virūpāksha) and Dark-brown (Kṛishnapīṅgalā.) So that, since.....fruit corresponds to worship, the contemplation of beings other than S'iva, and who are therefore not beneficent, cannot lead to the state of S'iva. Therefore, the Blissful S'iva alone should be meditated upon.

#### Adhikarana 9.

The new one (is intended) here, because that alone is said to be the act enjoined. (III. iii. 18).

"He who knows the first and the best":‡ the section beginning with these words teaches later on,—in answer to the Prāna's question "what shall he dress for me?"—that water is the dress for the Prāna and then proceeds to say: "therefore the S'rotriyas who know this, rinse the mouth with water when they are going to eat, and rinse the mouth with water after they have eaten, thinking thereby they make the breath dressed (with water)."—What is the thing enjoined here?—Is it the rinsing of the mouth with water as well as the contemplation of Prāna (breath) as dressed with water? Or is it only the latter?

(Pūrvapaksha):—Both are enjoined here, as there is nothing to shew that the one or the other alone is meant.

(Siddhānta):—Since the rinsing of the mouth with water is a thing already known to us through current practice based on Smṛiti, it is only the meditation of Prāna as dressed with water that is enjoined here, since it is the thing which we have not as yet known and which we learn here for the first time. What is not known to us otherwise has alone to be learnt from the S'ruti. Where the new thing is not expressly enjoined and the S'ruti takes the form of anuvāda, a restatement of what is already known, we should understand an injunction with reference to it. Therefore, we should understand that the meditation of Prāna as dressed with water is alone enjoined here, as a thing not known to us before.

#### Adhikarana 10.

(The Vidyā is one and the same) as (some of the attributes mentioned in both) are identical, as also because of the absence of any distinction (in others.) (III. iii. 19.)

In the Agnirahasya and the Brihadāraṇyaka the S'āndilya-Vidyā is taught. In the one it is taught as follows:

"Let a man contemplate A'tman, formed of thought, embodied in life, luminous in form, of unfailing will, and of the nature of ether (ākāśa)."\*

In the other it is taught as follows:

"That Person (Purusha) formed of thought, being light indeed, is within the heart, like a grain of rice or barley; He is independent, the ruler of all, the lord of all,—He rules all this, whatsoever exists."†

A doubt arises as to whether two different Vidyās are taught in the two places, or one and the same Vidyā is taught in both.

(Pūrvapaksha):—In the one place the Purusha, the object of contemplation, is great, being 'of the nature of ether (ākāśa)'; whereas in the other He is small 'like a grain of rice or barley.' In the one, again, He is said to be 'of unfailing will,' whereas in the other He is said to be 'independent' and so on. Thus the attributes being different, the Vidyās taught in the two places are different.

\* Ibid. 3-10.

† Arhavya's ikhā-up.

‡ Ibid. Up. 6.1.1-14.

\* Mādhyandina's ākhā.

† Bri. Up. 5-6.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: In both alike, the *Paraśa* is described as *manomāya* (formed of thought) and so on; and so far the attributes described in both are identical. As to His being described to be of the nature of ether (*ākāśa*), it may be explained as intended to shew that He is pure like *ākāśa*, or to praise Him by way of shewing how glorious He is. The attribute of independence and the like cannot be in any way distinguished from the attribute expressed in the words, "of unfailing will," and are therefore identical. Hence the identity of *Vidyā*.

### Adhikarana 11.

Is also elsewhere, because of (His) relation (to both alike). (III. III. 20.)

In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*, in the section beginning with the words "That Person who is in the orb, there and He who is in the right eye here,"\* the *Śruti* declares that the true Brahman embodied in the *Vyāhṛiti*—the utterances (such as *Bhūh*, *Bhuvah*, *Savah*),—should be contemplated as dwelling in the solar orb and in the eye; then the *Śruti* assigns, in the words "His secret name is *Ahaḥ*" a secret name to him as dwelling in the cosmos as a whole, and assigns in the words "His secret name is *Aham*" another secret name to Him as dwelling in the individual organism.

A doubt arises as to whether both the names should or should not be thought of in each case.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—The object of worship being the same in both, namely Brahman, one and the same *vidyā* is taught in both. Therefore, in each case both the names should be thought of.

(*Siddhānta*):—The *Sūtrakāra* says as follows:

Or, not so, because there is a distinction (III. III. 21.)

Here there is no identity in the *Vidyā*, because the object of worship is in each case different, as related to such different seats as the sun and the eye. Therefore each name is appropriate in its own place.

### Adhikarana 12.

And (the *śruti*) reveals (identity) (III. III. 22.)

The *Mandala-Vidyā* or the contemplation of the orb is taught in the *Chhândogya* and the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*. Is the *Vidyā* identical or different?

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—The *Chhândogya* teaches as follows:—

"Now, that golden Person who is seen within the sun, with golden beard and golden hair, golden altogether to the very tips of His nails,"\* and so on.

In the other, having—in the words "He that golden Person who dwells in the sun within,"—spoken of the golden Person dwelling in that person who dwells within the orb which is made up of the three vedas, the *śruti* concludes as follows:—

"All is Rudra..... Homage to the Golden-armed, to the Golden Lord, to the Lord of *Ambikā*, to the Lord of *Umā*, homage to Him again and again."†

Thus the *Taittiriya* speaks of the Person as golden-armed, and the Lord of *Umā*. Now, since in the one He is described as golden in all parts of the body and in the other as golden only in the arms, there is a difference in the form. Again, in the one He is described as the All, while in the other He is described as the Lord of all worlds, and thus there is a difference in the attributes. Hence no identity in the *vidyā*.

(*Siddhānta*):—The *Vidyā* is not different. Identity of His place as dwelling 'within the sun'‡ points to identity in the *vidyā*. As the *Taittiriya-upanishad*§ speaks of the Person as golden in the opening words of the section, the description in the sequel that He is golden-armed is only a *synecdoche*, and therefore even in the concluding passage the *śruti* means that He is golden in all parts of the body. We have shewn that Though He is the Lord of the world, it is right that He is one with the world, because of His having entered into it. Therefore as one and the same entity is referred to in both the places, such attributes as being the Lord of *Umā* and so on should all be included in the contemplation in each case.

\* Op. Cit. 1-6-6.

† *Mahānā*. 13...18.

‡ *Chhā.* 1-6-6.

§ *Mahā* 13.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

### THE VEDA'NTA-SŪTRAS WITH SRIKANTHA BHĀ'SHYA.

(Continued from page 5).

#### Adhikarana 13

And hence too, the accomplishment and the pervasion of heaven.  
(III. III. 23).

The Hānāyanīyas in their khilas or supplementary texts read as follows :

"Brahman accomplished mighty deeds of valour ;  
Brahman, the Supreme, in the beginning permeated heaven ; even before the <sup>world</sup> ~~world~~ did Brahman exist ; with that Brahman, who is there fit to compete ?"\*

The acts known to all people,—namely, the act of burning the three worlds, the act of swallowing the deadly poison, and so on,—unsurpassed by any, and very hard for others to achieve, have been achieved

\* Taitt. Brh. 2-4-7.

by the Supreme Brahman in the form of Sri-kantha,—that Brahman who is Superior to Hari, Hara, and Hiranyagarbha and so on, and who lay pervading the abode of Supreme Heaven even prior to their creation. The question is, is it necessary or not necessary to think of this accomplishment of mighty deeds of valour and this pervasion over heaven, in all our contemplations of the Supreme Being ?

(Pūrcupaksha) :—Because these are, like others, attributes of Brahman, and because these are not spoken of with reference to any particular injunction, they should be thought of in all our contemplations of the Supreme.

(Siddhānta) :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : The permeation of the Divine Being through the supreme heaven should not be thought of in all our contemplations. By the very nature of the thing, it should be thought of only when we contemplate Brahman in abodes other than the small ones. "The Devas verily went to the region of Svarga, and they asked Rudra who He was :"—\* here the Śruti speaks of the Supreme Abode, which is Superior even to the

\* Atharvasūtras.



abodes of Brahmā and others, and which, as the seat of unsurpassed bliss, is called Svarga. Therefore, the permeation through heaven should be thought of in contemplating Brahman in abodes other than small ones, i.e., in contemplating the Vaiśvānara and the like. As associated with it, even the accomplishment of mighty deeds of valour should be thought of in those cases only.

#### Adhikarana—14.

And so too in the Puruṣa-vidyā, because of the absence of mention of others. (III. iii. 24).

Puruṣa-Vidyā is taught in the Chhândogya and the Taittirīyaka Upanishads. "Puruṣa (man), verily, is a sacrifice. The twenty-four years of his life is the prāṭas-savana or morning sacrifice,"\* and so on : in these words the Puruṣa-Vidyā is taught in the one ; and in the other it is taught in the following words : "He who thus knows,—his self is the sacrificer in the sacrifice, his faith is the wife, his body is the fuel, his breast is the altar."† A doubt arises as to whether the Vidyās taught in the two upanishads are identical or different.

(*Pūrvapakṣa* :)—Because the Vidyās in both upanishads alike are named Puruṣa-Vidyā, and because the different members of the sacrifice are imagined alike in both, the Vidyās are identical.

(*Siddhānta* :)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : The Puruṣa-Vidyās taught in the two places are different ; for, the members of the sacrifice declared in the Taittirīyaka—namely, the sacrificer, his wife, etc.,—as also the three savanas are not mentioned in the Chhândogya, whereas in the latter the three savanas are represented in quite a different way. In the Taittirīyaka the three savanas are represented in the following manner : "What we call evening, morning, and noon are the savanas ;" while in the Chhândogya man's life-period is divided into three parts and these parts are represented as the savanas. In the Taittirīyaka, moreover, no specific fruit is declared. "For the Light of Brahman, one should utter 'Om' and contemplate A'tman ;"‡ in these words Brahma-Vidyā has been taught, and the fruit thereof has been declared in the words "He attains Brahman's greatness ;" and then is taught Puruṣa-vidyā in the words "He who thus knows,—his self is the sacrificer in the sacrifice." Thus the

Puruṣa-Vidyā is only an appendage of Brahma-Vidyā, the subject of discourse, and its fruit is therefore the attainment of Brahman. In the Chhândogya, the fruit of the Puruṣa-Vidyā is declared in the words "He lives sixteen hundred years, indeed."\* Therefore, owing to a difference in the fruit and in the representation of the members of the sacrifice, the Vidyās are not identical.

#### Adhikarana 15.

Because the act of piercing and other things are different. (III. iii. 25.)

At the commencement of the Taittirīyaka-Upanishad occur the following Mantras :

"May Mitra be propitious to us, and may Varuṇa be propitious."†

"May He protect us both."‡

A doubt arises as to whether these Mantras form part of the Vidyā or not.

(*Pūrvapakṣa* :)—Owing to their proximity to the Vidyās, they form part of these Vidyās.

(*Siddhānta* :)—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : just as the mantra which is read at the beginning of the Upanishad of the A'tharvanikas forms part of the abhichāra or magical rite intended to bring about death of the enemy because the mantra speaks of the piercing of the heart etc.,—or just as the rites of Mahāvratā and Pravargya treated of at the commencement of the Upanishads of the Aitareyins and the Vājasaneyins are, in virtue of express injunctions, parts of sacrificial rites, so, these two mantras form mere appendages of the act of reciting the Veda as shewn by the words "The true shall I utter" "Efficient may our study prove." They are not parts of the Vidyās, because they are intended for a different purpose. Mere proximity (*sannidhi*) is invalid when compared with *śruti* (direct declaration), *linga* (indicative mark), and *Vākya* (context).

#### Adhikarana—16.

But where the getting rid of (good and evil) is mentioned. (we should understand the obtaining of good and evil by others) because the declaration of the former is subservient to the latter as in the case of the Kusas the metres, the praises and the singing. It has been explained (already) (III. iii. 26.)

In one section (*S'ākhā*) of the Veda, the sage who attains Brahman is said to be released from merit

\* Chhā. 3-16.

† Mahānā 52.

‡ Ibid 51.

\* Chhā. 3-16-8.

† Tait. up. 1-1.

‡ Ibid. 2-1.

and demerit. In another section (S'ākhā) of the Veda it is declared that, of the merit and demerit from which he has been thus released, the former enters into the friends and the latter into the enemies. In a third section (S'ākhā) again, both the release from them and the places of their entrance are spoken of. All this is no doubt meant for contemplation. Here a doubt arises as to whether in all places both the release and the places of entrance should be contemplated or only one of them at one's option.

(Pārapakṣa):—What is the *prima facie* view that suggests itself to us?—In the S'ātyāyanaśrauta, it is said that "His sons come by his property, his friends come by his merit, and his enemies come by his sins." The Tāndina says, "shaking off all evil, as a horse shakes his hairs, and as the moon frees herself from the mouth of Rahu" \* The Atharvāna-upanishad says, "then he is wise, and shaking off good and evil he reaches the highest oneness free from passions."† Here, in the śruti which declares release from merit and demerit, we should not understand as declared the places into which the merit and the demerit enter, for the mere reason that the śruti which speaks of the release does not expressly speak of the matter.

(Siddhānta):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: When the release alone is declared, or when the places of entrance alone are mentioned, it stands to reason that we should understand both as declared in conjunction, not one of them alone. The passage which speaks of the entrance is supplementary to that which speaks of the release, and should therefore form an appendage to it; for, as declaring where the abandoned merit and demerit enter, the former passage necessarily presupposes the latter.

(Objection):—How can a passage which occurs in one section of the Veda be an appendage to that which occurs in another section?

(Answer):—Just as the passage "yon Kusas, the children of the Udambara-tree", is supplemented by the passage which occurs elsewhere and which serves to particularise the Kusas; or just as the passage "by the metres of the Devas and the Asuras" is supplemented by the passage, "the metres of the Devas should come first," which occurs elsewhere; or just as the passage "he should offer the stotra of the śhodasin-rite" is supplemented by the passage "he

should offer the stotra of the śhodasin-rite when the sun has half risen,"\* or just as the passage "the ritvika should sing" is supplemented by the passage "the Adhvaryu priest should not sing," which excludes some of the ritvikas from the operation of the injunction,—so also, when it is possible to make out the passage speaking of the entrance as one serving to supplement the passage which speaks of release from merit and demerit, it is not reasonable to say that one or the other of them should alone be contemplated.

It has been said in the first or ritualistic section of the Mīmāṃsā as follows: "It should on the contrary form a supplement to the other statement, since the adoption of one alone is unreasonable." Here in the present case the passage speaking of the entrance serves to praise or magnify what is stated in the other.

(Objection):—How can one supplementary passage (arthavāda) presuppose another supplementary passage occurring in quite a different context?

(Answer):—This does not detract from the validity of our contention. For, we find that the supplementary passage, "The twenty-first from here is the sun we see," which is intended to praise the contemplation of Sāman, presupposes another supplementary passage, which occurs in the sātra section of the Taittirīya-saṃhita and which serves to determine how the sun is the twenty-first. This latter passage reads as follows:

"Twelve are the months, five the seasons, three the words we see, and the twenty-first is the sun we see before us."

In these words it has been there determined how the sun constitutes the twenty-first in number. Therefore, though an arthavāda, the passage speaking of the merit and the demerit of the sage entering into his friends and enemies respectively should be understood as declared. Moreover, both the release and the entrance are mentioned in one passage in the Kaushītaki-Upanishad in the following words:

"And there he shakes off his good and evil deeds. His beloved relatives obtain the good, his unbeloved relatives the evil he has done."

Hence the conjunction of the two

\* Taitt. Sam. 6-6-11.

† Ibid. 6-3-1.

‡ Taitt. Sam. 6-1-10.

§ Kaushī. 1-4.

\* Chhā. Up. 8-13.

† Mund. Up. 3-1-3.

**Adhikarana—17.**

(It should be thought of) at the time of departure, because of the absence of anything to be reached. So, indeed, others declare. (III. III. 27).

A doubt arises as to whether the release from good and bad deeds should be thought of as taking place at the time of separation from the body or on the path to Brahman.

(*Īrvaṇpakṣa*):-In one place, the release from good and bad deeds is said to take place at the time of departure from the body, in the following words:

“Shaking off all evil as a horse shakes off his hairs.....and then shaking off his body.....”

In another place it is said to take place on the path:

“He comes to the river Virajā, and crosses it by the mind alone, and there shakes off his good and evil deeds.”

Though thus there are two passages speaking of the matter in two different ways, the release should be regarded as taking place only at the time of departure from the body, inasmuch as there exists no enjoyment of pleasure or pain to be brought about by karma at a subsequent period, the attainment of Brahman alone having yet to be achieved. So, indeed, do others declare:

“For him there is only delay so long as he is not delivered. Then he will be perfect.‡”

Accordingly, soon after departure from the body, Brahman is attained.

(It may be interpreted) according to our will, because there is no contradiction to both. (III. III. 28).

The S'ruti speaks of the release from good and bad deeds as taking place at the time of departure from the body; and it speaks of the attainment of Brahman as taking place after the release. In order that these two s'rutis may not be contradicted, we should understand the passage, “there he shakes off his good and evil deeds,” according to the meaning, as suited to the context. That is to say, we should construe the passage as occurring prior to the passage “having reached this path of gods.”§

|| (The journey on the path of gods is still) justifiable because we find a similar thing (taking place even after the attainment of Brahman), as in ordinary life. (III. III. 29).

Despite the exhaustion of all Karma at the time of departure from the body, the journey on the path is

quite justifiable in the case of the worshippers of Brahman. For we do find it said that (even after attaining Brahman) the liberated soul walks about enjoying. It has been said:

“He becomes an autocrat (*svarāj*), he walks about at will in all worlds.”\*

It is like what takes place in ordinary life. In ordinary life, the proteges of kings obtain all things which are beyond the reach of others.† Similarly the passage which speaks of the path can also be explained. Though the whole karma has been exhausted at the time of departure from the body, still, in virtue of the *Vidyā*, the *linga-sarīra* or subtle body remains, and therewith the journey on the path and the attendant acts may be effected, since then it is possible to walk about in the places located on the path, to converse with the Moon, and to do the other things spoken of in this connection.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows:

The passage serves a purpose when the release takes place on both occasions; otherwise, indeed, there is a contradiction. (III. III. 30).

The passage of the soul on the path of the Gods (*Devayāna*) serves a purpose only when the exhaustion of Karma is held as taking place on both the occasions,—on the occasion of departing from the body as well as on the occasion of crossing over the river *Virajā*. Otherwise, i. e., if the whole karma has been exhausted only at the time of departure from the body, the soul would be immediately liberated and the passage on the path of the Gods would serve no purpose at all; and this is inconsistent with the s'ruti which speaks of the passage on the path of Gods as well as with the s'ruti which, in the words “he unites with the supreme Light and attains to his own true being,”‡ declares that the soul attains to his true nature by way of attaining the illumination of intellect only after attaining to Brahman by the path of Gods. Therefore, though the soul's wandering in the several places, his conversation with the moon, and his passage on the path of Gods are all possible in virtue of the *Vidyā* or wisdom, just as the subsequent

\* Chhā. 9-13.

† Kaushī. 1-4.

‡ Chhā. 8-14-2.

§ Kaushī. 1-3.

|| This sūtra is intended to explain how the liberated soul's journey on the path of Gods is possible if he has been liberated from all Karma at death and therefore freed from body and the senses.

\* Chhā. 7-25-2.

† That is to say, in virtue of the *Brahmavidyā* and by the Divine Grace all the things mentioned here are possible as the liberated soul is then invested with a spiritual body and with spiritual senses.

‡ Chhā. 8-3-4.

wandering is possible in virtue of the Vidyā, still, the *samsāra*, taking the form of intellectual narrowness, and continuing till Brahman is attained, cannot be explained as due to the power of Vidyā. Wherefore it is necessary to admit the continuance of a part of Karma as forming the root of the *samsāra*. It cannot be maintained that this continuance of the *samsāra* is due—not to Karma, but—to the will of the Paramesvara or Supreme Lord; for we hold that the very will of the Lord constitutes the soul's Karma. Certainly, according to our theory, there exists no merit or demerit except the will of the Supreme Lord as governed by the doing of acts enjoined or of those prohibited by the *s'mriti*.

(*Objection*):—If the manifestation of the soul's true nature in the form of intellectual illumination should take place after the attainment of Brahman, then the Karma which causes intellectual narrowness should continue till the attainment of Brahman. How can the exhaustion of Karma take place the moment after the crossing of the river Virajā?

(*Answer*):—The very act of crossing over the limits of the boundary line of the material universe constitutes the attainment of the abode of the Paramasiva, which is the Paramāhita, the supreme Light; and this is the attainment of Brahman which is spoken of in the words "having united with the Supreme Light." The river Virajā, connected with the abode of Vishnu, constitutes the boundary line of the material universe. The yogins, who are freed from all taint of Karma on entering into the river, pass beyond Vishnu's abode and enter the spiritual abode of Śiva which is full of supreme bliss. Accordingly the *śruti* says:

"He reaches the goal of the path, and it is the supreme abode of Vishnu."

Hence no incongruity whatever.

#### Adhikarana 18.

The stay of the office-holders continues as long as the office lasts. (III. III. 31.)

It has been said above that the Upāsakas or devotees of Brahman obtain release from good and bad deeds and attain to Brahman. Now a doubt arises as to whether those in office do or do not attain to salvation in addition to their enjoying of the office.

(*Pūropakāśa*):—It would at first seem that there is no salvation at all to the office-holders such as Vaisiṣṭhas, inasmuch as the Purāṇas and other scriptures speak of their birth. Therefore the conclusion is that of the knowers of truth, some attain salvation, and others do not.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: The office-holders have to enjoy fruits other

\* Kātha up-2-9.

than salvation even after the death of the body, till the Karma which has invested them with their respective offices is exhausted. Accordingly, till the termination of the offices, they have to stay there (in the *samsāra* to enjoy the fruits of the Karma which has invested them with the offices; they cannot till then pass on to the path of Light (*archirādi-mārga*). The *prārabdha-karma* of even those who have attained knowledge is exhausted only by the enjoyment of its fruits. Thus, those in office attain salvation on the termination of the office, and therefore the knowers of truth invariably attain salvation.

#### Adhikarana—19.

No restriction as to any Vidyā; and hence no contradiction to the *Śruti* and the *Smṛiti*. (III. III. 32.)

The *Śruti* speaks of the path of Light in connection with the Upakosala-Vidyā and the like. A doubt arises as to whether the path is restricted to the devotees of that Vidyā alone or is open to all devotees (*upāsakas*).

(*Pūropakāśa*):—In the Chhāndogya, the Path of Light is mentioned in connection with the Upakosala-Vidyā and the Panchāgni-Vidyā alone; in the Atharvasiras it is slightly hinted at in connection with the Pāś'upata. It is not mentioned in connection with the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā and the like. The Path of Light must be restricted to those Vidyās, in connection with which it has been mentioned; it cannot be extended to others.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: There is no rule that the path is restricted to those Vidyās with reference to which it has been mentioned. On the contrary it extends to all Upāsakas. Then alone will the *Śruti* and the *Smṛiti* be uncontradicted. In the Panchāgni-vidyā the *Śruti* extends the path to all without exception, in the words "And those who in the forest devote themselves to austerity and penance, they proceed towards Light" \* The *Smṛiti* also (Bhagavadgītā VIII 24) extends the path to all without exception. Therefore the Path of Light is as a rule open to all Upāsakas alike.

Some interpret the Sūtra as follows: There is no rule that the Path of Light is trodden by all Upāsakas alike. Thus alone can the *Śruti* and the *Smṛiti* be absolved from all contradictions.

This interpretation also is unobjectionable; for, those who contemplate Nirguna Brahman, Brahman devoid of all attributes have nothing to do with the path.

\* Chhā 5-10-1.

A. MAHA'DEVA S'A'STRY, B.A.

(To be continued).



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## TRANSLATIONS.

### THE VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS WITH ŚRĪ KANTHA BHĀṢHYA.

*(Continued from page 29.)*

#### Adhikarana 20.

The inclusion of (negative) conceptions concerning the Indestructible is necessary, because Brahman is the same and there is (a purpose served) ; as for instance in the case of the mantra of the upasād. This has been explained (before) (III. III. 33.)

In the Gārgya-Brahmana, while imparting a knowledge of Brahman, certain denials are made in the words "Neither gross, nor fine, nor short,"\* and so on. In the Atharvama also they are found in such passages as the following†

"That which cannot be seen nor seized, which has no family and no caste,"‡ and so on.

\* Bri. Up. 3-8-8.

† Mund. 1-1-6.

A doubt arises as to whether, like bliss, etc., these should be comprehended or not in contemplating Brahman.

(*Pārvapakṣa*) :—At first sight it would seem that those denials need not be comprehended in all contemplations of the Supreme, inasmuch as, unlike bliss, etc., they are not attributes.

(*Siddhānta*) :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : It is proper to include in all contemplations of the Supreme the conception of denials relating to the Akṣara, the Indestructible, since Brahman, the possessor of the attributes, is the same in all places. It is, indeed, by means of these attributes, and in no other way, that a contemplation of Brahman as distinguished from all else becomes possible. For bliss and other attributes to distinguish Brahman from the *pratyagātman*, they must be such as are unassociated with any mean qualities. And it is the very nature of attributes to always accompany the main thing of which they are spoken of as attributes. For instance: though the mantra "O Agni, know the Hotri's deed, and the sacrifice," which is enjoined in connection with the upasād of the *purodāś'a* in the *Jāmadagnya*

sacrifice of four nights,—occurring in the Sāmaveda, has, as such,\* to be recited aloud, still, inasmuch as it should follow the main thing,—namely, the upasād which pertains to the Yajur-veda,—the mantra should be recited in a whisper. This principle has been declared in the former or ritualistic section III. iii. 9.

From this it does not follow that all attributes will have to be included in the contemplation, as the Sūtrakāra says:

This much (alone should be comprehended), on account of thorough contemplation. (III. iii. 34).

'Thorough contemplation' means the contemplation to which one takes readily. Those attributes alone are to be comprehended everywhere, by which a contemplation of Brahman as distinguished from all else is possible. Accordingly it is necessary to comprehend in the contemplations of Brahman only those negative attributes, namely, "not gross," etc., which are mentioned in connection with the Akshara-Brahman, because they are attributes which serve to distinguish Brahman from all else; but it is not necessary to include also such attributes as "who does all deeds, who has all desires, who has all smells, who has all tastes."†

#### Adhikarana—21.

If you hold that in the (passage speaking of Him who is) within (all) (the s'ruti refers to) one's own self possessed of the aggregate of the elements, and that otherwise the difference cannot be explained, (we say), no, as in the case of the teaching (of the Sad-Vidyā). (III. iii. 35).

In the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, Ushasta asks: "Yājñavalkya, tell me the Brahman who is visible, not invisible, the Atman, who is within all." The answer is given in the following words: "He who breathes in the up-breathing, he is thy Atman and within all. He who breathes in the down-breathing, he is thy Atman, and within all... Everything else is of evil."‡ Then again Kahola asks "Yājñavalkya, tell me the Brahman who is visible, not invisible, the Atman who is within all." But the answer is given in the following words: "He who overcomes hunger and thirst, sorrow, passion, old age, and death. When Brāhmanas know that Atman... they wander about as

\* The rule is that in sacrificial rites the mantras of the Sāmaveda should be recited aloud while those of the Yajur-Veda should be recited in a whisper.

† Uhhā 3-4-2.

‡ Bṛi. Up. 3-4.

mendicants... Everything else is of evil."\* Here a doubt arises as to whether the two Vidyās are one or different.

(Pūrṇapaksha):—Now, Ushasta's question refers to the pratyagātman or the individual soul united to the aggregate of elements. Otherwise it would be difficult to explain the difference between the entity spoken of in the answer to that question and described as "He who breathes in the up-breathing, he is thy Atman," and the entity referred to in the answer to the question of Kahola and described as having overcome hunger, etc.

(Siddhānta):—As against the foregoing supposition the sūtrakāra states the siddhānta or final conclusion as follows: You should not say so. This section is like the teaching (of the Sadvidyā):† "That Atman who is within all;" in these words the question was asked in both cases alike; and therefore in both cases, the Parames'vara Himself is the entity referred to in the question. And He alone can be the entity who is absolutely the cause of up-breathing, etc., and who has absolutely overcome hunger, etc., as stated in the answers to the questions. As in the case of the teaching of the Sad-Vidyā (contemplation of Brahman as Existence), the repetition of question and answer refers to one and the same subject. A difference in the questioner and in the form does not produce a change in the Vidyā. Accordingly the sūtrakāra says:

An exchange (should take place); for (they both) qualify (Brahman) as in the other case. (III. iii. 36).

Once the identity of the subject has been established, a mutual exchange of ideas should be effected between the two questioners. That is to say, Ushasta also should contemplate Brahman as one who has overcome hunger, etc., while Kahola also should contemplate Him as the cause of up-breathing, etc. For, the passages occurring in both the sections specify the Parames'vara, as in the other case of Sad-Vidyā. Wherefore as one and the same entity is spoken of in the questions and the answers, there is no difference in the Vidyā. Repetition is intended to remove doubts, as in the case of "That, thou art."

#### Adhikarana—22.

The same (Deity is spoken of); for 'real' etc., (are repeated). (III. iii. 37).

As to the Sad-Vidyā also, which has been cited to illustrate the conclusion arrived at in the preceding

\* Ibid. 3-5.

† CHhā. 6.

adhikāraṇa, there arises a doubt as to whether the Vidyā is one or different.

(*Pārvapakṣa*):—As a repetition is found in the questioning, and as a difference is found in the answers, at each turn a different Vidyā must have been taught.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: There is no difference in the Sadvidyā. The same Mighty Deity, referred to in the words "This Devatā," etc.,\* occurs in every question and in every answer. "That is real, That the Atman, That thou art;" in these words, again and again, reality and other attributes are found repeated. Therefore, the Entity being one and the same, the Vidyā is one and the same.

#### Adhikāraṇa—23.

(The attributes such as the possession of unfailing) desires should be comprehended in the several cases, because of the abode, etc., (being the same).  
(III. III. 38).

The Dahara-Vidyā,—contemplation of the Divine in the heart—is taught in the Chhândogya, in the Taittirīyaka, in the Brihadāranyaka, and in the Kaivalya Upanishads. Are they all one and the same, or are they different?

(*Pārvapakṣa*):—In the Chhândogya, the eight chief attributes, including sinlessness, of the Being dwelling in the small lotus of the heart, and spoken of as Dahara-śkṛtā, are declared in the passage which begins with the following words:

"There is this city of Brahman (in the body) and in it the palace, the small lotus (of the heart), and in it that small ether."†

In the Taittirīyaka the attributes of the Divine Being dwelling in the small lotus of the heart—as the One designated by the word 'Sound (Nāda)' which is the root of the Pranava, as the One denoted by the term the "Mighty Lord (Mahes'vara)", as the One who is dark-brown, as the One who has divers eyes—are declared in the passage "small, sinless,"‡ etc. In the Brihadāranyaka-Upanishad are mentioned the attributes such as lordship, in the following passage "There is ether within the heart. In it there reposes the ruler of all, the lord of all, the king of all."§

In the Kaivalya-Upanishad the attributes of the Supreme Being dwelling in the heart-lotus—as the

three-eyed, as the dark-necked, as consciousness and bliss, as having Umā for His mate, and so on—are declared in the following passage:

"Regarding the heart-lotus unstained and quite pure, and in its centre contemplating Him who is all-pervading; who is intelligence and bliss, the formless, the wonderful; Him whose help-mate is Umā; who is the supreme Lord, mighty, three-eyed, dark-necked, serene."

Now, since dark-neckedness and the like are the attributes of the body and since reality, etc., are the attributes of A'tman, they are two opposed sets of attributes and cannot therefore be included in one contemplation. Therefore they are different Vidyās.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Because the same abode of the heart-lotus is mentioned in the several places, the vidyā is one and the same. Therefore the attributes—such as "whose desires are true"—should be comprehended in all cases—Sinlessness and other attributes mentioned in the Chhândogya, lordship and other attributes mentioned in the Brihadāranyaka, the attribute of being designated by the Pranava and other attributes mentioned in the Taittirīyaka, the attribute of being consciousness and bliss in essence and other attributes mentioned in the Kaivalya-Upanishad,—all these attributes of Brahman should be comprehended in the Dahara-vidyā. The attributes of Brahman, described in the Kaivalya-Upanishad in the words "whose help-mate is Umā," "one who has three eyes," are identical in meaning with those of Brahman which are described elsewhere in the words "one who is dark-brown," and "one who has divers eyes." Repetition here is calculated to produce a high regard. The same construction should be put upon all attributes which are thus repeated. The Brahman is the being of whom all these attributes are predicated, and as such He alone is the object of worship in all cases, so that the Supreme Brahman should be contemplated in the middle of the small heart-lotus as endued with sinlessness and so on, as the lord of all, as the thing denoted by the syllable 'om,' as one whose help-mate is Umā, as Three-eyed, as Dark-necked, as Consciousness and Bliss, as Infinite, Immortal, Wonderful. Accordingly this contemplation is the most essential in all contemplations of the Supreme. In the Chhândogya and the Kaivalya-Upanishads, it is said that he who devotes himself to this contemplation is said to attain, as the fruit thereof, to the Supreme Brah-

\* Chhā. 6-2-2.

† Op. Cit. 5-1-1.

‡ Mahā. 10.

§ Bri. Up. 4-4-21

man Himself, the object of all worship, transcending the region of Prakṛiti or the material universe :

"Having reached the Highest Light he appears in his true form."\*

"Having meditated thus, the sage reaches Him who is the womb of all beings, the Witness of all, transcending darkness."†

Thus, as the attributes of dark-neckedness and the like as well as the attributes of sinlessness and the like are ever present in Brahman, and as each set of attributes presupposes the other, nothing stands in the way of our comprehending them all in one act of contemplation. The denials would be quite out of place if there were no occasion for them. On seeing the Supreme Brahman described as possessed of a body having three eyes, one would naturally attribute to Him other attendant attributes of the body, such as sin, old age, death, hunger, thirst, vain desires, vain purposes; and it is to prevent this that the śruti declares that He is devoid of all sin, and so on. Though the Supreme Brahman is endued with a body having three eyes and so on, still, He is free from all sins, free from old age, free from grief, free from hunger, free from thirst. His desires are true, his purposes are true, He is consciousness and Bliss. Hence no incongruity.

#### Adhikarana 24.

(*Objection*):—If in the form of Brahman there should exist such parts of the body as would entitle Him to be described in the words "dark-necked," and so on, as He is described in the words "love is His head," then He would be subject to growth and decay and would therefore cease to be "dark-necked."

(*Answer*):—The sūtrakāra says :

Because of high regard, there is no failure. (III. iii. 39).

In the preceding sections it has been determined that Brahman has a form described as dark-necked, etc., that He is associated with the Supreme Power (Parama Śakti) designated as Umā, and that He has all the attributes including unfailing will and so on. Now a doubt arises as to whether at any time these attributes cease to exist in the Supreme Brahman, or they never cease.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—At first sight it would seem that they cease at some time, inasmuch as they are merely imagined in the Supreme Brahman for the sake of contemplation.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: They never cease to exist in the Supreme Brahman because of the high regard the śruti shows for them by way of repeating in all cases His association with Umā and other attributes. Hence the description of the Supreme Brahman as one of

unfailing potentialities.—Where are they repeated with high regard?—We answer, everywhere. Though it has been declared that He is dark-brown and divers-eyed, i.e., that He is associated with Śakti and three-eyed, still, again, to shew indeed its high regard for them, the śruti repeats "Whose help-mate is Umā, who is the Supreme Lord, the Master of all, who has three eyes."\* In the śruti treating of the contemplation of the Divine Being in the solar orb, He is, again, out of high regard, described as the Lord of Umā, in the words "Homage to the Golden-armed, to the Lord of gold, to the Lord of Ambikā, to the Lord of Umā."† Elsewhere, again, that the Īśvara is dark-necked, is, for the sake of regard again repeated in the words "whose neck is dark, who is deep-red;"‡ "Homage to the dark-necked, to the black-throated,"§ and so on. It is only to inspire high regard that the attributes of unfailing will and the like are repeated again although they have been once mentioned. Wherefore, on account of the high regard for them which the śruti shows by way of repeating them again and again, the attribute of being the Lord of Umā and such other attributes never cease to exist in the Supreme Brahman.

In the case of Dharma and Brahman,—the subjects that are unknowable from any other source of knowledge,—those who follow the authority of the śruti should accept whatever that Divine śruti says as to their nature. Otherwise, if we follow that line of reasoning which is opposed to the śruti, it can never be established that Brahman is the material cause of the Universe, and so on. Accordingly, after having declared that Brahman is Existence and Consciousness and the Infinite, in the words "Existence, Consciousness, the Infinite, is Brahman,"§ the śruti itself again declares with reference to Him

"The Right, the Real, is the Supreme Brahman, the Person who is dark and brown, whose semen is held above, who has divers eyes. . . . :"

i.e., the śruti declares Brahman's conditioned form, that He is three-eyed and that He is associated with Umā, the Supreme Power (Paramaśakti). And again, in the words "that is the one bliss of Brahman,"¶ the śruti says that He is possessed of unsurpassed bliss. With reference to Him again, the śruti says

"Whose body is ākāśa, whose nature is true, whose delight is life whose manas is bliss, who is replete with peace, who is immortal."\*\*.

\* Kaiv.-Up.

† Māhātā. 18.

‡ Tait. Sam. 4-5.

§ Tait. Up. 2-1.

¶ Māhātā. 12.

¶ Tait. Up. 2-8.

\*\* Tait. Up. 1-6.

\* Chhā. 8-3-4.

† Kaivālya-Up.

A. MAHADEVYA SASTRI, B.A.

(To be continued.)



# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — OR — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

### THE VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS WITH ŚRĪKANTHA BHĀṢHYA.

*(Continued from page 52.)*

This means that Brahman shines forth with consciousness, that He delights in Himself, that He exults in the Supreme bliss which can be experienced by the antah-karana or inner sense alone divorced from all organs of external sensation, that He is untainted with any kind of evil, and that He is free from all bondage from time without a beginning. By describing Him as "freed from all sins" the śruti wards off all evils that may be supposed to pertain to Him,—as they pertain to a Jiva,—owing to His connection with a body described as divers-eyed and so on. In the words "who is the omniscient, the all-knower,"† "He has a Supreme Sakti,"‡ "To the Lord of all,"§ and the like, the Śruti speaks of His omniscience, His omnipotence, His independence, and so on. Thus

\* Chhā. 8.1-5.

† Mund. 1.1.10.

‡ S'vetā. 6-8.

§ Taitt. Sam. 4.5.2.

the Śruti itself, which stands at the head of all authorities, proclaims everywhere that Brahman is Existence, Consciousness, and Bliss; that He is infinite, omniscient, ever-satisfied, independent, that His manifestation has had no beginning, that He is possessed of infinite and undecaying powers; that He delights in Himself, that His bliss is enjoyed by the inner consciousness alone, that He is tranquil, immortal, dark necked, divers-eyed, associated with Umā; that the Supreme Brahman is the soul of all, and the means to Salvation. Who can stand in the way of the Śruti? Wherefore the essential attributes described above never cease to exist in the Supreme Brahman.

#### Adikarana—25.

*(The said Brahman is attained by the liberated) since the latter is said to attain freedom because of the (self-realisation accruing) on the attainment of Brahman. (III. III. 40).*

Now a doubt arises as to whether it is the Brahman described in the last section that is attained by the liberated soul, or some thing else.

*(Pūrvapaksha):—*One thing suggests itself to us at first.—The Śruti declares the unconditioned Brahman in the passages such as the following:

"Who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint."\*

"He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman Himself."†

In these words, the S'ruti says that liberation consists in the liberated soul attaining to Brahman's state. Wherefore it is the unconditioned Brahman, not anything else, that is attained by the liberated.

(Conclusion):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows. It is the state of the Conditioned Brahman that is attained by the liberated soul. For, the S'ruti declares that the liberated soul secures his relatives at will and attains equality with the Supreme Brahman—as declared in the passages of the S'ruti and the Smṛiti, such as "he moves about there eating, playing, and rejoicing, be it with women, carriages or relatives;" (1) "he attains perfect equality;" (2) "the liberated soul shall become equal to Ś'iva—only as a result of his attaining to his own true state on attaining to the Supreme Brahman," "on uniting with the Supreme Light" (3) as the S'ruti says—, the Divers-eyed, contemplated within the small heart-lotus. Wherefore the form of the Supreme Brahman described above as Dark-necked is the very form to which the liberated soul attains; it does not pertain to saṃsāra, to the mundane existence, since that form is said to be free from all conditions of mundane existence in the words "Who is freed from all Sins." (4) The highest wisdom, therefore, concerning the Supreme is one that comprehends Him as possessed of attributes. When the S'ruti describes Brahman as one "who is without parts, who is without actions," it is only the evil attributes that are denied, but not the auspicious qualities. To explain. The words "Who is without parts, who is without actions" and "The Lord of Nature and Souls, the Ruler of Guṇas" (5) describe Brahman both as unconditioned and conditioned, as *Nirguṇa* and *Saḡuṇa*; but from the passages—such as "Who is the omniscient, the all-knower", "Who is freed from all sins"—which speak of the specific nature of Brahman, we understand that the S'ruti speaking of Brahman as devoid of qualities, means only absence of evil qualities, and that the S'ruti

speaking of Brahman as possessed of qualities refers to the auspicious qualities that He possesses.

Moreover, there is a passage in the scripture itself which teaches that the *Saḡuṇa* is attained as the result of liberation.

"He attains all pleasures with Brahman the Wise." \*

That is to say, the liberated soul attains all pleasures with the omniscient Brahman. The word 'with' shows that the enjoyment of bliss is coeval with Brahman's. Wherefore the fruit attained by the liberated soul is none other than the *Saḡuṇa* Brahman.

### Adhikarana—26.

No absolute necessity for the observance of directions about such contemplations, because so we find. As a separate fruit indeed is non-obstruction (declared).

(III. iii. 41).

A doubt arises as to whether the directions concerning the contemplations taught in connection with the Udgītha and such other angas or constituent parts of sacrificial rites should invariably be attended to or not.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—It would seem that those contemplations should, of necessity, be gone through in performing the sacrificial rites, because such contemplations form part and parcel of those rites. Though they are taught outside the section which treats of the sacrificial rites themselves, still, through other things mentioned in connection with them, they may be connected with those rites. Though, for instance, the direction that the ladle (*juhū*) should be of parṇa tree is given without any specific reference to a sacrificial rite, still, inasmuch as the ladle is invariably associated with a sacrificial rite, the specific direction that the ladle should be of the parṇa tree refers to a sacrificial rite. Similarly, from the statements "He that sings aloud thus regarding;"† "He who chants sāmān, thus regarding,"‡ speaking of the contemplations as associated with the Udgītha, the Sāmān, etc., which are invariably associated with sacrificial rites, we understand that the contemplations also are connected with sacrificial rites. Therefore, the contemplation of the Udgītha and so on are absolutely necessary in the sacrificial rites.

\* Svētā. 6-19.

† Mund. 3-2-9.

(1) Chhā. 8-12-3.

(2) Mund. 3-1-3.

(3) Chhā. 8-3-4.

(4) Ibid. 4-1-5.

(5) Svētā. 6-16.

\* Taitt-up-2-1.

† Taitt. Sam. 3-5-7.

‡ Chhā. Up. 1-1-8.

§ Ibid. 1-7-9.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: These contemplations are not absolutely necessary, any more than the milk-pail, etc. To explain: The scripture says, "Let him convey water in the charāṇa vessel,—but in the milk-pail (*godhāna*) in the case of one who seeks cattle." Here the milk-pail is prescribed for conveying water, not in the interests of the sacrificial rite itself, but in the interests of the sacrificer, and the observance of the direction is therefore optional, not absolutely necessary like the act of conveying water. Similarly, the contemplation connected with the sacrificial rites are not prescribed in the interests of the sacrificial rites themselves, inasmuch as these rites may be performed without the contemplations, as the following passage shows:

"Both he who knows this (the true meaning of the syllable *Om*) and he who does not know, perform the same sacrifice."<sup>\*</sup>

Again, the *śruti* says:

"The sacrifice which a man performs with knowledge, faith, and meditation of the *Devatā*, is more powerful."<sup>†</sup>

Here, though the verb—'performs'—is in the present indicative, still we assume that the *śruti* means an injunction, that he who seeks to make the rite more powerful should observe the directions regarding the contemplations as a means of achieving his object. For a sacrificial rite to become more powerful is to produce its fruit soon without encountering obstruction from other stronger forces in action. Further, these contemplations are said to yield distinct fruits of their own, such as objects of desire and rain; and they cannot therefore be indispensable in the interests of the sacrificial rites themselves.

#### Adhikarana-27.

(The *Upāsana*s are different) exactly as in the case of the offerings. This has been explained (III. III. 42).

It has been declared that in all the several *upāsana*s of the Supreme, the one *S'iva*, the Supreme Brahman, should be thought of differently as endued with the different attributes specifically mentioned in the several contexts. Now, a doubt arises as to whether this stands to reason or not.

\* *Chhā. Up.* 1-1-10.

† *Ibid.*

(*Īrāpākṣa*):—It would appear that, notwithstanding a difference in attributes, Brahman, who is possessed of those attributes, is one and the same, and that therefore there can be no change in His *upāsana*. No change is perceived in the one prince, whether engaged in business, exercise or eating, whether he is seated or engaged in hunting or fighting, though he may put on different ornaments on different occasions, and though he may be seated on the throne or in any other place. So also, notwithstanding the difference in the abodes such as the heart, and notwithstanding the difference in the attributes with which He is endued, Brahman is one, and His *upāsana* must therefore be one alone.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: Though there is no change in the essential nature of the one *S'iva*, the Parabrahman, still, there is a difference corresponding to the difference in the qualifying attributes, the Supreme Being being endued with different attributes in the several *upāsana*s; and the manner of His contemplation therefore differs by contemplating Him as endued with different attributes. In the case of offerings to Indra, different *puroḍāsa*s are offered according to the difference in the attributes, as the *śruti* says, "To Indra, the king, let the *puroḍāsa* of eleven dishes be offered; as also to Indra, the over-lord, and to Indra the self-lord."<sup>\*</sup> Accordingly, the *Samkarṣha-Kāṇḍa* says, "The deities are separate because they are separately conceived"<sup>†</sup> So, here, though the Supreme Brahman is one, the *upāsana* differs with the difference in attributes. As to the illustration of the prince who remains one though his dress and seat may change, even there the manner of service rendered by the servants differs with the change of dress and place, though he remains essentially the same all the while.

#### Adhikarana-28.

(The Supreme Brahman associated with *Umā* is to be contemplated in all *upāsana*s) because of the predominance of the indicatory mark. That, indeed, is stronger; and it has been explained also. (III. III. 42.)

It has been established in the foregoing articles that, in all Highest *Vidyā*s (or *upāsana*s), Brahman should be contemplated. The purpose of this *adhikarana* is to determine specifically the nature of the Brahman to be contemplated. The *Taittirīya* says:

\* *Tait. Sam.* 2-3-6.

† *Op. Cit.* 14-2-15.

"All, verily, is Rudra. To that Rudra be this obeisance. Puruṣa, indeed, is Rudra, the Existence, the Splendour. I bow to Him, bow to Him."

"All being, the variegated world, that which has been born and is being born in various forms; all this, indeed, is this Rudra; and to that Rudra be this bow."

"To excellent Rudra, to the extremely wise, to Him who rains all blessings, to the Adorable, to the Heart, we shall address this happiest word: 'All this verily is Rudra, and to that Rudra be this homage'."

"Homage to the Golden-armed, to the Lord of gold, to the Lord of Ambikā; to the Lord of Umā be this bow, and again this bow."\*

Now a doubt arises as to whether the Supreme Brahman,—who is here declared to be one with all and so on, and to be the Lord of Umā,—should be contemplated only in the upāsana relating to the solar orb with which the present section is concerned, or in all contemplations of the Supreme.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—At first sight it would appear that such Brahman should be contemplated only in connection with the upāsana of the solar orb with which the present section is concerned, inasmuch as it will not do to do any violence to the main subject of the section.

(Siddhānta):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: This Brahman, the Supreme, associated with Umā should be contemplated as such in all upāsanas of the Supreme, owing to the predominance (in this section) of the passages treating of the indicatory marks or attributes mentioned in the several other upāsanas of the Supreme. To explain: The passage "All, verily, is Rudra," evidently refers to the attribute of the Supreme that has to be contemplated in the S'āṇḍilya-vidyā: "All this is Brahman. Let a man meditate on the (visible world) as beginning, ending, and breaking in that Brahman."† "Puruṣa, verily, is Rudra": these words repeat the characteristic attributes mentioned in the Puruṣa-Sūkt and the upakosa-Vidyā. "The existence": this corresponds to the attribute of Brahman to be contemplated in the Sad-Vidyā, "Existence alone, my dear; this at first was."‡ The word 'Mahah

(Splendour)' refers to the attribute of Brahman to be contemplated in the Vyāhṛiti-Vidyā, which says "'Mahah': this is Brahman, this the Ātman; its limbs are other Devatās."\* "The most beneficent one in the heart:" these words refer to the heart, and thus allude to the attribute of Brahman to be contemplated in the Dahara-vidyā. "The the Golden-armed:" these words refer to the attribute of golden form to be contemplated in connection with the solar orb. —"The Lord of Umā:" this is to show that Brahman described here should be contemplated in all upāsanas of the Supreme. As expelling (Sk. root *dra*) the disease (Sk. *ruj*) of saṁsāra, S'iva the Parmātman is called Rudra. Thus from the very words of the passages occurring in the section, it may be determined that S'iva, the Parabrahman, the Lord of Umā, should be contemplated in all Vidyās or Upāsanas of the Supreme. This agreement in the words of passage should certainly prevail as against the general subject matter of the section (which would go to restrict the attributes to the one particular Vidyā with which that section is concerned), as has been shewn in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā III. iii. 14. Hence the conclusion that the Supreme Being, the Lord of Umā, the expeller of the disease of saṁsāra, should be contemplated in all upāsanas of the Supreme.

#### Adhikarana—29.

As an alternative for the preceding, they should form (parts of) the ritualistic sacrifice, because of the section (in which they occur), as in the case of the mēnta cup. (III. iii. 44).

In the Aguirahasya-Brahmana it is said,

"It saw thirty-six thousand shining fire-altars, belonging to itself, made of mind, built of mind."†

Further on the śruti speaks similarly of other fire-altars built of speech, built of breath, built of sight, built of hearing, built of action, built of fire. In man's life-span extending over one hundred years, there are thirty-six thousand days. Computing the whole function of mind in a day as one fire, there are thirty-six thousand fires. These should be regarded as the Pratyagātman, the Inner Self. So too in the case of fire-altars built of speech, etc. Now a doubt arises as to whether they form part of the sacrifice of knowledge or part of the sacrifice of ritual.

\* Tait. Up. 1-5.

† Satapatha-Brahmana, Aguirahasya, 5-3. Many other passages are quoted in the sequel from the same section.

A. MAHADEVA SASTRI, B.A.

(To be continued).

\* Mahānā. 16-18.

† Chhā. 3-14-1.

‡ Ibid. 6-2-1.



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## TRANSLATIONS.

### THE VEDA'NTA-SŪ'TRAS WITH Ś'RĪ'KANTHA BHĀ'SHYA.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—These imagined fires—such as those made up of speech, those made up of mind, etc.—enter into the sacrifice of ritual, whereof the fire built of bricks, just spoken of, forms a supplementary part. Accordingly, these fires are only alternatives for the fire built of bricks as in the case of 'mental cup.' The explain. The cup offered on the tenth day, called *avivākya*, of the Soma sacrifice occupying twelve days,—the earth being regarded as the vessel, *Prajapati* being regarded as the Deity, and the ocean being regarded as the substance (*soma*),—forms part of a ritualistic sacrifice, though it is a mental cup, because the taking up of it, the putting down in its place, the offering of it the taking of the remaining liquid, the invitation to drink it, and the drinking of it can be achieved only in mind; similarly, though mental, these fires form part of the ritualistic sacrifice.

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And because of the extended application. (III. III. 45.)

These fires form part of the ritualistic sacrifice, because the particulars connected with the fire built of bricks are extended to them, in the words of the S'ruti, "each one of them is commensurate with the one mentioned above."

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows:

(They are), indeed, knowledge alone, because of the determination and of the Revelation. (III. III. 46.)

They are knowledge alone; i.e., they form parts of the sacrifice of knowledge. Though it is known that these are fires formed of knowledge because of their being merely imagined as fires, the S'ruti determines the same thing again in the words "these, verily are built only of knowledge"; and this determination shows that they form parts of the sacrifice of knowledge. And the S'ruti expressly declares that it is only a sacrifice of knowledge, in the following words.

"They were built of mind; in these the offerings were taken by mind; they praised in mind, and they extolled in mind. Whatever act was done in the sacrifice and whatever act pertained to the

sacrifice, all this was done by mind in mental forms, in the mental fires built of minds."

Wherefore they are parts of the sacrifice of knowledge.

And because of the greater force of the direct declaration, etc., this view cannot be set aside. (III. iii. 47.)

Our view cannot be set aside on the mere authority of the 'section (prakaraṇa)', because it is weak when compared with 'indicatory mark (linga)', with the 'wording of the passages (vākya)' and with the 'direct declaration (S'ruti)'. The śruti says:

"These, verily, are only built of knowledge; and by him who regards them thus always, all beings are won. Even though he be asleep, these fires are built up in knowledge in the case of him who regard them in this way."

(Objection):—"In these, the offerings were taken up in mind:" in such passages as these there is no particle denoting injunction; and therefore there is no sacrifice of knowledge as distinguished from the ritualistic sacrifice.

(Answer):—The Sūtrakāra says:

From the supplementary (statements, we learn that these are distinct from the ritualistic sacrifice), as the other (sacrifices of) knowledge are distinct. It is also seen (elsewhere). This has been explained. (III. iii. 48.)

"The offerings were taken by mind": from this and other such supplementary statements in connection with the sacrifice, as also from such direct declarations as "these, verily, are piled by mind," we understand that there is here an injunction of a sacrifice of knowledge. Just as the Dahara-Vidyā and the like are regarded as sacrifices quite unconnected with any of the ritualistic ones, so, from the supplementary passages and from direct declarations such as those cited above, we understand that the sacrifice of knowledge is also unconnected with any of the ritualistic sacrifices. And there are instances where passages which merely assert are construed into injunctions, as for instance, "what one does with knowledge, that surely is more powerful.\*" This principle has been well explained in the Pūrva-Mimāṃsā III. V. 21. Wherefore it is but proper to maintain that these fires are only parts of a sacrifice of knowledge.

The Sūtrakāra now supposes an objection and answers it as follows:

(This view is in) no (way objectionable) because (the transfer of particulars from one to another) is seen even on account of some similarity, as in the case of death. No occasion indeed for the relation of space. (III. iii. 49.)

"Each one of them is commensurate with the one mentioned above:" in these words the particulars connected with the fire built of bricks are transferred to the mental fires simply because of the similarity of results. The same fruit that accrues from the fire built of bricks through the sacrifice with which it is connected accrues also from these mental fires which form part of the sacrifice of knowledge. The S'ruti does not certainly mean that these mental fires occupy the same amount of space as the fire built of bricks. We find particulars connected with one thing being extended to another on account of some point of resemblance, whatever that point of resemblance may be. The passage "He verily is death, He who is the person dwelling in this orb," identifies the person dwelling in the sun with Death simply because both are alike destroyers. Here, certainly, the person dwelling in the orb does not occupy the same space as Death. Thus, the identification being possible on account of any point of resemblance whatever, no objection can be taken to our view.

The Sūtrakāra states another reason as follows:

And from the sequel, such is the meaning of the passage; and they are appended because of the preponderance. (III. iii. 50.)

From what follows in the Brāhmaṇa, we understand that the passage speaking of mind-built fire and so on means that these fires exist only in knowledge. The passage referred to runs thus: "that piled fire is this world, indeed," and so on. In this passage, the S'ruti enjoins a Vidyā (upāśanī) productive of a distinct fruit. The mind-built fire and the like are treated in a ritualistic section simply because of the details to be imagined in connection with these fires abound in that section. Therefore, these fires form part of the sacrifice of knowledge.

### Adhikaraṇa—30.

Some (hold that it is not proper) because of the existence of the self (Ātman) in the body. (III. iii. 51.)

Now a doubt arises as to whether it is proper or not to contemplate in all meditations of the Supreme, the nature of Brahman as described above.

(Pārvapakṣa): Some hold as follows:

As the worshipper dwells in the body and manifests himself as the actor and the enjoyer, it is not proper to contemplate, in the meditations of the Supreme, the

\* Chhā. 1-1-10.

Parames'vara as the Self of such a one,—to contemplate as such Him who is Three-eyed and so on.

(*Siddhānta*): As against the foregoing contention the Sūtrakāra says:

The opposite (should be contemplated because the self-realisation depends thereon, as in the case of the realisation (of Brahman).

No (incongruity) whatever (III. III. 52.)

It is not that the Paramātman should be contemplated as the Self of the worshipper who manifests himself as the actor and the enjoyer. On the contrary, it is the opposite nature, as manifested in the one liberated from the mundane life,—i.e., in the one by whom all sins have been shaken off, and so on—that should be contemplated, because the realisation of the true nature of the Self depends upon such contemplation. The realisation of the true nature of Brahman, for instance, depends on the contemplation of Brahman as He really is. The Śruti says:

"According to what his will is in this world, so will he be when he has departed this life."<sup>\*</sup>

Accordingly, inasmuch as the worshipper should be contemplated as liberated from mundane life, as free from all sins, and so on, there is no incongruity whatever in contemplating the Parames'vara,—who has to be contemplated as the Self of the worshipper,—in His nature as the Three-eyed, and so on.

#### Adhikarana—31.

What are connected with the subsidiary parts are not (confined to them alone). They are indeed common to all Vedas in all their recensions. (III. III. 53).

A doubt arises as to whether those things which are enjoined in certain parts of the Vedas in connection with the subsidiary parts of the contemplation should be regarded or not as forming parts of all contemplations.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—Now a repetition of the Pranava in connection with the Dahara-Upāsana is enjoined in the Kaivalya-Upanishad as follows:

"Having made the A'tman the (lower) arani, and the Pranava the upper arani, by repeated churning the wise man burns up the bond."<sup>†</sup>

In the Atharvas'iras the smearing of the ashes is enjoined in connection with the Pāś'upati-Vidyā (the contemplation of the Pāś'upati, the Lord of the souls,) as follows:

"With the Mantra, 'Fire is the ashes' and so on, let him take up the ashes, rub on the limbs (with it) and touch them all. This is therefore the vow relating to the Pāś'upati, for the liberation of the soul from bondage."

Elsewhere the wearing of the ashes in three lines is enjoined in the words "Let him make three lines."<sup>\*</sup> As oneness with Siva is declared to be the fruit of this kind of worship, it must form a necessary part of the worship of the Supreme. Such things as are thus enjoined as parts of the worship of Brahman should (according to the Pūrvapakṣin) be observed by the worshippers only in the case of those kinds of worship which are enjoined in the particular parts of the Veda referred to, because of their context; they cannot be common to all.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: There is no rule that the smearing of the ashes and the like which are enjoined in connection with the worship of Brahman should be confined to the students of those particular parts of the Veda in which they occur. On the contrary, they should be observed by all worshippers of Brahman, whatever Veda they study and whatever recension they follow. The ś'ruti or direct declaration should prevail against what we may make out from mere proximity or context.

Or, no incongruity as in the case of the incantations, etc.

(III. III. 54.)

Just as there is no incongruity whatever in using, in connection with a sacrificial rite common to all recensions, those incantations (Mantras) which occur only in certain recensions of the Veda in connection with that sacrificial rite, so too here.

#### Adhikarana—32.

The whole is essential, as in the case of the sacrificial rite.

So, indeed, the Śruti teaches. (III. III. 55).

Now a doubt arises as to whether, in the case of the Vais'vānara-Vidyā, the contemplation should be practised in separate parts or as a whole.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—The ś'ruti teaches that the heavenly region, the Sun, the Air (Vāyu), the Ether (A'kāśa), Water, and Earth should be regarded respectively as the head, the eye, the vital air, the trunk, the urinary organ and the foot of the Vais'vānara, the Universal Man. A contemplation of each of these parts separately has also been enjoined in such words as the following, occurring in connection with the contemplation of the heavenly region, and so on.

"And whoever meditates on that Vais'vānara Self eats food, sees his desire, and has spiritual lustre in his house."<sup>†</sup>

\* Chhā. Up. 3-14-1.

† Op. Cit. 1L.

\* Kāhlagāndra-Up.

† Chhā. Up. 5-13-2.

Accordingly, inasmuch as the word 'contemplate' and the declaration of the fruit are found mentioned in connection with each separately, it is but proper to practise the contemplation of each part separately.

(*Siddhānta*):—We say that the contemplation of the whole is essential.—To explain:—After declaring that the heavenly region, etc., are the head, and so on, of the Vaisvānara who has to be contemplated as having the three regions for his body, the Śruti declares further that the realisation of Brahman is the result of the contemplation:

"But he who worships the Vaisvānara Self as a span long, and as identical with himself, he eats food in all worlds, in all beings, in all selfs."\*

Now, the contemplation of the Vaisvānara as a whole is essential, as founded on proper authority when compared with the contemplation of Him only in part; for it is said that the former alone leads to the realisation of Brahman. The Śruti is not quite earnest when speaking of the contemplation of the Vaisvānara in part, or of its fruit. After enjoining, for instance, the sacrificial rite in the words "when a son is born one should offer an oblation of twelve dishes to Vaisvānara," the Śruti goes on: "What has been offered in eight dishes purifies him, as Gayatri, with spiritual lustre;" and so on. Just as the śruti is not quite earnest in speaking of the oblation of eight dishes or of its fruit, so too here (in the case of the Vaisvānara-Vidyā). And the Śruti expressly declares that the contemplation of the whole is surely essential. In the section referred to, after the questions, "What Self, O son of Upamanyu, dost thou worship?" "What-Self, O Prāchinayogya, dost thou worship?" the answers are given in the words "I worship the Heaven, O Lord, O King;" "I worship the Sun, O Lord, O King." Having in these words taught the contemplation of the constituent parts, the śruti has declared here and there the fruits thereof in the words "He eats food, he sees desire," and so on. All this notwithstanding, the Śruti declares that evil would result from the contemplation of the separate parts, in the following words of the King:

"That, however, is but the head of the Self, and thus your head would have fallen (in a discussion), if you had not come to me."†

Wherefore, surely, the contemplation of the whole is essential.

### Adhikarana—33.

They are different, because of the difference in the designation, etc. (III. III. 55).

Here a doubt arises as to whether in the contemplation of the Supreme we should combine together all the various descriptions of the Supreme, or contemplate each separately.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—In the contemplation of the Supreme, we should combine all together, inasmuch as Brahman, the object of contemplation, is one and the same, though various contemplations are taught severally in the several recensions of the Veda.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows:—Because of the impossibility of combining together the infinite number of contemplations taught in the Vedic texts which are infinite in number, the several contemplations are distinct from one another, since Brahman, though one in Himself, has distinct attributes. It has been shown that there may be such a distinction in the worship of one and the same Being, just as different cakes are offered to one and the same Indra when endued with different attributes, i.e., according as He is addressed as the King and so on, or just as the sacrificial fire is worshipped differently according to the place occupied, as Garhapatya, and so on. Hence the conclusion that, because of the distinction in the designation and other such appendages, the contemplations of the Supreme taught in different recensions are different. This special section has been devoted to the same subject, only with a view to refute the theory that the Vedas do not enjoin contemplation or knowledge (jñāna).

### Adhikarana 34.

They are so many alternatives, because their fruits are all alike.

(III. III. 57).

Thus, the contemplations of the Supreme in different forms have been treated of. A doubt arises as to whether, in the case of a devotee, they form so many alternative courses, or they should one and all be practised.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—What is the *prima facie* view? It would seem proper that the Dharma-Vidyā (the contemplation in the heart), the Sad-Vidyā (the contemplation of the One Existence) and the like, should be practised in conjunction, because it is possible that more effort produces more fruit. There is nothing to show that they are so many alternatives.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against this view, we hold as follows:—As regards one and the same individual, all the several contemplations of the Supreme form so many alternative modes of worship—Why?—Because the realisation of the unsurpassed Bliss of Brahman, which is the fruit of the intuitive perception of Brahman, is the same in all cases. If the aim is attained by one upāsana only, why should one resort to others which are of no use? Moreover, by one upāsana, the immediate perception of the true nature of Brahman is attained in most intense meditation, because the devotee firmly regards himself as one with Brahman. By abandoning one and resorting to another, there will be only a wandering of the mind. Hence it is that they are all so many alternative courses.

A. MAHADEVA SASTRI, B.A.

(To be continued.)

\* Chha-Up 5-18-1.

† Chha 5-12-17.



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## TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDA'NTA-SŪTRAS WITH S'RĪ'KANTHA-  
BHĀ'SHYA.

(Continued from page 124).

### Adhikarana 35.

The interested ones, however, may be conjoined together  
at will, or not, because of the absence of the  
foregoing reason. (III. III. 58.)

Now, a doubt arising as to whether the principle  
set down in the last preceding Adhikarana applies to  
such contemplations (Vidyā) which are intended to  
produce results distinct from the intuitive realisation  
of Brahman, we hold as follows: The principle estab-  
lished in the foregoing adhikarana does not apply  
to such contemplations; for, there is a distinction be-  
tween the two kinds of contemplation. "Becoming a  
Śāh, he goes to the Gods:"\* in these words the śruti  
teaches us to understand that, in all contemplations of  
the Supreme in which the Supreme is contemplated

as the Self of the devotee, the realisation of Divinity  
is attained while still alive, as a result of intense  
meditation. There is no evidence whatever to shew  
that in the same way the interested (Kāmya) contem-  
plations, such as the contemplation of 'name' as Brah-  
man, produce such intuitive realisation. As the inte-  
rested contemplations are not calculated to produce  
the result spoken of, it would seem proper to practice  
as many of such contemplations as possible, with a  
view to produce a proportionately greater result.  
Hence the conclusion that one may resort to either  
one alone of such contemplations, or more

### Adhikarana 36.

In the case of the members (of sacrificial rites), they follow  
(the rites) to which they relate. (III. III. 59.)

Now, again, a doubt arises as to whether the Upāsa-  
nas connected with members of sacrificial rites, such  
as the Udgītha and the like, form part of the rites  
concerned, or they are independent.

(Pūrvapakṣa): Such a doubt having arisen, the  
argument on behalf of the *prima facie* view is stated  
by the Sūtrakāra as follows: The Upāsanās relating  
to the Udgītha and such other members of sacrificial

\* Bri. Up. 6-1-2.

rites do, like those members themselves, form part of the sacrificial rites concerned, since, as in the case of the milk-pail and so on, no result is said to accrue from such Upāsanas where the S'ruti speaks of them.

And because of the commandment. (III. iii. 60.)

Because there is an injunction implied in the words "let him contemplate the Udgītha,"\* and because no injunction is implied in the words "whatever he does with contemplation (Vidyā),"† etc., we conclude that the Upāsanas referred to, do form part of the sacrificial rites.

Because of the rectification. (III. iii. 61.)

"He who knows that the Udgītha is the Pranava, and the Pranava the Udgītha, rectifies, from the seat of the Hotri priest, any mistake committed by the Udgātri in performing the Udgītha;"‡ in these words the S'ruti impresses the necessity of conjoining the Upāsana. For this reason, too, these Upāsanas form parts of the sacrificial rites. The mistakes referred to consists in performing the Udgītha without knowledge or contemplation (Vedana). The S'ruti, which speaks of rectification by other means in the absence of the knowledge, certainly points to the necessity of conjoining the knowledge or contemplation with the sacrificial rite. Because of this necessity, the Upāsanas referred to, form parts of the sacrificial rites.

Because of the declaration that the attribute is common. (III. iii. 62.)

"By that (syllable) does the threefold knowledge proceed. 'Om,' thus does the Adhvaryu priest give an order; 'Om'; thus does the Hotri recite; 'Om': thus does the Udgātri sing." Thus the Pranava is associated everywhere; and since the Upāsana is here spoken of as an attribute of the Pranava, it may be concluded that the Upāsana is a necessary part of the sacrificial rite. The word 'that,' (occurring in the passage quoted above) referring to something that has just been spoken of, must here refer only to the Pranava combined with Upāsana. Wherefore it cannot be made out that the Upāsanas connected with the Udgītha and the like do not form necessary parts of the sacrificial rites concerned.

(Siddhānta:) As against the foregoing the Sūtrākāra states the Siddhānta as follows:

Certainly no, because of the absence of the declaration that they go together. (III. iii. 63.)

For the Upāsanas to go together with the sacrificial rites is to form necessary parts of them. Because

this is not declared in the sruti, the Upāsanas do not form parts of the sacrificial rites. "What a man performs with knowledge, that alone is more powerful;"\* in these words we are told that such Upāsanas are the means of producing distinct results of their own; they cannot therefore form parts of sacrificial rites. "Let him sing the Udgītha": here the sruti teaches merely that the Upāsanas are related to the Udgītha; and therefore those Upāsanas which are connected with the members of sacrificial rites are not necessary parts of those sacrificial rites.

And because of the revelation. (III. iii. 64.)

"A Brahman priest who knows this saves the sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all the other priests;" thus speaking of all being saved by the Brahman priest's knowledge, the sruti shows that the knowledge is not quite necessary for the Udgātri and the other priests and that it does not therefore form a necessary part of the sacrificial rite. Wherefore it is but right to hold, as we have done above, that the Upāsanas are not absolutely necessary for the sacrificial rites.

### THIRD ADHYA'YA—FOURTH P'ADA.

#### Adhikarana I.

In the preceding section has been expounded the nature of the Paravidyā, the supreme wisdom. And now, with a view to expound the nature of the *a's'rama dharmas*,—those duties which are enjoined on the several holy orders,—which are accessories to that wisdom, the Sūtrākāra declares that the end of man is attained through wisdom alone.

Thence is the end of man, because of the word. So says Bādarāyana. (III. iv. 1.)

Thence,—that is from wisdom alone,—accrues the end of man, because of the following passages of the S'ruti:

"The knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme."†

"Having known S'iva, one finally attains peace."‡

So thinks the blessed Bādarāyana.

Now a doubt arises as to whether this is possible or not, because of the passages of the S'ruti pointing both ways.

(Pūrvapaksha):—The *prima facie* view is stated follows:

\* Chhā. 1-1-10.

† Chhā. 4-17-10.

‡ Tait. Up. 2-1.

§ S'vetā Up. 4-14.

\* Chhā 1-1-1.

† Chhā 1-1-10.

‡ Chhā 1-5-5.

as an appendage, it is a mere arthavāda concerning man, as in other cases. So thinks Jaimini. (III. iv. 2.)

The end of man accrues not from knowledge. Why? For, it is the agent of actions that is declared to be one with Brahman in such passages as "Thou art That," where the words referring to the agent and Brahman are put in apposition to each other; and to treat the agent as one with Brahman conduces to the perfection of the agent and thus forms an accessory to the ritual. As to the Śruti, however, speaking of independent fruits of knowledge, we hold that it constitutes a mere Arthavāda, on the principle enunciated in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā (IV. II. 1). Accordingly, the end of man does not accrue from knowledge. So thinks the teacher, Jaimini.

Because it is seen to be the custom. (III. iv. 2.)

Custom to the same effect is also seen. Aśva-kṛṣṇa Kekaya, who knew Brahman, says: "I am going to sacrifice, O Lords." Thus we learn that ritual is essential even in the case of knowers of Brahman, such as Kekaya.

Because there is Śruti to the same effect. (III. iv. 4.)

Knowledge is a mere appendage to ritual because, the words "whatever one does with knowledge," knowledge is declared by the Śruti itself to be a part of ritual. The Śruti means that what is done is done with knowledge.

Because of the embrace. (III. iv. 5.)

Him do knowledge and work embrace?† From the words we understand that knowledge and ritual are united in one and the same person; and therefore knowledge forms but an appendage of ritual.

Because of the injunction in the case of him who is possessed of it. (III. iv. 6.)

Ritual is enjoined on one who has studied the Vedas till he has understood the meaning, as may be seen in the passages like the following:

"He who has learnt the Veda from a family of teachers, according to the sacred rule, in the leisure time left from the duties to be performed for the Guru, who, after receiving his discharge has settled in his own house, etc."‡

Wherefore, too, knowledge is an appendage of ritual.

Because of the rule. (III. iv. 7.)

It has been definitely laid down as a rule that the knower of Atman should devote his life to ritual. "Only performing works here a man should wish to live a hundred years."\* For this reason also knowledge is an appendage of ritual. From that no good accrues to man.

(Siddhānta).—Now the Siddhānta is stated as follows:—

Because of the one above is taught. Śaṅkara's view is (is valid); because so it is revealed (III. IV. 8).

Knowledge is not a mere appendage of ritual. On the contrary, Śaṅkara's view that by knowledge alone man attains his end holds good, because He alone who is a being other than the individual soul, other than the agent, is pointed out as the one to be known. So indeed the Śruti says.

"Let me be born manifold"†

"He is the Cause, the Lord of the lords of senses."‡

"Superior to the universe is Rudra, the Great Sage."§

In passages like these we find declared the superiority of Brahman who has to be known. Wherefore knowledge is not an appendage of ritual.

As to the contention that custom points otherwise, the Sūtrakāra says:

But equal is revelation (III. iv. 8.)

Custom is found pointing equally to the supremacy of knowledge, not alone of ritual exclusively. Revelation, indeed, points to the renunciation of ritual by knower of Brahman, as seen in the passages like the following:—

"This, indeed, said the Kṛasheya sages who knew Him: 'for what purpose are we to study? for what purpose are we to sacrifice? What are we to do with offspring?'"

One should perform, as an accessory to knowledge, that work which is not accompanied with a longing for the result; whereas one should abandon that which is accompanied with a longing for the result. So, there being no incongruity whatever, it is ritual that forms an appendage to knowledge, while knowledge is of primary importance.

As to the argument based on the text "whatever one does with knowledge," the Sūtrakāra says:

\*Chhā. 6-11-10.

†Ibid. 1-1-19.

‡Bṛi. Up. 6-4-2.

§Chhā. 8-12-1.

\*P'rā. Up. 2

†Chhā. 6-2-2.

‡Śruti 6-9.

§Mahānā 10-12.

Not universal. (III. iv. 10.)

The passage "whatever one does with knowledge," does not speak of knowledge as common to all cases, inasmuch as it speaks of knowledge as if it has been already made familiar. And the knowledge which has just been familiarized is that concerning the Udgītha-Vidyā. "Whatever one does with knowledge that alone becomes more virulent;" in these words it is taught that the Udgītha-Vidyā, the subject of the present section, is the means of making more powerful the ritual which is associated with it. Accordingly the Vidyā does not form an appendage of ritual.

As to the contention based on the text, "Him do knowledge and work embrace," the Sūtrakāra answers as follows:

Division (is meant), as in the case of a hundred. (III. iv. 11.)

"Him do knowledge and work embrace:" here, knowledge and work being productive of distinct results, knowledge accompanies (the soul) to yield its own fruit, and work accompanies (the soul) to yield its own fruit. Thus a division is meant here, when we say, for example, two hundred (rupees) has been realised by the sale of land and precious stones, we mean a division, namely, that land has been sold for a hundred (rupees) and that precious stones have been sold for a hundred.

For him who is possessed of the mere learning. (III. iv. 12.)

Because the scriptural text "Having learned the Veda," etc., enjoins ritual only on him who possesses the mere learning, knowledge does not form an appendage of the ritual. The injunction concerning the learning of the Veda relates merely to the getting up of texts. Even supposing that it extends also to a knowledge of the meaning of the texts, the Vidyā or knowledge spoken of (in the passage under consideration) is something different from that relating to the meaning of the texts. Vidyā is that revolving in mind of a certain idea, which is enjoined in the words "let him contemplate (upāsita)." Therefore (this knowledge which is under discussion) nowhere forms an adjunct.

Because there is no specification (III. iv. 13.)

In the passage "Only performing works here," etc., there is no specific reason found to shew that the whole life of the enlightened sage should be devoted to ritual for ritual's sake. On the contrary we understand that this ritual is an appendage of Vidyā, because it occurs in a section devoted to Vidyā, beginning with the words "By Lord should be covered all this." Therefore Vidyā does not form an appendage of ritual.

Or it is a permission, for the praise (of Vidyā) (III. iv. 14.)

The sequel says indeed that, though doing works always, one is not tainted by them, in virtue of Vidyā. For the foregoing reason also, Vidyā alone is of primary importance.

And some (read of the abandonment of ritual) on the impulse of desire. (III. iv. 15.)

"What shall we do with offspring?" in these words some speak of the enlightened sage's abandoning of house-holder's life on the impulse of desire. Therefore, too, Vidyā appears to be of primary importance.

And (of) destruction (III. iv. 16.)

And some read of the destruction of all work brought about by Vidyā. "His works, too, are destroyed, when, He, who is high and low, is seen." Therefore ritual is not of primary importance.

And (Vidyā is found) among celibates; and indeed in the word (they are mentioned.) (III. iv. 17.)

Because we find Vidyā among those holy orders whose ranks are composed of celibates, and because such cannot perform Agnihotra and other rites, Vidyā cannot be an appendage of ritual. Indeed, in the Vedic passage "Three are the branches of law,"\* three orders of holy life are mentioned. Hence the conclusion that Vidyā alone is of primary importance, conducing to the good of man, and that it should be combined with those of the prescribed works, as its appendage, which are not associated with a longing for the fruits spoken of primarily in connection with them.

## Adhikarana-2.

Jaimini (thinks there is) a backward reference, because of the absence of command. The Śruti indeed forbids. (III. iv. 18.)

In the preceding section three orders of holy life alone are mentioned as the paths of religion, in the words "Three are the branches of law." Therefore there arises a doubt as to the existence of the fourth order of holy life.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—Because of the absence of all injunction of the fourth order of holy life in the passage referred to, Jaimini thinks that the reference to the fourth order in the passage "wishing for that world (for Brahman) only, mendicants leave their homes,"† is intended as a praise of the upāsana. Indeed, the Śruti forbids the fourth order in the words, "the killer of the son of the gods, indeed, is he who casts aside the sacrificial fire."‡ Accordingly, there is a great evil in the abandonment of the sacrificial fire, and therefore no other order of life can be entered on by abandoning fire.

\* Mund. Up. 2.2.9.

† Bri Up. 6.4.23.

‡ Tait-Sam. 1.5.2.

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(To be continued).



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## TRANSLATIONS.

### THE VEDA'NTA-SŪTRAS WITH ŚRĪKANTHA- BHĀṢHYA.

(Continued from page 148).

**Siddhānta:**—Now, the conclusion is stated as follows:

It should be entered on, as Bādarāyaṇa thinks, because of the S'ruti pointing to its equality (III. iv. 18.)

Lord Bādarāyaṇa regards that like the order of householders, etc., the other order also should be entered on. The evil connected with the abandoning of sacrificial fire must apply only to the order of householders, inasmuch as the S'ruti speaks of all orders of holy life as of equal importance, as the following passages shew:

"Three are the branches of law."

"Wishing for that world only mendicants leave their homes."

Hence the existence of the duties of the fourth order of holy life.

Or it is an injunction, as in the case of the carrying (III. iv. 20).

"For, above he carries it for the Devas:" in this passage, (the carrying of the firewood above for the Devas) is enjoined, because it has not been enjoined anywhere else. So, too, in the present case, there is an injunction.

Or, there is even a direct injunction in the Jābala-Upanishad: "Having finished student's life, he should become a householder. Having become a householder or a forester, he should leave home." This passage cannot point to any restricted order; for, the S'ruti says: "Having abandoned fire, or having lit no fire at all, on whatever day he is disgusted, that very day he should abandon home." For him whose mind (antah-karana or inner sense) has been purified on the ripening of the good acts of former births, it is possible to leave home while yet a student. But the prohibition contained in the passage,

"Having discharged the three debts, one should direct the mind to liberation. But he who resorts to it without having discharged the debts, goes downward,"

\* Manu 6—24.

refers to him who has not yet grown disgusted with the world.

Some hold that, because of the prohibition of the abandoning of sacrificial fire in the passage "the Killer of Devas' son is he who abandons the sacrificial fire," the leaving of home (*i.e.*, the fourth order) should be entered on only from the student's life, but not after entering on the life of a householder. If such were the case we can attach no meaning to the following injunction :

"Having become a forester, he should leave home . . . Having abandoned fire, or having lit no fire at all, on whatever day he is disgusted, that very day he should leave home."

Wherefore there can be no restriction that one should leave home only from the student-life, or that one should leave home after having become a forester.

As to those who say that one should leave home only from the student-life, their meaning is as follows: There are only two orders of holy life,—one with fire, the other without fire. Of the two, the latter comprises the student and the mendicant, and the former comprises the householder and the forester. Of the two, the abandoning of home from the student-life is far preferable to the abandoning of home as resorted to by one who has first lit the sacrificial fire and then abandoned that fire. If the meaning were explained otherwise, then there would be a contradiction in the Śruti. Hence the necessity of the duties of all orders of life.

#### Adhikarana.—3.

If it be held that they are mere praises because of their referring (to parts of sacrifices), (we say) no, because they are new. (III. iv. 21).

"Let a man meditate on the syllable Om, called udgītha; . . . That udgītha is the best of all essences, the highest, holding the highest place, the eighth."\*

A doubt arises as to whether in the passages like the foregoing the contemplation of the udgītha, etc., as the best of all essences, etc., is enjoined or not.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—What view suggests itself at first? It would appear that the contemplation of the udgītha, etc., as the best of all essences, etc., is not enjoined; but that, as in the passages "the (earth) is the ladle," "the heavenly world is the A'havaniya," the predicating,—with reference to the udgītha, etc.,

which are parts of sacrificial rites—as the best of all essences, etc., are mere praises.

(*Siddhānta*):—No, because they are new. They are not mere praises, but the contemplation of the udgītha, etc., as the best of all essences, is surely enjoined, because they are new. And according to the argument relating to the ladle cannot apply here because here there is no proximity to the injunction of the udgītha as there is in the case of the ladle. Wherefore, the contemplation of the udgītha, etc., as the best of all essences, etc., is certainly a subject of injunction.

And because of the word of injunction. (III. iv. 22).

"Let a man meditate on the udgītha."

Here a word of injunction occurs. For this reason too, there is an injunction as to the contemplation of the udgītha, etc., as the best of all essences, etc.

#### Adhikarana.—4.

If it be held that they serve the purposes of *pāriplava*, (we say) no, because such are specified. (III. iv. 23).

In the Vedāntas, stories like the following are taught at the commencement of Vidyās:

"Pratardana, forsooth, the son of Divodāsa, came by means of fighting and strength to the below abode of Indra."\*

A doubt arises as to whether they are intended for *pāriplava* or for the praise of the Vidyās.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—What view suggests itself at first? That they are intended for *pāriplava*. In the sacrifice of *As'vamedha*, the king shall be seated with his family and the *Adhvaryu* shall tell Vedic stories in their presence. This is the act called *pāriplava* enjoined in the words "let him tell *pāriplava*."† Because of the injunction "they should relate all stories in *pāriplava*,"‡ the stories occurring in the Upanishads are intended for *pāriplava*.

(*Siddhānta*):—We answer as follows: They are not intended for *pāriplava*, because such are specified. "On the first day should be related the story that Manu, the son of Vivasvat, is the king; . . . and on the second the story that Yama, the son of Vivasvat is the king."‡ In such words as these are specified the stories which are intended for *pāriplava*.

As to the stories occurring in the Upanishads, the *sūtrakāra* says that, as forming one coherent whole

\* Kaushī. 8-1.

† Aśvalayana-Smṛiti-Sūtra, 10-6-10.

‡ Ibid 10-7-1,2.

\* Chhā. 1-1.

the proximate injunctions of Vidyā, they are said for the (praise of those) Vidyās:

because in the same way they are connected as one (III. iv. 24.)

As the stories such as "He cried," form one whole with the injunctions of sacrificial rites, so, these form coherent wholes with the injunctions of Vidyā, and, as such, they are certainly said for praising the Vidyās.

#### Adhikarana. 5.

Is there a necessity for lighting fire, etc. (III. iv. 25.)

In the preceding adhikarana the existence of the final and holy life was explained. A doubt arises as to whether there is a necessity or not for the lighting of sacrificial fire, etc., as subserving Vidyā.

*(Uppakāṣa)* :—What view suggests itself to us? Since ritual is enjoined as an appendage of Vidyā, there is a necessity, even in the case of celibates, for the lighting of sacrificial fire, as subserving Vidyā.

*(Siddhānta)* :—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: Their Vidyā does not stand in need of lighting of sacrificial fire etc. For we are given by the Śruti to understand that they attained Vidyā by renouncing ritual: "wishing at world (for Brahman, only, mendicants leave homes)."† But, their Vidyā stands in need of the discharge of those duties only which pertain to their own order, it being impossible for them to light sacrificial fire, etc.

#### Adhikarana. 6.

Is there a necessity for all, because of the śruti enjoining sacrificial rites, etc., as in the case of a horse. (III. iv. 26.)

In the preceding adhikarana it has been shown that Vidyā of those belonging to the fourth order does stand in need of the lighting of fire, etc., since ritual is inconsistent with their order. Now, a doubt arises as to whether, in the case of the order of householders, the Vidyā stands in need of the rituals.

*(Uppakāṣa)* :—Now, we say that even in the case of the householders, Vidyā does not stand in need of the ritual, such as the lighting of sacrificial fire, the ritual cannot form an appendage of Vidyā, since it is not associated with it in the case of celibates. As to the argument that Vidyā (in the discussion) stands in need of ritual, because the ritual subserves Vidyā as the prayāja, etc., subserves

the Darśa and the Pūrnāmāsa, we ask, how does the adhāna or the like ritual subserve Vidyā? Does it subserve Vidyā by way of contributing to the result, as the Prayāja subserves the Darśa? Or does it subserve Vidyā by way of contributing to the very being of Vidyā, as the husking of the paddy subserves the Darśa. It cannot be in the former way, since then, as a result of action, Mukti (liberation) would be non-eternal. If the latter were the case, then the analogy fails because such is not the relation between the Darśa and the Prayāja. Therefore ritual does not form an appendage of Vidyā. Wherefore, even in the case of householders, Vidyā does not stand in need of ritual.

*(Siddhānta)* :—In the case of householders who have to perform the sacrificial rites, Vidyā requires all rites such as Agnihotra, because the Śruti says, "Brahmanas seek to know Him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting;"‡ and the sacrificial rites, etc., are things commanded by the Paramesvara. Just as a horse, though a means of transit, stands in need of proper equipage for the purposes of transit, so also does Vidyā stand in need of ritual. When freed from all longing for results, the Vedic ritual subserves Vidyā by way of contributing to its very being, and liberation does not therefore constitute a result of the ritual. On the contrary, liberation (mokṣa) is the direct result of knowledge (jñāna). Thus, in the case of householders, Vidyā requires sacrificial rites, etc. In fact, in the case of all orders of holy life, Vidyā should be necessarily associated with the duties of the respective orders; and it therefore stands to reason that Vidyā should be associated with ritual.

#### Adhikarana.—7.

Still, he should be endued with calmness and subjugation, because of their being enjoined, and because, as the accessories thereof, they also should be necessarily observed. (III. iv. 27.)

"Having become calm and subdued, quiet, patient and collected, he sees the Self in self"† in a calm, firm self.

"By faith, devotion, meditation, do thou know."‡

In such passages as these it is declared that Vidyā stands in need of calmness, subjugation of the senses, etc. A doubt arises as to whether, in the case of the order of householders, acquisition of these is possible.

*(Uppakāṣa)* :—As having to do with the sacrificial rites, etc., they are concerned in many kinds of activity; and therefore, the acquisition of calmness and sense-subjugation, which consists in the cessation of such activity, is not possible in their case.

*(Siddhānta)* :—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: The householder, though engaged in the

† Bṛ. Up. 1.6.1.

‡ Bṛ. Up. 6.1.22.

\* Bṛ. Up. 6.4.22.

† Bṛ. 6.4.23.

‡ Kāivalya-Up.

actions enjoined, should abstain from prohibited and interested actions, and thus cultivate calmness, etc., inasmuch as calmness, etc., faith, devotion and meditation are enjoined, and because, as the accessories of Vidyā, they should be necessarily practised with a view to the acquisition of Vidyā. *Calmness* (Sama) consists in the suppression of the subjective affections such as fondness and enmity. *Subjugation* (Dama) consists in withdrawing all senses from prohibited activities. *Quietude* (Upariti) is abstention from all prohibited and interested actions. *Patience* (Titikshā) is the endurance of pairs of opposites. *Collectedness* (Samadhāna) of the mind consists in its being turned towards the Supreme Principle, it being at the time free from lassitude and other kinds of distraction. *Faith* (Sraddhā) is that phase of pure mind (Sattva) in which it has conceived an aversion for all other sciences not conducing to the *summum bonum*, and in which it feels an intense longing for a familiar acquaintance with the Upanishad, the Supreme Wisdom, the science of the Paramātman. *Devotion* (Bhakti) is the Vedic ritual, constituting that service of the Supreme Being, Paramasiva, which is quite unconnected with the worship of any other God, which is effected by the threefold group of sense-organs, which forms that lofty eight-fold path of devotion. *Mumukshā* is an intense desire to obtain an intuitive vision of that mighty splendour of Liberation (Moksha Lakshmi) wherein the devotee is penetrated through and through by the Supreme Bliss; and this state of *Mumukshā* is attained through the attainment of calmness, etc., by him who is endued with *Vairāgya*,—with indifference to all pleasures of this world and the next—and *Viveka*, the faculty of determining the real and the unreal. All these supreme virtues, from *Viveka* (discrimination) to *Mumuksha* (desire for liberation)—should be studiously practised by all orders of holy life seeking Vidyā.

#### Adhikarana 8.

And there is permission of all food when there is danger to life.  
because of revelation to that effect. (III. iv. 23.)

In the Prāna-Vidyā (the contemplation of the Supreme as Life), the Śruti says:

"To him who knows this, there is nothing that is not (proper) food."\*

This passage appears to teach that, in the case of him who is devoted to Prāna-Vidyā, all food is permitted. A doubt arises as to whether this is reasonable or not.

(*Purvapakṣa*):—Since eating is a thing with which we are all familiar in other ways and is therefore not a thing fit to be taught by revelation, it is the permission of all food, which, otherwise unknown to us, is the fit subject of injunction here.

(*Siddhānta*):—To this we reply as follows: Even in the case of him who is devoted to Prāna-Vidyā,

the permission of time, but only when in the case Ushas knower of Brahman resort may be had to case of extreme danger follows:

"When the Kurus, Ushastis, with his virgin chief entering bed said: 'I have put away for me to eat of them.' said: 'There is said Ushasti: drunk what was before unclean.' those beans also 'No,' he replied if I had not eaten water would be

Wherefore, it is clear that permission even to him who is (Para-Vidyā, the con-

And because of the Permission of all life is in jeopardy, serving purity in passage:

"When aliment nature attains purity attained purity, remains firm, the

And it is also That the permission of only when life is in the Smṛiti:

"A man partaking ever, when life sin, any more than water."

And hence the text above

And accordingly, that one should rise

"A Brāhman should

Thus, even in the permission of all food life is at risk. Other act, he will prove an of the Supreme Lord

\* Ibid 1-10,  
† Chhā 7.26-2.

\* Chhā 5-2-1.



# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH — OR — SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA.

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## TRANSLATIONS.

### VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS WITH ŚRĪKANTHA- BHĀṢHYA.

(Continued from page 172)

#### Adhikarana 9

On the duties of the order (should be observed) because they are enjoined. (III. iv. 33.)

Because of a house-holder (grihastha) who does not possess knowledge (Vidyā) we understand that the duties of the order (aśrama) such as sacrificial rites are observed, because they are enjoined as such words "He should offer oblation into the fire out life," and that they should be observed as means of acquiring Vidyā as declared in "the Brāhmanas seek to know Him by rites, gifts,"\* etc.

And also as accessories (III. iv. 33.)

We further understand that even in the case of those who possess knowledge (Vidyā), they should be

observed, because they are enjoined as accessory to Vidyā in the words "He who has known both Vidyā and Avidyā"\*\*\* etc.

Now, a doubt arises as to whether the sacrificial rites, etc., should be performed only once, or twice separately—as a means to Vidyā when the man does not possess knowledge, and again as an accessory (anga) to Vidyā when the same man has obtained knowledge inasmuch as they are enjoined both as a means and as an accessory to Vidyā.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—In virtue of the two injunctions, they should be observed twice.

(Siddhānta):—The Sūtrakara says:

In any case, they are identical, because of the marks pointing both ways. (III. iv. 34.)

Because of the two injunctions occurring in the two different contexts, the same sacrificial rites may be regarded as assuming two different forms; but they are nevertheless identical, inasmuch as their identity is recognised everywhere. Though, thus, the acts are identical in themselves, yet on the principle of

*Samyoga Prithaktva*\* there is no contradiction involved in viewing them in two distinct lights. Though performed only once, one and the same act may be regarded in two distinct lights in virtue of the double injunction. For instance, one and the same sacrificial post made of Khadira wood enters into an obligatory (Nitya and an optional Kāmya, interested) rite in virtue of the following double injunction: "The sacrificial post can be made of Khadira wood"; and "in the case of one who desires manliness, they make the sacrificial post of Khadira wood." In the same way, the sacrificial rites, etc., are prescribed as a means of attaining Vidyā in the case of one who does not possess it, and as an accessory of Vidyā in the case of one who possesses it, and for these two purposes it will do to perform them only once.

And the Sruti declares that there is no overpowering. (III. iv. 35.)

In the words "by Dharma he removes sin,"† the Sruti declares that, by way of removing the sin obstructing the rise of Vidyā, the effect of the performance of the sacrificial rites is the removal of all the forces which may overpower Vidyā. Hence no inconsistency such as the one urged above.

#### Adhikarana 10.

(Vidyā is possible even for those who stand) in the intermediate stages, because it is seen. (III. iv. 36.)

It has been shewn that Vidyā is possible for those who belong to the recognised orders of holy life (ās'ramas). Now a doubt arises as to whether Vidyā is possible or not for those who do not belong to any of the recognised orders.

(*Pūrvapaksha*):—The Śnātaka,—i.e., one who has left the student-life but has not yet entered on the life of a householder,—and the widower are those who do not belong to any of the recognised orders of holy life. For them Brahmanavidyā is not attainable, because of the absence of the duties of a recognised order (ās'rama) which constitute the means of acquiring Vidyā.

(*Siddhanta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Vidyā is quite possible even for those who do not belong to any of the recognised orders, inasmuch as we find it stated in the Sruti that Raikva and other such persons attained Vidyā.

As to the contention that it is not possible of the non-performance of the duties of any recognised orders, the Sūtrakara says:

It is, moreover, declared in the Smṛiti. (III. iv. 37.)

It is stated in the Smṛiti that even for those who do not belong to a recognised order Vidyā is possible of attainment by means of prayers and the like.

"By prayer alone a Brāhmana can attain Vidyā: as to this there is no doubt. Let him do anything else, or not do it. A kind man is called a Brāhmana."\*

Vidyā is said to be possible of attainment by a special act. (III. iv. 38.)

The Sruti states that it is possible to attain Vidyā by means of special acts which are not contained in any of the recognised orders:

"By austerity, by celibacy, by faith, and by devotion, let him seek the self."†

Let the other be superior, because of the indicatory nature of the acts. (III. iv. 39.)

It is better to belong to one of the recognised orders than not to belong to any, because the former enables one to accumulate more merit (Dharma). Moreover, the Smṛiti says "Let no twice-born man remain for even a single day without belonging to one of the recognised orders."‡ Thus, it is quite clear that to belong to one of the recognised orders is better than not to belong to any of them. Still, in extreme cases, the Vidyā is possible of attainment for those who are outside the pale of the recognised orders, by means of prayer and the like.

#### Adhikarana 11.

For one who has become such, there can be no cessation of such, as Jaimini also thinks, because of the prohibition against ceasing to be such. (III. iv. 40.)

Now, a doubt arises as to whether a descent to a lower stage is allowed or not to those who have attained the order of celibates.

(*Pūrvapaksha*):—Even descent to a lower order is optional, like the ascent to a higher order which is taught in the following passage:

"Having completed student-life, let him become a householder. He may even become a hermit after retiring to the forest from home."§

\* The same act enjoined in two different contexts may put on two distinct aspects.

† Mahānū 79.

\* Manu, II. 87.

† Prasna Up. 1-2.

‡ Dakṣha 1.

§ Jābāla Up. 4.

*siddhanta*)—As against the foregoing, we argue our conclusion as follows:—For one who has ascended the life of a perpetual student (*Naiṣṭhika*) it is impossible to come down again from it. For, there is prohibition of the abandonment of that life. It is expressly prohibited by the *S'ruti* in the words, "morning his body in the teacher's family till death."<sup>4</sup> Following passages prohibit the descent:

"Let him go to the forest, and let him not come back."

"Having renounced fires, let him not return again."<sup>5</sup> And there exist no Scriptural passages permitting ascent, as there exist those concerning descent. Accordingly, since the *S'ruti* expressly prohibit their ascent, and since no passage in the *S'ruti* is found permitting descent, those who descend down from a higher stage are not fit for *Vidyā*. This is also Jain view of the matter.

The *Sūtrakṛta* proceeds to show that the man who descended from a higher order cannot regain qualification for *Vidyā* by means of expiatory rites:

Is even (the expiatory rite) conferring qualification (is possible), because, since the *smṛiti* speaks of them as fallen, it is impossible for them. (III. iv. 41).

In the case of a student who has broken the vow of *brahmacarya*, the sacrifice of an ass is prescribed as the expiatory rite by which to regain his qualification for the rites, as taught in the section of the *Mīmamsā* giving of qualification for Vedic rites.<sup>6</sup> Even this expiatory rite is not possible in the case of him who descended down from a higher stage of life. The *śruti* says:

"The man who, having once ascended to the life of a perpetual student, descends down from it,—for him I see no expiation, whereby that killer of the self may be purified."

The *Smṛiti* thus denying his qualification for the expiatory rite, he cannot regain qualification by that.

One also (regard it as a) minor sin and (therefore claim the) existence (of expiation) as in the case of eating (forbidden food). This has been declared. (III. iv. 42).

One hold that, as it is a minor sin, it admits of expiation, just as the eating of honey (on the part of a student) admits of an expiation. It has been said, but is not taught in the case of a student applies to the other orders when there is no contradiction." That

is to say, what has been taught in the case of an ordinary student (who in due course will enter on the life of a householder) applies to men of other orders, provided that it does not run counter to what has been expressly enjoined on those other orders.

But they should be kept outside (the pale), in either case, because of the *smṛiti* and custom. (III. iv. 43).

Whether it be a minor sin or a major sin, these transgressors are excluded from the path of the Vedic rites, etc. For, the *Smṛiti* says:

"I see no expiation whereby that killer of the self may be purified."

And they are excommunicated from the society of the orthodox. Wherefore, from all points of view, those who have fallen down from a higher stage, are not qualified for *Vidyā*.

### Adhikarana-12.

A'treya thinks that it pertains to the sacrificer, because of the fruit (being assigned to him) by the *śruti*. (III. iv. 44).

The contemplation of the *Udgītha*, etc., has been taught. A doubt arises as to whether it has to be done by the sacrificer, or by his priests (*Itivikṣa*).

(*Pārcapakaśa*):—The contemplation of the *Udgītha*, etc., has to be done by the sacrificer himself, for it is he that is said to reap the fruit of the sacrifice acquiring more power, not the priests (*Itivikṣa*). So thinks A'treya.

Audulomi thinks that it is the duty of the priest. For that indeed is he paid. (III. iv. 45).

"Let the *Udgātri* priest who knows this shall say."<sup>7</sup> In these words occurring in the sequel it is expressly said that the *Udgātri* priest is the one who should contemplate. According to Audulomi, the act of contemplating is the duty of the priest.

(*Objct*):—How can it be that the act is done by one person while the fruit goes to another?

(*Insist*):—For, the priests have been paid by the sacrificer for the performance of supplementary acts as well as of the main act. It is certainly for the performance of the sacrificial rites with all its supplementary acts that the priests are paid by the sacrificer. Therefore what is done by the priest forms the act of the sacrificer; and hence no incongruity in holding that the fruit of the act goes to the master of the sacrifice.

### Adhikarana 13.

The third is, like the sacrificial rites etc., enjoined in the case of the possessor of *Vidyā*, because of the acceptor. (sense of the word). (III. iv. 46).

In the *Kahola-Brāhmaṇa* it is said:

"Therefore, let a *Brāhmaṇa*, after he has done with learning, seek to remain in childhood; then, after he has done with learning and childhood (let him be) a *Muni*."<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup>Iba. Up. 3-23-2.

<sup>5</sup>Iba. *Mīmamsā* 6-4-22.

<sup>7</sup>ChhA. 1-7-3.

<sup>8</sup>Bri. Up. 3-5-2.

Having thoroughly acquired learning, i.e., having determined the main drift of the teaching of the many Upanishads, let a Brāhmana seek to remain in childhood; that is to say, let him lead another mode of life, resembling childhood in so far as it is devoid of love and hatred, and the like. Having attained perfection in learning and the child-like state, then he is (to be) a Muni. Here a doubt arises as to whether the life of a Muni is the subject of an injunction or not.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*) :—As there are no such words as "He shall become a Muni," showing an injunction, it is not enjoined.

(*Siddhānta*) :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows :—The third one, namely, the state of a sage (Muni), is enjoined, as another accessory, on the possessor of Vidyā, in addition to learning and childhood, just as the sacrificial rites, etc., are enjoined. For, the word 'Muni' is familiar to all as denoting one who is given to profound meditation. This profound meditation which consists in constantly revolving the object of worship in thought is enjoined with a view to the perfecting of Vidyā: the words "let him remain" being repeated in this connection. Therefore it is possible to make out an injunction of meditation.

#### Adhikarana 14.

For the inclusion of all, verily does the Śruti conclude with the householder. (III. iv. 47).

A doubt arises as to whether Vidyā is common to all Āśramas, or confined to some only.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*) :—Since the student (Brahmachārin) is dependent on the teacher for the study of the Vedas, since the householder (Grihastha) is engrossed in the maintenance of the family, since the forest-dweller (Vānaprastha) is engaged in the hermit-life, knowledge and meditation are not possible for them. The Śruti connects Samnyāsa with those who possess the knowledge of the Vedāntic teaching in the following words :

"They who have determined the nature of things by their knowledge of the Vedāntic teaching, those Yatis who, by Samnyāsayoga, have purified their minds,"\* etc.

In connection with the practice of meditation (Dhyāna), the Śruti declares that the devotee should be one "leading the life of the last āśrama."† Therefore, knowledge and meditation are meant for the last order of men, not for others.

(*Siddhānta*) :—Vidyā is quite possible for all orders of men. The possibility of Vidyā for all orders of men is taught in the Chhāndogya Upanishad in the following words :

"He who...keeping up the memory of what he has learnt by repeating it regularly in some sacred spot,...he who behaves thus all his life reaches,

the world of Brahman and does not return, he does not return."\*

Though the Śruti thus concludes with the householder, all orders are meant. So also, though the last order alone is mentioned in connection with meditation, other orders also must have been meant. Therefore, Vidyā is quite possible for all orders of men. (In the Śruti quoted above in the Pūrvapakṣa 'Samnyāsa' means renunciation of fruits, and 'Yati' means one who has subdued the senses. All this is quite possible for all orders of men.

#### Adhikarana 15.

Because, like the life of a muni, others, too, are prescribed (III. iv. 48).

The Atharvasiras says :

"Having cut off desire, having thought over by reason the root of the aggregate of causes, having fixed the mind in Rudra.—in Rudra, they say is unity,—in view of the eternal and ancient Rudra, who is food and strength, by austerity do ye restrain yourselves. This is the vow in honor of Pās'upati."

This Pās'upati-vrata, this sacred vow in honor of Pāsupati, taught in the Atharvasiras is clearly taught in the Purāṇas. Now a doubt arises as to whether Vidyā and Moksha are attained by those who devote themselves to this vow.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*) :—It would seem that they cannot attain Moksha, but that they attain only some minor results; for, this vow is not ranked among the religious orders; there is a limit to its duration; and it has been observed by Krishna and others with a view to obtain sons and the like fruits.

(*Siddhānta*) :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : Mukti itself accrues to those who observe the vow till death. The accomplishment of Vidyā consists in deep meditation of Rudra, the Supreme Brahman. Like the life of a Muni, other duties belonging to the other orders, such as mendicant life, control of the body and the senses, are enjoined even in connection with the Pās'upati-vrata. The meditation of Rudra, which is the severance of the bond (Pās'a) and which produces Moksha, is enjoined on those who devote themselves to the observance of this vow : "They say unity is in Rudra. In view of the eternal and ancient Rudra do ye restrain yourselves by austerity. With the Mantra 'Agni is the ashes,' etc., do ye take the ashes and touch the limbs smearing them all. Hence this is the vow sacred to the Pās'upati, conducing to the release of the soul (Pā'su) from the bond (Pās'a)."

Therefore those who observe the Pās'upati-vrata at the end of life attain to nothing short of Mukti (salvation) as the result of it.

As to the contention that it is not ranked among the recognised orders (āśramas), the Sūtrakāra says :

\* Ohṃā 8-15-1.

† Atharvasiras.

\* Mahānā 10-22.

† Kaivalya Up.



## THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RĪ'KANTHA-BHĀ'SHYA.

(Continued from page 192 Vol. IV.)

Though not showing itself out (as an ās'rāma, yet it is a means to salvation) as comprehending (the essential features of an ās'rāma'. (III. iv. 49).

The Pās'upatās'rāma, though not exhibiting itself as an independent ās'rāma, is still an ās'rāma by itself, known as Atyās'rāma or the transcendental order, and constitutes an independent means of reaching the Paramas'iva, by virtue of celibacy and other attributes of an ascetic (which conduce to the attainment of Vidyā) being comprehended in it. The Pās'upata-vrata is of two kinds, life-long and temporary, as declared in the following passage :

“ Either lasting till the death of the body, or lasting for a period of twelve years.”

Of these two, that which lasts till the end of life and is called atyās'rāma or transcendental order, leads to Moksha; whereas the other is a means of attaining some worldly enjoyment. Such is the distinction between the two. Thus the Sruti itself teaches that this vow (Vrata) has two aspects,—as a means to worldly enjoyment and as a means to Moksha—both securing Siva's grace. We should so interpret the texts as not to stultify the authority of this passage of the Sruti.

**Adhikarana 16.**

The result is obtained in this birth in the absence of obstacles, as we see in the sruti. (III. iv. 50.)

A doubt arises here as to whether the result of meditation accrues, to those who practise it as taught before, in this birth, or in a future birth.

(Purvapaksha):—Let us enquire. A man engages in the Upāsana hoping that liberation may come to him in this very birth, but not in a future birth. Who does ever desire delay with regard to the result? Therefore the result in the form of liberation must accrue to him in this birth, if it should ever accrue to him at all. If not in this birth, it will never accrue at all.

(Siddhanta):—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: In the absence of an obstacle in the shape of a strong karma of a different kind, the result of the upāsana of the Supreme accrues in this birth. If there should be any obstacle, it will accrue in a future birth; just as the result in the shape of a worldly good does not necessarily accrue soon after the performance of

the good karma which serves as a means to it, and will accrue in a future birth if there should be an obstacle present. And we are told in the s'ruti that Vāmadeva and others reaped in a later birth the fruits of their investigation and study of Brahma vidyā carried on in their past births. Hence no necessity, that the result of liberation should accrue in this very birth.

**Adhikarana 17.**

Unlike (the sacrificial rites), there is no distinction in the result of liberation, because of the state of Him being determined (as the result). (III. iv. 51).

It has been established that, as in the case of the results accruing from mere works, the result in the shape of liberation accrues in the absence of an obstacle in the form of a strong karma of a different kind. A doubt now arises as to whether, on the same principle, there exists or not a difference in liberation accruing as the result of the different upāsanas, as there is a difference in the case of the results of sacrificial rites.

(Purvapaksha):—It may appear that, like the results of mere sacrificial rites, liberation admits of distinctions. We are given to understand that different sacrificial rites produce different results: “Let him who desires Svarga perform the sacrifice of Jyotishtoma.” “Let him who desires Svārāja or lordship in Svarga perform the sacrifice of Vājapeya.” So too there must be a difference in the results of knowledge acquired through Upāsana.

(Siddhanta):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Unlike the results of mere sacrificial rites, the result of Upāsana-Jñāna admits of no differences, inasmuch as it has been determined that the state of Brahman is the result of Upāsana-Jñāna. Since the state of Brahman which the possessors of Vidyā attain is one and the same, there is no room for any kind of difference in the result here. It should not be urged that a difference in the degrees of Upāsana may give rise to a difference in the result; for, in the case of the acts of Upāsana no results have been mentioned other than liberation. Brahman being one and the same, liberation which is the state of Brahman must also be one and the same. Hence no difference in the liberation accruing from different Upāsanas.

## FOURTH ADHYĀYA—FIRST PĀDA.

**Adhikarana 1.**

**Frequent repetition (is meant) because of the instruction.**  
(IV. 1. 1)

In the third Adhyāya has been discussed in detail the nature of the worshipper (Upāsaka), of the object of worship (Upāsya), and of the several kinds of worship (Upāsana), as also the duties of the various orders of holy life (Āśramas). Here, again, in the fourth Adhyāya will be discussed the following topics: in the first pāda, the mode of worship (Upāsana); in the second pāda, the departure, from earthly life, of Jīva, the worshipper (upāsaka); in the third pāda, the Path of Light (Archir), etc. and in the fourth pāda, the state of the one who has attained to Brahman. Now the first Adhikarana (of the first pāda) deals with the doubt as to whether one has to do once alone or to frequently repeat the act of knowing prescribed, as the means to Moksha, in the following passages:

"The Knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme."\*

"Knowing Siva, one attains infinite peace."†

(Purvapaksha):—It should be done only once, because, on the principle that "once done, the intention of the scripture is fulfilled," the act intended by the scripture in the words 'knowing (Jñāna)' and 'realising (Vedana)' becomes accomplished when once done, as in the case of the Prayāja.

(Siddhanta):—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows. The act of knowing, prescribed as the means to Moksha in such passages as "the Knower of Brahman reaches the Supreme," should be frequently revolved; for, we understand that the act of knowing (Vedana) which is spoken of as the means to Moksha is of the form of meditation (Upāsana), inasmuch as the two terms 'Know (vid)' and 'meditate (Upās)' are interchangeably used at the commencement (Upakrama) and the concluding portions (Upasamhāra) of the following passages:

Let a man meditate (upās) on mind as Brahman.  
.....He who knows (Veda) this shines and  
warms through his celebrity, fame and glory of  
countenance."‡

"He who knows (Veda) what he knows, he is thus  
spoken of by me."§

\* Tai. Up. 2-1.

† Sve. Up. 4-14.

‡ Chhā. Up. 3-18-1.

§ Ibid. 4-14.

"Teach me, O Lord, the Deity which you worship  
(upās)."\*

And the word 'meditation (upāsana)' denotes a continuous flow of thought. As to the Prayāja, etc., it is but proper to do them only once because their effects are invisible. Inasmuch as the intuitive realisation (Sākshātkāra), the result of knowledge (Vedana), is visible, this act should be repeated till its result is attained, as in the case of threshing the paddy.

And because of the indicatory marks. (IV. 1. 2).

As pointing to this conclusion, the following passages (of the Smṛiti) may be cited:

"By knowledge of Is'vara, the soul (Kshetrājña) attains, it is deemed, the highest purity."

Be he guilty of the major sins, or be he guilty of the minor sins, let a man practise meditation (dhyāna) of Brahman, engaged therein for a quarter of the night."

"Let a man practise Yoga (or Samādhi) directed to the A'tman."

"Let a man realise the Supreme Being (Purusha) who is of golden hue, who can be reached in the dream-consciousness (svapnadhi)."

And so on. Hence the necessity of a frequent repetition of the knowledge of Brahman.

**Adhikarana 2.**

**As the Self, verily, do they understand (Him) and teach also.**  
(IV. 1. 3).

In the preceding Adhikarana it has been made out that the meditation of Brahman should be repeated. Here follows the enquiry as to whether the Jīva or individual soul whose A'tman is Brahman should regard himself as one with I'svara, or as distinct from Him.

(Purvapaksha):—(It may at first sight appear that the proper course is for the Jīva to contemplate upon Brahman only as distinct from himself; for, firstly, in the passage "superior to the universe is Rudra, the Great Sage,"† and in the Vedānta-sūtra I. i. 22, it is declared that the Lord, the Para-Brahman, is an

\* Ibid. 2-2.

† Form the passages quoted above, it may be seen that the knowledge by which Brahman is reached is of the form of meditation (dhyāna) and Yoga (Samādhi), consisting in the frequent repetition of one and the same thought.

‡ Mahāna-Up. 10-19.

entity distinct from the Jīva, from the Pratyagātman, from the Paś'u or individual soul, and *secondly*, the Jīva can never become Brahman whose characteristic mark is Omniscience.

(*Siddhānta*):—No doubt, the Supreme Brahman called S'iva is superior to the Jīva; still, the worshipper should meditate Him thus: "I am Brahman." For, even the worshippers of old, regarded Brahman as their own Self (Ātman) thus: 'Thou, verily, I am, O Lord, O God; I, verily, Thou art.' Though an entity quite distinct from the worshipper, the Supreme Brahman serves those worshippers all the same, by giving them His own being.\* And in the words "That Thou art," etc., they also give others, their pupils, to understand that Brahman is their own Self. Certainly, Mukti or liberation consists in attaining the state of S'iva, that state which is full of unlimited s'upreme bliss and free from all taint. This attainment of the state of S'iva is not possible except on the cessation of bondage (Paśutva) on the part of the Jīva, and the cessation of bondage cannot be brought about except by the meditation thereof (i. e., of the state of S'iva). Therefore, the worshipper, freed from servitude on the bondage being loosened by the continuous stream of the thought that "I am S'iva," becomes S'iva Himself. Indeed, the state of S'iva consists in being the repository of that unsurpassed Bliss which is free from all traces of evil taint. And the Supreme Brahman is of quite the same nature. By constant meditation thereof, the worshipper becomes of the same nature. Hence it is that all else is said to be unworthy of being meditated by the seeker of Moksha, in the passages like the following:

"The beneficent S'iva alone should be meditated upon (by the worshipper) abandoning all else."†

For, all scriptures teach that Mukti or liberation consists in the cessation of servitude (Paśubhāva), of the identification with the body of a brāhmaṇa and the like,—and in the attainment of oneness with that Supreme Individuality (Parāmbhāva), with that S'iva who is the immediate witness of His own

inherent unsurpassed Bliss, and who is self-luminous, shining by his own light. Contemplation of oneness with Brahman leads the Upāsaka to Mukti; otherwise there will be no cessation of saṃsāra.

### Adhikarana 3.

The Sutrakāra makes a distinction

(No meditation as Ātman in the symbol; not indeed is He (to be worshipped there.) (IV: i 4.)

In the passages like "let him meditate mind as Brahman," Chhā 3-18-1, we are taught to meditate Brahman in the mind and so on. Is Brahman to be meditated there as the Self (Ātman) or as something different from the Self?

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—In such meditations of symbols as are enjoined in the passages "Let him meditate the mind as Brahman," "Let him meditate the Sun as Brahman," we are given to understand that, in meditating upon the mind, etc., we have to exalt them by regarding them as Brahman. Accordingly, inasmuch as the symbol has been regarded by the devotee as Brahman, what harm is there in regarding it as the Self (Ātman)?

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: The Self should not enter into the contemplation of symbols; for, in them it is not the Supreme Brahman that is meditated upon. On the other hand, it is the mind, etc., that are to be meditated upon as Brahman. Even supposing that in these cases the object of meditation is Brahman Himself conditioned by the mind, etc., it is not this conditioned Brahman that we should regard as the Self, inasmuch as the mind, etc., are not the essential attributes of Brahman and are therefore mere phenomena (Vikāras). It is the Brahman possessed of such attributes as unfailing will, etc., that we regard as the Self. Otherwise even the Self (Ātman) would be subject to phenomenal charges. Therefore, the devotees should not meditate upon the symbol as the Self, seeing that there the Parames'vara is not the direct object of worship.

A. MAHADEVA SASTRY, B.A.

(To be continued.)

\* That is to say, by removing from them the state of bondage (paśutva).

† Atharvas'ikṣā

# THE LIGHT OF TRUTH

— OR —

## SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA

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### TRANSLATIONS.

#### THE VEDA'NTA-SU'TRAS WITH S'RIP'KANTHA-BHA'SHYA.

(Continued from page 8 Vol. V.)

##### Adhikarana. 4.

Contemplation of Brahman (in the symbol is meant.) because of His supremacy. (IV. 1. 5.)

In regard to the contemplation of symbols, a doubt arises as to whether the devotee should regard the symbols,—such as the mind, the sun etc.,—as Brahman, or he should regard Brahman as the mind, etc.

(Pūrvapakṣa):—We should regard Brahman as the mind, etc., and thus contemplate Brahman, inasmuch as He alone is the dispenser of fruits.

(Siddhānta):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: "Superior to the universe is Rudra; \* in these words the śruti speaks of Brahman as the supreme; and therefore we should regard the mind

and the like inferior objects as Brahman? In the ordinary world, indeed, one regards a man of inferior rank, such as a king's servant, as the king himself, and serves him as though he were the king himself. None, on the other hand, serves a king regarding him as a servant. Propriety indeed requires that all should bow down before that Being only who is Superior to all others. Accordingly, we understand that the Supreme Brahman is the Being before whom all should bow down, verily because, He is superior to all others. In the Mahānārāyaṇa-Up. 12, it is said that all worship should be directed to Him alone who informs all, to that Supreme Brahman whose attributes are mentioned in the Mantra, and to none else under any circumstances whatsoever.

\* Moreover, this Supreme Brahman (Parabrahman) has been defined to be the Being who is worshipped as the Supreme. To explain. The Taittirīya says:

He, to whom all bow, is the Dharma is the forehead; Brahmā is the upper jaw, sacrifice is the lower jaw, Vishnu is the heart; Samvatsara (Prajapati) is the organ of generation; \* and so on.

\* Mahanar, 10-19.

\* Tai. Aranyaka. 7-19.



In this description of Samsūmāra, the Parabrahman or Siva is distinguished from Vishnu, the heart, and other members, simply because Siva is superior to all others, and He is designated as the head, the principal member, by an expression which embodies His essential character as the object of all worship. Even at the end of that section, the śruti speaks of Him alone as the Lord of all beings and as superior to all beings, and concludes by saying that He is the Being to whom all worship is ultimately due, because, He is superior to all: "My others, bow is to Thee, my bow is to Thee, all bow is to Thee." In the passages like "Bow to Thee, to Rudra, to Anger,"\* He is again and again referred to as the object of all worship, for the very reason that He is superior to all others. In the ordinary world, indeed, people worship him most who is great in power, and so on. Thus, the Supreme Brahman is the Being that is superior to all others, as the object of all worship, associated with Umā, possessed of divers eyes, the One Being who can be designated by the term 'Isvara.' All symbols such as the mind become objects of worship because they are found pervaded by Him who is superior to all others, who is worthy of being worshipped by all. Hence the śruti speaking of such extremely low animals as dogs and kings of dogs, as the objects of worship, simply in view of their being pervaded by Brahman who is superior to all others.

Wherefore, inasmuch as lower beings are found to command our regard in virtue of their relation to the higher beings, we conclude that in contemplating the mind, etc., we should regard them as Brahman who transcends all.

#### Adhikarana 5.

And the ideas of Aditya, etc., (should be contemplated) in the member, because it stands to reason. (IV. i. 6).

In the preceding Adhikarana it has been said that, because of Brahman's superiority, A'ditya, and others should be regarded as Brahman, in our contemplation (upāsana) of them. Now, a doubt arises as to whether, in such contemplations of members of sacrifices (Karmakṛt) as are enjoined in the words 'He who burns here, upon Him let a man meditate as udgītha,\* we should contemplate Aditya, etc., as udgītha, or in the reverse order.

\* Tait. Sam. 4-5.

\* Chh. 1-3-1.

(Pūrvapaksha):—What would at first sight appear? It would appear that, inasmuch as udgītha, etc., and Aditya, etc., are both alike factors of sacrificial rites, and both alike manifested forms of Brahman, no fixed rule can be laid down as to the one way or the other.

(Siddhānta):—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: Since A'ditya and others are the objects of worship in sacrificial rites and are therefore superior, udgītha and the like which are mere members of sacrificial rites should be regarded as A'ditya, etc., for, it is possible that the udgītha and other factors of sacrificial rites produce greater results, when improved by our contemplation of them as A'ditya, etc. Indeed, the passage of the śruti—"Whatever one performs with knowledge becomes more powerful,"\* gives us to understand that the very thing which, when performed by itself, is possessed of power, is productive of greater results by way of becoming more powerful, when improved by knowledge. Thus, notwithstanding that both are alike essentially one with Brahman, and so on, still, because udgītha, etc., are enjoined as sacrificial acts, because udgītha, etc., are acts to be done and are, as such, means to ends, and because Aditya, etc., are things already existing and are, as such, of a different nature from udgītha, etc., and do not constitute means to ends, we conclude that udgītha and the like factors of sacrificial rites should be contemplated as A'ditya and so on.

#### Adhikarana 6.

(One should be) seated, because of the possibility. (IV. i. 7.)

It has been explained in what particular way one should practise contemplation. Now, a doubt arises as to whether one should be necessarily seated during contemplation, or not.

(Pūrvapaksha):—Because the Ś'ruti has nowhere laid down the rule that one should be seated during contemplation, and because contemplation, which is a mental process, is possible in all postures, there is no necessity for the upāsaka to be seated.

(Siddhānta):—One should contemplate Brahman only when seated; for, to such a man alone one-pointedness of mind is possible. And the Ś'ruti does enjoin that the upāsaka should be seated:

\* Ibid 1-1-10.

"At a retired spot, seated in an easy posture, pure, erect of neck, the head and the body ;

"Leading the highest order of life, restraining all the sense-organs, and having saluted his own Guru in devotion, regarding the heart-lotus unstained and quite pure, and in its centre contemplating Him who is free from all taint and grief ;

"The Unthinkable, the Unmanifest, whose forms are endless ; S'iva who is tranquil, immortal ; who is the womb of Brahman, and who is devoid of a beginning, middle, or end ; the one, who is Intelligence and Bliss ; the Formless, the Wonderful ;

"Him whose help-mate is Umā ; who is the Supreme Lord, Mighty, Three-eyed ; Dark-necked and Serene. Having meditated thus, the sage reaches Him who is the womb of all beings, the Witness of all, transcending darkness."†

So says the Kaivalya-Upanishad. Wherefore, one should contemplate Brahman only while seated.

And because of meditation. (IV. i. 8.)

And because by the following passages we are given to understand that Upāsana, which brings about the break of the bond, is the same as Dhyāna or Meditation :

"Having meditated thus, the sage reaches Him who is the womb of all beings."\*

"It is the Cause that should be meditated upon in the middle of ether (ākāśa), He who is endued with all powers, who is the Lord of all, the source of all Good (Sambhu)."

"Only by the churning of meditation."

And the verb *Dhyai* is used in the case of persons whose bodily members are inactive, whose eye-sight is steadily fixed, whose mind is directed towards one object alone, as when we say "the crane meditates," "Kinsmen meditate upon the absent person." Moreover, one-pointedness of mind is quite necessary for Dhyāna, which is an unbroken current of thought like the current of oil, interrupted by no alien thought of a different kind. Wherefore we should necessarily observe the rule concerning the sitting posture for success in Dhyāna.

† Kaivalya-Up. 4, 5, 6 and 7.

\* Kaivalya-Up.

† Atharvasikha.

And (the word is used) with reference to the motionlessness. (IV. i. 9.)

"The Earth meditates as it were, the mid-region meditates as it were."\* In such passages as these the word "meditate" is used because the earth, etc. are motionless ; wherefore one should contemplate only when seated. Indeed, the current of meditation is possible only to him who is seated, as he is then motionless like the earth, etc.

And the Smṛiti says the same. (IV. i. 10.)

"Having in a cleanly spot established a firm seat, neither too high nor too low, with cloth, skin, and *kusa* grass thereon ;

"Making the mind one-pointed, with the actions of the mind and the senses controlled, let him, seated there on the seat, practise yoga for the purification of the self."†

In such passages as these, the Smṛiti enjoins that the upāsakas should be seated ; wherefore, one should contemplate Brahman only when seated.

#### Adhikarana-7.

Where concentration (is possible), there (meditation may be carried on), owing to the absence of any difference. (IV. i. 11)

It has been said above that it is necessary that the Upāsaka should be seated (during meditation). Now, a doubt arises as to whether, as in the foregoing case, there is any rule, or none as to time and place.

(Pūrvaśloka):—It is but proper that there should be (a fixed rule). Just as a particular direction, a particular place, and a particular time are enjoined in the śruti with reference to sacrificial rites — "He who is going to engage in Brahma-Yajña shall do so in the eastern direction ;" † "Let him sacrifice by Vaisvadeva in a place sloping to the east ;" "They sacrifice by Pinda-Pitriyajña in the afternoon ;" — so also, it is but proper that, in this case also, there should be a rule as to the direction, etc. ; for, the practice of Upāsana is an act enjoined in the śruti.

(Siddhānta):—There is no fixed rule as to the direction, etc., in the case of Upāsana. Concentration is indeed the primary requisite for meditation. Certainly this does not require a particular direction, time.

\* Cāh. Up. 7-8-1.

† Bhagavad Gita. 11. 12.

† Taitt. Ara. 2-11.

or place. Where there does not exist any cause for attachment, hatred and other such evil passions, there indeed the mind attains concentration. So much alone is necessary, as taught in the śruti, "let him be seated at ease in a solitary place."† As to the statement "It attains infinite proportions when done in the presence of Siva," it refers to *Japa* or mere repetition of mantras. It does not refer to meditation, which, however, may be practised even there, provided that concentration, the primary requisite, is attainable. Wherefore, there is no rule as to time, place, or direction, in the case of *Upāsana*, which is the same as meditation, and for which concentration alone is the necessary requisite.

### Adhikarana—8.

**Till death (*Upāsana* should be practised); for even then, it is seen. (IV. i. 12).**

In the preceeding *Adhikarana* it has been made out that the *Upāsana* of Brahman requires no particular place, etc. But now we have to enquire whether it has an end or not.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—*Upāsana* may be practised as long as one may wish to do so. Otherwise, it may be stopped.

(*Siddhānta*):—*Upāsana* should be practised day after day till death. It should never have an end, inasmuch as the śruti enjoins *Upāsana* till death in such passages as the following:

"He who meditates thus day by day goes to Svarga."\*

"He who behaves thus all his life reaches the world of Brahman."†

There should be no break, in the middle of the meditation of Brahman which leads to the state of Brahman. It is only when Brahman has been meditated upon by the *Upāsakas* as their own Self without intermission that the state of Brahman manifests itself in those *Upāsakas*. Hence it is necessary, for the manifestation of Brahman's nature, that the *Upāsakas* should meditate, without intermission, upon the Supreme Brahman, who is omniscient, ever-satisfied, self-luminous, self-reliant, whose powers never fail, whose

potencies are infinite. Accordingly the śruti says that Brahman's nature manifests itself in the *Upāsakas*:

"In that most blessed form of Thine, O Rudra, which is gracious and attractive, which manifests itself in the sinless ones, do Thou, O Lord, that dost pour Thy blessings from the mountain top, shine in Thy full splendour to us."\*

To explain: *Rudra* is so called because, He expels (or causes to run away) from the *Upāsakas* the intolerable misery of *samsāra* which arises from various causes abiding in oneself as well as outside, and which has been running in a continuous stream of attachment for the body of *Devas* and the like, so that it has been firmly ingrained in one's nature by the beginningless sin (*malā*), karma and impressions (*vāsanās*) of past experience. The supreme Brahman, Siva, the Supreme Lord (*Paramesvara*), is here addressed as *Rudra*. *Rudra* has a form which is gracious; i. e. a form which is eternal, devoid of sin, and therefore supremely pure, most beneficent, the Highest Bliss itself. Because, it is gracious, it attracts the heart of all. It manifests itself in the sinless ones, i. e., in those persons whose acts, both good and evil, have all been consumed in the fire of wisdom,—'sin' standing for virtue as well. This form is also the most blessed one, because it is none other than the unsurpassed supreme Bliss spoken of in the śruti, "That is the unit of Brahman's Bliss."† The *Upāsakas* pray: "In that most blissful form, do Thou remove all good and evil acts of ours which have brought about our *samsāra*, and manifest Thyself in Thy full splendour in our own essential nature."

Wherefore, inasmuch as Brahman's nature manifests itself in the nature of the worshippers (*Upāsakas*), the meditation of Brahman which causes such manifestation, should be practised till death. There should be no break in it at any time whatever.

### Adhikaraṇa 9.

**From the attainment thereof (accrue) non-contact of the subsequent sins and destruction of the previous ones, because of the mention thereof, (IV. i. 13.)**

In the preceding section it has been explained with reasons how in the *Upāsakas*, who are free from sins, the essential nature of Brahman clearly manifests itself. Now, a doubt arises as to whether, in

† Kaivalya-Up.

\* Chha. 8-2-3.

† Ibid. 8-13-1.

\* Tai. Sam. 4-3-1.

† Tai. Up. 2-6.

the case of an Upāsaka, a destruction of sins takes place or not.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—It would appear at first sight that even in the case of Upāsakas no destruction of sins can take place without the enjoyment of their fruits, since it is said that no action is exhausted even in hundreds of crores of ages. (*Kalpas*), without its fruits being enjoyed. On the attainment of a body for the enjoyment of their fruits, further accumulation of Karma is inevitable; so that, there is no occasion for moksha.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: In the case of Upāsakas, all sin is destroyed. —How?—As soon as the Upāsana is commenced, destruction of previous sins and non-contact with the subsequent ones follow as a result of the Upāsana itself. So indeed is it declared in the śruti:

“As the soft fibres of the Ishika reed, when thrown into the fire, are burnt, thus all his sins are burnt.”\*

“As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows it.”†

Therefore, destruction of the previous sins and non-contact with the subsequent ones do accrue to the upāsakas. As to the assertion that so sins can be exhausted without their fruits being enjoyed, it applies only to the unenlightened, and hence no contradiction.

#### Adhikarāna 10.

Of the other also (there is) in the same way non-contact, but on death. (IV. i. 14).

It has been proved that in the case of the enlightened sage there is no contact of sins. Now, a doubt arises as to whether there is a taint of good deeds (as opposed to sins or evil deeds) or not.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—It is proper that there should be a destruction of sin, as it is opposed to Vidyā or knowledge, but not of good deeds, since it would stand to reason that they should go along with Vidyā as its necessary accompaniment.

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Even the good deeds of the sage do not touch him and are destroyed, inasmuch as their results are equally opposed to Moksha and therefore undesirable. The good deeds which are favourable to Vidyā by

way of securing good health and the like will be destroyed on the death of the body. But as to those acts which form a necessary accompaniment of Vidyā, they do not taint the sage, as they are free from contact with objects of desire. Hence the conclusion—that in the case of the sage there is no taint of good deeds either.

#### Adhikarāna 11.

But only those previous acts whose effects have not yet begun, because of its being marked as the limit. (IV. i. 15).

In the preceding adhikarāna, it has been shewn that in the case of the enlightened one there is a non-contact with the subsequent acts of merit and demerit and a destruction of the previous ones. Now a doubt arises as to the continuance or otherwise of those acts of merit and demerit which have already begun their effects.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—In the words “all his sins are burnt” the śruti speaks of all sins without distinction. Therefore, as even the acts in question are among those done prior to entering on the path of Vidyā, they, also must undergo destruction.

(*Siddhānta*).—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: It is only such of the acts of merit and demerit done before entering on the path of Vidyā as have not yet begun their effects, that undergo destruction; for, the śruti speaks of the death of the body as the limit:

“For him, there is only delay so long as he is not delivered (from the body); then he will be perfect.”\*

Hence no destruction of the Prārabdha-Karma, of the acts, which have already begun their effects.

#### Adhikarāna 12.

But the Agnihotra and others (contribute) only to the effect thereof, as seen (in the scriptures.) (IV. i. 15).

In the preceding Adhikarāna it has been shewn that good and evil deeds do not touch the enlightened one and are destroyed. It has been further shewn that Upāsana should be continued throughout life. But, now, a doubt arises as to whether even the performance of Agnihotra and other rites should continue till the death of the body or should cease in the middle.

\* Chhā. 5-24-3.

† Ibid. 4-14-3.

\* Ibid. 6-14-2.



(*Pūrvapakṣa*):—It may appear that the Agnihotra and other rites need not be performed till death, inasmuch as it is supposed that, though performed, they undergo destruction. Who will have the mind to do a thing in the absence of utility?

(*Siddhānta*):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows: Agnihotra and the like should be performed till death as contributing to the very success of Vidyā. Accordingly, indeed, the śruti says:

“Brāhmins seek to know him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting.”\*

The study of the Veda means the repeated japa or recitation of the Vedic mantras which treat of matters concerning Atman, which are calculated to produce the highest knowledge constituting the means of attaining the supreme Lord, Paramesvara. The Jābāla-upanishad says:

“Then the students of Brahman thus addressed him: Tell us, O Lord, what mantra has to be recited whereby to attain immortality?” Yājñavalkya said: “It is by Satarudrīya. These are indeed the names of the Immortal, and thereby one becomes immortal.”

In the Kaivalya-Upanishad it is said:

“That Brāhmana who daily recites S'atarudrīya, he is purified by the sacred fires; he is purified by the air, he is purified from liquor-drinking, he is purified from Brāhmanicide. Taking his stand in the final order of holy life, let a man recite it always or, once; he attains the highest knowledge; the Ocean of Samsara undergoes extinction.”

Here we are given to understand that by the recitation of the mantras called S'atarudrīya which treat of Brahman, that supreme knowledge which extinguishes Samsara is attained, and that the sins which are opposed to the knowledge undergo destruction. The recitation of S'atarudrīya is here said to bring about destruction of all sins, on the ground that it comprises the names of Siva who is immortal and free, through time without a beginning—as declared in the words “these indeed are the names of the immortal.” From this it will be seen that even the recitation of the names of the Paramesvara,—such as ‘Siva,’—conduces to the destruction of all sins that may stand in the way of knowledge. The Śruti says:

“If even a chandāla, if he should utter the word ‘Siva’, one may talk with him, dwell with him, eat with him.”

Here indeed we are given to understand that the greatest sinner who is most impure attains highest purity by a mere utterance of the word ‘Siva’ denoting Brahman. Elsewhere also the śruti, after saying that in the case of the Brāhmana who recites daily the Atharvasiras all sins are extinguished, declares also that he attains moksha, in the following words:

“Once reciting, he becomes clean, pure, and fit for sacrificial ritual. Reciting a second time, he attains the state of Ganapati; reciting it a third time he enters the Deva Himself.”

And that the recitation of the Pranava causes the break of the bond (Pāsa-vichchheda) is taught in passages like the following:

“Having made Atman the arani, and Pranava the upper arani, by practice of knowledge, by repeated churning, the wise man burns up the bond.”\*

So also elsewhere. Accordingly, since we are given to understand that the Vedic mantras treating of Paramesvara constitute the means to Moksha by way of conducing to the knowledge of the Supreme, through destruction of all sins, the recitation of those mantras should be practised throughout life even by the enlightened sage. So also it is necessary to perform Agnihotra and such other sacrificial acts, dedicating their fruits to Paramesvara inasmuch as they are things commanded by him and constitute His worship. So, too, the observance of the injunction regarding gifts, etc., is necessary. Hence the conclusion that even for the enlightened sages it is necessary to perform Agnihotra and the like with a view to bring about the perfection of knowledge (Vidyā). The worship of the Lord (Iśvara-upāsana) takes the form of ritual (karma), austerity (tapas), recitation (japa), meditation (dhyāna) and knowledge (jñāna). Ritual (karma) comprises Agnihotra, etc; austerity (tapas) means *niyama* or self-imposed religious observance, or it may be Kāya-soshana, physical mortification; recitation (japa) means repetition of Pranava and the like mentioned above. These form the means to moksha, by bringing about the extinction of sins. But knowledge and meditation are the direct means to moksha, as they cause the attainment of the condi-

tion of Brahman. Wherefore the observance of all these is necessary.

(*Objection*).—If the good deeds such as Agnihotra are intended for the development of knowledge, and if good deeds other than these, done in the past, have been destroyed on entering the path of Vidyā, then what are those goods which, as said in the śruti, the friends of the sage inherit on his death?

(*Answer*)—The Sūtrakara says:

(There are also deeds) other than these,—of which some speak of both kinds. (IV. 1 17)

Some, i. e., the students of Sātyāyana recension of the Veda, read as follows:

“His sons inherit the property, his friends the good deeds, his foes the evil deeds.”

The good deeds here spoken of are other than those—Agnihotra and the like—which are intended for the perfection of knowledge; they are the deeds whose fruition is obstructed by other and stronger deeds, and which, as capable of producing food, health, mental purity and the like which are consonant with knowledge, conduce to results favourable to knowledge and have not therefore been destroyed even by knowledge. These are the deeds spoken of—deeds of both kinds which precede and succeed knowledge.

It is indeed (said), “Whatever is done with knowledge.” &c., (IV. 1 18)

“Whatever is done with knowledge, that alone becomes more powerful.”\* Here the śruti says that the purpose of the Udgītha-Vidyā is the removal of obstruction in the path of the fruition of the act. Thereby the śruti implies the existence of obstruction, the fruition of some acts by other and stronger deeds. Hence the meaning of the sūtra is that Agnihotra and the like should be performed with a view to the removal of the obstacles that obstruct the fruition of those acts which are favourable to knowledge.

### Adhikarana-13.

After exhausting the others by enjoyment, he then becomes blest. (IV. 1 19.)

Now we have to enquire whether those who, while possessing Vidyā, hold certain responsible offices (in the administration of the universe), are entitled or not to Moksha,—as the result of their Vidyā,—over and above the offices they hold.

(*Pūrvapakṣa*).—If plurality of births be postulated for the enjoyment of the fruits of the prārabdha,—of the karma which has begun its effects,—then the knowledge attained in one birth disappears in the succeeding birth, so that whatever karma is done in the latter birth leads to enjoyment of fruits. Wherefore, owing to this possibility of a series of births, they (i. e., the office-holders) do not attain liberation.

(*Siddhānta*).—As against the foregoing we argue as follows: The prārabdha-karma can but lead to enjoyment of its own fruits. They cannot also lead to the extinction of Vidyā acquired in the past, so that they (those office-holders) do attain liberation. They will not be subjected to an (endless) series of births; for, there is no cause. The interval of birth and death is like that of sleep: they do not bring about extinction of Vidyā.

A. MAHADEVA SASTRY, B.A.

(To be continued.)

## SIVAGNANA SIDDHIYAR

OF

ARUL NANDI SIVA ACHARYA.

(Continued from page I.)

SUTRA IX.

PURIFICATION OF THE SOUL.

### Adhikarana I.

Meditate on Sri Panchakṣara.

1. Him, who cannot be understood by the Paśu and Paśuṅnana if you cannot reach, not possessing sufficient Pathiṅnana and love in your heart, and are separated from his Divine foot, you can reach Him, if you regard the alluring world as a mirage and get free from its clutches. If you again meditate constantly according to law on the Sri-Panchakṣara, The Supreme will graciously enter your heart, driving away your darkness.

Paśu and Paśuṅnana defined.

2. Paśuṅnana consists of the knowledge of the Vedas, Sastras, Smritis, Puranas and Arts, and of the Mantras from Aṣṭabhai Vaikari to Nada; these have the effect of inducing future births. The Ahat. Knowledge is Paśuṅnana as the Paśu becomes bound in a body, has to learn and know from others, and one by one. The Supreme Siva knows alone without extraneous aid.

Extinction of senses is no Moksha.

3. If you hold that the extinction of the senses is alone Mukti, then we may as well hold that the eggs of fishes and worms, and seeds, and persons dead and in a swoon in

\* Chha 1-1-10.

**TRANSLATIONS.****THE VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS WITH SRIKANTHA BHASHYA.***(Continued from page 33 of Vol. V).***Fourth Adhyaya.****SECOND PĀDA.****Adhikarana 1.**

Speech (is dissolved) in mind, because of our experience and the word. (IV. ii. 1).  
 And for this very reason all senses (follow) after (mind). (IV. ii. 2).

In the pāda just closed, it was shewn in what particular way, &c., the upāsaka should practise upāsana. This pāda will treat of his departure from the body. The dissolution of speech and other sense organs in mind of the departing person is taught in the following passage:—

“Of this departing person, my dear, speech is dissolved in mind, mind in breath, breath in fire, fire in the Supreme Deity.”<sup>1</sup>

A doubt arises as to whether this stands to reason or not.

*Pūrvapakṣa* :—What is the *pramāṇa* view? Every effect, indeed, attains dissolution in its material cause (upādāna), as we find that a pot is invariably resolved into clay, its material cause, and so on. The material cause of speech and other sense-organs is Brahman, not mind. Wherefore, it is proper that they should be dissolved only in Brahman.

*Siddhānta* :—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows :—  
 The Sṛuti says :—

“Of this departing person, my dear, speech is dissolved in mind”<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Chha. 6-8-6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

“The senses being dissolved in mind”<sup>1</sup>.

We actually see that at departure speech and other sense-organs cease to function even prior to mind. Therefore, speech first attains dissolution in mind; then all senses are dissolved in mind. As to the contention that an effect attains dissolution only in its material cause, we say that it is not always the case. This law applies only to the dissolution of the thing itself. It is not meant here that speech and other senses are themselves dissolved in mind; only the cessation of their functions is meant here. Just as a burning piece of charcoal, when cast into a body of water, ceases to emit light, &c., so also it stands to reason that the functions of speech and other sense-organs are merged in mind, though mind is not their material cause. The dissolution of speech, &c., *i.e.*, of things which possess the functions, here stands for the dissolution of the functions, the functions and the things that possess those functions being here spoken of as identical by courtesy.

## Adhikarana 2.

This mind in breath, from the sequel. (IV. ii. 3).

The dissolution, in breath, of mind accompanied with speech and all other senses, is spoken of in the words, “Mind (is dissolved) in breath”<sup>2</sup>. A doubt arises as to what kind of dissolution this is.

*Pūrvapakṣa* :—Granted that it is the functions of speech and other senses that are merged in mind, seeing that mind is not their material cause (*upādāna*). But as to mind itself, it is itself dissolved in breath (*prāna*), inasmuch as breath is the material cause of mind. “Made up, indeed, of food, my dear, is mind, and made up of waters is breath”<sup>3</sup>. In these words, the *Sruti* teaches that, as made up of food, mind is made up of earth (*prithivī*) and that, therefore, as made up of waters, breath is the material cause (*upādāna*) of mind; so that it is not contrary to reason to say that mind is substantially dissolved in breath.

<sup>1</sup> Prasna. 3-9.

<sup>2</sup> Chha. 6-8.6.

<sup>3</sup> Chha. 6-5-4.



**Siddhānta** :—As in the case of speech and other senses, so also in the case of mind, it is the functions of mind that are merged in breath, because of the sequel, “Mind (is dissolved) in breath”<sup>1</sup>. Mind is not substantially dissolved in breath; for, breath cannot be the direct (upādāna) or material cause of mind, since mind is not born from breath (prāṇa). Wherefore, reason shews that it is only the functions of mind that are said to be merged in breath.

### Adhikarana 3.

It unites with the lord, because of the union therewith, etc., (being spoken of) (IV. ii. 4).

Firstwhile, the dissolution of the mind and all the senses in the breath was spoken of. Now a question arises as to where that breath attains dissolution.

**Pūrrapakṣa** :—What, now, suggests itself at first? From the words of the Śruti “the breath (is dissolved) in light” the breath attains dissolution in light.

**Siddhānta** :—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows :—That breath then unites with the Jīva, the lord; it does not attain dissolution in light, because of the Śruti which speaks of its union with the Jīva in the passages like the following :—

“Thus do all the senses gather round the  
Self at the time of death”<sup>2</sup>.

Now the Sūtrakāra proceeds to explain away the apparent contradiction of the passage “the breath (is dissolved) in light.

(It unites) with the elements of matter, because of the Śruti referring to them. (IV. ii. 5).

In the passage, “the breath (is dissolved) in light”<sup>3</sup>, the Śruti refers to ‘light’ as conjoined with the other elements of matter. Accordingly, there is no contradiction, since we are only taught here

<sup>1</sup> Chha. 5-8-6.

<sup>2</sup> Bri. 6-3-38.

<sup>3</sup> Chha. 5-8-6.

that the breath along with the Jīva unites with the elements of matter.

Not in the one alone; so indeed they teach. (IV. ii. 6).

Not in light alone does the breath attain its dissolution. For, the Sruti which treats of the triplication teaches its conjunction with the other elements of matter. Wherefore, since the breath, along with the Jīva, unites with the elements of matter, there is no contradiction of the Sruti.

### Adhikarana 4.

And same up to the commencement of the passage. And immortality. (IV. ii. 7).

A question arises as to whether the departure that is here described is the same or different for the enlightened and the unenlightened, prior to the commencement of the passage starting with light.

*Pārcapaksha* :—What suggests itself at first? Inasmuch as mundane life and liberation are two quite different effects, the departure is different in the two cases of the wise and the ignorant

*Siddhānta* :—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows :—Prior to the commencement of the passage starting with the light, etc., the departure is quite the same for the wise and the ignorant. But the wise man effects the exit through the tubular passage (nādī) in the head and attains immortality, but not the other: here lies the difference. For, the Sruti says:—

“There are a hundred and one nādīs of the heart; one of them enters the crown of the head. Moving upwards by it, a man reaches immortal; the other nādīs serve for departing in different directions”<sup>1</sup>.

Prior to this, the departure is quite the same.

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<sup>1</sup> Katha-Up. 6-16.

**Adhikarana. 5.**

Because of the reference to embodied existence prior to union with Him. (IV. ii. 8).

It has been shown in the last section that the enlightened one makes his exit through the *nâdī* in the head, and that then commences the journey on the Path of Light. Now there arises a question as to whether, in the case of the enlightened one who has departed from the body, a journey on the Path of Light is possible. The *Sruti* speaks of immortality being attained immediately after the death of the physical body :—

“When all desires which once entered his heart are undone, then does the mortal become immortal, then he attains *Braman* here”<sup>1</sup>.

And the *Sruti* speaks also of the journey on the Path of Light, in the words, “They go forth to light”<sup>2</sup>. Thus, both being declared in the *Sruti*, there arises a doubt on the matter.

*Purrapaksha* :— Now it would seem that journey on the Path of Light is impossible in the case of liberated souls, inasmuch as the liberated soul cannot start on the journey, owing to the impossibility of speech, etc., coming into life again after having been once absorbed in *Brahman*.

*Siddhanta* :— As against the foregoing, we argue as follows :— Embodied existence does not cease, because of the reference to a connection with the body, prior to the attainment of *Brahman* through the path of light. The *Sruti* merely says that the liberated one becomes immortal at once, because the actual attainment of immortality is to come off very soon. Wherefore in the case of the departing wise man, journey on the Path of Light is possible. Now as to the assertion that such a journey is impossible in his case, because of the absorption of speech, etc., the *Sūtrakāra* says as follows :—

And a (body) subtle in size (he has), because so we find. (IV. ii. 9).

..

1. Bri. 6-4-7.

2. Chha. 5-10-1.

Though he has departed from this body, the subtle body continues. Otherwise, owing to the impossibility of a journey, no conversation with the moon and the like would be possible. In the *Sruti*, indeed, in the *Paryanka-Vidyâ*, there is recorded a conversation taking place on the path of gods between the wise soul and the moon :—

“ All who depart from this world (this body) go to the moon . . . . Verily, the moon is the door of the *Svarga* world. Now, if a man objects to the moon (if one is not satisfied with life there), the moon sets him free. But, if a man does not object, then the moon sends him down as rain upon this earth. And according to his deeds and according to his knowledge, he is born here again as a worm, or as an insect, or as a fish, or as a bird, or as a lion, or as a boar, or as a serpent, or as a tiger, or as a man, or as something else in different places. When he has thus returned to the earth, some one (a sage) asks, ‘ Who art thou ?’ And he should answer : . . . .”<sup>1</sup>.

So that, in the case of the wise man who has departed from the body, journey on the Path of Light is possible.

Hence not by destruction. (IV. ii. 10).

Hence, *i.e.*, for the foregoing reasons, the *Sruti*, “ Then does the mortal become immortal ;”<sup>2</sup>, which speaks of the attainment of immortality, does not mean that immortality is immediately attained through a complete cessation of all connection with the body.

Because of the probable existence of this very one, there is warmth. (IV. ii. 11).

Because it is possible that such a subtle body exists somewhere without being altogether destroyed, warmth, which is the property of the subtle body is indeed felt somewhere, even when the wise soul departs from the body. Warmth is not the property of the gross physical body, as it is not felt in it after death. Hence also the possibility of the journey.

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1 Kaushitaki, Up. 1-2.

2 Bri. 6-4-7.

(If it be objected that this cannot be) because of the denial (we say that the senses depart) not from the embodied one. This indeed is clearly taught in the recension of some. (IV. ii. 12).

**Objection :—**The Brihadāranyaka teaches how the unenlightened soul departs from the body in the following words :—

“ The point of his heart becomes lighted up, and by that light the Self departs, either through the eye, or through the skull, or through other places of the body. And when he thus departs, life departs after him, and when life thus departs, all the other vital elements depart after it.”<sup>1</sup> And so on.

Then, the Sruti, after concluding the subject so far as it concerns the unenlightened soul in the words, “ So much for the man who desires”, proceeds as follows :—

“ But as to the man who does not desire, who, not desiring, freed from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only, his vital elements do not depart elsewhere ; being Brahman, he goes to Brahman.”<sup>2</sup>

As the Sruti here denies the departure of the wise soul, he directly attains Brahman here alone.

**Answer :—**No ; for, in the words, “ his vital elements depart not,”<sup>3</sup> the Sruti teaches that the vital elements of the departing soul who has started for a journey on the Path of Light are not detached from him. This idea is clearly conveyed by the words of the Upanishad in the recension of the Mādhyandinas.

“ As to the man who, not desiring, freed from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only, *from him* the vital elements do not depart.”

And the Smṛiti also says. (IV. ii. 13).

The Smṛiti speaks of the wise one passing through the nāḍī in the head :

“ Among them, there is one going upward, making its way

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<sup>1</sup> Bri. 6-4-2.

<sup>2</sup> Bri. Up. 6-4-6.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.



through the Solar region; thereby, he passes beyond the region of Brahman and attains the supreme goal.”

Therefore, journey on the Path of Light is possible in the case of the departing soul of the wise man.

Some say that journey on the Path of Light is not invariable in all cases, inasmuch as in the case of those who are devoted to the Unconditioned the cessation of connection with the body here is itself their liberation.

## Adhikarana 6.

They (are dissolved) in the Supreme. So, indeed, the Sruti says. (IV. ii. 14).

In a former section, it was shewn that Jiva conjoined with the senses becomes absorbed in the elements of matter including light (tejas). From the words “light (becomes dissolved) in the Supreme Deity,”<sup>1</sup> we understand that light combined with other elements of matter and conjoined with Jiva attains dissolution in the Supreme Deity. Now, a doubt arises as to whether a dissolution of its very being in the Supreme Deity (Parabrahman) is here meant, or the mere undistinguishability of the two from one another.

*Pûrvapaksha*:—It would seem proper that the absorption of the very being of light is here meant. The Supreme Deity is, etymologically, none other than Mahâdeva. It is Mahâdeva who is spoken of in the Sruti as Parabrahman, the source of all beings, in the following and similar passages:—

“This Deity thought”<sup>2</sup>

“The one God (Deva) creating heaven and earth.”<sup>3</sup>

Therefore, it is but reasonable to suppose that in Him, the material (upâdâna) cause, all elements of matter, along with Jîva, attain dissolution in their very being.

1 Chha. 6-8-6.

2 Chha. 6-9-2.

3 Mahanarayana Up. 1-12.

*Siddhānta*.—The true theory, however, may be stated as follows :—Though Brahman is the material cause, the elements are not dissolved in Him by their very being. On the other hand, they only become undistinguishable from one another. There is no ground whatever why the mere union, once taught in the words, “speech becomes one with mind,”<sup>1</sup> should be understood in quite a different sense here. Therefore, as in the case of the mind, etc., here too, the Sruti means only a cessation of function.

Non-separation (is meant) because of the text. (IV. ii. 15).

Because the text of the Upanishad speaks of union, it is quite reasonable to understand that mere non-separation of the elements of matter from Brahman is here meant.

## Adhikarana 7.

There is the blazing forth of the point of his seat ; then within the gate illumined by it, in virtue of the knowledge and in virtue of the complementary contemplation of the path, (the wise one), helped by the Grace of the One in the heart, departs by the passage beyond the hundred. (IV. ii. 16).

In a former section, it was said that up to the starting point on the Path of Light, the process of departure is the same in the case of the enlightened and the unenlightened. Now we shall enquire whether there is any difference or no between the two at the time of their exit.

*Pūrvapakṣa* :—In the words, “light is dissolved in the Supreme Deity”, it is said that the wise as well as the ignorant is absorbed in the Supreme Cause,—the Highest God, the Supreme Brahman, the Supreme Light,—and remains there inseparable, for a time, resting himself. Therefore, their departure is quite the same, inasmuch as the Sruti speaks of the blazing up of the heart and so on in the case of both alike. The Sruti says :

“The point of his heart becomes lighted up, and by that

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<sup>1</sup> Chha. 6-8-6.

**light the self departs, either through the eye, or through the skull or through other places of the body."**<sup>1</sup>

Therefore, the departure being the same in both, there is no difference whatever between the two.

*Siddhānta* :—Such being the *prima facie* view, we say that our conclusion is that there is a difference between the two. To explain at length :— In virtue of the wisdom which takes the form of the worship of the Supreme Lord (Paramésvara) dwelling in the heart, and in virtue of the complementary contemplation of the Path of Light, the Lord, who is gracious to all, becomes propitiated; and when the enlightened devotee is glanced at by the gracious eye of the Lord which is capable of destroying all the sin that enshrouds His being and when the gate of his exit is illumined by His grace, he passes upwards by that nâdî in the head which lies beyond the hundred ones. But not so the other; on the contrary, he passes out by the other nâdîs. So says the Sṛuti :—

"There are a hundred and one nâdîs of the heart, one of them enters the crown of the head. Moving upwards by it, a man reaches the immortal; the other nâdîs serve for departing in different directions."<sup>2</sup>

Such is the peculiarity in the departure of the wise man.

All this amounts to this :—"Rudra abides in the heart of men." "The heart-lotus, which is free from dirt, perfectly pure;"<sup>3</sup> in such passages of the Sṛuti as the above as well as in the passages like "the Lord sits, O Arjuna, in the region of the heart in all beings,"<sup>4</sup> we are given to understand that the Supreme Lord (Paramésvara) dwells in the hearts of all men. He in whom Jiva with the functions of his senses becomes absorbed and is merged in sole communion; He whom—in the

<sup>1</sup> Bri. 6-4-2.

<sup>2</sup> Katha-Up. 6-16.

<sup>3</sup> Kaivalya-Up.

<sup>4</sup> Gīta. 18-51.

words, "Superior to the universe is Rudra, the Great Sage (Maharshi),"<sup>1</sup> and "all verily is Rudra,"<sup>2</sup>—the Sṛuti declares to be above the universe as the efficient cause (Nimittakârana) thereof, and to be one with the universe as its material (upadana) cause; He whose supremacy as the Lord of the universe is taught in the words "One indeed is Rudra; they stand not for a second;"<sup>3</sup> He than whom nothing else the seekers of liberation have to know, as taught in the words, "Siva alone is to be meditated upon";<sup>4</sup> He of whom,—in the words, "Here indeed, when the life principles of a man depart from the body, Rudra imparts instruction to him about Brahman, the Saviour (the Taraka-Brahman), whereby he becomes immortal,"<sup>5</sup>—the Sṛuti says that He teaches to the enlightened devotees at death the Taraka-Brahman whereby they realise his true being; He who, as the object of all worship, is the Lord of all sacrifices; as the Sṛuti says, "Secure Rudra, the Lord of your sacrifice, for your protection;"<sup>6</sup> He who is the best doctor of the disease of Samsara, as addressed in the passage, "O Rudra, . . . invigorate our sons by thy medicinal plants, for, I hear that Thou art the chief physician amongst physicians."<sup>7</sup> He whose form and part Maya is said to be—in the words, "Maya, verily, be it known is the material cause, and Mahesvara is its possessor,"<sup>8</sup>—that supreme energy (paramasakti) called Maya which manifests itself in the variegated flower-show called the universe;—He, indeed, the Supreme Brahman dwelling in the heart—the Supreme Lord, whose form is supreme Bliss, who is the Consort of Uma, the Supreme Spirit (Paramatman), glances at the contemplating and devout aspirant—the devotee who has been constantly engaged in *Agnihotra* and other rituals enjoined as forms of Divine worship in the Sṛuti which constitutes the Divine command, who is completely free from the slightest mark of prohibited action, who has dedicated all fruits of his action to God, whose will has been completely surrendered to the Divine will, who has imbibed in full the immortal nectar of the knowledge of God, who has renounced all

<sup>1</sup> Mahana. 10-19.<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 16.<sup>3</sup> Sve. 3-2.<sup>4</sup> Atharvasikha.<sup>5</sup> Ramottaratapani.<sup>6</sup> Rig-Veda. 4-3-1.<sup>7</sup> Ibid. 2-38-4.<sup>8</sup> Sve. Up. 4-10.

interested action as well as its fruit, who, having attained discrimination, etc., is solely engaged in devotion to God, seeking Divine Grace,—and, at the time of his leaving the body, the Lord, in all His Grace towards the devotee, directs towards him His gracious glance which wipes away all the stain of samsara. Then this devotee, with all the stain of samsara completely wiped away by the mighty Grace of God, and departing by the nâdī of the head shone on by the resplendent Atman, reaches by the path of Light the supreme Divine abode which transcends all material universe, the unsurpassed bliss being its very nature ; then attaining to a form like the Divine form itself, his nature partakes of the eternal unsurpassed bliss. Therefore, it is but proper to hold that there is a difference in the destinies of the enlightened and the unenlightened.

### Adhikarana 8.

Following the (sun's) rays. (IV. ii. 17.)

In the preceding section, it has been shown that the devotee, who has obtained the grace of the Paramésvara abiding in the heart, departs by the nâdī of the head. Now a question arises as to whether, in the case of the departing devotee, the upward journey is possible by night as well as by day.

*Pūrvapakṣa*:—The view that first suggests itself is this : We are given to understand that the departing soul passes upward in contact with the sun's rays, as the Sruti says :

“ When he departs from this body, then he departs upwards by those very rays. ” 1.

Certainly, contact with the sun's rays is possible only by day, but not by night.

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1. Chha. 8-3-5.



**Siddhānta** :— As against the foregoing, we hold as follows : It is true that the departing soul of the enlightened devotee (Vidvan) passes upward only in contact with the sun's rays. But this contact is possible by night as well as by day ; for, even at night, the sun's rays are present, as shown by the heat felt during summer nights. Hence the conclusion that, by night as well as by day, his soul passes upward in the wake of the sun's rays.

Now the Sutrakara refers to an objection and answers it.

If it be objected (that it) cannot (happen) at night, (we say) no, because the connection exists as long as the body exists ; and so the Sruti says. (IV. ii. 18).

**Objection** :—It has been said that, even when one is dead at night, he attains Brahman, by passing in contact with the sun's rays. This is not possible ; for, death by night is condemned in the following words :

“Day-time, bright fortnight, the period of the summer solstice,—these are good for the dying ; but the opposite is condemned.

**Answer** :—No, because the bondage of samsara lasts only as long as the body lasts. For, the prârabdha karma,—i.e., the sum total of the acts, which has brought about the present birth—continuing to operate even when those acts which will lead to bondage, but which have not yet begun to operate, have been destroyed by Vidya or knowledge, is operative only up to the close of the final bodily existence ; and, therefore, when even the prârabdha ceases at the close of the last bodily existence, there remains no obstacle to the attainment of Brahman.

And the Sruti teaches accordingly : “For him there is only delay so long as he shall not be delivered from the body ; then he shall be perfect.” 1.

As to the condemnation of the night-time, it holds good only

in the case of other persons. Wherefore, there is nothing unreasonable in the statement that, even when the enlightened devotee is dead at night, he can attain Brahman.

And hence even during the period of the winter solstice. (IV. ii. 19.).

For the foregoing reason, *i.e.*, only because there is no cause of bondage, the enlightened devotee (Vidvan) attains Brahman, even though he may die during the period of the winter solstice.

These two are taught in the Smṛiti with reference to the Yogins as things to be contemplated. (IV. ii. 20).

*Objection* :—It is with reference to the dying enlightened devotees that the Smṛiti speaks of certain periods of time as leading to a return of the souls and of certain other periods as causing no return :

“Now in what time departing, Yogins go to return not, as also to return, that time will I tell thee, O chief of the Bharatas.

“Fire, light, day-time, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern solstice,—then departing, men who know Brahman reach Brahman.

“Smoke, night-time, and the dark fortnight, the six months of the southern solstice,—attaining by these to the lunar light, the Yogin returns.

“These bright and dark paths of the world are verily deemed eternal; by the one, man goes to return not, by the other, he returns again.”<sup>1</sup>

Therefore, it is unreasonable to maintain that the condemnation of the night-time and the period of the winter solstice refers to unenlightened persons.

(*Answer*) :—This Sūtra is meant as an answer to the foregoing objection. In the passages quoted above, the Śruti teaches that the two paths, called the path of the pitris (Pitri-yanā) and

the path of the gods (Deva-yana), are to be daily contemplated upon by those who are engaged in Yoga or contemplation as a necessary part of their Yoga, that they should contemplate daily that the enlightened souls pass by the Path of Light and that others pass by the opposite path. The Sruti does not, on the contrary, teach that any particular periods of time are suitable for the death of the enlightened devotees; for, the Smṛiti concludes in the following words:—

“Knowing these paths, O son of Pritha, no Yogin is deluded, wherefore at all times, be steadfast in Yoga, O Arjuna.”<sup>1</sup>

And it is the Pitriyana and Devayana paths that are referred to in the second and the third of the verses quoted above. The word ‘time’ occurring in the first of the verses quoted above refers only to the whole host of the escorting gods (ativahika-gana), among whom the gods presiding over particular periods of time predominate. Wherefore, no objection whatever exists to the view that the enlightened devotees reach Brahman, even though they may die by night, or in the winter solstice, or in the dark fortnight. When the body dies, then Brahman is attained at once.

A. MAHADEVA SASTRY, B.A.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* viii. 27.

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**TRANSLATIONS.**



**THE VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH SRIKANTHA BHASHYA.**



*(Continued from page 17 of Vol. VII.)*

**FOURTH ADHYAYA.**

**THIRD PADA.**

**Adhikarana 1.**

By light, etc., as it is clearly taught (IV. iii. 1.)

In the last pada it was taught that the contemplator departs from the body by the nadi of the head, the passage being lighted by the Grace of the Paramesvara dwelling in the heart. Now, we shall first enquire whether such a contemplator attains Brahman solely by the path of light, or it is possible for him to reach Brahman by some other way also.

*Pārvaṇakṣha*:—Indeed, in one place we are taught that it is also possible to reach Brahman without passing through the path of light: “Where the root of the hair divides, there he opens the two sides of the head, and saying Bhu, he enters Agni, saying Bhuvā, he enters Vayu, saying Suvas, he enters Aditya, saying Mahas he enters Brahman. He there obtains lordship.”\* Wherefore the path of light is not always necessary for reaching Brahman.

*Siddhānta*:—As against the foregoing view, we argue as follows. The enlightened devotee (Vidvān) reaches Brahman by the path of light solely; for in the Vidyā of Five Fires (Panchagnividya) it is clearly taught that the path of light leads to Brahman, in the words “They go to light...”† In the passage of the Taittirīya-Upanishad quoted above it is not the path to Brahman that is taught; on the other hand, it is the attainment of the glory (vibhūti) of Brahman that is taught there. Wherefore the attainment of the Supreme is possible only through the path of light. According to some, there is no necessity for the path of light in the case of those who take to the contemplation of the unconditioned Brahman.

## Adhikāraṇa 2.

(We should understand) ‘Vayu’ after ‘year,’ because of the generic and specific mention. (IV. iii. 2.)

A doubt arises as to whether in the order of the stages on the path of light as mentioned here (*i. e.* in the Chhandogya-Upanishad) we should interpose the order mentioned elsewhere in the Śruti, or whether we should adhere only to the order found here. The Chhandogya teaches the order of the stages on the path of light as follows:

“They go to light (archis,) from light to day, from day to the light half of the moon, from the light half of the moon to the six months when the sun goes to the north, from the six months when the sun goes to the north to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, from the moon to the lightning. There is a person not human; he leads them to Brahman.”§

\* Tait. Up. 1-6.

† Chha. 5-10-1.

§ Ibid. 5-10-1, 2.



In the Brihadaranyaka, the wind (Vayu) is mentioned between the year and the sun :

“When the person goes away from this world, he comes to the wind. Then the wind makes room for him, like the hole of a carriage wheel, and through it he mounts higher. He comes to the sun.”\*

The question is whether or not the wind should be interposed (between the year and the sun.)

*Pārvapaksha* :—Now it should not be interposed, because it does not occur in the Sruti between them.

*Siddhānta* :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows : On the principle that we should gather together what is taught in different places on the same subject, the wind should be interposed after the year and before the sun. In the Brihadaranyaka itself, elsewhere, when speaking of the order of the stages on the path of light, the region of Gods, (Devaloka) is mentioned in the words “from the months to the region of the Gods, from the region of the Gods to the sun.” and this Devaloka should come after the year, for, following the teaching of the Chhandogya we should interpose the year in this passage, and then the year will have to take its place after the months since it is a longer period than the months. The Devaloka is none other than the wind. The word ‘Devaloka,’ *literally* the region of Gods, denotes the wind as its generic appellation, whereas the word ‘Vayu’ denotes the wind itself specifically. Thus, as specific and generic appellations of the same thing, the words ‘devaloka’ and ‘Vayu’ refer to one and the same thing, namely, the wind. So before the sun we should interpose the wind. The Sruti says :

“The wind is the seat of the Gods.”

“The wind that blows here,—this is the stronghold of the Gods.”

### Adhikarana 3.

After lightning (comes) Varuna, because of (their) connection. (IV. iii. 8.)

The Kaushitaki-Upanished reads as follows :

“Having reached the path of the gods, he comes to the world of Agni (fire), to the world of Vayu (air), to the world of Varuna,

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\* Op. cit. 7-10-1.

to the world of Indra, to the world of Prajapati, to the world of Brahman."\*

Here, the first place given to light, here designated as 'Agni,' is indisputable. As the relative positions of Vayu and the sun expressly assigned to them in the other upanishads have a better claim to our acceptance than the one assigned here, they will have to be placed after the year in their due order. Varuna, too, and others being mentioned here, a doubt arises as to whether they can or cannot be placed in the path of light.

(*Purvapaksha*):—There being no rule by which to determine their position, they can find no place in the path of light.

(*Siddhanta*): As against the foregoing we hold as follows: It is necessary to assign places to them in the path. It is but right to assign a place to the world of Varuna next after the world of lightning, because of their mutual relation. The mutual connection between lightning and Varuna is well known to all, inasmuch as Varuna is the lord of the water in the rain which is preceded by the lightning. After them should come the worlds of Indra and Prajapati, such being the only places that remain to be assigned to them. Thus there remains nothing inexplicable.

### Adhikarana 4.

They are guides, because of the mark (IV. iii. 4.)

Now a doubt arises as to whether light, etc., are so many localities marking the stages on the path, or they are so many gods (Devatas) leading the wise devotees (to their destination).

(*Purvapaksha*):—It may at first appear that they are so many localities, since the path may have some marked stages. In common parlance people say, 'leaving the village, go to the river, and then thou wilt reach the station of the herdsmen, so, too, are light, etc.

(*Siddhanta*): As against the foregoing we hold as follows. Light, etc., are certainly so many different gods identifying them-

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\* Op. cit. 1-3.

**solven** with the path, and acting as leaders of the wise devotees. It is but right to conclude that light, etc., also are leaders, though not mentioned as such specifically as may be inferred from the fact that the person in the lightning is mentioned to be a leader: "There is a person not human, and he leads them to Brahman."\*

Now it may be asked: Of what use are Varuna, &c., if the person in the lightning leads the souls to Brahman? The Sutrakara answers as follows:

Thence by the person in the lightning alone, as the Sruti says. (IV. iii. 5.)

After reaching the person in the lightning, that person alone leads them to Brahman, as the Sruti says: "There is a person not human; and he leads them to Brahman." Varuna and others are leaders in so far as they help the person in leading the souls. So, there is nothing inexplicable here.

### Adhikarana 5.

(He leads them to) the Created, says Badari, because of the possibility of passage to Him. (IV. iii. 6.)

A doubt arises as to whether the non-human person leads the devotees to the Brahman Himself or to some one else.

(*Purrapaksha*): He leads them only to the Hiranyagarbha, the Created; for it is to Him, not to the supreme Brahman who is all-pervading, that a passage is possible.

The Sutrakara gives another reason:

And because it is so specified (IV. iii. 7.)

Being specified in the words "I come to the hall of Prajapati, to the house,"† it is to the abode of the Hiranyagarbha that the person leads the devotees.

But the mention of Him is due to proximity (IV. iii. 8.)

As to the mention of Brahman in the words "he leads them to Brahman,"§ it is due to the Hiranyagarbha's proximity to Brahman,

\* Chha. 5-10-2

† Chha. 8-14-1.

§ Ibid. 5-10-2.

and the Hiranyagarbha's proximity is inferrible from his being spoken of as the first created being: "See ye the Hiranyagarbha who is the first-born."\*

At the dissolution of the creation, along with its lord he goes beyond it, as the Sruti says. (IV. iii. 9.)

Though the abode of the Hiranyagarbha is first reached, there is no contradiction of the Smṛiti which denies return to this world. For, at the dissolution of the world of the Hiranyagarbha, the souls of the enlightened pass on to the Highest goal which lies beyond the world of the created Brahman, along with the Hiranyagarbha the lord of the latter. Accordingly it is said in the Sruti:...

"They in the Brahma-loka, at the end of the creation, are all released, on reaching the immortal one beyond."

Hence no inconsistency whatever.

And the Smṛiti also says. (IV. iii. 10.)

"At the time of dissolution, at the end of the great cycle, they all, along with Brahman, with regenerated souls, enter the Supreme Abode." From this passage of the Smṛiti too, we understand so. Thus we conclude that the host of the gods, from the god of light upward, leads the soul to the Hiranyagarbha first. Then, at dissolution, the supreme Brahman is reached by the soul along with the Hiranyagarbha. (Now follows another *pūrvapakṣa* :—)

To the one beyond, says Jaimini, because He is primarily so. (IV. iii. 11.)

The gods on the path of light lead the soul to Narayana Himself, who is superior to the Hiranyagarbha; for Narayana can be called Brahman in the primary sense of the word, as He is the Parabrahman in His aspect as the upādāna or material cause of the universe. So says Jaimini.

The Sutrakara gives a reason for the above :

Because we find it so stated. (IV. iii. 12.)

"He reaches the end of the path, that supreme abode of Viṣṇu"† in these words we find it stated that the abode of Viṣṇu is the one reached by the soul.

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\* Mahanarayana-Upaniṣad.

† Katha Up. 8-9,

**For the following reason also, we hold that the soul is led to Vishnu.**

And there is no reference to the Created. (IV. iii. 18.)

As to the passage "I come to the hall of Prajapati, to the house,"\* there is no reference to the created being, the Hiranyagarbha; for it is possible that, as the protector of creatures, Narayana may be denoted by the word "Prajapati." And as to the passage, "They in the Brahma-loka, at the end of creation, are all released, on reaching that immortal one beyond,"† here, too, the word 'Brahman' refers to Narayana. Having dwelt in His abode, the Yogins, at the end of the great cycle, i. e. on the last bodily existence coming to a close, they pass on to the Great Immortal Brahman who is above all, and become released. Hence no inconsistency. "These, indeed, are the designations of the Immortal,"‡ in these words it is said that Siva, the Parabrahman, is the one who is called the Immortal, and the one who can be said to be ever free. Wherefore, on the death of the body brought into existence by the prarabdhakarma, the yogins dwell in the abode of Vishnu, till the completion of the fruit of the prarabdhakarma, and then, passing on to Brahman who is above all, they become free.

*Siddhānta*:—Now the Sutrakara proceeds to state his own conclusion.

Badarayana maintains that (the person) leads (to Brahman) those who do not worship symbols; because there is a fault in both (the views given above). And he who is intent on Brahman (goes to Brahman Himself). (IV. iii. 14.)

The worshippers of symbols are those who worship a sentient being or an insentient object merely regarding it as Brahman. But they who worship Brahman Himself who is above all are not said to be the worshippers of symbols. The worshippers of the Brahman Himself are led by the person to Brahman Himself and to none else, to that Brahman whom the Śruti describes as superior to all, as dark and yellow, as divers-eyed,—inasmuch as the Śruti teaches that the worshipper of Brahman Himself attains Brahman Himself: Having reached the highest light, he attains his true form."§

• Chha. 8-14-1.

† Mahanarayana Up.

‡ Jabala-Up.

§ Chha. 8-3-4.



“Him whose help-mate is Uma, who is the supreme Lord, Mighty, Three-eyed, Dark-necked, and serene : having meditated thus, the sage reaches Him who is the womb of all beings, the witness of all, transcending darkness.”\*

In both the views given above there is a fault, inasmuch as they contradict the Sṛuti. He who is intent on Brahman, i. e. the worshipper of Brahman Himself, goes to Brahman ; he does not tarry on the way, because there is no use doing so. Being the Upadana or material cause of the Hiranyagarbha who represents the sum total of all creation, Narayana is superior to the Hiranyagarbha ; superior even to Narayana is the supreme Brahman called Siva, the Nimitta or efficient cause, the Divers-eyed, the Omniscient, the Omnipotent, the Ever-satisfied, the Self-reliant, the Self-luminous. So we read in the Sivasankalpa-Upanishad.

“Brahman is greater than the great; greater still than that great one is Hari; even greater than this one is Isa.”

Elsewhere, too, we read “Brahman who is superior to Narayana.”† Having thus spoken of Brahman as superior to Narayana, the Sṛuti, in answer to the question—of what nature is Brahman?—proceeds to describe Brahman in the passage “The True, the Real,”§ as one who, being the Omniscient, is never subject to error in thought or speech; as one who fills the whole universe with the rays of His Potency; as one associated with Uma, the Parasakti or Supreme Potency, who is inseparable from Himself, the great cause (para-prakṛiti) that supreme Light made up of highest bliss and pure intelligence, manifesting Herself in the form of the whole universe including the Hiranyagarbha, which is evolved out of Narayana the highest sentient being, who in his turn is but one aspect of Her own being; as the Immutable, as the Three-eyed, as the supreme Brahman transcending all. In the words “superior to all is Rudra”|| He is said to be above the whole universe. Therefore it is quite unreasonable for the followers of the Vedas to imagine a higher being than this one.

And the Sṛuti points out a distinction. (IV. iii. 15.)

\* Kaivalya-Up.

† Mahanarayan. - p.

§ Ibid.

|| Ibid.

The Sruti itself distinguishes the three—(1) Brahman who is above all (2) Vishnu who is an aspect of Brahman and who is the material cause (upadana) and (3) the Hiranyagarbha who is evolved from Vishnu—from one another as the passages like the following shew :

“Brahma is greater than the great.....even greater than this one is Isa.”

“See ye the Hiranyagarbha the first born.”\*

“Purusha verily, is Rudra.” Wherefore the only reasonable conclusion is that the non-human person leads the soul to the abode of Siva, the supreme Brahman, that is beyond Brahma (the Hiranyagarbha) and Vishnu,—to that abode which is the supreme Light made up of supreme bliss.

As to the supposition (that the person leads the soul to Vishnu,) based on the passage “He reaches the end of the path, that supreme abode of Vishnu,” we say that the word ‘Vishnu’ here denotes the Parabrahman. The end of the six-fold path, i. e., that which lies beyond that path, can properly be no other than the abode of Siva, who is above all. Or to interpret it otherwise: the supreme abode or nature of Vishnu who manifests Himself as the universe is the supreme light, which is supreme bliss, itself; and this can be no other than the state of Siva, the Parabrahman, wherein dwelling Vishnu is not of the world though manifesting Himself as the universe. Hence no inconsistency whatever.

In reference to this subject some hold as follows:—As the Sruti says, “At the end of the great cycle, they are all released, on reaching the Immortal One beyond,”\* we should understand that those who worship Vishnu as the highest manifestation of Siva, the supreme Brahman, reach the world of Vishnu,—who is called Brahman (in the Sruti) because he is a manifestation of the supreme Brahman—and, with all the glory of Vishnu manifested in themselves, they, at the end of the cycle, when the last bodily existence comes to a close attain to Siva, the Supreme Immortal Being beyond, and then they

† Kath Up. 3-9.

§ Mahanarayana Up.

are liberated. Thus the sruti teaches that those who worship Vishnu reach first the world of Vishnu and, then, after some interval, attain to the abode of Siva. Hence nothing inconsistent here.

A. MAHADEVA SASTRY, B.A.,

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"And this I know that good shall fall at last, far off, at last to all,  
And every winter change to spring; that nothing walks with aimless  
feet,

That not one life can be destroyed or cast as rubbish in the void,  
When God hath made the pile complete."—*Tennyson*.

~~~~~

"The ideal of a man's real self is hid in the bosom of God, and may lie ages away from his knowledge; and his ideal of woman is the ideal belonging to his unrealized self. The ideal only can call forth or long for its counterpart ideal."

~~~~~

"To perform is to promise :

To-day's dawn pledges the sun for to-morrow."

~~~~~

"We are deeper than we know. Who is capable of knowing his own ideal?"

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"First the grain and then the blade, the one destroyed, the other made ;

The stalk and blossom and again, the gold of newly minted grain.

So life by death, the reaper, cast to earth again shall rise at last ;

For 'tis the service of the sod, to render God the things of God."

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"So long as we love, we serve. So long as we are loved by others I would almost say we are indispensable; and no man is useless while he has a friend."—*Robert Louis Stevenson*.—*From the Mind*.

# THE SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA

OR

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### TRANSLATIONS.



THE VEDANTA-SŪTRAS WITH SRIKANTHA BHASHYA.



*(Continued from page 50 of Vol. VII.)*

## FOURTH ADHYAYA.

### FOURTH PADA.

#### Adhikarana 1.

On reaching (the Supreme Light), there is the manifestation in his true form, as the Śruti says. (IV. iv. 1.)

It has been shown in the last preceding section that those who have attained true wisdom, reach, by the path of light, the abode of Siva, the Parabrahman,—that abode which lies beyond the abodes of the Hiranyagarbha and Narayana, and which, being of the nature of the highest bliss, is known by the name of Svarga. In this pada, the Sūtrakara proceeds to shew how, in the case of those who have

reached that abode, the manifestation of their true nature takes place. The Sruti teaches that he who has reached the Parabrahman,—the Great Luminary, the Supreme Light,—manifests himself in his true form: “Having risen from out of this earthly body, and having reached the highest light, (the serene being) appears in its own form.”\* Now a doubt arises as to whether this form which is attained by him comes into being at the time, or it has already existed.

*Purvapaksha* :—It has not already existed in him. On the other hand, since the Sruti speaks of this form being *attained*, it must be something newly acquired, like Svarga.

*Siddhanta* :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows:—When the Jiva reaches Brahman, his *true* form—similar in its nature to that of Brahman—which has already existed in him veiled by his sin, manifests itself on the removal of the sin. So we understand from the words “in its own form;” otherwise, the qualification “own form” will have no meaning, inasmuch as even the newly acquired form belongs alike to the Jiva. On the contrary, as we maintain, when the sin veiling the *true* nature of the Jiva has been removed by the Grace of Siva, the Parabrahman who is gracious to all, the *true* nature of the Atman, similar to the nature of Siva, comes into manifestation; it is not newly brought into existence, as the result of an act is. Since the Jiva’s sin has existed from time without beginning, we can easily understand how he is subject to *samsara* or mundane life. Wherefore we conclude that when the Jiva is liberated, it is his true inherent nature, the pure consciousness and bliss endued with omniscience and other such attributes,—which bursts forth into manifestation.

(It is) the liberated one (that attains his true form), (as shewn by) the original proposition. (IV. iv. 2.)

Though the Atman in himself has already existed, we maintain that, when the Jiva is freed from sin, the infinite bliss and the like manifest themselves in him; for, in the words “I shall explain him (the true self) further to you,” the Sruti proposes to treat of him alone who is released from the waking and other states of consciousness brought about by sin.

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\* Chha. 8-3-4.



**Moreover,**

**The Atman (is meant here.) as shown by the context. (IV. iv. 3.)**

From the context we understand that the Sruti, in the words "I shall explain him further to you," proposes to treat of the Atman free from all sins, who forms the subject of the discourse; for, the Sruti starts with the words. "The Atman who is free from sin,...He it is that we must search out, He it is that we must try to understand," and says further on "I shall explain him to you further." Wherefore, we conclude that the liberated Atman, in whom the inherent attribute of sinlessness and the like have manifested themselves, is of a nature and attributes similar to those of Brahman.

## Adhikarana 2.

**Because (the liberated one) is found described without distinction. (IV. iv. 4.)**

It has been said in the last adhikarana that the nature and attributes of the liberated one are similar to those of Brahman. Now, we have to enquire whether this similarity of the liberated (soul to Brahman) is consistent or not.

*Purvapaksha* :—Which of the two seems at first sight to be the case? It would seem that none of the souls, whether bound or liberated, can be similar to Brahman, inasmuch as the Sruti denies a second being similar to Brahman, in the passages like "Rudra is one and remains without a second."

*Siddhanta* :—As against the foregoing we state our conclusion as follows :—There does exist a similarity between Brahman and the liberated soul.—How?—For, in such passages as "The sinless one attains greatest similarity," and "the liberated one becomes equal to Siva," we find it taught that the liberated soul is similar to Brahman in nature and attributes; and it is this similarity that is taught by the Sruti in the words "He that knows Brahman becomes the very Brahman." The liberated Atman, in virtue of this similarity being attained, realises himself as inseparable in nature from Brahman. As to the allegation that the Sruti denies similarity in the words "Rudra is one and remains without a second," it has reference to the fact

that the Jiva has no concern with the operations connected with the universe. The Sutrakara, too, says in the sequel, "as may be inferred from the similarity in respect of mere enjoyment." Therefore the similarity meant here refers to the attainment of all objects of desire equally with Brahman. Accordingly the Sruti says: "He enjoys all blessings, at one with the omniscient Brahman" Hence we conclude that the liberated soul can be similar to Brahman.

### Adhikarana 3.

It is in respect of Brahman's attributes, says Jaimini, as the Sruti's teaching, etc., shews (IV. iv. 5.)

It has been said above that, when the soul is liberated, his inherent nature,—similar to that of Brahman, self-luminous and endued with the attributes of sinlessness, etc,—manifests itself. A doubt arises as to whether similarity in both respects is possible or not possible.

*Purvapaksha* :—The purvapaksha will now be stated by way of citing the views held by others.—Jaimini says that the manifestation of the true nature of the liberated soul, as declared in the words "he appears in his own form," refers to the attributes of Brahman, such as sinlessness, etc. It is these attributes of Brahman which are also inherent in the nature of the Pratyagatman or Jiva, as declared in the Sruti:

"The Atman who is free from sin.....He it is whom we must try to search out, He it is whom we must try to understand,"

"He moves about there eating, playing, and rejoicing:.."

Wherefore, according to Jaimini, the liberated one becomes equal to Brahman only in respect of the attributes above referred to.

In respect of consciousness alone, says Audulomi, because that is his nature. (IV. iv. 6.)

Audulomi holds that the liberated soul is equal to Brahman only in so far as the inherent nature of both is consciousness (vijñana), as the Sruti says:

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\* Chha. 8-12-3.

“As a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of taste, thus indeed has this Atman neither inside nor outside, but is altogether a mass of consciousness” †

“He is nothing but a mass of consciousness.” ‡

Thus, as we find both the views upheld, we have to conclude that the liberated soul and Brahman are distinguishable as well as undistinguishable; but, as they cannot be both distinguishable and undistinguishable at the same moment, we have to conclude that they are distinguishable or undistinguishable under different conditions of time, &c.

(*Siddhanta*) :—The Sutrakara proceeds to state his own conclusion :—

Though (the soul is) such, the attributes mentioned above do exist because of their mention, so that Badarayana finds no inconsistency. (IV. iv. 7).

But Badarayana maintains that the liberated soul is, both by nature and attributes, equal to Brahman, because there is no inconsistency whatever involved in the view. Though in the words, “he is nothing but a mass of consciousness,” it has been taught that the liberated soul is self-luminous, still the Sruti proceeds to teach “The Atman who is free from sin,...must be understood,” thus shewing that the attributes also mentioned above, such as sinlessness, pertain to the liberated soul. Wherefore, as the two aspects based on the teaching of the twofold authority are not inconsistent with each other, it is but proper to admit both. It is only in case of mutual opposition that an explanation should be sought for in the difference of the conditions of time, etc. Thus, we conclude that the liberated soul is like Brahman, self-luminous, as he is consciousness by his very nature, and that he is also endued with all excellent qualities, as it is declared that he is free from sin, and so on.

### Adhikarana 4.

By mere will [he secures all enjoyment] because so the Sruti teaches. [IV. iv. 8.]

It has been said above that the liberated soul, who is self-luminous, is of unfailing will, and so on. Now a doubt arises as to whether this is possible or not

† Bri. 6-5-13.

‡ Ibid. 4-4-12.

(*Purrapaksha*) :—What is the view that first suggests itself ? It would seem at first sight that, in the case of the liberated soul, his mere will, without the aid of external causes, cannot secure for him the objects of enjoyment, since that alone cannot produce the effect.

(*Siddhanta*) :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows. By mere will, he can secure all objects of enjoyment, as the *Sruti* says :

“Thus when he desires the world of the *Pitris*, by his mere will the *Pitris* come to him.”\*

Wherefore, his mere will can secure for him all objects of enjoyment; there is no need for external causes.

And hence he has none else as his lord. [IV. iv. 9.]

For the very reason that he has attained to the nature of Brahman and is endued with sinlessness and other such attributes, he has none else for his lord; he is independent, never subject to Karma, since all karma has been destroyed. The *Paramesvara* does not control him, because he has gone beyond the sphere of the injunctions and the prohibitions which constitute His command and which have been in vogue in the long current of time.—How so?—Because he has ceased to be a dependent being (*pasu*). And certainly, on the removal of sin, he has attained to the state of *Siva* Himself. His attainment of the state of *Siva* consists in his possessing all the unsurpassed blessed qualities free from the taint of all sin,—that is,—in being of the same nature as that of *Siva*. Now, the nature of *Siva* is made up of omniscience, etc. Therefore the liberated soul who is equal to *Siva*, has *Siva*'s attributes such as omniscience, eternal knowledge, eternal happiness, perfect freedom, omnipotence, unfailing power, and endless resources. *Samsara* means the contraction of the self-knowledge (*Atmajñana*), so that, when the sin, the cause of contraction, is removed, the liberated soul attains omniscience. For the same reason, when ignorance, the source of *samsara*, has been eradicated, the illusion also, by which the soul identifies himself with a large or a small body, ceases to exist. And because the liberated soul is devoid of decay, death, and grief, therefore, not being subject to karma, he is perfectly free. He is ever happy,

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\* Chha. 8-2-1.

because he rejoices in his own self, being solely immersed in the enjoyment of that unsurpassed bliss which constitutes his very nature; and he is therefore devoid of hunger, thirst, and so on. Because all his powers are ever unfailing, therefore his desires and his will are always realised. Hence it is that the liberated soul and the Paramesvara are spoken of in the Sruti as endued with the eight attributes, such as freedom from sin, etc. Wherefore it is but right to say that the liberated soul who is equal to Siva is perfectly independent.

### Adhikarana 5.

Badari maintains absence (of the body); for so says (the Sruti.) (IV. iv. 10.)

It has been shewn above that the liberated soul is self luminous, of unfailing will, and so on. Now comes the enquiry as to whether the liberated soul is embodied, or disembodied, or both.

Badari maintains that the liberated soul has no such organs as the body and the senses; for, the Sruti speaks of Brahman as disembodied,—in the words “who is without parts, without actions,”—and the liberated soul, who is of the same nature as Brahman, must also be disembodied.

Jaimini maintains existence [of the body], because of the alternatives spoken of in the Sruti. [IV. iv. 11.]

But Jaimini holds that the liberated soul has a body, because the Sruti speaks of him as putting on different phases of existence with bodies and the sense-organs.

“He becomes one, he becomes three, he becomes five,”† and so on. Now the Sruti having spoken of the liberated soul as embodied and also as disembodied, a doubt arises as to what his true state is.

*Purvapaksha* :—The truth is that the liberated soul is disembodied; for, the Sruti teaches that he has no external organs and the like in the following words :

“Seeing these pleasures by the mind, he rejoices.”\*

† Chha. 7-26-2.

\* Chha. Up. 8-12-5.



And Brahman, too, is spoken of in the Sruti as devoid of external organs and the like, as one whose delight is in the Atman and prana alone, whose bliss lies in mind alone.\* That is to say He takes delight in the Atman alone, not in any external object; He enjoys by the mind not by any external organ. Wherefore the liberated souls are ever in a disembodied state. As to the embodied state spoken of, it relates to the souls (in a state of bondage) whose conditions are different.

*Siddhanta*:—As against the foregoing view, the Sutrakara states his conclusion as follows:

Like the sacrifice lasting twelve days, both are possible, says Badarayana for the same reason. [IV. iv. 12.]

As the Sruti speaks of both embodied and disembodied states, the liberated soul exists in either way at will. So thinks the blessed Badarayana. Since the Sruti teaches both ways, the sacrifice lasting twelve days may be treated either as a *sattra*, or as a *ahina*, that is to say, either as a sacrifice in which a number of persons are engaged as primary sacrificers, or as a sacrifice in which only one person is engaged as a primary sacrificer. So, too, here. On the state of the souls who have risen to the height of Siva there is a paṇḍaric text which reads as follows:

All-knowing, all-pervading, pure, all-full by nature, endued with strength equal to Siva's, gifted with supreme power, embodied as well as disembodied do they become at will." Wherefore the liberated souls may exist in either way.

(To be continued.)

A. MAHADEVA SASTRY, B.A.




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\* Tai. 1-6.

# SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA

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### TRANSLATIONS.

THE VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH SRIKANTHA BHASHYA.

*(Continued from page 83 of Vol. VII.)*

## FOURTH ADHYAYA.

### FOURTH PADA.

The Sutrakara says that in the case of one and the same person the two states are possible at different times.

Because of the possibility (of enjoyment) in the absence of the body, as in a dream. (IV. iv. 13.)

The liberated one sometimes creates several bodies at will, and, entering into them, he wanders about. Sometimes, withdrawing the bodies, he remains. In the disembodied state, the liberated one enjoys the pleasure created by the Paramesvara, in the same way

that in a dream a person in the state of bondage enjoys by the mind (manas) the pleasures etc., created by the Paramesvara. That is to say:—Just as in a dream a person enjoys with the mind alone, without the aid of the body and the sense-organs, the objects brought before his view by the Isvara, so also the liberated one enjoys the bliss which is the essential being of Brahman with the mind alone which forms part and parcel of his being.

When it exists, as in the waking state. (IV. iv. 14.)

During the existence of the body and other accessories created by his will, the liberated one enjoys all pleasures like a person in the waking-state.

*Objection*:—If it be possible for the liberated one to enjoy by way of perceiving material objects, then, as the liberated one will have to perceive also what is not desirable in the universe, he cannot be free from the contact of the miseries of samsara.

*Answer*:—No; for, the liberated one never perceives the universe in an undesirable form. In point of fact, the whole of this universe appears to him as Brahman. So the Sruti says:

“This then becomes Brahman, embodied in akasa, the True Being, the pleasure-ground of life, the bliss of the mind, full of peace, immortal.” (1)

In the passage preceding this one,—in the words, “He attains the heavenly kingdom, he attains the Lord of wisdom,”—it has been said that the Yogin attains to the abode of Siva, the Parabrahman, the one essential bliss of the heavenly kingdom, that he attains to the Lord of wisdom, to that one who is the fountain source of all wisdom. Then, the question arising as to what the particular state of the liberated one may then be, the Sruti answers in the words ‘He is the lord of speech, the lord of the eye, the lord of the ear, he lord of knowledge.’ (2) i.e., he becomes the ruler of speech etc.,

1 Tait. Up. 1-6.

2 Ibid.

inasmuch as they are all obedient to his own will. In the case of the liberated one who has attained to this state,—that is to say, who has risen to the state of Brahman embodied in akasa, and whose organs of speech, etc., are pure and obedient to his own will,—then, i. e. on his attaining to that state, this whole universe becomes the Brahman Himself embodied in akasa, that is, Brahman clothed in the supreme splendour (akasa), i. e., in His Supreme Bliss. That Supreme Power (Para-Sakti) which is the fountain-source of all being, the one homogeneous essence of ultimate being, light, and bliss, is what is called Paramakasa, the Supreme Splendour, forming the very being of Brahman, and which directly in the case of the Paramesvara and the liberated one, and ultimately in the case of others, is the means of realising their will and activity.

Accordingly the Sruti says:

“Who indeed could breathe, who could live, if this akasa, this bliss, did not exist? This one, indeed, makes one happy.” (1)

“Bliss indeed is He; attaining that bliss, indeed, a person here becomes happy.” (2)

In these words the Sruti teaches that the Parasakti is the object of universal experience. Accordingly the Sruti—beginning with the words “That is the unit (the highest) of human bliss,” and ending with the words “That is the unit of Brahman’s bliss,” (3)—teaches that the manifestation of bliss rises in an ever ascending scale up to Brahman according as the limiting conditions (upadhis) subside. As free from all limiting conditions, the bliss of Brahman and the liberated one is all full, as the Sruti says, “That is the unit of Brahman’s bliss, and of the bliss of that man who is versed in the scriptural lore and unassailed by desire.” (4) The man here referred to is that person who has attained supreme knowledge and who performs the *agnihotra* and other sacrificial acts

(1) Tait. 2-7.

(2) Ibid.

(3) Ibid 2-8.

(4) Ibid

without longing for their fruits, while dedicating them all to Brahman. The bliss of such a man, who is liberated while still alive, and the bliss of Brahman are quite equal. No inconsistency is however, involved in the Śruti teaching, at the same time, that such a man's bliss is equal to the bliss of lower stages, such as the human bliss; for, in the case of the Yogin who, by his superior Yoga, has risen through the several stages, his yoga at the lower stages being yet imperfect his bliss manifested at those stages is spoken of as equal to the bliss of the beings who are on those levels. Hence it is that this one, this supreme Bliss, the final source of all, this supreme splendour, being inseparable from the Supreme Being, is spoken of as Brahman, as the cause of the universe, in the words "He knew that Bliss was Brahman." (1) And the manifestation of this Bliss is referred to in the words "This was the wisdom attained by Bhṛigu, founded in the Supreme Heaven." (2) Accordingly, inasmuch as the universe appears to the liberated ones as Brahman clad in His Supreme splendour, they become immersed in the Supreme Bliss, and are, therefore, like Brahman, free from all contact of misery.

### Adhikarana 6.

Like a lamp he pervades: so indeed the Śruti teaches. (IV. iv. 15.)

It has been already indicated that the liberated soul becomes all-pervading in virtue of his power of assuming an infinite number of bodies at his own will.

*Purvapakṣa*:—Now one may suppose that the liberated soul cannot, properly speaking, be all-pervasive, because he is said to wander about like a limited being, in the following passages:

"In all worlds, he wanders about freely" (3)

"These worlds he wanders through, eating the food he likes, putting on the form he likes." (4)

Wherefore his assumption of several bodies can only be gradual, but not simultaneous.

1 Ibid 3 6

2 Ibid

3 Chhā. 8-4-3

4 Tait. 3-10-5.



**Siddhanta** :—Just as a lamp enclosed within a jar pervades the whole room by its light on the removal of the limitation, so also does the liberated soul become all-pervasive by way of pervading the whole universe through his Sakti (Divine Power), on the removal of the sin which obscured his Sakti.

Accordingly the Sruti says:

“He is our kinsman and father. He is the dispenser. He knows all the heavenly abodes; in whom disporting, those who have attained immortality find their heavenly abodes in the third region.” (1)

“They at once spread over earth and sky, over all worlds, over all quarters, and over heaven; having snapped asunder the long thread of destiny, and seeing the One in all creatures, they become that One.” (2)

These verses occur in the section treating of Mahadeva, the Supreme God, the creator of the universe, and embodied in the whole universe. (The first verse quoted may be interpreted as follows:—) He, Mahadeva, our kinsman, our Father, the creator. He is the dispenser of all good. He knows all non-material heavenly regions. Now the sruti proceeds to say what purpose is served by His being our kinsman and knowing all regions. Those who have attained immortality and enjoy the bliss of freedom and always disport in Him, resort to the abodes they like, all full of spiritual splendour, and situated in that region of Mahadeva called heaven and which lies beyond Maya, forming the third region from here. That is to say:—The liberated ones, having attained immortality—with their bonds of confinement broken asunder when Mahadeva, the Parabrahman, the doer of all good like a kinsman and a father, has vouchsafed His grace,—dwell in the splendid abodes formed in their own region of Supreme Heaven, the third one from here.

1 Mahana. 1-15.

2 Ibid. 1-17.

Now in the next verse the Sruti teaches how they pervade the whole.—The liberated souls spread over the earth and sky with the rays of their own Divine power (Sakti); they spread over even the regions of the Hiranyagarbha and the like; they spread through the four quarters. Thus they dwell, pervading the whole universe. So that, omniscient as they are, they rend asunder the vast thread of destiny caused by Karma; and thus released from bonds of virtue and vice, they behold in all beings the one Being, Mahadeva, and become one with Him, one with all. Therefore, the liberated ones immersed in the one Being, Siva, do pervade the whole.

Thus, the liberated Jivas are of the same nature as Mahadeva and are spoken of as Devas, pervading the universe including heaven itself. It is they that are extolled in the Saman called Devavrata beginning with "Those Devas who abide in Heaven," etc. The Purana also says:

"They indeed are the very Devas who dwell in Heaven, the Devas who dwell in the Mid-air, (antariksha,) the Devas who dwell on Earth; these Devas abide in their Divine vow."

Here the "Earth" means the Brahmanda; what is spoken of as "Antariksha" refers to the second region called Maya; what is here spoken of as "heaven" (Dyauh) refers to the third region, otherwise known as Parmakasa, the Supreme Light, the pure Divine Source, the abode of Siva. Hence the all-pervasiveness of the liberated ones.

Nescience refers to one of the two states of self-absorption and death; so indeed it is taught in the Sruti. (IV. iv. 16.)

*Objection:*—The Sruti teaches the absence of the internal and external knowledge, in the case of him who has attained to Brahman: "Embraced by the all-knowing Atman, he knows nothing whatever, external or internal." (1) How then can the liberated soul pervade all by his divine power of knowledge?

[ Bri. 6.3.21.]

*Answer* :—This objection cannot be maintained. For, this want of knowledge on the part of jiva refers to either of the two states, namely, sleep or death. Regarding sleep the Sruti says:

He said: "Sir, in that way he does not know himself that he is I, nor does he know anything that exists." (1)

And as to death it is taught as follows: "Having risen from out of these elements, he vanishes again in them. When he has departed, there is no more knowledge." (2)

Liberation being quite distinct from these two states, there can be no absence of knowledge. On the contrary, owing to the removal of the veil of sin (mala,) the soul becomes all-knowing and all-powerful. So in liberation there can be no want of knowledge.

### Adhikarana 7.

Excepting activities connected with the universe, from the section and from want of proximity. (IV. iv. 17.)

It has been said that the liberated souls attain equality with Isvara in respect of the attributes of self-luminosity, pervasiveness, omniscience, etc. Accordingly equality even with respect to the creation of the universe is inevitable, because of the unqualified assertion, "He attains utmost equality." (3) When equality in respect of creation of the universe is once admitted, then as there would be many Isvaras, we would have to give up the theory that Isvara has no second. Therefore the question arises as to what sort of equality with Isvara is attained by the liberated souls: Does the equality comprehend the creation of the universe, etc., or does it not comprehend it?

*Purvapaksha* :—What is the view that suggests itself? Because that Sruti—in the words "When he desires the region of the Pitris," etc., (4)—teaches that, by mere will, he has the power to create the region of the Pitris, etc., because again the Sruti—in the words "through these regions he wanders, eating the food he likes, putting

1 Chha. 8-11-1.

2 Bri. 6-5-13

3 Mundaka. 3 1 3

4 Chha. 8-2-1

on the form he likes,"—(1) he is said to be active in all regions, as also because no limitation is made as regards the equality attained with *Paramesvara*, it may be concluded that the liberated souls are engaged also in the creation, etc., of the world.

*Conclusion*:—As against the foregoing view we maintain as follows: Though the liberated soul attains equality with the *Paramesvara*, his freedom as regards objects of enjoyment does not extend to the creation, etc., of the universe. Having regard to the section (in which the passages treating of the creation etc., of the universe occur,) we conclude that such functions pertain to the *Paramesvara*. Take for instance.

“Whence, verily, those creatures are born.”(2)

“Creating the heaven and the earth there is one *Dēva*.”(3)

In these sections treating of the creation of the universe, *Jīva* has no place at all. Therefore, the liberated soul has nothing to do with the creation, etc., of the universe.

If it be said that it is expressly taught, we say, no, for such teaching refers to what exists in the region of the hierarchy. (IV. iv. 18.)

If it be said that the liberated soul has to do with the activity connected with the universe, as expressly taught in the *Sruti* “through these worlds he wanders, eating the food he likes, putting on the form he likes,” (4) we answer that it is not so taught. The passage teaches merely that he can command the enjoyments available in the regions of *Brahma* and others of the hierarchy, because the passage refers to the enjoyment of the objects of desire. He has therefore nothing to do with activities connected with the creation of the universe.

*Objection*:—If so, then, as he is engrossed in the enjoyment, he is subject to change.

*Answer*:—The *Sutrakara* answers as follows:

And it is not subject to change; so, indeed, the *Sruti* describes its state. (IV. iv. 19.)

1 *Tait.* 3-10-5

2 *Tait.* 3-1.

3 *Mahana* 1-12

4 *Tait.* 3-10.

**The bliss to be enjoyed by the liberated soul is not subject to change, is pure, is of the nature of all-full Brahman. So, indeed, does the Sruti describe its state :**

**Bliss indeed is He ; attaining that bliss, indeed, a person here becomes happy.” (1)**

**And the nature of Brahman, indeed, is described as immutable in the following passages.**

**“ Existence, knowledge, and infinite is Brahman.” (2)**

**“ Bliss is Brahman.” (3)**

Hence the bliss of liberation is not subject to change, as the bliss of a bound soul (Pasu) is subject. That is to say :- Wandering freely in the region of the hierarchical beings ranging from Sadasiva to Brahma, eating the food he likes, putting on the form he likes, released from all sense of identification with the human and other bodies, with his three potentialities uncontracted, the liberated soul fully realises his all-pervading self, endued with the supreme Bliss and light, with Siva and Sakti held in homogeneous union in all their glories, immersed in the universe which has become of one homogeneous essence in perfect unison with Parabrahman. Accordingly, in the words “I am the food, I the food, I the food ! I am the eater of food, I the eater of food, I the eater of food !” the Sruti teaches that the liberated soul regards his self as all-pervading, identifying himself with the whole universe including the experiencer and the objects of experience. The Self spoken of here is not the self of Samsara or mundane experience, inasmuch as it is all-full as embracing the whole universe. On the other hand this Self is quite free ; it is quite distinct from the fictitious samsaric self which is limited as comprehending only the body of a Deva or some other being, thinking “I am a Deva,” or “I am a man,” and so on. Hence there is no connection whatever with the self of the world of matter.

1 Tait. 2-7.      2 Tait. 2-1.      3 Tait. 3-6.



Or the self "*Aham*," refers to Siva and Sakti held in perfect unison. The thought of the liberated soul takes the form "The whole universe including food, etc., is nothing but that self." Hence the saying of the wise :

"The recognition of Siva and Sakti in perfect union, embracing the whole from 'a' to 'ha,' is spoken of as '*aham*,' since the infinite is void of attributes.

"The syllable 'a' is in the heart, and the syllable 'ha' is in the twelve membered region. Hence the sages look upon this (universe) as '*aham*,' the non-dual, resting in the shining Self."

Now, the song of the liberated soul who has entered the supreme abode of the unsurpassed Brahman, accompanying his meditation of the glorious word '*aham*' which denotes Siva who comprehends all universe, is not a thing which is enjoined here by the Sruti as incumbent on the liberated soul. On the contrary, the song referred to is intended to extol the state of the liberated soul with a view to indicate the highest flight of the enjoyment of Bliss. Wherefore, excepting the enjoying of Brahman's Bliss, the liberated souls cannot, of their own will, have anything to do with creation and other such activities.

A. MAHADEVA SASTRY, B.A.

(To be Continued.)

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**TRANSLATIONS**

**THE VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH SRIKANTHA BHASHYA.**

*Continued from page 130 of Vol. VII).*

**FOURTH ADHYAYA.**

**FOURTH PADA.**

So do the direct and the indirect (Revelations) reveal. (IV iv. 20)

The Śruti and the Smṛiti teach the same thing—that has been taught above. The passages of the Śruti are such as the following :

“From that Atman sprang Akasa.”<sup>1</sup>

The Smṛiti referred to includes the passages like the following:

“Waters alone did He create in the beginning.”<sup>2</sup>

Therefore Brahman alone is the cause, etc., of the universe.

Now one may suppose :—Then, because perfect equality of the liberated soul with Brahman, i.e., with *Īśva*, is taught—in the passages like the following :

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<sup>1</sup> Tait. 2-1.

<sup>2</sup> Manu. 1-8.

“When the seer sees the brilliant maker and lord (of the world as the person who has his source in Brahman, then he is wise, and staking off good and evil he reaches the highest oneness, free from passions;”<sup>1</sup>

“The liberated one can be equal to Brahman;”—

Therefore, whatever power Siva has, such as the power of creating the universe, all that power can accrue to the liberated one, without any limitation whatever. Otherwise perfect equality cannot hold good.

As against this supposition the Sutrakara says:—

And because of equality only as regards enjoyment. (IV iv 21)

The equality of the liberated soul with Brahman refers more to the enjoyment of all objects of pleasure. It does not refer to the creation of the universe and the like; for, then, there would be many Isvaras or Lords of the universe. The Sruti accordingly says:

“He attains all pleasures in unison with the omniscient Brahman.”<sup>2</sup>

Brahman is spoken of as omniscient because He is endued with that *chit* or consciousness which sees all things, which constitutes His very nature, His heart itself, manifested as the one supreme existence and light, and in virtue of which Brahman or Siva who is unconditional by time and space becomes omniscient, is the cause of all, abides in all things as their very self, is possessed of all powers, is of unfailing power, is independent of all, is ever satisfied, is of unsurpassed supremacy, is gracious to all, is the one bliss which all the liberated souls seek to attain. Only as endued with this power, even the Supreme Brahman is said to be omniscient.

Having attained perfect unison with Him, the liberated soul, too, with his inner sense, with his inherent thought or consciousness,

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1 Mundaka. 3-1-3.

2 Tai. 2-1

The Vedānta Sūtras

attains all objects of desire; that is to say, he sees them all and rejoices. Accordingly the Sruti says.

“Seeing these pleasures with the mind, he rejoices.”<sup>1</sup>

“The Mind is his divine eye.”<sup>2</sup>

“Whose nature is true, rejoicing in the senses, delighted in the mind;”<sup>3</sup>

In these words it is said that even Brahman enjoys His bliss in the mind, not with the aid of the external organs. The wearing of the body and the senses by Brahman and the liberated soul is optional for them and subserves amusement; hence no room for any objection. Wherefore it stands to reason that the equality of the liberated soul with Brahman holds good only as far as enjoyment is concerned, inasmuch as we maintain that, as Brahman enjoys all objects of desire, so also does the liberated soul enjoy. Even in common parlance, as when we say “Devadatta is a lion” we speak of equality when we find agreement in respect of a few attributes; and therefore the assertion of equality (between the liberated soul and Brahman) is not open to objection.

No return, as so it is taught. No return, as so it is taught. (IV iv. 22)

It has been said that the liberated souls attain equality (*sayujya*) with Brahman, because of the similarity in respect of enjoyment, etc. Now a doubt arises as to whether even they do again return to Samsara at any time, or do not return. This doubt arises because we find that those who in virtue of a certain act of merit have attained to the position of Indra do return to Samsara.

*Purvapaksha*:—What view may suggest itself to us here? In the words “having as much food as he likes and assuming as many forms as he likes, he enters (into these worlds),” we are given to understand that the liberated souls are associated with many bodies. When once they are associated with them, it is likely that they will

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1 Chha. 8-12-5.      2 Tai. 1-6      3 Tai. 8-12-5.

again do good and evil deeds. When the great act of Divine worship which he had done before became exhausted through enjoyment in various ways, the liberated soul has to come back to the Samsara of mean pleasures under the force of the act or acts which ripen at the time. Accordingly, those who have risen to the height of Indra and the like return here on the exhaustion of their great meritorious act, and are born in the body of a Brahmana or the like. Wherefore those who have attained to the height of Brahman return to Samsara again, inasmuch as the enjoyment, which works by way of bringing together the objects of enjoyment and the enjoyer, only causes the exhaustion of the great meritorious act.

*Siddhanta* :—As against the foregoing we hold as follows. There is no return to Samsara for the liberated ones who have seen directly the Divine Light of Brahman and entered into His abode. Why? For, the Sruti teaches as follows :

“He who behaves thus all his life, reaches the world of Brahman and does not return, yea, he does not return.”<sup>1</sup>

The Purana, too, after treating of the abodes of Brahma, Vishnu, and others, declares as distinct from them all the ancient abode of Siva, the Parabrahman, in the following words :

“The primeval abode of the Spouse of Uma is as resplendent as a crore of the suns; it is furnished with all objects of enjoyment, quite pure, eternal and imperishable.

“Having attained to that celestial abode the souls are freed from all troubles; they become omniscient, all-pervading, pure and all-full.

“They, according to their own will, become embodied or disembodied, with their body and the senses quite pure, with supreme powers endowed to them.

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1 Chha. 8-15



"In the case of those men who were devoted to Gnana and Yoga and have attained the supreme abode, there is no return again to the fierce region of Samsara."

We shall now explain the meaning of these passages :—

In the words "having reached the highest light it appears in its true form ; that is the self ;"<sup>1</sup> the Sruti, refers to the Supreme Light, attained by the liberated soul ; the Supreme Brahman, associated with Uma ; that Mighty Light whose splendour transcends the splendour of crores of the suns, and by whose light all this shines. So says the Sruti :

"The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, and much less the fire. When He shines, everything shines after Him ; by His light all this is lighted."<sup>2</sup>

In the Atharvasiras also it has been described as follows :

"I am Paramesvara, the Supreme Lord ; I am Akasa, the celestial Ether ; I am the pure ; I am the end and the middle ; I am the Light in front and at the back ; I am one and all ; whose knows Me and Me alone he knows all Devas."

The Smriti also says :

"Every one should meditate on Siva, who has feet and hands everywhere ; who has the head, the eye and the mouth everywhere ; who is the mass of light that overspreads all."

Beyond this is that Light, the Para-Brahman known as Siva, associated with Uma. The abode wherein He dwells, it needs no saying, is as resplendent as a crore of the suns put together. The same thing which in the form of consciousness is the unsurpassed light, is the seat of unsurpassed bliss and is therefore known as Svarga, as taught in the Sruti : "the region of Svarga enveloped in Light ;"<sup>3</sup> "Devas, verily, went to the region of Svarga,

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1 Chha. 8-8-4.

2 Katha. 5-15.

3 Tai. Ara. 1-27

and these Devas asked Rudra,"<sup>1</sup> and so on; the abode here spoken of being the one beyond the fourth. So says the Uttara Gita : "the fourth and the one beyond the fourth is the abode of Siva devoid of evil."

The abode is primeval because it is beyond all *lokas* or regions, because it is the cause; below it and outside it are the seven envelopes of the Brahmanda as taught in the words "be it known that the envelopes of the Anda are outside the region of Siva." And it is primeval also because that is the abode of Brahman who transcends the whole universe including Brahma, because it has transcended all, as the Sruti says :

"Greater than the great is Brahma; beyond this great one again is Hari; and beyond Him even is Isa."<sup>2</sup>

It is the abode of Uma's Spouse, of Siva, the Parabrahman. In the words "Him whose help-mate is Uma, the Supreme Lord, the Ruler,"<sup>3</sup> the Sruti teaches that Siva, the Lord of Uma, who is dark-necked and three-eyed, should be meditated upon and is the goal lying beyond the Prakriti of darkness. Moreover, having declared that Siva is the essential being of all, in the words "All verily is Rudra,"<sup>4</sup> the Sruti concludes, "Homage to the golden-armed, to the Lord of Gold, to the Lord of the Mother, to the Lord of Uma."<sup>4</sup> By word the "Uma" which is synonymous with Pranava, the Supreme power or Parasakti, which is also the Supreme cause (Paraprakriti) is meant. In the words "Dark and Yellow is Brahman" the Sruti teaches that Brahman is harmoniously blended with her. Therefore the abode belongs to the Parabrahman, the Lord of Uma.

What else is it? It is furnished with all objects of enjoyment; it is always endowed with all objects of desire. Hence, verily, the Sruti, "He attains all objects of desire, with the omniscient Brah-

1 Atharvasiras. 2 Sivasan kaepa-Up. 3 Kaivalya-Up. 4 Mahanh. 16-18

The Vedanta Sūtras

**man,** teaches that the liberated one attains all objects of desire in conjunction with Brahman.

Quite pure is the abode, because untouched by change, the Sruti giving us to understand that it is beyond all causes and effects, in the passages like the following :

“Him who is the witness of all, who is beyond darkness.”<sup>1</sup>

“Who has colour like the sun, who is beyond darkness.”<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, that abode wherein Siva abides is perfectly pure, because, unlike the products of matter (Prakriti), it does not give rise to attachment, hatred, greed and the like. That is to say, this abode is the Supreme reality, luminous, full of great bliss, the Supreme celestial Akasa, because the material products alone are said to be subject to creation and other processes; and because this abode is beyond those processes, it is eternal. It is the universe of the material Akasa that passes through the processes of creation, &c.; it does not apply to this celestial abode which is composed of spiritual Akasa.

(Objection) We are taught that everything except Siva is subject to dissolution, as the Sruti says :

“When what is beyond darkness is attained, then there is neither day nor night, neither being nor non-being, Siva alone there is.”<sup>3</sup>

How can this abode and the liberated ones be eternal ?

(Answer) No such objection can be raised here. For, the liberated souls and this abode are comprehended in the entity of Siva. These are equally blessed (Siva) as seats of perfect purity. Blessedness consists in being of a nature quite distinct from that of the bound soul (pasu) and his bondage (pasa) which come within the sweep of the wheel of creation, etc. Thus, the abode of Siva which is distinct from the bound soul and his bondage, cannot be perishable.

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1 Kaivalya

2 Sve. 3-8.

3 Sve. 4-18.

This abode is imperishable, not subject to decay and growth, unlike Svarga etc., which are the results of acts admitting of increase and decay. Such it is declared to be in the Sruti, "He reaches the goal of the Path; that is the Supreme abode of Vishnu."<sup>1</sup> The highest inherent nature of Vishnu is, indeed, the abode of Siva known as Paramakasa, the Spiritual ether, the goal of the six-fold Path, that which lies beyond the Path. It is this abode designated as Brahma-loka from which there is no return—which is spoken of in the following passage :

"He reaches the world of Brahman, and does not return, yea, he does not return."<sup>2</sup>

In the words "having attained to that celestial abode, the souls are freed from all troubles," and so on, the characteristic marks are given of those who have risen to that abode and who are equal to Brahman. Having attained the abode, that inherent divine nature of the great God which is beyond speech and thought, i. e., having realised it by Gnana-yoga directed towards it, the souls become emancipated. They are completely freed from death and all sources of evil such as Avidya. That is to say, the liberated souls are free from all evil tendencies and qualities.

Next their blessed qualities are mentioned. They have attained the state of Siva, and are omniscient owing to the destruction of the taint of sin which has shrouded their knowledge; they become omniscient. As their power of knowledge extends to all regions, they become all pervading, as explained already in the Sutra IV. iv. 15. And being pure, with the state of Siva manifested on the removal of sin, they attain to a pure spiritual condition and become one mass, as it were, of consciousness. In the Sutra IV. iv. 7, it was shewn that the soul becomes self-luminous, of unfailing will, and so on.

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1 Katha 3-9.

2 Chhā. 8.15-1

They become also all-full, they are ever satisfied, inasmuch as they are in their very nature the bliss unsurpassed and have attained all desires. It is their very nature to enjoy unchanging and unsurpassed bliss, as already explained in the Sūtra IV. iv. 19.

Because they are thus all-full, their body and senses are perfectly pure; their body and the senses are no longer those which are subject to undesirable change. It is taught in the Śruti,—“He becomes one”<sup>1</sup> and so on,—that the liberated souls put on several bodies at will. Therefore the body and the like which the liberated ones assume at will are all perfectly pure, because they are formed by Mahamaya. Their purity consists in not subjecting the soul to any undesirable change. In the words “The Lord by his Mayas is seen in different forms,”<sup>2</sup> the Śruti teaches that even Isvara assumes, by His powers of Māhamaya, many bodies, such as the one with dark neck. In the words “Ugra is of diverse forms with eternal bodies,”<sup>2</sup> the Śruti teaches that the bodies assumed by the Paramesvara, are not made of matter, are made of pure spirit (Vidya) and are eternal. Just as the Paramesvara assumes manifold pure bodies, so also the liberated souls.

They are endowed with Supreme powers, with the highest glories acting according to their own will, not having to demean themselves so as to do service to others. In the Sūtra IV. iv. 9, it has been shewn that the liberated soul is perfectly independent, not being swayed by Karma and the like. They, the liberated ones, are independent and are endowed with supreme powers.

They become embodied or disembodied of their own accord. They who have risen to the abode of Siva sometimes put on pure bodies and senses and enjoy pleasures therein, independently of the will of Isvara; sometimes, without the body and senses, and solely with their inherent mind, they enjoy all sorts of pleasures. This has

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1 Chha. 7-26-2.

2 Bri Up. 4- 5-19.



been already shewn in the Sūtra IV. iv. 12, by way of explaining the meaning of some passages in the Śruti bearing on the subject. Accordingly the liberated one becomes embodied or disembodied at will. In the words "Homage to you all, to the disembodied and to the all bodied"<sup>1</sup> the Śruti teaches that those who have attained equality with Siva are without form and have manifold forms. When they become embodied, then whatever bodies—marked with dark neck and so on,—the Iswara assumes, all such bodies can be assumed by those who have attained equality with Him. In support of this some quote the Śruti. "Those who are darknecked, dark throated."<sup>2</sup>

Accordingly, those who are devoted to the knowledge conveyed by the Vedānta and to Yoga embracing all forms of self control and the like and directed towards the Paramesvara,<sup>3</sup> and who have thereby attained to that abode of Paramasiva which has been described above,—they who have become endowed with the attributes mentioned above and have become equal to Siva do not return again to the region of Samsara, which is one unsurpassed suffering and is therefore hard to endure; they will not again be subject to the life of Samsara.

Therefore, as taught in the words "he reaches the world of Brahman and does not return," those who have reached the eternal, imperishable world of infinite Bliss and Light belonging to the Lord of Uma, the Parabrahman, who is omniscient, omnipotent, possessing all glories, bestowing His grace on all, who is the object of all worship, who is devoid of all taint of evil who is the depository of all excellent and good qualities, who is possessed of divers eyes, are endowed with omniscience and other virtues, and dwell there (in that world) without fear of return.

That is to say—

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<sup>1</sup> Rig. Sam. 2-13-9.

<sup>2</sup> Tai. Sam. 4-5-4.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. 4-5-11.

The liberated ones become blended with Brahman, with Siva who is one mass of unsurpassed bliss and light, and attain luminous bodies. They become omniscient, omnipresent, peaceful; they are the seat of the supreme eternal glories; from them all veils of sin have glided away; and they see Him every where; and He is their very being and self. As the sruti says "Where the gods having attained the immortal pass into abodes in the Third,"<sup>1</sup> they attain the abodes they like in His Supreme Spiritual world; and with all desires accomplished at their own will, they shine everywhere along with Him at all times. Thus the whole is quite consistent.

This commentary has been written by me, solely with the aid of Devotion, my way being illumined by service at the feet of Svetacharya.

A. MAHADEVA SASTRY, B.A.

(*Finis.*)

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Man himself is greatly responsible for his limitations. He refuses to open his mind to the influx of Divine Truth and thereby builds up a dam of ignorance in his being that keeps out the Truth that would make him free. Every man can have access to the accumulated Love and Wisdom that would guide and protect him if he would become sensitive enough to receive.

Every state of consciousness is a state of mind. "As a child I was happy with my childish things. Now in this very same world I am unhappy with all that heart can wish for of material things." The world has not changed, but I have changed my point of view of the world. The question is, What must I do mentally to build up a permanent state of happiness in my mind?—*The World's Advance Thought.*

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THE  
SIDDHANTA DEEPIKA  
OR

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**Srikanta Bashya**

AND

**THE SIDDHANTA SASTRAS.**

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It is with great pleasure we record the fact that the Srikanta Bashyam on the Vedanta Sūtras was finished in the last number of this Magazine. Our best thanks are due to Mr. Mahadeva Sastriar for his very able and scholarly translation. The importance of this translation can in no way be overestimated when, as is well-known, this Bashya is the earliest of the existing commentaries on the Sariraka Mimansa Sūtras of Sri Badarayana. (Vide the article extracted from the *Brahma Vidya* of the late Pundit Srinivasa Dikshitar p. 215 Vol. II. of this Magazine). He was an elder contemporary of Sri Sankara, and nearly all the lives of Sri Sankara refer to Sri Srikanta or Nilakanta. Very little indeed is known of him besides that he was a native of Southern India. He is said to have composed commentaries on the Upanishads and on

the Gita, but except scattered portions here and there, the full commentary is not yet available. Among his followers were the great Haradatta and Appaya Dikshita. Appaya Dikshita's *magnus opus* was his Viritti on Srikanta Bashya, called Sivarka Mani Dīpika, which is being now issued in parts by Halasyanatha Sastrigal of Kumbaconam. Being the earliest, Srikanta's Bashya should be of the highest value for historical purposes, especially in regard to the question as to what was the true meaning of Badarayana himself. It must strike every impartial reader that though he was a Saiva, and a believer in the Saiva Agamas, he rarely obtrudes his own views, but with a rare fidelity and honesty which is highly commendable, he sticks to the text and just brings out its leading idea. His style is very terse and simple, avoiding all prolixity. Nearly all the Siddhanta writers have drawn upon his commentary in the elucidation of their doctrines; and as we have elsewhere pointed, there is essential unity between the Vedanta, as expounded by Srikanta, and the Siddhanta, and the distinction between the two is one without a difference, and so the whole philosophy is called Vedanta Siddhanta Samarasa. Every European Scholar and Christian missionary who has studied the system carefully has been struck with its eclectic character, and its essential agreement with Christianity. As the world is very largely christian, those who have the interests of the Ancient Indian National Philosophy at heart will see the importance, nay the necessity of spreading a knowledge of this Samarasa philosophy among the christian nations. We do not desire the conversion of the Christian World, but what we want is that they should not look down upon us as the perishing heathen, and that in course of time they should come to appreciate our truths and love and respect us. If this end can possibly be achieved nothing can tend to the greater glory of either religion.

It will be known that it was little more than 10 years ago, Mr. Nallaswami Pillai published his translations of *Sivagnanabodham* and *Tiruvāṛutpayan*, and since then, that he has been systematically and unflinchingly working hard in this field, the pages of this Magazine will bear ample testimony to. The bulk of the translations, nearly all the leading articles and reviews and literary contributions have been contributed by him; and that by these means he has well succeeded in disseminating a knowledge of this Samarasa Gnana, and in creating a taste for Tamil literature goes without saying. Acting on a suggestion thrown out by Mr. R. W. Frazer that the Rev. Dr. G. U. Pope should bring out an edition of the Siddhanta Works, we have communicated with the veteran Tamil Scholar and we are happy to state that he has kindly consented to issue an edition of Mr. Nallaswami Pillai's works together with Sivaprakasam, which he hopes to complete soon, and Srikanta Bashya. They will be issued in two Volumes uniform with Dr. Pope's Tiruvachakam, and will be priced at 15 Rs., both Volumes, to subscribers who will register their names before the 31st December 1906. We earnestly hope that our proposal will meet with a ready acceptance by the public.

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“Life is a leaf of paper white,  
Whereon each one of us may write  
His word or two, and then comes night;  
Greatly begin! though thou have time  
But for a line, be that sublime.  
Not failure, but low aim, is crime”

Lowell.

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